FIGURES     FROM    AMERICAN    HISTORY 


STEPHEN  A. 


FIGURES  FROM  AMERICAN  HISTORY 


STEPHEN  A.   DOUGLAS 

BY 

LOUIS  ROWLAND 


FIGURES  FROM  AMERICAN  HISTORY 

Now  Ready 

THOMAS  JEFFERSON 
By  David  Seville  Muzzey 

JEFFERSON  DAVIS 
By  Armistead  C.  Gordon 

STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 
By  Louis  Howland 

ALEXANDER  HAMILTON 
By  Henry  Jones  Ford 

Further  volumes  will  follow  at  short  intervals,  the 
list  including  WASHINGTON,  LINCOLN,  WEB- 
STER,  GRANT,  LEE,  CLEVELAND,  and  others. 


CHARLES   SCRIBNKR'S  SONS,  PUBLISHERS 


FIGURES    FROM    AMERICAN   HISTORY 


STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 


BY 
LOUIS   ROWLAND 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 
1920 


COPYRIGHT,  1920,  BY 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER'S  SONS 


Published   April,    1920 


TO 
C.  H.  H. 


PREFACE 

THIS  is  the  story  of  an  interesting  man  who  lived 
in  an  interesting  and  fateful  time.  By  his  con 
temporaries  Douglas  was  thought  to  stand  even- 
shouldered  with  the  greatest  of  the  men  with  whom 
he  was  associated.  Those  of  the  succeeding  genera 
tion  ranked  him  far  below  his  deserts.  He  was  in 
part  the  sport  of  forces  that  no  man  could  control 
or  much  influence,  and  in  part  himself  a  force  that 
helped  to  mould  the  destiny  of  the  nation.  The 
author  has  striven  to  tell  the  truth,  and  to  give  such 
interpretations  as  seemed  necessary  to  help  the 
reader  to  reach  a  just  verdict  concerning  one  of  the 
most  remarkable  men  whom  the  country  has  pro 
duced.  It  is  hoped  that  they  are  free  from  the  de 
fect  that  marks  so  many  interpretations,  namely 
over-ingenuity. 

The  author's  indebtedness,  which  is  cheerfully 
acknowledged,  will  appear  on  almost  every  page. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAQH 

I.    EAKLY  YEARS 1 

II.    CONGRESSMAN 32 

III.  WAR  AND  POLITICS 58 

IV.  FREEDOM  OR  SLAVERY     83 

V.    THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE 106 

VI.    COMPROMISE  AND  FUGITIVE  SLAVES     ....  132 

VII.    PRESIDENT-MAKING 147 

VIII.    PIERCE'S  SURRENDER 170 

IX.    POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY 190 

X.    WAR  IN  KANSAS 224 

XI.    FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY     249 

XII.    DOUGLAS  BREAKS  WITH  THE  ADMINISTRATION  280 

XIII.  THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE 299 

XIV.  THE  GATHERING  STORM 328 

XV.    DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT 345 

INDEX  373 


STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 


STEPHEN   A.   DOUGLAS 

CHAPTER  I 
EARLY  YEARS 

THERE  are  many  men  who  have  played,  if  not  a 
great,  at  least  a  conspicuous  part  in  the  history  of 
this  nation,  who  have  been  treated,  if  not  unfairly, 
at  least  ungenerously  both  by  contemporaries  and 
later  generations.  Years  ago  I  read  with  delight 
Theodore  Parker's  terrible  sermon  on  Daniel  Web 
ster,  and  believed  with  the  preacher  that  Webster, 
when  he  made  his  Seventh  of  March  Speech,  had 
"paltered  with  eternal  God  for  power."  Yet  a  few 
years  later,  Abraham  Lincoln,  as  President,  a  man 
enshrined  in  the  reverent  affection  of  the  American 
people,  made  the  Webster  policy  his  own  when  he 
declared  that  his  object  was  to  save  the  Union,  and 
that  he  would  save  it  even  at  the  cost  of  continuing 
slavery.  His  devotion,  like  that  of  the  great  Mas 
sachusetts  senator,  was  first  of  all  to  the  Union. 
Stephen  A.  Douglas,  a  much  less  great  man,  has 
suffered  from  the  same  extreme  of  contemporary 
criticism.  He  too  sought  the  presidency,  he  too 
was  ambitious.  In  truth,  it  is  not  easy  to  believe 
that  his  judgment  and  action  were  not,  in  certain 


2  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

crises,  swayed,  if  not  controlled,  by  personal  con 
siderations.  But  this  was  by  no  means  always  the 
case.  We  cannot  think  of  Douglas  without  at  the 
same  time  thinking  of  Lincoln,  and  the  juxtaposi 
tion  is  most  unfortunate  for  the  former.  It  .is  to 
be  remembered  that  in  much  less  trying  times  than 
those  in  which  Douglas  lived,  men  whose  patriot 
ism,  intellectual  honesty,  and  moral  integrity  have 
never  been  questioned,  have  been  known  to  com 
promise,  and  forswear  what  were  believed  to  be 
their  deepest  convictions.  If  we  give  these  the  bene 
fit  of  the  doubt,  it  seems  no  more  than  fair  that 
we  should  show  the  same  measure  of  justice  to  those 
who  served  greatly  in  the  past,  and  are  no  longer 
able  to  speak  for  themselves,  or  to  guard  their  own 
fame.  The  present  writer  confesses  to  a  strong 
bias  against  those  extremists  who  find  it  easy  and 
pleasant  to  condemn  human  weakness  and  failure, 
and  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  award  praise  even 
where  praise  is  due.  Life,  especially  political  life, 
is  much  less  simple  than  they  suppose.  Human 
motives  are  seldom  unmixed. 

Stephen  Arnold  Douglas  was  born  in  the  town 
of  Brandon,  Vt.,  April  23,  1813.  He  came  of  free 
dom-loving  stock  on  both  sides.  The  Douglases, 
as  the  name  indicates,  were  Scotch,  though  the 
great-grandfather  of  the  subject  of  this  sketch  was 
born  in  this  country.  The  grandfather  was  a  sol 
dier  in  the  Revolutionary  War.  He  was  with  the 


EARLY  YEARS  3 

Continental  army  during  the  terrible  winter  at 
Valley  Forge,  and  was  present  at  the  surrender  of 
Cornwallis.  Through  his  grandmothers,  Stephen 
A.  Douglas  traced  back  to  the  Arnolds  of  Rhode 
Island,  one  of  whom  was  an  associate  of  Roger  Wil 
liams.  The  son  of  this  Arnold  was  governor  of  the 
Rhode  Island  colony  by  appointment  of  Charles 
Second.  Born  in  Vermont,  descended  from  men 
who  fought  for  both  civil  and  religious  liberty,  reared 
in  the  democratic  atmosphere  of  the  town  meeting, 
Douglas  could  never  in  his  heart  have  believed  in 
the  right  of  one  man  to  enslave  another.  All  his 
antecedents  were  Northern.  His  father,  Doctor 
Stephen  A.  Douglas,  was  born  at  Stephentown, 
Rensselaer  County,  N.  Y.  Instead  of  migrating 
to  the  West,  he  turned  his  face  eastward  and  settled 
in  Brandon,  where  he  married  Sarah  Fisk,  and  where 
his  son  was  born.  Doctor  Douglas  was  a  graduate 
of  Middlebury  College,  and  a  physician  of  some 
distinction.  Within  less  than  three  months  after 
the  birth  of  his  famous  son  he  died  very  suddenly 
of  heart  disease.  The  bereaved  family,  consisting 
of  mother,  son,  and  an  elder  daughter,  was  for  many 
years  cared  for  by  a  bachelor  brother  of  Mrs. 
Douglas.  The  subsequent  marriage  of  this  brother, 
and  the  birth  of  a  child,  made  it  clear  to  young 
Douglas  that  he  could  never  hope  for  the  college 
education  to  which  he  had  looked  forward.  Up 
to  his  fifteenth  year  he  had  attended  the  district 


4  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

school  in  Brandon  during  the  winter  months,  work 
ing  on  his  uncle's  farm  in  the  summer.  After  his 
uncle's  marriage  he  apprenticed  himself  to  a  cabinet 
maker  at  Middlebury,  becoming  very  proficient  in 
the  trade,  at  which  he  worked  for  two  years.  En 
tering  the  Brandon  Academy,  he  pursued  his  studies 
for  a  year,  when  his  mother  married  again,  and  the 
whole  family  moved  to  Canandaigua,  N.  Y.,  where 
the  young  man  continued  his  studies  for  three  years 
at  the  excellent  academy  at  that  place,  devoting 
himself  specially  to  the  classics.  It  was  at  this  time 
that  he  began  the  study  of  the  law^  James  W. 
Sheahan,  in  his  well-known  life  of  Douglas,  says: 
"Some  idea  may  be  formed  of  his  proficiency  in 
the  classical  course,  and  of  the  energy  with  which 
he  pursued  his  studies,  from  the  fact  that,  while 
the  laws  of  New  York  at  that  time  required  a  course 
of  seven  years  to  entitle  a  student  to  be  admitted 
to  practise  law,  four  years  of  which  might  be  occu 
pied  in  classical  studies,  Mr.  Douglas,  on  a  thor 
ough  examination  upon  his  whole  course  of  study, 
was  allowed  a  credit  of  three  years  for  his  classical 
attainments  at  the  time  he  commenced  the  study  of 
the  law,  leaving  four  years  only  as  the  period  which 
he  would  be  required  to  continue  as  a  law  studenj 
to  entitle  him  to  be  admitted  to  the  bar  of  that  State. 
He  kept  up  his  collegiate  course,  however,  during 
the  whole  time  he  was  studying  law,  so  that  when 
he  removed  West  in  June,  1833,  he  had  mastered 


EARLY  YEARS  5 

nearly  the  entire  collegiate  course  in  most  of  the 
various  branches  required  of  a  graduate  in  our  best 

I  universities."  His  youthful  dream  was  thus  in 
effect  realized.  He  had  a  college  education,  knew 
something  of  farming,  and  was  master  of  a  trade. 
Life  had  forced  on  him  the  necessity  of  supporting 
himself,  and  yet  there  had  been  up  to  his  twentieth 
year  little  of  that  hardness  that  has  so  often  marked 
the  youth  of  great  Americans,  notably  that  of  the 
great  man  who  was  to  be  the  rival  of  Douglas— 
'Abraham  Lincoln.  Douglas  was  well  equipped  for 
the  battle  of  life.  He  had  worked  industriously, 
studied  hard,  and  improved  his  time  to  the  utter- 
jmost.  His  advantages  also  were  greater  than  those 
of  many  who  have  won  a  higher  place  in  the  world's 
esteem.  Of  grinding  and  sordid  poverty  he  had 
known  little  or  nothing.  His  association  had  for 
tl^e  most  part  been  with  educated  and  intelligent 
people.  He  grew  up,  not  in  the  wilderness,  but  in 
a  settled  community,  and  one  with  great  tradi- 


What  would  have  been  Douglas's  attitude  toward 
slavery  had  he  continued  to  reside  either  in  Ver 
mont  or  New  York,  one  can  hardly  say.  Probably 
he  would  have  continued  to  be  a  stanch  Democrat, 
and  have  felt  that  it  was  essential  to  the  nation's 
welfare  to  keep  his  party  in  power.  For  he  was 
from  his  youth  a  great  admirer  of  General  Jackson, 
and  in  his  early  manhood  was  a  defender  both  of 


6  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

him  and  his  policies.  It  certainly  is  impossible  to 
believe  that  he  would  ever  have  been  an  abolitionist. 
Indeed,  abolitionism  was  no  more  popular  in  New 
England  and  New  York  in  the  early  days  of  the 
last  century  than  it  was  in  Illinois  at  the  time  of 
Douglas's  migration.  It  was  in  1833,  when  he  was 
twenty  years  old,  that  the  young  man  heard  the 
call  of  the  West.  What  he  sought  was  a  wider  op 
portunity  and  a  freer  life.  It  may  be  said  that  he 
found  both.  The  story  of  his  wanderings  is  inter 
esting,  but  it  has  little  bearing  on  his  character  or 
career.  After  brief  stops  at  Cleveland,  Cincinnati, 
and  Louisville,  he  reached  St.  Louis  before  the  close 
of  the  year.  There  he  made  the  acquaintance  of 
Edward  Bates,  candidate  before  the  convention 
that  nominated  Lincoln,  and  attorney-general  in 
Lincoln's  cabinet.  His  stay  was  short,  for  November 
of  the  same  year  found  him  in  Jacksonville,  111., 
friendless,  unknown,  and  practically  penniless.  He 
had  cut  loose  entirely  from  his  base  of  supplies, 
and  was  determined  to  make  his  own  way  in  the 
world.  He  was,  however,  not  long  friendless,  for 
he  soon  won  the  regard,  respect,  and  confidence 
of  his  neighbors.  The  West  that  had  called  him 
satisfied  him.  He  early  acquired  its  spirit  and  point 
of  view.  It  was  pioneer  territory,  and  Douglas 
was  a  pioneer.  He  found  inspiration  in  the  prairie 
landscape  which  to  many  is  so  unpicturesque  and 
unimpressive.  Speaking  of  Kansas,  Walt  Whitman 


EARLY  YEARS  7 

says:  "Under  these  skies  resplendent  in  September 
beauty — amid  the  peculiar  landscape  you  are  used 
to  but  which  is  new  to  me — in  the  freedom  and  vigor 
and  sane  enthusiasm  of  this  perfect  Western  air 
and  Autumn  sunshine — it  seems  to  me  that  a  poem 
would  be  almost  an  impertinence.  But  if  you  care 
to  have  a  word  from  me,  I  should  speak  it  about 
these  very  prairies.  I  have  been  most  impressed, 
and  shall  remain  the  rest  of  my  life  impressed  with 
that  feature  of  the  topography  of  your  Western 
central  world — that  vast  Something,  stretching  out 
on  its  own  unbounded  scale,  unconfined,  which 
there  is  in  these  prairies,  combining  the  real  and 
ideal,  beautiful  as  dreams.  I  wonder  indeed  if  the 
people  of  this  continental  inland  West  know  how 
much  of  first-class  art  they  have  in  these  prairies — 
how  original  and  all  your  own — how  much  of  the 
influences  of  a  character  for  your  future  humanity, 
broad,  patriotic,  heroic,  and  new?  How  entirely 
they  tally  on  land  the  grandeur  and  superb  monotony 
of  the  skies  of  heaven,  and  the  ocean  with  its  waters  ? 
How  freeing,  sooth-ing,  nourishing  they  are  to  the 
soul?  Then  is  it  not  subtly  they  who  have  given 
us  our  leading  modern  Americans,  Lincoln  and 
Grant? — vast-spread  average  men — their  fore 
grounds  of  character  altogether  practical  and  real, 
yet  (to  those  who  have  eyes  to  see)  with  finest  back 
grounds  of  the  ideal,  towering  high  as  any.  And 
do  we  not  see  in  them  the  foreshadowings  of  the 


8  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

future  races  that  shall  fill  these  prairies  ?  .  .  .  This 
favored  central  area  of  (in  round  numbers)  2,000 
miles  square  seems  fated  to  be  the  home  both  of 
what  I  would  call  America's  distinctive  ideas  and 
distinctive  realities."  Perhaps  the  "Something" 
of  which  the  poet  speaks  is,  considered  politically, 
nationality.  It  is  certain  that  in  this  section  there 
has  never  been  that  intense  loyalty  to  the  State 
that  has  prevailed — and  still  prevails — in  the  East 
and  South.  The  nation  comes  first.  Long  before 
Whitman  wrote,  Douglas  felt  the  charm  of  the 
prairies,  and  responded  to  it.  There  was  a  remark 
able  correspondence  between  the  transplanted  New 
Englander  and  his  new  environment.  The  people 
liked  and  trusted  him,  and  followed  his  leadership. 
He  understood  them  and  their  "ways,"  and  never 
lost  his  hold  on  their  affections.  Born  a  politician, 
young  Douglas  found  himself  at  home  among  men 
of  whom  it  may  almost  be  said  that  politics  was 
their  chief  business.  Great  questions  were  under 
consideration — banking,  currency,  internal  improve 
ments,  the  relations  of  the  States  to  the  Union  and 
to  one  another,  and,  most  vital  of  all,  slavery.  It 
was  the  day  of  joint  debates,  often  informal  and 
neighborhood  or  street-corner  affairs,  and  again 
attended  by  thousands  of  people.  Campaigns  ex 
tended  over  seven  and  eight  months.  Every  lawyer 
was  a  politician.  The  orator  was  highly  esteemed, 
and  the  man  who  could  make  a  speech  was  a  hero. 


EARLY  YEARS  9 

Perhaps  the  interest  in  public  questions  was  no 
greater  than  now,  but  it  seems  to  have  been  more 
direct,  intense,  and  personal.  Issues  were  discussed 
face  to  face  rather  than  through  newspapers,  of 
which  there  were  few.  It  was  in  such  a  society  that 
Douglas  made  his  home.  Unable  to  find  work  at 
Jacksonville,  and  with  his  money  almost  all  spent, 
he  pushed  on  to  Winchester,  the  county-seat  of 
Scott  County,  where  he  obtained  employment  as 
a  school-teacher,  in  which  capacity  he  served  for 
three  months.  The  employment  afforded  him  a 
living,  and  left  him  sufficient  time  to  continue  his 
legal  studies.  Though  he  had  not  then  been  ad 
mitted  to  the  bar,  the  young  man  practised  in  the 
justice-of-peace  courts,  thus  adding  somewhat  to 
his  income,  and  getting  a  practical  experience  that 
was  not  without  value.  He  made  many  friends, 
and  wielded  no  small  influence  in  the  life  of  the  little 
town.  It  was  during  the  Winchester  period  that 
his  power  in  debate  was  first  exhibited,  and  recog 
nized.  This,  probably  more  than  anything  else, 
commended  him  to  the  people.  President  Jack 
son's  war  on  the  United  States  Bank  was  not  pop 
ular  in  Illinois,  and  many  of  the  Democrats  accepted 
it  solely  on  the  authority  of  the  President,  and  were 
quite  unable  to  answer  the  arguments  of  the  Whigs. 
Douglas  gave  them  reasons  and  arguments  to  justify 
the  Jacksonian  policy,  ammunition  which  they 
used  with  good  effect  against  their  political  op- 


10  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

ponents.  Whether  the  reasons  were  good  is  not 
the  question.  It  is  enough  that  Democrats  were 
able  to  discuss  the  issues,  and  were  no  longer  forced 
to  fall  back  on  the  infallibility  of  Andrew  Jackson. 
Douglas  promptly  took  the  offensive,  and  by  his 
boldness  encouraged  others  to  do  so.  Thus  before 
he  was  twenty-one  he  showed  something  of  the 
qualities  that  later  marked  him  as  a  great  party 
leader.  As  a  boy  in  Vermont,  and  later  in  New 
York,  he  had  taken — as  far  as  a  boy  could  take — 
an  active  part  in  politics.  At  Winchester  his  career 
may  be  said  to  have  begun.  From  that  time  he 
moved  steadily  and  swiftly  forward.  In  ten  years 
after  his  coming  to  Illinois  he  was  a  national  figure. 
Probably  never  did  the  capacity  for  arguing  serve 
a  man  to  better  purpose.  Jn  March,  1834,  Douglas 
removed  to  Jacksonville,  where  he  was  admitted 
to  the  bar,  and  opened  a  law-office.  At  once  he 
was  drawn  into — or  plunged  into — politics,  again 
as  the  champion  of  the  Jackson  administration  and 
its  bank  policy.  The  situation  was  the  same  as  at 
Winchester,  and  it  was  met  in  the  same  way.  The 
Democrats  needed  leadership,  and  they  found  it 
in  the  young  lawyer.  A  mass-meeting  of  Democrats 
was  called  to  decide  whether  the  administration 
should  be  supported  or  abandoned  by  those  who 
had  put  it  in  power.  The  leading  men  in  the  move 
ment  were  Douglas  and  S.  S.  Brooks,  editor  of  the 
Jacksonville  News.  There  were  many  who  were 


EARLY  YEARS  11 

doubtful  of  the  wisdom  of  the  action,  so  strong  was 
the  opposition  to  the  President.  Douglas,  who 
had  not  attained  his  majority,  presented  the  reso 
lutions  indorsing  the  President,  and  supported  them 
in  a  speech  which  greatly  impressed  and  stirred 
his  audience,  and  won  for  him  the  sobriquet  of 
"Little  Giant,"  which  he  bore  through  life.  The 
resolutions  were  enthusiastically  adopted,  and  the 
Democratic  status  of  Morgan  County  was  fixed 
for  years.  The  position  of  Douglas  was  established, 
and  from  this  time  on  he  was  a  real  leader  in  the 
political  life  of  Illinois.  Nor  did  he  ever  lose  his 
hold  on  the  people,  though  it  was  in  after  years 
subjected  to  severe  strain.  The  next  few  years 
showed  that  he  was  as  shrewd  and  resourceful  in 
political  organization  and  management  as  he  was 
eloquent  and  convincing  in  argument.  He  gave 
unsparingly  of  his  time  and  energy  to  the  service 
of  his  party,  not  for  reward — at  least  not  primarily 
so — but  because  he  loved  "the  game/'  and  believed 
in  Democratic  principles.  But  reward  came  in  full 
measure,  nor  is  there  any  reason  to  think  that  it 
was  unwelcome.  Douglas,  by  his  services,  put  the 
Democratic  party  of  Illinois  under  heavy  obligation 
to  him,  an  obligation  that  it  fully  and  gladly  dis 
charged.  If  ever  a  man  earned  political  preferment 
by  political  services — if  such  a  thing  is  possible — 
Douglas  did.  He  was  first  of  all  a  party  man. 
The  first  honor  that  came  to  him  was  the  State's 


12  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

attorneyship  of  the  first  judicial  district,  to  which 
he  was  elected  by  the  legislature  in  January,  1835. 
His  election  was  the  result  of  a  political  manoeuvre 
to  which  Douglas  was  a  party,  though  he  insists 
in  his  autobiography  that  he  was  not  prompted 
by  ambition,  and  was  without  selfish  motive,  and 
denies  that  there  was  a  deal.  The  inspiration  was 
the  desire  to  legislate  out  of  office  John  J.  Hardin, 
who  had  two  years  to  serve.  The  moving  spirit 
was  John  Wyatt,  a  member  of  the  legislature,  to 
whose  influence  Hardin  was  said  to  have  been  in 
debted  to  some  extent  for  his  office.  Two  other 
men  had  also  helped  Hardin.  All  three  were  op 
posed  by  him  when  they  were  candidates  for  re 
election.  The  Douglas  account  follows:  "Captain 
Wyatt  was  the  only  one  of  them  who  succeeded  in 
his  election,  and  was  so  indignant  at  Hardin  for 
what  he  called  his  ingratitude,  that  he  determined 
upon  removing  him  from  office  at  all  hazards.  The 
opposition  having  succeeded  in  electing  their  candi 
date  for  governor,  there  was  no  hope  from  that 
quarter;  and  the  only  resort  left  was  to  repeal  the 
law  conferring  the  appointment  upon  the  governor, 
and  making  the  office  elective  by  the  legislature. 
At  the  request  of  Captain  Wyatt,  I  wrote  the  bill, 
and  on  the  second  day  of  the  session  ...  he  in 
troduced  his  bill,  and  also  another  bill  written  by 
myself  making  the  county  recorders'  election  by  the 
people  instead  of  being  appointed  by  the  governor. 


EARLY  YEARS  13 

I  felt  no  peculiar  interest  in  these  bills  any  further 
than  I  thought  them  correct  in  principle,  and  de 
sired  to  see  them  pass  because  my  friends  warmly 
supported  them.  Both  the  bills  were  violently  op 
posed  by  the  opposition  (the  Federal  party)  and 
advocated  by  a  large  majority  of  the  Democrats, 
and  finally  passed  by  a  small  majority.  When  sent 
to  the  Council  of  Revision  (composed  of  the  governor 
and  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court)  for  approval, 
they  were  both  vetoed;  the  former  as  unconstitu 
tional,  and  the  latter  because  it  was  inexpedient. 
Then  came  a  desperate  struggle  between  the  friends 
and  opponents  of  the  bills,  and  especially  the  State's 
attorney  bill.  The  opposition  charged  that  its  only 
object  was  to  repeal  Hardin  out  of  office  in  order 
to  elect  myself  in  his  place,  and  that  the  whole  move 
ment  had  its  origin  in  Wyatt's  malice  and  my  selfish 
ness  and  ambition.  I  will  here  remark,  and  most 
solemnly  aver  it  to  be  true  that,  up  to  the  time  this 
charge  was  made  against  me,  I  never  had  conceived 
the  idea  of  being  a  candidate  for  the  office,  nor  had 
any  friend  suggested  that  I  could  or  ought  to  receive 
it.  But  from  that  moment  forward,  the  friends  of 
the  bill  declared  that,  in  the  event  they  passed  the 
bill  over  the  heads  of  the  council,  I  should  be  elected 
to  the  office.  At  this  time  I  did  not  desire  to  be  a 
candidate,  for  I  had  no  reason  to  suppose  I  could 
be  elected  over  so  formidable  an  opponent  who  had 
for  a  long  time  been  a  resident  of  the  State,  had 


14  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

fought  in  the  Black  Hawk  War,  and  was  well  ac 
quainted  with  the  members.  My  short  residence 
in  the  State,  want  of  acquaintance,  experience  in 
my  profession  and  age  (being  only  twenty-one  years 
old)  I  considered  insuperable  objections.  My  friends, 
however,  thought  differently,  passed  the  bill,  and 
elected  me  on  the  first  ballot  by  four  votes  majority." 
When  a  man  writes  and  champions  a  bill  of  which 
he  later  becomes  the  beneficiary,  it  is  not  easy  to 
make  others  believe  in  his  entire  disinterestedness. 
Nor  when  legislation  is  enacted  the  confessed  pur 
pose  of  which  is  to  remove  one  individual  from  office, 
is  it  much  easier  to  make  it  appear  that  regard  for 
the  public  interest  was  the  controlling  motive.  It 
is  probably  true,  however,  that  Douglas  went  into 
the  campaign  against  Hardin  for  political  rather 
than  personal  reasons.  Wyatt's  motive,  of  course, 
was  purely  personal — he  wished  to  punish  Hardin. 
This  specimen  of  Illinois  politics  at  that  early  day 
may  not  be  uninteresting  to  those  of  our  own  day 
who  are  not  strangers  to  guile.  However,  the  youth 
ful  State's  attorney  was  faithful,  intelligent,  and 
efficient  in  the  performance  of  his  duties.  One  in 
cident,  that  of  the  indictments  in  which  the  name 
of  a  county  was  thought  to  be  misspelled — as  was  la 
ter  proved  to  be  the  case — is  important  only  because 
of  the  principle  that  Douglas  deduced  from  it.  He 
says:  "This  small  incident,  although  of  no  con 
sequence  in  itself,  has  been  an  instructive  lesson 


EARLY  YEARS  15 

to  me  in  the  practice  of  the  law  ever  since,  to  wit : 
Admit  nothing,  and  require  my  adversary  to  prove 
everything  material  to  the  success  of  his  cause. 
Every  lawyer's  experience  teaches  him  that  many 
good  causes  are  saved  and  bad  ones  gained  by  a 
strict  adherence  to  this  rule."  Douglas  never  de 
parted  from  it  in  politics,  or,  so  far  as  is  known,  in 
the  practice  of  the  law.  In  later  years  he  did  not  op 
pose,  if  he  refused  to  defend,  certain  "bad  causes." 
He  did  not  "admit"  that  slavery  was  wrong,  though 
in  1860  he  refused,  in  response  to  the  demand  of 
the  Southern  radicals,  to  say  that  it  was  right,  though 
had  he  done  so  he  might  perhaps  have  had  the  presi 
dential  nomination,  and  possibly  the  presidency 
itself  through  the  support  of  a  united  Democratic 
party.  The  man  who  adopted  this  principle  before 
he  was  twenty-two  years  of  age  was  certainly  of  a 
very  practical  turn  of  mind.  Yet  he  was  not  with 
out  ideals,  or  wholly  unattended  by  visions,  as  will 
appear  later  in  the  story.  Evidently  he  had  a  con 
viction  that  he  would  play  an  important  part  in 
public  affairs.  It  came  to  him  very  early  in  his 
life.  There  are  to-day  few  men  of  twenty-three 
years  of  age — Douglas's  age  when  he  was  elected 
to  the  Illinois  legislature  in  1836 — as  deeply  grounded 
as  he  was  in  a  knowledge  of  the  country's  history 
and  institutions.  In  speaking  of  the  debate  between 
himself  and  Josiah  Lambert  at  Winchester,  which 
took  place  before  he  was  twenty-one  years  old, 


16  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Douglas  says:  "I  was  then  familiar  with  all  the 
principles,  measures,  and  facts  involved  in  the  con 
troversy,  having  been  an  attentive  reader  of  the 
debates  in  Congress  and  the  principal  newspapers 
of  the  day,  and  having  read  also  with  great  interest 
the  principal  works  in  this  country;  such  as  the 
debates  in  the  convention  that  formed  the  Constitu 
tion  of  the  United  States,  and  the  conventions  of 
the  several  States  on  the  adoption  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  the  Federalist,  John  Adams's  work  denominated 
a  defense  of  the  American  Constitution,  the  opin 
ions  of  Randolph,  Hamilton,  and  Jefferson  on  the 
constitutionality  of  the  Bank,  and  the  history  of 
the  Bank  as  published  by  Gales  &  Seaton,  Jeffer 
son's  Works,  etc." 

One  cannot  read  even  his  youthful  speeches  with 
out  feeling  that  he  had  not  only  read  widely  and 
deeply,  but  had  mastered  what  he  had  read.  Prob 
ably  it  was  to  his  knowledge  as  much  as  to  his 
personality,  and  fluency  of  speech,  that  he  owed 
his  rapid  advancement.  Whether  he  in  all  cases 
drew  the  correct  conclusions  from  the  facts  and 
principles  with  which  he  was  familiar  is  a  question 
that  need  not  now  be  considered.  Douglas  worked 
hard  for  the  success  that  came  to  him,  and  built 
up  his  career  on  an  honest  foundation.  It  is  not 
surprising  that  he  should  at  once  have  assumed  a 
position  of  leadership  in  the  legislature  which  met 
in  December,  1836.  He  had  taken  an  active  part 


EARLY  YEARS  17 

in  the  campaign,  which  was  conducted  almost  wholly 
on  national  issues.  Morgan  County  was  thoroughly 
canvassed  by  Douglas  for  the  Democrats,  and  John 
J.  Hardin  for  the  Whigs,  the  Democrats  carrying 
the  county,  and  electing  five  out  of  six  legislative 
candidates,  Mr.  Hardin  being  the  only  Whig  chosen. 
The  State  cast  its  electoral  vote  for  Martin  Van 
Buren,  giving  him  a  small  plurality  over  General 
William  Henry  Harrison,  the  Whig  candidate. 

The  great  subject  before  the  legislature  was  that 
of  internal  improvements.  It  is  not  surprising  that 
the  people  should  have  been  deeply  and  passionately 
interested,  since  they  were  cut  off  from  the  rest  of 
the  world,  and  largely  indeed  from  one  another. 
Douglas  favored  the  completion  of  the  Illinois  and 
Michigan  canal,  and  the  construction  of  a  north 
and  south  and  east  and  west  railroad.  But  the 
moderation  of  this  plan  was  its  condemnation.  He 
opposed  the  more  extravagant  projects,  and  espe 
cially 'the  policy  of  making  the  State  a  partner  in 
them.  The  bill  finally  passed  was  a  compromise 
measure  prepared  in  part  by  Douglas.  The  best 
that  can  be  said  for  it  is  that  it  was  less  objectionable 
than  other  measures  that  might  have  gone  through. 
The  following  extract  from  the  autobiography  throws 
light  on  the  man's  political  philosophy:  "When 
it  was  ascertained  from  my  conversation,  speeches, 
and  resolution  that  I  would  oppose  the  mammoth 
bill,  its  friends  procured  me  to  be  instructed  by  my 


18  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

constituents  to  go  for  it.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  at  that  day  the  people  were  for  the  system — 
almost  en  masse.  So  strong  was  the  current  of  pop 
ular  feeling  in  its  favor  that  it  was  hazardous  for 
any  politician  to  oppose  it.  Under  these  circum 
stances  it  was  easy  to  obtain  instructions  in  favor 
of  a  measure  so  universally  popular,  and  accordingly 
the  friends  of  the  bill  got  up  instructions,  which, 
from  my  known  sentiments  in  favor  of  the  doctrine 
of  instruction,  I  did  not  feel  myself  at  liberty  to 
disobey.  I  accordingly  voted  for  the  bill  under 
these  instructions.  That  vote  was  the  vote  of  my 
constituents  and  not  my  own." 

There  could,  of  course,  be  nothing  "  hazardous " 
to  a  "politician"  in  voting  as  he  thought  right  except 
such  a  loss  of  influence  as  might  imperil,  if  not  termi 
nate,  his  political  career.  Nor  is  there  any  way  in 
which  a  representative — if  he  is  truly  such — can 
delegate  to  his  constituents  his  right  to  vote,  and 
so  escape  responsibility  for  legislative  folly.  Ed 
mund  Burke  has  shown  once  and  for  all  the  entire 
viciousness  of  "the  doctrine  of  instruction,"  though 
it  is  still  held  and  proclaimed  by  eminent  men  of 
our  own  day  who  have  denounced  those  who  dis 
regard  instructions  as  "embezzlers  of  power."  The 
vote  of  Douglas  was  his  own,  and  he  could  not  make 
it  other  than  his  own  by  saying  that  it  was  that  of 
his  constituents.  It  was  also  the  vote  of  a  politician 
ambitious  for  preferment. 


EARLY  YEARS  19 

Being  responsible  for  his  vote,  he,  with  the  others 
who  acted  with  him,  was  responsible  for  the  dis 
astrous  consequences  that  followed.  The  legislature 
had  hardly  adjourned  in  March,  1837,  before  a  panic 
broke  over  the  country.  It  caught  the  State  of 
Illinois  with  an  enormous  debt,  which  for  years 
was  a  vexation  and  burden.  Suspension  of  specie 
payments  was  general  throughout  the  country. 
The  Illinois  State  Bank  and  its  branches  collapsed, 
and  the  State  lost  practically  all  it  had  subscribed. 
The  notes  of  the  banks  depreciated  till  they  were 
worth  not  more  than  forty  or  fifty  cents  on  the 
dollar.  The  State  banks  never  renewed  specie  pay 
ments,  and  a  few  years  later  all  charters  were  re 
pealed,  and  Illinois  was  without  banks  until  under 
the  new  constitution,  adopted  several  years  later, 
a  general  banking  law  was  passed.  The  whole  scheme 
of  internal  improvements  went  down  in  the  wreck. 
Not  often  has  vicious  legislation  so  promptly  worked 
out  in  its  inevitable  results.  One  can  readily  under 
stand  why  this  legislature  was  one  of  the  most  im 
portant  that  Illinois  ever  knew,  since  its  evil  in 
fluence  lasted  for  many  years.  None  of  the  men 
who  bowed  to  the  storm  seems  to  have  suffered 
either  in  reputation  or  influence — certainly  Douglas 
did  not. 

In  April,  1837,  he  was  appointed  by  President 
Van  Buren  to  be  register  of  the  land-office  at  Spring 
field,  the  home  of  Abraham  Lincoln.  The  paths 


20  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

of  the  two  men  had  crossed  before  this  time,  as  both 
were  members  of  the  internal  improvement  legis 
lature,  and  both  had  voted  for  the  legislation. 
Shortly  after  Douglas  took  up  his  residence  in  Spring 
field  he  and  Lincoln  met  in  joint  debate.  The  Van 
Buren  administration,  which  assumed  office  March 
4,  1837,  soon  found  itself  face  to  face  with  a  terrible 
financial  crisis.  The  President's  party  was  in  control 
of  both  branches  of  Congress,  and  had  for  eight  years 
held  the  presidency.  There  was,  therefore,  no  ques 
tion  of  a  panic  inherited  from  an  opposition  ad 
ministration,  or  of  divided  responsibility.  The 
panic,  as  far  as  it  was  the  result  of  party  policies, 
was  wholly  Democratic.  Such,  at  any  rate,  was 
the  feeling  of  the  people.  They  turned  fiercely  on 
the  President,  who  was  deserted  by  his  political 
friends  in  Congress  and  throughout  the  country. 
The  situation  in  Illinois  was  desperate.  The  State's 
representatives  in  the  national  house  of  representa 
tives,  all  Democrats,  refused  to  support  the  Presi 
dent's  subtreasury  scheme,  and  the  Democratic 
governor  of  Illinois  openly  denounced  the  President. 
When  the  legislature  met  in  special  session  in  July 
the  Democratic  members  were  in  an  almost  worse 
state  of  panic  than  the  country  was,  and  several 
of  them  actually  allied  themselves  with  the  Whigs. 
The  President  adhered  to  the  Jacksonian  policy 
of  breaking  the  connection  between  the  government 
and  the  banks,  and  at  the  special  session  of  Con- 


EARLY  YEARS  21 

gress  in  April  he  had  urged  the  establishment  of  a 
subtreasury.  That  it  was  powerless  to  prevent 
panics  later  generations  were  to  learn.  But  the 
policy  was  that  of  the  administration,  and  Douglas 
was  called  on  to  defend  it.  His  first  move  was  to 
give  to  the  party  an  organization.  It  was  possible 
for  him  to  point  to  the  success  of  the  convention 
system  which  had  been  adopted,  largely  as  the  re 
sult  of  his  efforts,  in  Morgan  County  several  years 
before. 

There  had  never  been  a  State  convention  hi  Il 
linois,  or  a  State  central  committee.  Probably  no 
party  ever  needed  an  effective  organization  more 
sorely  than  the  Democratic  party  of  Illinois  did  in 
1837.  When  in  July  of  that  year  the  legislature 
met  in  special  session  at  Vandalia,  a  meeting  of  the 
Democratic  members  was  called  to  consider  party 
affairs.  Douglas  was  not  a  member,  but  he  attended 
the  meeting,  and  took — as  usual — a  leading  part. 
These  men  issued  a  call  for  a  State  convention  to 
meet  in  December  at  Vandalia  to  nominate  a  State 
ticket,  choose  a  committee  to  prepare  an  address 
to  the  people  of  the  State  dealing  with  the  issues 
of  the  day,  and  create  a  State  central  committee. 
The  address — Douglas  being  a  member  of  the  com 
mittee  that  drafted  it — was  a  bold  defense  of  the 
presidential  policies,  and  it  did  much  to  check  the 
drift  away  from  the  Democratic  party.  But  the 
battle  had  just  begun.  All  through  the  summer, 


22  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

and  all  over  the  State,  the  issues  were  debated, 
Douglas,  of  course,  bearing  his  full  part.  He  was 
nominated  for  Congress,  again  under  the  convention 
system,  hi  November,  his  opponent  being  John  T. 
Stuart.  They  began  their  formal  canvass  in  March 
of  the  following  year,  and  spoke,  from  the  same 
platform,  every  day,  except  Sundays,  till  the  night 
before  the  election  hi  August.  Douglas  was  defeated 
by  35  votes  in  a  total  poll  of  36,000.  The  Demo 
cratic  State  ticket  was  elected  in  the  midst  of  a 
Democratic  panic.  That  the  campaign  made  by 
Douglas  did  much  to  strengthen  his  party  cannot 
be  doubted.  The  organization,  for  which  he  is  en 
titled  to  much  of  the  credit,  also  played  an  important 
part.  Douglas,  before  he  was  twenty-five  years  of 
age,  had  proved  himself  to  be  a  great  party  leader. 
He  had  served  as  State's  attorney,  member  of  the 
legislature,  register  of  the  land-office,  and  had  been  a 
candidate  for  Congress.  That  is  a  record  of  achieve 
ment  that  it  would  not  be  easy  to  parallel.  The 
environment  was  certainly  favorable  to  a  develop 
ment  of  the  man's  powers  and  talents. 
J  After  his  defeat  for  Congress,  Douglas  formed  a 
law  partnership,  and  announced  that  he  would 
henceforth  devote  himself  exclusively  to  the  prac 
tice  of  his  profession.  But  his  passion  for  politics 
was  so  strong,  and  the  demand  for  his  services  so 
imperious,  that  he  found  it  impossible  to  divorce 
himself  from  political  life.  Nor  was  it  difficult  in 


EARLY  YEARS  23 

those  days  to  combine  law  and  politics,  as  most 
politicians  were  lawyers,  and  most  lawyers  politi 
cians.  Douglas  was  employed  in  a  case  involving 
the  right  of  the  Democratic  governor  to  remove 
the  Secretary  of  State  and  to  appoint  his  successor. 
The  Senate  refused  to  confirm  the  nomination  of 
John  A.  McClernand  on  the  ground  that  there  was 
no  vacancy.  A  suit  was  brought  before  Judge  Breese, 
of  the  Circuit  Court,  to  try  the  title  to  the  office, 
and  the  right  of  the  governor  to  remove  and  ap 
point  was  sustained.  An  appeal  was  taken  to  the 
Supreme  Court,  Douglas  being  one  of  the  counsel 
for  McClernand.  Associated  with  him  were  James 
Shields  and  John  A.  McClernand,  both  of  whom  in 
later  years  won  national  prominence.  The  lower 
court  was  reversed,  and  the  right  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  to  his  office  was  upheld.  This  decision  had 
important  consequences  for  the  court  that  made 
it.  Thus  the  matter  stood  till  the  meeting  of  the 
new  legislature,  which  was  Democratic  in  both 
branches,  when  the  secretary  retired.  Mr.  Douglas 
was  appointed  in  his  place.  He  had  favored  the 
taking  from  the  governor  the  right  to  appoint  State's 
attorneys,  and  was  elected  to  the  position  vacated 
as  a  result  of  a  bill  that  he  had  helped  draw.  He 
had  argued  that  the  governor  had — and  should 
have — the  right  to  appoint  the  Secretary  of  State, 
and  the  governor  appointed  him.  The  decision  of 
the  Supreme  Court  was  the  inspiration  of  a  move- 


24  STEPHEN  A.   DOUGLAS 

ment  to  reorganize  it,  a  movement  that  derived 
further  force  from  the  court's  known  attitude — 
though  it  rendered  no  decision — on  the  right  of 
unnaturalized  aliens  to  vote.  As  most  of  these  were 
Democrats,  Douglas  and  his  party  friends  were 
alarmed.  They  took  the  ground  that  the  general 
government  had  no  right  to  withdraw  a  privilege 
conferred  by  the  State,  and  which  it  was  within 
the  power  of  the  State  to  confer.  The  regulation 
of  suffrage  was,  it  was  contended,  wholly  a  State 
affair.  It  was  for  Illinois  to  say  whether  unnatural 
ized  aliens  ought  to  vote.  That  there  was  a  prin 
ciple  involved  is  clear.  It  cannot  be  said,  however, 
that  the  Democratic  interest  in  the  case  was  wholly 
based  on  principle,  or  indeed  that  the  Whigs  were 
much  alarmed  by  the  votes  of  unnaturalized  aliens 
as  such,  bub  rather  by  their  practice  of  voting  against 
the  Whig  candidates.  We  have  travelled  far  since 
those  days,  since  all  now  realize  that  there  ought  to 
be  some  power — where  we  do  not  greatly  care — to 
withdraw  from  unnaturalized  aliens  the  right  to 
vote.  We  have  seen  the  federal  government  confer 
the  right  of  suffrage  on  the  blacks,  and  it  is  proposed 
that  the  women  be  enfranchised  by  constitutional 
amendment.  But  the  Illinois  Democrats  saved  the 
votes  of  these  men  for  the  election  of  1840,  and  they 
greatly  needed  them.  There  was  a  good  reason 
for  reorganizing  the  Supreme  Court,  for  it  exercised 
not  only  judicial  but  legislative  and  executive  func- 


EARLY  YEARS  25 

tions.  It  shared  with  the  governor  the  veto  power, 
and  as  council  of  revision  it  was  able  to  thwart  the 
will  of  both  governor  and  legislature,  in  the  interest 
of  the  legislative  minority.  But  the  two  cases — that 
involving  the  Secretary  of  State  and  that  concern 
ing  the  right  of  unnaturalized  aliens  to  vote,  in  both 
of  which  Dquglas  was  employed — brought  matters 
to  a  head.  The  number  of  judges  was  increased 
from  four  to  nine,  and  the  circuit  courts  were  abol 
ished,  the  supreme  judges  being  required  to  sit  as 
circuit  judges.  The  legislature  appointed  five  new 
judges,  one  of  whom  was  Douglas,  the  others  being 
Sidney  Breese — the  judge  whom  the  Supreme  Court 
had  overruled  in  the  Secretary  of  State  case — S.  H. 
Treat,  Thomas  Ford,  and  Walter  B.  Scates.  The 
combination  of  law  and  politics  seems  on  the  whole 
to  have  worked  very  well.  The  politicians  of  that 
time  could  not  have  learned  much  from  those  who 
are  to-day  practising  the  gentle  art. 

All  this  followed  the  great  campaign  of  1840. 
It  began  in  November,  1839,  the  Whigs  having 
nominated  their  presidential  electors,  with  a  joint 
debate  at  Springfield  between  Cyrus  Walker,  repre 
senting  the  Whigs,  and  Douglas.  Lincoln  was  called 
in  by  the  Whigs,  and  the  debate  continued  till  mid 
night  between  Lincoln  and  Walker  on  the  one  side 
and  Douglas  on  the  other.  Both  parties  were  ap 
parently  satisfied  with  the  result.  The  Democratic 
State  Convention  met  in  December,  and  in  the 


26  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

following  March  General  Harrison  was  nominated 
as  the  Whig  candidate  for  the  presidency.  The 
campaign  that  followed  was  one  of  the  hottest  and 
most  picturesque  that  the  country  ever  went  through, 
marked  by  more  than  the  usual  amount  of  dema 
gogy.  Party  spirit  ran  high,  and  the  enthusiasm  was 
great.  It  was  the  "hard-cider  and  log-cabin"  cam 
paign.  The  people  were  urged  to  vote  for  "Tippe- 
canoe  and  Tyler  too,"  and  were  assured  that  "Little 
Van  was  a  used-up  man."  The  tide  ran  strongly 
against  the  Democrats  from  the  start.  The  ad 
ministration  was  unpopular,  and  the  President's 
party  was  held  responsible  for  the  panic.  General 
Harrison,  on  the  other  hand,  was  a  popular  hero. 
Nowhere  was  there  a  fiercer  struggle  than  in  Illinois. 
The  Democrats  of  that  State  went  into  the  fight  as 
though  they  expected  to  win  it.  For  seven  months 
Douglas  canvassed  Illinois,  meeting  all  opponents, 
and  boldly  discussing  the  issues.  At  the  August 
election  the  Democrats  carried  the  legislature  and 
elected  their  State  ticket.  The  struggle  went  on, 
Douglas  speaking  till  the  day  of  the  election  in  No 
vember,  when  the  State  cast  its  vote  for  Van  Buren. 
The  Democrats  carried  only  six  other  States,  and 
but  one  other  Northern  State — New  Hampshire.  In 
the  nation  Harrison  received  1,275,017  votes  as 
against  1,128,702  cast  for  Van  Buren,  Harrison's 
plurality  being  146,315.  Harrison's  electoral  vote 
was  234  as  against  60  for  Van  Buren.  It  is  evident 


EARLY  YEARS  27 

that  Illinois  was  in  those  days  firmly  rooted  in  the 
Democratic  faith.  Yet  except  for  the  leadership  of 
Douglas  it  is  not  probable  that  the  State  could  have 
been  saved  to  the  Democrats.  Never  was  his  power 
more  clearly  demonstrated.  He  was  not  only  a  great 
debater  but  a  leader  of  inspiring  personality,  who 
had  the  ability  to  impart  his  courage  and  confidence 
to  his  followers.  It  was  in  his  favor,  too,  that  he  had 
thus  far  been  almost  uniformly  successful,  even  his 
defeat  for  Congress,  so  hopeless  did  the  race  seem, 
and  so  small  was  the  plurality  against  him,  having 
been  looked  on  by  his  friends  as  a  victory.  It  is 
undoubtedly  true  that  to  him  was  due  most  of  the 
credit  for  the  Democratic  success  in  an  election 
in  which  his  party  as  a  national  organization  was 
almost  wiped  out.  In  January  following  the  elec 
tion  he  was  appointed  Secretary  of  State,  and  on 
February  15,  1841,  he  was  elected  by  the  legislature 
to  the  supreme  bench,  and  shortly  afterward  re 
moved  to  Quincy,  where  it  was  necessary  for  him 
as  judge  to  reside.  It  is  not  probable  that  he  was 
called  on  to  decide  any  very  important  cases.  He 
was  not  a  great  judge  or  a  great  lawyer.  His  pro 
fession  had  hardly  been  more  than  a  "side-line." 
Moreover,  he  was  not  quite  twenty-eight  years  old 
when  elevated  to  the  bench.  But  he  seems  to  have 
performed  his  duties  acceptably. 

Though  the  court  had  been  reorganized,  it  had 
not  been  stripped  of  its  functions  as  Council  of  Re- 


28  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

vision,  though  Douglas  and  his  friends  had  objected 
to  its  exercise  of  such  power.  As  member  of  the 
council,  however,  the  influence  of  Douglas  was 
strongly  exerted  against  all  legislation  the  object 
of  which  was  to  free  men  from  the  necessity  of  pay 
ing  their  debts.  Against  all  such  laws  Douglas 
remonstrated,  and  as  judge  declared  them  uncon 
stitutional  whenever  it  was  possible  for  him  con 
scientiously  to  do  so.  It  should  be  said  further  that 
he  used  his  influence  with  the  legislature,  though 
not  at  the  time  a  member  of  it,  to  prevent  the  State 
from  repudiating  its  debt,  a  thing  which  Illinois 
refused  to  do.  It  would  have  been  easy  for  a  man 
who  was  a  mere  demagogue  to  tempt  a  heavily  bur 
dened  people  into  a  betrayal  of  its  own  honor.  But 
Douglas  was  a  man  of  integrity,  with  a  keen  sense 
of  responsibility.  He  was  a  shrewd  and  not  always 
a  sensitively  scrupulous  politician,  but  he  was  also 
a  true  man,  with  some  statesmanlike  qualities.  His 
career  as  judge  was  neither  notable  nor  protracted. 
In  December,  1842,  he  came  within  five  votes  of 
being  elected  United  States  senator,  though  he  was 
at  the  time  under  the  senatorial  age  of  thirty.  On 
the  nineteenth  ballot  Judge  Breese  was  chosen,  his 
vote  being  56,  and  that  of  Douglas  51.  In  June  of 
1843  he  was  nominated  for  Congress  to  represent 
a  district  composed  of  Jersey,  Green,  Macoupin, 
Calhoun,  Pike,  Brown,  Schuyler,  Adams,  Marquette, 
Fulton,  and  Peoria  counties.  The  State  had  been 


EARLY  YEARS  29 

redistricted — and  of  course  gerrymandered — and 
was  entitled  to  seven  representatives.  Mr.  Douglas's 
opponent  was  Orville  H.  Browning,  one  of  the  lead 
ing  lawyers  of  the  State,  and  later  honorably  prom 
inent  in  the  nation  as  successor  in  the  United  States 
Senate  to  Douglas  after  the  latter's  death  in  1861, 
and  as  Secretary  of  the  Interior  in  President  John 
son's  administration.  The  redistricting  of  the  State 
had  been  done  by  a  Democratic  legislature,  and 
the  result  was  a  gerrymander  of  the  most  approved 
type.  Douglas's  nomination  may  not  have  been 
planned  so  far  in  advance,  but  the  fifth  district  as 
newly  created,  and  in  which  he  resided,  can  hardly 
be  said  to  have  been  hopeful  ground  for  the  Whigs. 
The  convention,  composed  of  forty  members,  met 
at  Griggsville  June  5.  It  was  machine-made  and 
machine-controlled.  Judge  Douglas  was  nominated 
on  the  second  ballot.  An  effective  party  organiza 
tion  was  created,  extending  down  into  the  precincts. 
The  party  was  firmly  united  in  support  of  its  candi 
date,  whose  popularity  was  perhaps  greater  than 
it  had  ever  been.  The  campaign  was  brief — for 
those  days — but  spirited.  The  sectional  issue  was 
not  raised,  and  apparently  only  one  national  issue, 
the  Oregon  question,  was  discussed.  Douglas  was 
elected  by  a  plurality  of  461.  Here  closes  the  first 
stage  in  the  remarkable  career  of  an  extraordinary 
man.  His  ten  years  in  Illinois  had  been  full  and  busy 
ones.  He  had  been  State's  attorney,  register  of  the 


30  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

land-office,  Secretary  of  State,  judge  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  an  unsuccessful  candidate  for  the  House 
of  Representatives  and  the  Senate,  and  finally  a 
member  of  Congress,  and  all  by  the  time  he  was 
thirty  years  old.  On  his  way  to  Washington  Douglas 
stopped  off  at  Cleveland  to  visit  the  friends  that  he 
had  made  in  that  city  ten  years  before,  and  spent 
some  time  at  Canandaigua  with  his  mother,  from 
whom  he  had  been  so  long  separated.  He  had  made 
his  way  in  the  world,  relying  wholly  on  his  own 
resources,  and  had  established  himself.  It  was  not 
the  home-coming  of  a  prodigal,  for  the  wanderer 
had  brought  his  sheaves  with  hini.  That  he  had 
high  hopes  for  the  future,  one  may  readily  believe. 
He  had  been  tried  and  tested  and  knew  his  powers. 
Never  lacking  in  self-confidence  and  courage,  Doug 
las  had  learned  by  experiment  that  the  one  was 
justified  and  the  other  a  great  power.  fBut  there 
were  weaknesses  in  his  character,  as  will  later  ap 
pear,  which  his  ten  years  of  education  and  training 
in  Illinois  had  done  little  or  nothing  to  cure.  But  it 
may  fairly  be  said  that  he  was  well  equipped  for  the 
distinguished  part  he  was  to  play  in  public  affairs. 
The  story  of  his  life  from  now  on  is  almost  entirely^ 
the  story  of  the  great  struggle  over  slavery.  For 
tHe  next  seventeen  years  no  issue  that  was  presented 
could  be  considered  apart  from  slavery.  So  one 
chapter  of  the  man's  life  closes  and  another  opens. 
The  future  was  full  of  promise,  and  yet  it  was  not 


EARLY  YEARS  31 

without  menace,  not  to  the  political  success  of  Doug 
las,  but  to  his  fame,  and  also  to  national  unity. 
His  breathing-spell  was  short.  In  December,  1843, 
he  took  his  seat  in  the  House  of  Representatives, 
which  consisted  of  232  members.  It  was  the  first 
session  of  the  Twenty-eighth  Congress.  John  W. 
Jones,  of  Virginia,  was  speaker  of  the  House,  and 
W.  P.  Mangum,  of  North  Carolina,  president  pro 
tern  of  the  Senate,  Vice-President  Tyler  having 
succeeded  to  the  presidency  on  the  death  of  General 
Harrison  one  month  after  his  inauguration  in  1841. 
Douglas  was  now  fairly  launched  on  his  life  voyage, 
and  a  stormy  one  it  proved  to  be. 


CHAPTER  II 
CONGRESSMAN 

THE  history  of  the  American  people  for  the  next 
seventeen  years  proves  incontestably  the  futility 
of  compromise  when  questions  of  principle  are  in 
volved.  This  is  not  to  say  that  the  great  men;  Henry 
Clay  being  pre-eminent  among  them,  were  wrong 
in  their  policies,  and  certainly  they  are  not  to  be 
condemned  for  their  actions,  nor.  are  their  motives 
to  be  questioned.  It  may  even  be  said  that  some 
of  their  measures  were  right  in  the  sense  that  they 
were  the  best  possible  at  the  time.  The  Missouri 
Compromise,  to  take  one  case,  undoubtedly  served 
to  quiet  for  a  time  a  very  dangerous  agitation  against 
national  unity.  Though  it  did  not  stop  discussion, 
or  create  a  condition  in  which  other  subjects  might 
be  dealt  with  apart  from  slavery,  it  did  check  the 
spread  of  slavery  and  soften  somewhat  the  sectional 
feeling.  In  his  life  of  Henry  Clay,  Carl  Schurz 
says:  "It  seemed  good  statesmanship  to  hold  the 
Union  together  by  a  compromise,  and  to  adjourn 
the  final  and  decisive  struggle  on  the  slavery  ques 
tion  to  a  time  when  the  Union  feeling  should  be 
strong  and  determined  enough  to  maintain  the  in 
tegrity  of  the  republic,  if  necessary,  by  force  of  arms, 

32 


CONGRESSMAN  33 

and  when  the  free  States  should  be  so  superior  in 
men  and  means  to  the  slaveholding  section  as  to 
make  the  result  certain." 

There  was  grave  peril  of  disunion.  Not  only 
were  the  slavery  men  prepared  to  break  up  the 
Union,  but  many  of  the  antislavery  men  were  willing 
that  they  should  do  so.  Few  at  that  time  thought 
of  the  possibility  of  using  force  to  prevent  secession. 
Even  John  Quincy  Adams  approved  the  Missouri 
Compromise,  though  he  suggested  "a  new  Union 
of  thirteen  or  fourteen  States  unpolluted  with 
slavery."  "If,"  he  said,  "the  Union  must  be  dis 
solved,  slavery  is  precisely  the  question  upon  which 
it  ought  to  break." 

There  was  little  of  the  national  feeling  that  later 
developed  as  a  result  of  the  Civil  War.  Even  the 
most  patriotic  men  thought  first  of  their  States 
and  section.  There  were  many  exceptions,  it  is 
true,  such  as  Henry  Clay  and  Daniel  Webster. 
When  a  disregard  for  the  supposed  rights  and  in 
terests  of  one  section,  or  even  of  one  State,  was  met 
by  the  threat  of  secession,  the  lovers  of  the  Union 
may  well  have  felt  that  compromise  was  a  necessity. 
When  Douglas  entered  Congress  the  Missouri  Com 
promise  had  been  in  effect  for  twenty-three  years. 
Under  it  Missouri  had,  in  1820,  been  admitted  as 
a  slave  State,  with  the  provision  that  slavery  should 
be  forever  excluded  from  all  territory  north  of  36 
degrees  and  30  minutes,  this  being  the  southern 


34  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

boundary  of  the  State.  Benton  says  in  his  Thirty 
Years  in  the  United  States  Senate  that  the  compromise 
was  of  Southern  inspiration,  but  it  was  not  satis 
factory  to  either  side.  The  North  did  not  relish 
the  creation  of  another  slave  State.  The  South, 
then  having  reached  the  conclusion  that  slavery 
was  morally  right,  could  not  see  why  it  should  be 
excluded  from  any  part  of  the  Union.  The  legisla 
tion  established  the  constitutional  doctrine  that 
Congress  had  the  right  to  exclude  slavery  from  the 
Territories,  a  doctrine  that  was  later  hotly  disputed; 
and  it  was  also  an  acknowledgment  that  Territories 
might  be  admitted  subject  to  conditions.  This 
latter  principle  was  later  denied  by  many,  including 
Douglas,  who  insisted  that  it  was  for  the  Territories 
themselves  to  say  whether  they  would  or  would 
not  permit  slavery.  So  neither  side  was  pleased, 
though  all  were  glad  to  have  escaped  the  immediate 
peril.  Slavery,  it  should  be  remembered,  had  grown 
to  be  much  more  than  an  "institution,"  and  had 
become  an  interest,  and  a  very  large  one.  The  value 
\  of  slaves  had  trebled  in  thirty  years,  and  the  cotton 
crop,  cultivated  by  slave-labor,  had  enormously 
increased.  We  do  not  need  to  go  back  to  those  days 
to  find  men  whose  views  of  right  and  wrong  were 
powerfully  influenced  by  material  considerations. 
Many  of  those  who  once  thought  that  slavery  was 
wrong,  or  were  at  least  doubtful  about  it,  easily 
found  arguments  to  convince  themselves  that  it 


CONGRESSMAN  35 

was  right,  and  even  of  divine  institution.  With 
the  exception  of  the  abolitionists,  and  the  few  who 
held  their  views,  though  not  indorsing  their  methods, 
Northern  men  generally  did  not  press  the  moral 
argument.  "Business,"  as  usual,  was  indifferent, 
when  not  truckling.  So  the  Compromise  went 
through.  It  temporarily  saved  the  situation,  and 
for  a  time  it  seemed  as  though  a  real  settlement 
had  been  reached.  Indeed,  the  Missouri  Com 
promise,  taken  together  with  the  cession  of  Texas 
to  Spain  by  the  treaty  of  1819,  finally  proclaimed 
in  1821,  almost  seemed  to  have  put  slavery  in  process 
of  ultimate  extinction.  By  the  former,  slavery  was 
excluded  from  the  North;  by  the  latter,  all  territory 
out  of  which  new  slave  States  might  be  carved  had 
been  abandoned.  The  nation's  title  to  Texas  under 
the  Louisiana  purchase  was  doubtful,  and  the  effect 
of  the  treaty  with  Spain  was  to  quiet  her  title  in 
exchange  for  Florida.  Such  was  the  situation,  as 
far  as  concerns  slavery,  when  Douglas  took  his  seat 
in  the  House  of  Representatives.  With  the  presi 
dential  election  of  1844  just  ahead,  and  war  with 
Mexico  even  then  threatening,  the  old  issue  soon 
again  became  prominent. 

The  first  speech  of  the  new  representative  was 
delivered  January  7,  1844.  It  is  not  of  much  in 
terest  or  importance  now,  though  one  cannot  read 
it  without  feeling  the  power  of  the  speaker.  The 
question  was  on  the  passage  of  a  bill  to  remit  a  fine 


36  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

of  $1,000  imposed  by  Judge  Hall,  of  New  Orleans, 
on  General  Jackson,  who  had  been  held  for  contempt 
of  court  in  connection  with  the  measures  taken  by 
Jackson  for  the  defense  of  the  city  against  the  Brit 
ish.  The  speech  was,  however,  more  than  a  denun 
ciation  of  the  judge,  and  a  eulogy  of  the  general, 
for  the  speaker  went  into  the  legal  and  constitutional 
phases  of  the  subject,  and  discussed  the  relation 
of  the  military  to  the  civil  authority.  Douglas  did 
not  ask  for  a  mere  acquittal  on  the  score  of  the 
services  rendered  by  Jackson  to  the  nation,  but 
rather  for  a  vindication  on  the  ground  that  his  ac 
tion  was  right,  and  entirely  within  constitutional 
limits.  It  is  true  that  he  went  further  and  said  that 
he  did  not  care  "whether  his  proceedings  were  legal 
or  illegal,  constitutional  or  unconstitutional,  with 
or  without  precedent,  if  they  were  necessary  for 
the  salvation  of  that  city."  Douglas  clearly  was 
at  that  time  no  narrow  constructionist.  But  he 
rested  his  case  on  the  law,  and  was,  as  General  Jack 
son  later  said,  the  first  man  to  make  it  clear  that 
the  proceedings  could  be  justified  under  the  Con 
stitution.  The  speech  created  a  very  favorable 
impression,  and  showed  the  quality  of  the  new  rep 
resentative.  The  bill  subsequently  became  a  law. 
"An  eloquent,  sophistical  speech,  prodigiously  ad 
mired  by  the  slave  Democracy  of  the  House,"  was 
the  verdict  of  John  Quincy  Adams.  Professor 
Johnson  truly  says  that  these  were  "words  of  high 


CONGRESSMAN  37 

praise,  for  the  veteran  statesman  had  little  patience 
with  the  style  of  oratory  affected "  by  the  new 
member.  There  was,  however,  more  than  oratory 
in  the  speech — namely,  power  of  statement  and 
vigor  of  reasoning.  It  is  not  surprising  that  the 
House  should  have  been  impressed.  Those  who 
remembered  the  speech  must  later  have  wondered 
at  the  extreme  deference  of  Douglas  to  constitu 
tional  limitations,  and  his  denial  to  Congress  of  the 
power  under  the  Constitution  to  legislate  with  ref 
erence  to  slavery  in  the  Territories. 

An  important  question  which  Douglas  had  to 
face  shortly  after  he  had  taken  his  seat  was  that 
of  his  re-election.  It  was  the  year  of  a  presidential 
election.  Everything  pointed  to  the  nomination  of 
Henry  Clay  by  the  Whigs,  and  he  was  the  most 
popular  man  in  the  country,  and  the  greatest  polit 
ical  leader  of  his  time  with  the  possible  exception 
of  Andrew  Jackson,  who  was  an  old  man,  living 
in  retirement  at  the  Hermitage.  But  he  was  still 
a  power — his  name  has  not  even  yet  lost  its  magic. 
The  Democratic  party  was  falling  more  and  more 
under  the  control  of  the  slave  power,  and  that  divi 
sion  that  later  wrecked  it  was  beginning  to  make 
itself  felt.  The  Whig  party  was  even  nearer  dis 
solution.  There  were  slavery  and  antislavery  men 
in  both  organizations,  and  the  question  for  politicians 
and  statesmen  was  one,  not  only — perhaps  not 
primarily — of  preserving  the  Union  but  of  main- 


38  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

taining  party  unity.  Benton  shows  in  great  detail 
the  efforts  that  were  made  to  nominate  John  C. 
Calhoun  as  the  Democratic  candidate.  He  charges 
that  the  whole  movement  for  the  annexation  of 
Texas  by  treaty,  which  was  defeated  in  the  Senate, 
was  in  the  interest  of  Calhoun,  whose  friends  were 
as  anxious  to  defeat  Van  Buren  as  they  were  to 
nominate  the  great  South  Carolinian.  The  plan 
was  to  form  a  union  of  the  Southern  States  that 
should  annex  Texas  if  the  old  Union  should  refuse 
to  do  so.  Secession  as  a  policy  was  openly  avowed. 
The  practice  had  been  to  admit  slave  and  free  States 
in  pairs.  When  the  question  of  admitting  Oregon—- 
a  free  State — was  presented,  there  was  no  natural 
slave  territory  left  out  of  which  States  could  be 
made.  Douglas  made  two  other  speeches  before 
Congress  adjourned,  both  of  which  involved  prin 
ciples  of  constitutional  construction.  It  need  not 
be  claimed  that  his  purpose  was  to  strengthen  him 
self  with  his  party  and  to  insure  his  re-election,  but 
undoubtedly  such  was  the  effect.  Four  States  had 
elected  twenty-one  representatives,  seventeen  of 
them  being  Democrats,  on  general  tickets,  although 
the  federal  statute  prescribed  that  they  should  be 
chosen  by  districts.  The  question  as  to  their  right 
to  their  seats  was  referred  to  a  committee  of  nine — 
six  Democrats  and  three  Whigs — of  which  Douglas, 
who  wrote  the  report,  was  a  member.  One  cannot 
read  the  report  of  the  majority,  which  was  in  favor 
of  seating  the  members,  without  detecting  its  fal- 


CONGRESSMAN  39 

lacy.  It  was  admitted  that  Congress  might  make 
such  regulations  as  it  had  made,  but  that  there  was 
no  power  to  "compel  State  legislatures  to  make 
such  change."  There  was  no  question  of  compelling 
the  States  to  do  anything,  but  simply  of  saying 
whether  men  chosen  in  other  ways  than  those  pre 
scribed  by  Congress  were  entitled  to  seats.  Little 
seems  to  have  been  made  of  the  point  that  Congress 
is  the  judge  of  the  qualifications  of  its  own  members. 
Douglas  was  finally  driven  to  deny  to  Congress 
the  power  to  district  States.  The  result  was  to 
retain  for  the  Democrats  control  of  seventeen  seats. 
The  Douglas  report  was  supported  by  reasons  that 
were  ingenious  and  plausible  for  action  that  could 
hardly  have  been  wholly  unprompted  by  partisan 
motives.  He  showed  the  same  power  that  he  had 
shown  in  his  youth  when  he  defended  the  bank  policy 
of  Jackson  and  Van  Buren.  It  was  the  power  of 
the  advocate,  and  exercised  in  strict  accordance 
with  the  principle  that  he  adopted  when  he  was 
State's  attorney — namely  to  "admit  nothing,  and 
require  my  adversary  to  prove  everything  material 
to  the  success  of  his  cause."  "Every  lawyer's  ex 
perience,"  he  had  said,  "teaches  him  that  many 
good  causes  are  saved  and  bad  ones  gained  by  a 
strict  adherence  to  this  rule."  But  he  had  rendered 
an  important  service  to  his  party,  and  proved  that 
he  was  much  more  than  a  mere  speech-maker.  The 
people  of  his  district  were  no  doubt  impressed. 


40  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

But  it  was  as  necessary  then  as  it  is  now  for  a 
congressman  to  "do  something"  for  his  constituents, 
and  then  as  now  river  and  harbor  appropriations 
were  found  very  useful.  It  is  to  be  said  for  Douglas 
that  he  did  have  a  national  vision,  and  that  he  al 
ways  showed  a  great  interest  in  the  development 
of  the  West — not  for  the  West's  but  for  the  nation's 
sake.  In  one  of  his  well-known  speeches  he  showed 
his  ability  to  think  imperially  of  this  nation,  and 
rebuked  the  narrow  sectionalism  of  both  Easterners 
and  Southerners.  But  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  the 
Illinois  River  could  be  thought  to  sustain  any  vital 
relation  to  the  great  subject  of  internal  improve 
ments,  or  how  Douglas's  plea  for  an  appropriation 
for  its  improvement  could  be  reconciled  with  his 
theory  of  national  power.  But  here  again  the  speaker 
made  a  very  plausible  argument  designed  to  show 
that  he  was  not  departing  from  the  Democratic 
faith.  We  need  not  seek  to  convict  him  of  incon 
sistency,  nor  is  it  important  that  the  point  should 
be  made  against  him.  The  effort  failed,  and  the 
appropriation  for  the  Illinois  River  was  stricken 
from  the  bill.  But  the  representative  had  done  his 
best,  and  perhaps  his  speech  was  as  helpful  to  him 
in  a  political  way  as  the  appropriation  would  have 
been.  Indeed,  it  may  have  been  that  he  needed 
no  help  of  this  sort.  For  his  campaign  for  renomina- 
tion  had  already  made  great  headway,  the  influential 
papers  of  the  district  and  the  organization  being 


CONGRESSMAN  41 

friendly  to  him.  In  May,  1844,  he  was  unanimously 
renominated  as  candidate  for  representative  for 
the  fifth  district.  In  August  he  was  re-elected  by 
a  plurality  of  more  than  1,700. 

The  Calhoun  men,  though  they  did  not  realize 
all  their  hopes,  did  succeed,  by  the  adoption  of  the 
two-thirds  rule,  in  defeating  Van  Buren  with  James 
K.  Polk,  of  Tennessee.  Douglas  took  an  active 
part  in  the  campaign,  which  resulted  in  the  election 
of  Polk  over  Clay.  Illinois  gave  Polk  a  majority 
of  12,392,  Douglas's  district  voting  for  the  winning 
candidate.  Clay  really  defeated  himself  by  his 
concessions  on  the  question  of  the  annexation  of 
Texas.  For  the  effect  was  to  strengthen  the  Liberty 
party,  whose  candidate  was  James  G.  Birney.  Polk 
carried  New  York  by  a  plurality  over  Clay  of  only 
5,080  votes.  Birney  received  15,812,  of  which  more 
than  half  would  have  been  cast  for  Clay  but  for 
his  fatal  letter.  With  New  York  he  would  have 
had  a  majority  in  the  electoral  college.  By  so  narrow 
a  margin  did  this  great  man  miss  the  goal  of  his 
ambition.  The  great  issue  in  the  campaign  was 
the  annexation  of  Texas,  to  which  policy  Polk  was 
clearly  and  strongly  committed.  The  Democratic 
convention  adopted  a  resolution  urging  "the  re- 
occupation  of  Oregon  and  the  re-annexation  of  Texas 
at  the  earliest  practicable  period,"  as  great  Amer 
ican  measures.  The  Whigs  strove  to  keep  the  issue 
out  of  the  campaign,  but  the  defeat  of  Van  Buren, 


42  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

who  was  opposed  to  annexation,  in  the  Democratic 
convention,  made  this  impossible.  There  was  in 
truth  no  other  issue.  On  the  other  once  great  ques 
tions,  the  tariff  and  the  bank,  there  was  practically 
no  difference  between  the  parties.  With  the  elec 
tion  of  Polk,  the  annexation  of  Texas,  war  with 
Mexico,  and  further  aggressions  on  the  part  of  the 
slavery  interest,  became  certainties.  The  election 
of  1844  was,  therefore,  one  of  the  most  important 
in  the  history  of  the  country,  for  it  put  the  govern 
ment  under  the  control  of  the  slave-power,  and  sub 
jected  the  Democratic  party  to  the  same  blighting 
influence. 

The  period  between  1844  and  1860,  though  one 
of  the  most  interesting,  is  also  one  of  the  most 
depressing,  in  our  history.  It  was  an  era  of  com 
promise,  not  only  as  to  policies  but  as  to  convic 
tions.  Whether  one  condemns  or  idealizes  the 
abolitionists  one  must  admit  that  they,  and  the 
radical  proslavery  men,  were  the  only  ones  who 
said  at  all  times  just  what  they  thought,  and  who 
refused  to  make  concessions.  The  Whig  leaders 
found  it  necessary  to  yield  much  in  order  to  placate 
the  Southern  members  of  the  party,  while  in  the 
North  there  were  many  Democrats  who  at  least 
disliked  slavery,  and  resented  the  radical  and  violent 
talk  of  the  Southerners.  Probably  there  never  was 
a  time  when  it  was  so  difficult  to  maintain  party 
unity.  The  unity  of  the  nation,  indeed,  was  in 


CONGRESSMAN  43 

serious  jeopardy.  Conditions  were  such  as  to  de 
velop  in  an  extraordinary  degree  the  art  of  the 
politician.  Lowell  has  painted  the  type,  in  colors 
that  will  never  fade: 

"  Tell  'em  thet  on  the  slavery  question 

I'm  RIGHT,  although  to  speak  I'm  lawth; 
This  gives  you  a  safe  pint  to  rest  on, 
An'  leaves  me  frontin'  South  by  North." 

This  is  not  a  true  picture  of  the  great  men  of  the 
day,  not  even  of  Douglas.  But  the  words  accurately 
describe  many  of  the  lesser  men,  whose  only  thought 
was  of  "keeping  the  party  together"  and  getting 
office.  From  this  time  on  the  question  with  the 
South  was  not  one  of  preserving  slavery  but  of 
extending  it.  The  institution  was  not  menaced 
in  the  States  where  it  already  existed,  for  all  men 
and  parties  agreed  that  Congress  had  no  power  to 
interfere  with  slavery  in  the  States.  But  the  South 
saw  that  extension  of  the  system  was  necessary  to 
its  preservation.  It  was  even  claimed  by  some  who 
denied  that  Congress  had  power  to  exclude  slavery 
from  the  Territories  that  it  had  power  to  establish 
it  therein.  So  strong  was  the  pressure  from  the 
South  that  Douglas  deemed  it  necessary  to  sound  a 
note  of  warning  to  extremists  on  both  sides.  Later 
in  a  speech  in  the  Senate  he  said:  "It  is  the 
speeches  of  Southern  men,  representing  slave  States, 
going  to  an  extreme,  breathing  a  fanaticism  as  wild 


44  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

and  as  reckless  as  that  of  the  senator  from  New 
Hampshire  [Hale],  which  create  abolitionism  in  the 
North."  Denounced  by  those  to  whom  he  specially 
spoke,  he  continued:  "In  the  North  it  is  not  ex 
pected  that  we  should  take  the  position  that  slavery 
is  a  positive  good — a  positive  blessing.  If  we  did 
assume  such  a  position,  it  would  be  a  very  pertinent 
inquiry:  Why  do  you  not  adopt  this  institution? 
We  have  moulded  our  institutions  at  the  North 
as  we  have  thought  proper;  and  now  we  say  to 
you  of  the  South,  if  slavery  be  a  blessing,  it  is  your 
blessing;  if  it  be  a  curse,  it  is  your  curse;  enjoy 
it — on  you  rest  all  the  responsibility !  We  are  pre 
pared  to  aid  you  in  the  maintenance  of  all  your 
constitutional  rights;  and  I  apprehend  that  no  man, 
South  or  North,  has  a  more  consistent  disposition 
to  do  so  than  myself." 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  at  this  time  the 
Southern  leaders,  with  few  exceptions,  not  only 
preferred  slavery  to  union,  but  looked  on  the  main 
tenance  of  the  Union  as  a  detriment  to  slavery. 

That  there  had  for  a  long  time  been  a  plan  on 
foot  to  annex  Texas,  which  had  declared  its  in4e- 
pendence  of  Mexico,  and  whose  independence  we  had 
acknowledged,  is  made  clear  by  Benton  in  his  great 
speech.  It  is  impossible  to  read  his  argument  with 
out  being  convinced  that  there  was  an  intrigue, 
extending  over  many  years,  of  the  most  disgraceful 
character.  A  treaty  of  annexation  was  submitted 


CONGRESSMAN  45 

to  the  Senate  prior  to  the  conventions  in  1844,  and, 
under  the  inspiration  of  Benton,  was  defeated.  But 
after  the  election  the  scheme  was  brought  forward 
again,  which  was  natural,  as  the  Democratic  party 
had  declared  for  annexation,  and  Polk,  the  new 
President,  was  known  to  favor  it.  Our  government 
had  been  warned  by  Mexico  that  any  steps  looking 
to  annexation  would  mean  war.  Benton  and  others 
had  denounced  the  policy,  and  had  said  that  an 
nexation  of  Texas  would  mean  the  annexation  of  a 
war.  In  his  last  message  President  Tyler  said  that 
"a  controlling  majority  of  the  people  and  a  large 
majority  of  the  States  "  had  voted  for  annexation, 
and  that  Congress  had  been  instructed  to  that  ef 
fect.  It  is  doubtful  whether  a  treaty  could  have 
been  got  through  the  Senate,  so  it  was  decided  to 
proceed  by  joint  resolution,  which  would  require 
only  a  majority  vote  of  the  two  houses.  Such  a 
resolution  was  passed  by  the  House  on  January 
25, 1845,  with  an  amendment  offered  by  Mr.  Douglas 
providing  that  the  Missouri  Compromise  line  should 
be  extended  through  the  new  territory.  The  effect 
of  this  would  have  been  to  prohibit  slavery  north 
of  latitude  36  degrees  and  30  minutes,  and  to  permit 
the  formation  of  four  slave  States  south  of  that 
line.  It  is  humiliating  to  reflect  that  the  transfer 
of  territory  from  Mexico  to  the  United  States  should 
have  brought  most  of  it  under  the  curse  of  slavery. 
All  the  Whigs,  with  the  exception  of  eight  from  the 


46  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

South,  voted  against  the  resolution.  In  order  to 
insure  the  passage  of  the  resolution  in  the  Senate, 
an  amendment  was  added  giving  the  President  the 
power  to  submit  the  annexation  resolution  to  the 
Texan  Government,  or,  if  he  pleased,  to  begin  new 
negotiations  for  an  annexation  treaty,  the  assump 
tion  being  that  Mexico  would  also  be  consulted. 
There  was  no  opposition  to  annexation  in  itself, 
but  only  to  a  war  of  conquest  to  make  annexation 
good — to  annexation  by  conspiracy  and  intrigue. 
Benton  says  that  it  was  understood  that  the  sub 
ject  would  be  left  to  the  new  President  to  deal  with, 
and  that  he  had  been  assured  that  President  Tyler 
and  Mr.  Calhoun,  his  Secretary  of  State,  would 
not  have  the  "audacity"  to  carry  through  the  pro 
gramme  in  the  closing  hours  of  the  administration. 
Polk,  it  was  understood,  would  negotiate  for  a  treaty. 
But  if  there  was  such  an  agreement,  it  was  not  carried 
out.  The  joint  resolution  after  it  had,  in  its  amended 
form,  been  passed  by  both  houses,  was  signed  by 
the  President  on  March  3,  and  a  messenger  was  at 
once  despatched  to  offer  annexation  to  the  Texan 
Government.  Texas  had,  in  the  meantime,  through 
the  mediation  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  made 
peace  with  Mexico.  In  the  treaty,  which  was  rati 
fied  by  the  Mexican  Congress,  there  was  a  recogni 
tion  of  the  independence  of  Texas,  and  a  pledge  that 
Texas  should  not  be  annexed  to  any  foreign  power. 
This  treaty  and  our  resolution  of  annexation  were 


CONGRESSMAN  47 

submitted  to  the  Texas  Congress  in  June,  which 
rejected  the  treaty  and  adopted  the  annexation 
resolution.  So  there  was  again  war  between  the 
two  governments,  and  annexation  made  it  our  war. 
But  actual  hostilities  did  not  break  out  till  a  year 
later,  though  there  were  occasional  collisions.  War 
might  possibly  have  been  avoided  but  for  the  Amer 
ican  claim  to  territory  vastly  larger  than  ever  had 
been  admitted  by  Mexico  to  belong  to  Texas.  At 
best  it  was  disputed  territory,  that  between  the 
Rio  Grande  and  Nueces  rivers.  The  resolution 
of  annexation  referred  only  to  "territory  properly 
included  within,  and  rightfully  belonging  to,  the 
republic  of  Texas,"  and  contemplated  "an  adjust 
ment  by  this  government  of  all  questions  of  bound 
aries  that  may  arise  with  other  governments." 

Having  annexed  Texas,  it  was  necessary  to  de 
fend  it,  and  this  was  done  by  sending  troops  under 
General  Taylor  into  the  disputed  territory,  an  act 
which  Mexico  held  to  be  an  act  of  war.  A  year 
later  Texas  was  admitted  into  the  Union,  and  formal 
war  followed.  There  is  reason  to  think  that  the 
surrender  of  the  administration  on  the  Oregon  ques 
tion  was  due  to  its  unwillingness  to  risk  a  contest 
with  Great  Britain  that  might  interfere  with  its 
war  on  Mexico.  By  treaties  between  Great  Britain 
and  Russia,  and  Russia  and  the  United  States,  the 
southern  boundary  of  Russian  territory  was  fixed 
at  54  degrees  and  40  minutes,  while  by  our  treaty 


48  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

with  Spain  the  northern  boundary  of  Spanish  pos 
sessions  was  the  forty-second  parallel.  All  between 
was  a  sort  of  No  Man's  Land,  held  in  joint  occupa 
tion  by  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  The 
Democratic  party  was  committed  to  the  extreme 
northern  line,  its  convention  having  declared  that 
"our  title  to  the  whole  of  the  territory  of  Oregon 
is  clear  and  unquestionable."  "Fifty-four  Forty 
or  Fight "  was  the  slogan  of  the  Democrats.  Douglas 
was  strongly  in  favor  of  asserting  and  maintaining 
our  utmost  claim,  if  it  could  be  called  a  claim.  The 
same  administration  that  pressed  for  war  with 
Mexico  negotiated  a  treaty  with  Great  Britain  com 
promising  the  Oregon  question,  and  fixing  our  north 
ern  boundary  at  the  forty-ninth  parallel.  Douglas, 
who  was  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  ultras,  was  much 
disappointed,  and  considerably  embarrassed,  since 
he  had  pledged  the  faith  both  of  himself  and  his 
party  to  54-40  or  fight.  But  the  warlike  spirit 
quickly  subsided.  Benton,  in  opposing  the  Mexican 
plot,  asked:  "Why  not  march  up  to  fifty-four  forty 
as  courageously  as  we  march  upon  the  Rio  Grande? 
Because  Great  Britain  is  powerful  and  Mexico 
weak,"  and  he  added  that  the  administration 
"wanted  a  small  war  just  large  enough  to  make 
military  reputations  dangerous  for  the  presidency." 
In  the  course  of  his  speech  defending  the  Mexican 
war,  which  is  perhaps  the  strongest  statement  that 
was  made  on  that  side,  Douglas  was  embarrassed 


CONGRESSMAN  49 

by  questions  as  to  the  very  point  made  by  Benton. 
He  could  not — at  least  he  did  not — say  anything 
to  discredit  the  administration.  But  he  did  say 
that  he  would  never  have  yielded  on  the  Oregon 
question.  He  said:  "To  me  our  country  and  all 
its  parts  are  one  and  indivisible.  I  would  rally  under 
her  standard  in  the  defense  of  one  portion  as  an 
other — the  South  as  the  North;  for  Texas  as  soon 
as  Oregon.  And  I  will  here  do  my  Southern  friends 
the  justice  to  say  that  I  firmly  believe,  and  never 
doubted  that,  if  war  had  arisen  out  of  the  Oregon 
question,  when  once  declared,  they  would  have 
been  found  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  me  as  firmly 
as  I  shall  be  with  them  in  this  Mexican  war." 

When  John  Quincy  Adams  said  that  he  "under 
stood  the  gentleman  some  time  ago,  while  standing 
on  54-40,  to  tell  his  Southern  friends  that  he  wanted 
no  dodging  on  the  Oregon  question,"  Douglas  re 
plied:  "I  did  stand  on  54-40;  I  stand  there  now, 
and  never  intend  by  any  act  of  mine  to  surrender 
the  position.  I  am  as  ready  and  willing  to  fight 
for  54-40  as  well  as  for  the  Rio  del  Norte.  My 
patriotism  is  not  of  that  kind  which  would  induce 
me  to  go  to  war  to  enlarge  one  section  of  the  Union 
out  of  mere  hatred  and  vengeance  toward  the  other. 
I  have  no  personal  or  political  griefs  resulting  from 
the  past  to  embitter  my  feelings  and  inflame  my 
resentment  toward  any  section  of  the  country.  I 
know  no  sections,  no  divisions." 


50  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Then  he  turned  on  Mr.  Adams  and  asked  him 
if  he  would  not  be  willing  to  apply  to  Mexico  as 
well  as  to  Oregon  the  principle  of  Frederick  the 
Great — which  Mr.  Adams  had  approved  in  a  speech 
— "Take  possession  first,  and  negotiate  afterward." 
Here,  of  course,  is  an  unwitting  admission  that  the 
Mexican  policy,  favored  by  Douglas,  was  based 
on  the  teaching  of  one  of  the  greatest  robbers  known 
to  history.  As  for  Douglas's  demand  that  there 
be  no  dodging,  he  must  have  felt  that  the  President 
himself  had  been  guilty  of  that  very  thing.  The 
truth,  of  course,  is  that  the  men  interested  in  the 
admission  of  Texas  as  slave  territory  cared  little 
or  nothing  about  Oregon,  since  they  knew  that 
slavery  never  could  exist  in  that  part  of  the  coun 
try.  Probably  they  were  quite  willing  to  relinquish 
any  right  the  nation  may  have  had  to  the  territory 
north  of  the  forty-ninth  parallel,  since  out  of  that 
several  free  States  might  have  been  carved.  Slavery 
thus,  it  will  be  seen,  was  at  the  bottom  of  both  these 
controversies,  which  were  closely  related.  Douglas 
was  not,  at  least  not  consciously,  the  instrument 
of  the  slave-power.  He  was  a  man  of  broad  national 
views,  an  expansionist,  and  a  believer  in  "manifest 
destiny."  Many  of  his  utterances  have  a  jingoistic 
sound,  but  they  reflect  an  honest  faith  and  a  true 
patriotism,  and,  as  we  can  see  now,  were  by  no  means 
always  wide  of  the  mark.  It  was  certain  that  Texas 
would  sooner  or  later  come  into  the  Union — that 


CONGRESSMAN  51 

is  plain  to-day.  Indeed,  there  are  some  who  think 
that  if  the  northern  states  of  Mexico  were  annexed 
to  the  United  States  it  would  be  better  for  all  con 
cerned.  The  speech  of  Douglas  on  the  Mexican 
war  is,  in  parts,  somewhat  more  than  plausible. 
Its  defect  consists  in  its  ignoring  many  important 
facts,  as  will  appear  when  it  is  read  in  connection 
with  the  great  speech  of  Benton  on  the  Mexican 
intrigue.  It  is  probable  that  the  senator  from  Mis 
souri  went  too  far  when  he  said  that  there  was  a 
scheme  to  use  annexation  as  a  means  of  breaking  up 
the  Union,  though  he  knew  much  more  about  what 
was  going  on  in  Washington  at  the  time  than  those 
who  to-day  doubt  his  theory.  But  he  is  much 
nearer  the  truth  than  Douglas,  who  not  only  favored 
the  admission  of  Texas  but  defended  all  the  steps 
that  had  been  taken  to  bring  it  about.  Benton's 
speech  reflects  and  is  inspired  by  a  sound  and  high 
political  and  national  morality,  and  that  is  some 
thing  that  cannot  be  said  of  the  speech  of  Douglas. 
It  is  able  and  shrewd,  but  it  is  neither  frank  nor 
high-minded.  One  again  thinks,  when  reading  it, 
of  the  principle  adopted  by  him  in  his  youth:  " Ad 
mit  nothing,  and  require  my  adversary  to  prove 
everything  material  to  the  success  of  his  cause. 
Every  lawyer's  experience  teaches  him  that  many 
good  causes  are  saved  and  bad  ones  gained  by  a 
strict  adherence  to  this  rule."  Few  things  in  our 
history  are  more  disgraceful  than  the  correspondence 


52  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

of  Calhoun,  then  Secretary  of  State,  with  the  British 
foreign  minister  in  regard  to  a  supposed  conspiracy 
of  the  British  Government  to  control  Texas  in  the 
interest  of  freedom.  That  there  should  have  been 
such  an  issue  is  bad  enough,  but  it  is  much  worse 
that  Calhoun  should  have  embodied  in  one  of  his 
despatches  an  elaborate  defense  of  slavery,  thus 
blazoning  the  nation's  shame  to  the  world.  There 
is  no  possibility  of  defending  the  policy  of  the  Polk 
and  Tyler  administrations  in  regard  to  Mexico. 
It  was  most  warmly  championed  by  those  interested 
in  slavery,  and  the  holders  of  Texas  scrip.  Lincoln, 
a  member  of  the  houses,  voted  for  a  resolution  de 
claring  that  the  war  with  Mexico  was  "unneces 
sarily  and  unconstitutionally  begun  by  the  President 
of  the  United  States."  In  this  view  Webster  con 
curred,  though  his  opposition  to  the  war  was  largely 
the  result  of  his  feeling,  shared  by  many  of  the  people 
of  the  East,  that  no  more  territory  should  be  an 
nexed.  "We  want  no  extension  of  territory,"  he 
said.  "We  want  no  accession  of  new  States.  The 
country  is  already  large  enough."  Years  later,  in 
one  of  his  speeches  in  the  debate  with  Douglas, 
Lincoln  said:  "I  was  an  old  Whig,  and  whenever 
the  Democratic  party  tried  to  get  me  to  vote  that 
the  war  had  been  righteously  begun  by  the  Presi 
dent,  I  would  not  do  it.  But  when  they  asked  money 
or  land  warrants,  or  anything  else  to  pay  the  sol 
diers,  I  gave  the  same  vote  that  Douglas  did."  In 


CONGRESSMAN  53 

a  letter  to  his  old  partner,  William  H.  Herndon, 
who  evidently  favored  the  war,  written  February  1, 
1848,  Lincoln  said:  "You  fear  that  you  and  I  dis 
agree  about  the  war.  I  regret  this,  not  because 
of  any  fear  we  shall  remain  disagreed  after  you  have 
read  this  letter,  but  because  if  you  misunderstand 
I  fear  other  good  friends  may  also.  That  vpte  affirms 
that  the  war  was  unnecessarily  and  unconstitution 
ally  commenced  by  the  President;  and  I  will  stake 
my  life  that  if  you  had  been  in  my  place  you  would 
have  voted  just  as  I  did.  Would  you  have  voted 
what  you  felt  and  knew  to  be  a  lie?  I  know  you 
would  not.  Would  you  have  gone  out  of  the  house 
— skulked  the  vote?  I  expect  not.  If  you  had 
skulked  one  vote,  you  would  have  had  to  skulk 
many  more  before  the  end  of  the  session.  Richard 
son's  resolutions,  introduced  before  I  made  any 
move,  or  gave  any  vote  upon  the  subject,  make 
the  direct  question  of  the  justice  of  the  war;  so 
that  no  man  can  be  silent  if  he  would.  You  are 
compelled  to  speak,  and  your  only  alternative  is 
to  tell  the  truth  or  a  lie.  I  cannot  doubt  which  you 
would  do."  It  is  fairly  clear  that  Douglas  took 
the  side  that  was  popular  in  Illinois.  There  was 
in  that  State  none  of  the  feeling  against  expansion 
that  there  was  in  the  East,  nor  was  the  antislavery 
sentiment  strong.  In  1840  and  1844  the  State  had 
cast  its  vote  for  the  Democratic  candidates.  Lin 
coln's  course,  which  was  altogether  right,  evidently 


54  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

gave  his  friends  some  concern.  Having  received 
a  paper  containing  an  "oration  on  the  occasion  of 
the  celebrating  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista/'  in  which 
it  was  maintained  that  there  had  been  no  aggres 
sions  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  Lincoln  wrote 
to  the  orator,  the  Reverend  J.  M.  Peck,  pointing 
out  many  acts  of  aggression.  "I  own,"  he  said, 
"that  finding  in  the  oration  a  labored  justification 
of  the  administration  on  the  origin  of  the  Mexican 
war  disappointed  me,  because  it  is  the  first  effort 
of  the  kind  I  have  known  made  by  one  appearing 
to  me  to  be  intelligent,  right-minded  and  impar 
tial."  After  setting  forth  the  facts  that  proved 
his  case,  the  writer  continued:  "If  you  deny  that 
these  are  facts,  I  think  I  can  furnish  proof  which 
shall  convince  you  that  you  are  mistaken.  If  you 
admit  that  they  are  facts,  then  I  shall  be  obliged 
for  a  reference  to  any  law  of  language,  law  of  States, 
law  of  nations,  law  of  morals,  law  of  religions,  any 
law,  human  or  divine,  in  which  an  authority  can 
be  found  for  saying  those  facts  constitute  no  '  ag 
gression.'  Possibly  you  consider  those  acts  too 
small  for  notice.  Would  you  venture  to  so  consider 
them  had  they  been  committed  by  any  nation  on 
earth  against  the  humblest  of  our  people?  I  know 
you  would  not.  Then  I  ask,  is  the  precept,  '  What 
soever  things  ye  would  that  men  should  do  to  you,f 
do  ye  even  so  to  them'  obsolete?  of  no  force?  of 
no  application?"  Douglas  was  much  less  careful 


CONGRESSMAN  55 

about  his  facts  than  Lincoln,  and  he  was  quite  in 
capable  of  rising  to  the  heights  of  idealism  reached 
by  the  latter.  Indeed,  we  have  seen  men  in  our 
own  day  sneer  at  the  proposed  application  of  the 
Golden  Rule — to  which  Lincoln  appealed — in  politics 
or  international  relations.  It  is  curious  that  two 
Southern-born  men,  one  of  whom  was  a  slaveholder, 
Benton  and  Lincoln,  should  have  opposed  the  policies 
of  the  Polk  administration,  and  that  a  New-England- 
born  man,  who  was  not  a  slaveholder,  should  have 
supported  them.  Politics  no  doubt  had  something 
to  do  with  it,  though  Benton  was  a  Democrat.  Yet 
the  Whigs  were  doubtful  about  the  wisdom  of  op 
posing  the  war,  and  some  of  them  supported  it. 
Lincoln,  as  has  been  seen,  was  forced  by  some  of 
his  party  associates  to  defend  himself.  Many  Demo 
crats  of  the  North  were  opposed  to  annexation,  this 
being  true  generally  of  the  Van  Buren  following. 
There  was  one  man,  however,  Ralph  Waldo  Emer 
son,  who,  though  he  did  not  approve  the  methods 
used,  nevertheless  did  think  that  the  ultimate  result 
was  so  certain,  and  also  so  desirable,  as  to  make 
the  methods  of  comparatively  minor  importance. 
James  Ford  Rhodes  gives  the  following  extract 
from  Emerson's  diary  of  1844:  "The  question  of 
the  annexation  of  Texas  is  one  of  those  which  look 
very  different  to  the  centuries  and  to  the  years. 
It  is  very  certain  that  the  strong  British  race,  which 
have  now  overrun  so  much  of  this  continent,  must 


56  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

also  overrun  that  tract  and  Mexico  and  Oregon 
also;  and  that  it  will  in  the  course  of  ages  be  of  small 
import  by  what  particular  occasions  and  methods 
it  was  done."  It  is  remarkable  that  such  words 
should  have  been  written  in  the  heat  of  the  struggle 
by  a  man  who  loved  liberty,  and  who  knew  the  na 
ture  of  the  conspiracy.  "Emerson,"  says  Mr. 
Rhodes,  "had  remarkable  foresight."  It  is  un 
doubtedly  true  that  men  to-day  think  little  of  the 
motives  or  actions  of  the  men  who  brought  Texas, 
New  Mexico,  and  California  into  the  Union,  and 
that  they  will  think  less  as  time  passes.  Never 
theless,  Mr.  Rhodes  is  right  when  he  says  that  "in 
pondering  the  plain  narrative  of  these  events,  more 
reason  for  humiliation  than  pride  will  be  found," 
and  that  "the  story  of  the  annexation  of  Texas 
and  the  conquest  of  New  Mexico  and  California 
is  not  a  fair  page  in  our  history."  The  territory 
would  have  fallen  to  us  sooner  or  later,  had  we  only 
waited,  but  slavery  could  not  wait.  The  story  of 
the  war  itself  need  not  be  told,  since  it  is  not  related 
to  the  life  of  Douglas,  though  there  was  talk  of  ap 
pointing  him  "Brigadier-Major"  of  Illinois  volun 
teers.  Douglas  indeed  asked  to  be  appointed,  but 
when  the  President  said  to  him  that  he  could  best 
serve  the  country  in  Congress,  he  withdrew  his  ap 
plication.  The  declaration  of  war  was  passed  with 
only  two  dissenting  votes  in  the  Senate  and  fourteen 
in  the  House.  The  war,  as  every  schoolboy  knows, 


CONGRESSMAN  57 

was  brilliantly  fought.  In  a  speech  in  the  House 
of  Representatives  on  January  12,  1848,  Lincoln 
said  that  "our  arms  have  given  us  the  most  splendid 
successes,  every  department  and  every  part,  land 
and  water,  officers  and  privates,  regulars  and  volun 
teers,  doing  all  that  men  could  do,  and  hundreds 
of  things  which  it  had  ever  before  been  thought 
men  could  not  do." 


CHAPTER  III 
WAR  AND  POLITICS 

THE  war,  however,  figured  largely  in  the  politics 
of  the  year  1846,  when  a  new  Congress  was  elected. 
Douglas  was  renominated  in  January  by  a  conven 
tion  composed  of  19  delegates.  There  was  no  op 
position.  His  attitude  on  the  Oregon  question 
and  his  support  of  the  war  both  strengthened  him 
with  the  people  of  his  district.  He  was  elected  by 
a  plurality  of  more  than  2,700,  carrying  every  county 
except  one.  But  the  Democratic  party  suffered  a 
serious  reverse,  and  that  in  the  midst  of  a  war  of 
its  making.  Its  majority  of  more  than  60  votes 
in  the  House  was  turned  into  a  minority  of  8.  This, 
says  Mr.  Schurz  in  his  life  of  Henry  Clay,  "was 
strange,  but  not  inexplicable."  "Although,"  he 
continues,  "the  bulletins  from  the  theatre  of  opera 
tions  reported  victory  after  victory,  the  popular 
conscience,  at  least  in  the  North,  was  uneasy,  and 
the  shouts  of  triumph  could  not  silence  its  voice, 
which  said  that  the  war  was  unjust  in  its  origin, 
and  that  slavery  was  its  object.  Moreover,  the 
shuffling  character  of  Polk's  diplomacy,  and  his 
apparent  consciousness  of  guilt,  urging  him  inces 
santly  in  his  public  utterances  to  defend  the  govern- 

58 


WAR  AND  POLITICS  59 

ment  as  to  the  causes  of  the  war,  repelled  the  pop 
ular  heart;  and  thus  an  administration  victorious 
in  the  field  was  defeated  at  the  ballot-box."  The 
party  that  could  have  been  beaten  by  the  Whigs 
in  that  year  must  have  been  pitiably  weak,  for  the 
Whigs  had  failed  to  maintain  any  logical  or  con 
sistent  attitude  toward  the  war.  They  had  rightly 
opposed  it,  then  had  practically  all  voted  for  it, 
and  then  had  continued  their  opposition  while  the 
struggle  was  on.  Clearly  they  won  on  the  weakness 
of  their  adversary  rather  than  their  own  strength. 
The  slavery  men  in  Congress  did  much  during  the 
summer  of  1846  to  solidify  Northern  sentiment. 
They  began  a  movement  looking  to  peace,  which 
showed  that  they  cared  more  for  additional  slave 
territory  than  for  victory.  After  liberal  appropria 
tions  had  been  made  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war, 
the  President  asked  for  $2,000,000  to  be  used  in 
negotiations  with  Mexico,  the  hope  being  to  end 
the  war  and  to  get  the  territory  that  was  wanted. 
Then  it  was  that  David  Wilmot,  a  Pennsylvania 
Democrat,  offered  an  amendment  to  the  $2,000,000 
appropriation  bill  providing  that  slavery  should 
be  forever  prohibited  in  all  territory  that  might 
be  acquired  from  Mexico.  The  amended  bill  passed 
the  House  but  was  defeated  in  the  Senate.  Douglas 
voted  against  the  proviso.  It  was  he  who  moved 
the  amendment  to  the  act  admitting  Texas  by  which 
the  Missouri  Compromise  line  was  extended  through 


60  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

the  new  territory.  Under  this  act  four  States  be 
sides  Texas  could  have  been  created,  slavery  being 
permitted  in  those  south  of  the  line  and  forbidden 
in  those  north  of  it.  But  these  negotiations  for 
peace  in  the  midst  of  a  victorious  war,  coupled  with 
the  defeat  of  the  amendment  forbidding  slavery  in 
the  new  domain,  did  much  to  weaken  the  Demo 
cratic  party  by  seeming  to  justify  the  Whig  theory 
of  the  war.  There  was,  too,  a  suspicion  that  the 
administration  was  jealous  of  the  two  Whig  generals 
— Scott  and  Taylor — who  were  so  brilliantly  suc 
cessful.  At  any  rate,  the  Whigs  were  victorious. 
In  Illinois,  however,  the  Democrats  elected  their 
State  ticket,  and  carried  every  congressional  dis 
trict  except  the  seventh,  from  which  Abraham  Lin 
coln  was  returned. 

As  chairman  of  the  committee  on  territories, 
Douglas  was  practically  the  leader  of  his  party  in 
the  House.  For  that  was  the  most  important  com 
mittee  at  that  time,  since  it  had  to  do  with  a  subject 
that  could  not  be  considered  apart  from  slavery, 
which  menaced  the  very  life  of  the  nation.  Men 
were  beginning  to  realize  this,  and  the  leaders  in 
Congress — Webster,  Clay,  Benton,  and  Douglas- 
did  everything  they  could  to  minimize  it  and  to 
keep  it  in  the  background.  It  is  certainly  fair  to 
assume  that  their  motives  were  good,  since  the  danger 
was  real.  For  Douglas  it  is  to  be  said  that  for  the 
next  seven  years  he  travelled  in  close  company  with 


WAR  AND  POLITICS  61 

Henry  Clay,  supporting  his  compromise  measures 
wholeheartedly  and  not  going  beyond  them.  Be 
tween  the  two  men  there  seems  to  have  been  the 
closest  sympathy.  Clay,  however,  had  condemned 
slavery,  and  had  compromised  with  it  only  to  ward 
off  a  greater  evil — disunion.  This  Douglas  had  not 
yet  done,  and  was  not  to  do  for  many  years.  His 
attitude  was  rather  one  of  indifference  toward  it. 
In  his  debate  with  Lincoln  he  said  that  he  did  not 
care  "whether  slavery  was  voted  up  or  down,"  a 
statement  of  which  Lincoln  made  much.  Clay's 
attitude  was  almost  precisely  that  taken  by  Lincoln 
a  few  years  later.  One  has  only  to  read  the  Lincoln 
and  Douglas  debate  to  see  how  wide  was  the  gap 
between  Douglas  and  Lincoln.  Yet^ these  three  men 
were  alike  in  having  no  sympathy  with  abolitionism. 
At  the  session  of  Congress  immediately  following 
the  election  of  1846,  the  Mexican  question  was  still 
the  leading  one.  The  Whigs  attacked  the  adminis 
tration,  and  Douglas  led  in  its  defense.  Again  it  was 
proposed,  in  accordance  with  the  recommendation 
of  the  President,  to  negotiate  with  the  Mexican 
Government,  an  appropriation  being  advised  to 
pay  for  any  territory  that  might  be  acquired.  This 
policy  had  the  approval  of  Douglas.  When  the 
bill  was  brought  up  in  the  House,  Wilmot  again 
moved  to  attach  his  proviso,  and  his  motion  was 
carried  by  a  majority  of  nine.  The  Senate  struck 
it  out,  and  the  House  receded,  and  passed  the  bill 


62  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

as  it  came  back  from  the  Senate.  The  sectional 
line  was  drawn  more  clearly  and  sharply  than  ever 
before.  All  the  Whigs  and  many  of  the  Democrats 
from  the  free  States  voted  for  the  proviso,  while 
all  the  members  from  the  slave  States,  with  the  ex 
ception  of  the  one  from  Delaware,  voted  against 
it.  Though  negotiations  had  been  authorized,  the 
war  went  on  in  the  most  vigorous  way  throughout 
the  year  1847.  General  Scott  captured  Mexico  City, 
and  New  Mexico  and  California  were  conquered. 
Early  in  the  year  the  legislature  of  Illinois  elected 
Douglas  to  the  Senate,  and  he  was  immediately 
made  chairman  of  the  committee  on  territories. 
Professor  Allen  Johnson  in  his  life  of  Douglas 
says:  "It  was  then  a  position  of  the  utmost  im 
portance,  for  every  question  of  territorial  organiza 
tion  touched  the  peculiar  interests  of  the  South. 
The  varying  currents  of  public  opinion  crossed  in 
this  committee.  Senator  Bright  of  Indiana  is  well 
described  by  the  hackneyed  and  often  misapplied 
designation,  a  Northern  Democrat  with  Southern 
principles;  Butler  was  Calhoun's  colleague.  Clay 
ton  of  Delaware  was  a  Whig  and  represented  a  border 
State  which  was  vacillating  between  slavery  and 
freedom;  while  Davis  was  a  Massachusetts  Whig. 
Douglas  was  placed,  as  it  appeared,  in  the  very 
storm-centre  of  politics,  where  his  well-known  fight 
ing  qualities  would  be  in  demand.  It  was  not  so 
clear  to  those  who  knew  him  that  he  possessed  the 


WAR  AND  POLITICS  63 

not  less  needful  qualities  of  patience  and  tact  for 
occasions  when  battles  are  not  won  by  fighting. 
Still,  life  at  the  capital  had  smoothed  his  many  little 
asperities  of  manner.  He  had  learned  to  conform 
to  the  requirements  of  a  social  etiquette  to  which 
he  had  been  a  stranger,  yet  without  losing  the  hearti 
ness  of  manner  and  genial  companionableness  with 
all  men  which  was,  indeed,  his  greatest  personal 
charm.  His  genuineness  and  large-hearted  regard 
for  his  friends  grappled  them  to  him  and  won  re 
spect  even  from  those  who  were  not  of  his  political 
faith."  It  was  in  this  year,  shortly  after  he  became 
senator,  that  Douglas  married  Miss  Martha  Denny 
Martin,  the  daughter  of  a  South  Carolina  planter 
and  slave-owner.  There  is  no  doubt  that  this  mar 
riage  had  a  great  influence  on  his  life — perhaps  even 
on  his  opinions.  It  represented  a  sort  of  personal 
alliance  between  the  North  and  the  South  at  a  time 
when  the  sections  were  drifting  farther  and  farther 
apart.  Douglas  must  have  been  charmed  by  the 
graciousness  of  Southern  hospitality.  Also  he  saw 
slavery  at  its  best.  As  a  result  of  it  all  he  no 
doubt  acquired  a  Southern  point  of  view  such  as  he 
had  not  before  had.  Such  a  man  would  naturally 
be  greatly  influenced,  even  if  unconsciously,  by 
his  friends.  The  young  woman  who  became  his 
wife  was  endowed  with  charm  of  manner  and 
keenness  of  mind.  It  was,  if  there  ever  was  one, 
a  love-match. 


64  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Southern  society  was  in  the  highest  degree  con 
servative,  and  Washington  was  largely  Southern. 
Its  conservatism  was  the  conservatism  of  aristoc 
racy.  The  people  were  satisfied  with  the  status 
quo.  Many  of  them  felt  that  they  were  called  to 
defend,  not  so  much  slavery,  as  a  social  order,  of 
which  slavery  was  only  a  part,  though  a  very  im 
portant  part.  The  abolitionists  were  looked  on, 
not  as  champions  of  freedom  but  as  enemies  of 
society,  disturbers  of  the  peace,  and  intruders  in 
the  domestic  affairs  of  a  people.  It  was  into  this 
atmosphere  that  Douglas  was  ushered  by  his  mar 
riage.  His  father-in-law,  Colonel  Martin,  was  him 
self  a  slaveholder.  It  was  impossible  that  the  young 
senator  could  have  seen  any  resemblance  between 
him  and  the  terrible  portrait  of  the  slaveholder 
drawn  by  the  abolitionists.  The  fact  that  Douglas 
had  never  experienced  any  moral  revolt  against 
slavery  made  it  all  the  easier  for  him  to  be  influenced. 
When  later  his  wife  inherited  her  father's  slaves 
it  became  still  more  difficult  for  Douglas  to  con 
demn  as  a  whole  the  class  which  she  then  entered. 
Douglas  himself  refused  to  take  charge  of  the  plan 
tation,  though  asked  by  Colonel  Martin  to  do  so, 
as  he  did  not  wish  to  own  slaves.  When  three  years 
later  he  was  charged  with  being  a  slaveholder,  he 
gave  the  facts,  as  set  out  above,  to  the  world,  and 
said  in  a  letter  to  a  friend:  "It  is  true  that  my  wife 
does  own  about  150  negroes  in  Mississippi  on  a 


WAR  AND  POLITICS  65 

cotton-plantation.  My  father-in-law  in  his  life 
time  offered  them  to  me  and  I  refused  to  accept 
them.  This  fact  is  stated  in  his  will,  but  I  do  not 
wish  it  brought  before  the  public  as  the  public  have 
no  business  with  my  private  affairs.  ...  It  is  our 
intention  to  remove  all  our  property  to  Illinois  as 
soon  as  possible."  The  slaves  would  then  have 
been  free. 

Douglas  was  justified  in  believing  that  his  course 
so  far  was  approved  by  the  people  of  Illinois.  For 
he  had  been  elected  three  times  to  the  House  of 
Representatives,  each  time  by  an  increased  ma 
jority,  and  finally  promoted  to  the  Senate.  No 
one  knew  better  than  he  that  the  State  was  prac 
tically  untouched  by  the  abolition  sentiment.  It 
had  voted  twice  for  Jackson,  twice  for  Van  Buren, 
and  had  proved  its  loyalty  to  the  Democratic  fiarty 
in  what  may  be  said  to  have  been  a  supreme  test — 
when  it  voted  for  Polk  in  1844  as  against  Henry 
Clay.  Illinois  had  stood  fast  even  in  the  "Log  Cab 
in  and  Hard  Cider"  campaign  of  1840.  There  was, 
therefore,  nothing  in  the  situation  at  home  to  rouse 
in  Douglas  any  interest  in  slavery  as  a  practical 
political  issue.  Illinois  had  been  settled  largely 
from  the  South,  and  it  was  not — as  yet — greatly 
concerned  over  the  fate  of  the  negro.  Very  early 
what  has  since  been  known  as  the  "moderation" 
of  the  Middle  West  began  to  manifest  itself.  View 
ing  conditions  solely  from  the  immediately  practical 


66  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

angle  Douglas  could  hardly  have  helped  feeling 
that  he  was  on  the  right  track.  He  was,  however, 
destined  to  receive,  if  not  a  shock,  at  least  a  jar  in 
the  near  future.  There  came  a  time  when  he 
had  to  face  the  problem  not  only  of  preventing 
a  dissolution  of  the  Union  but  of  keeping  his  party 
together  in  Illinois.  During  the  last  ten  years  of 
his  life  he  cannot  be  said  to  have  been  inspired  by 
wholly  unmixed  motives.  But  at  the  present  stage 
of  his  career,  happily  married,  a  member  of  the 
United  States  Senate,  and  possessing  the  confidence 
of  his  people,  few  public  men  in  the  country  were 
more  fortunately  placed. 

The  Senate  in  which  Douglas  took  his  seat  in 
December,  1847,  was  a  very  strong  body.  Among 
its  members  were  Webster  of  Massachusetts,  Cal- 
houn  of  South  Carolina,  Dix  of  New  York,  Reverdy 
Johnson  of  Maryland,  Benton  of  Missouri,  Mason 
of  Virginia,  Cass  of  Michigan,  Houston  of  Texas, 
Jefferson  Davis  of  Mississippi,  Corwin  of  Ohio, 
Bell  of  Tennessee,  Crittenden  of  Kentucky,  and 
others  hardly  less  notable.  Calhoun  had  been  Vice- 
President  and  Secretary  of  State,  Webster,  Secre 
tary  of  State,  while  Cass  and  Bell  were  later  to  be 
candidates  for  the  presidency,  and  Jefferson  Davis 
became  President  of  the  Confederacy.  Clay  was 
not  a  member,  he  having  retired  a  few  years  be 
fore,  as  he  thought  permanently.  Two  years  later 
he  returned  and  served  till  the  end  of  his  life.  Per- 


WAR  AND  POLITICS  67 

haps  never  in  our  history  was  the  Senate  as  influen 
tial  as  in  those  days.  The  great  men  of  the  nation 
almost  seemed  to  gravitate  to  it  by  a  natural  law. 
It  had  been  so  from  the  beginning  of  the  govern 
ment.  While  he  was  by  no  means  the  equal  of  the 
acknowledged  leaders,  Douglas  was  nevertheless  re 
spected  and  trusted  by  them,  and  wielded  a  strong 
and  steadily  growing  influence.  He  soon  became  a 
national  figure  and  the  recognized  leader  of  his 
party.  There  can  be  no  questioning  the  power  of 
a  man  who  was  able  to  win  distinction  in  competi 
tion  with  such  associates. 

One  of  the  important  questions  that  pressed 
in  the  winter  of  1847-1848  was  that  of  winning 
the  presidential  election  of  the  latter  year.  It 
was  not  an  easy  one.  The  position  of  many  men 
on  the  slavery  issue  was  determined  almost  wholly 
by  political  considerations.  When  Texas  was  ad 
mitted  to  the  Union,  the  nation  annexed  not  only 
a  war  with  Mexico  but,  as  any  one  can  now  see, 
the  Civil  War.  The  problems  were  of  the  most 
difficult  character,  and  they  all  had  their  political 
side.  As  a  result  of  the  war,  General  Zachary  Taylor 
became  a  national  hero.  Two  years  before,  or  im 
mediately  after  Taylor's  great  victories  of  Palo 
Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  certain  of  the  Whig 
leaders,  in  a  tentative  way,  launched  the  Taylor 
"boom."  The  general  had  never  voted,  and  he 
cared  nothing  and  knew  little  about  politics.  In- 


68  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

deed,  he  himself  had  said,  in  a  letter  that  was  made 
public,  greatly  to  the  discomfiture  of  his  supporters, 
that  he  had  only  "crude  impressions  on  matters  of 
policy."  In  the  beginning  he  expressed  the  opinion 
that  the  movement  in  his  interest  was  absurd.  But 
it  spread,  and  gradually  Taylor  changed  his  mind, 
and  soon  allowed  himself  to  become  at  least  a  "re 
ceptive  candidate."  His  determination  to  be  the 
people's  candidate  rather  than  the  candidate  of  a 
party  did  not  arouse  much  enthusiasm  among  the 
Whigs.  But  public  meetings  had  been  held  in  many 
sections  of  the  country,  participated  in  by  many 
who  were  not  Whigs,  demanding  the  nomination 
of  Taylor.  Perhaps  he  was  right  in  appealing  for 
general  support.  Clay  still  hoped  to  be  nominated, 
and  he  expected  that  if  he  were  chosen  by  the  Whig 
convention,  General  Taylor  would  retire.  But  in 
two  letters  written  in  April,  1848,  one  addressed 
to  the  public  and  the  other  to  Clay  himself,  the 
general  said  that  having  been  nominated  by  "the 
people  called  together  in  primary  assemblies  in  sev 
eral  of  the  States,"  he  considered  himself  "in  the 
hands  of  the  people,  and  would  stay  in  the  field 
no  matter  what  the  Whig  convention  might  do." 
Thus  the  Whigs  got  a  candidate  whom  they  prob 
ably  did  not  want,  though  they  would  have  taken 
any  one  with  whom  they  might  win;  and  the  Demo 
crats  found  all  the  political  capital  that  they  looked 
for  as  a  result  of  the  war  in  the  hands  of  their  oppo- 


WAR  AND  POLITICS  69 

nents.  The  Whig  convention  met  in  June,  1848,  and 
on  the  fourth  ballot  nominated  General  Taylor,  his 
vote  being  171  to  32  for  Clay.  A  month  before  the 
Democrats  had  nominated  Lewis  Cass.  There  was 
great  dissatisfaction  in  both  parties.  The  Whigs 
adopted  no  platform,  though  never  was  one  more 
needed,  since  no  one  knew  the  views  of  their  can 
didate.  There  were  several  antislavery  resolutions 
offered,  but  all  were  voted  down.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Democrats  refused  to  indorse  Calhoun's 
view  that  Congress  had  no  power  to  exclude  slavery 
from  the  Territories.  The  Whig  leaders  hoped  to 
hold  the  Southern  members  of  the  party,  while  the 
Democrats  sought  to  keep  in  line  the  Democrats 
of  the  North.  Clay  was  bitterly  disappointed,  not 
wholly  for  personal  reasons,  and  he  refused  to  take 
any  part  in  the  campaign.  Webster  denounced 
Taylor's  nomination  as  "one  not  fit  to  be  made/' 
though  he  did,  after  his  anger  had  subsided,  later 
in  the  campaign,  advise  his  friends  and  neighbors 
to  vote  for  Taylor.  To  make  matters  still  worse, 
General  Taylor,  shortly  before  the  election,  accepted 
a  nomination  from  a  Democratic  convention  held 
in  South  Carolina  by  men  who  distrusted  General 
Cass  because  he  was  a  Northern  man.  There  had 
been  schisms  in  both  the  great  conventions,  the 
seceders  in  both  cases  being  antislavery  men.  The 
Barnburner  wing  of  the  Democratic  party  met  in 
convention  at  Utica  and  nominated  Martin  Van 


70  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Buren  as  its  candidate  for  the  presidency,  and  con 
demned  the  extension  of  slavery  into  the  Territories. 
In  August  a  great  antislavery  convention  was  held  at 
Buffalo,  attended  by  antislavery  men  of  all  parties. 
The  candidates  were  John  P.  Hale,  an  antislavery 
Democrat,  who  had  been  nominated  the  preceding 
autumn  by  the  Liberty  party,  and  Martin  Van  Buren, 
who  was  chosen  by  the  Buffalo  convention.  Nothing 
could  have  been  more  insincere  than  the  campaign 
that  followed.  Taylor  was  supported  by  the  South 
ern  Whigs  because  he  was  a  Southern  man,  and 
was  said  to  be  "safer"  on  the  slavery  question  than 
General  Cass,  while  the  Northern  Whigs  took  much 
comfort  in  the  fact  that  their  candidate  was  de 
clared  to  be  in  favor  of  the  Wilmot  proviso.  Both 
parties  denounced  the  Free-Soilers,  and  both  were 
thoroughly  dishonest  in  their  attitude  toward  the 
great  questions  of  the  day.  The  Buffalo  convention 
helped  Taylor  at  the  expense  of  Cass,  the  Whigs 
carrying  fifteen  States,  eight  of  them  being  Southern 
States.  Illinois  continued  true  to  the  Democratic 
party,  giving  Cass  a  plurality  of  a  little  more  than 
3,000.  Van  Buren,  however,  received  15,774  votes 
in  Illinois,  a  vote  sufficiently  large  to  indicate  a 
decided  growth  in  aggressive  antislavery  sentiment. 
Such,  in  brief,  was  the  situation  as  it  existed  or  was 
swiftly  developing  in  the  year  1848.  The  country 
was  waking  up  to  the  great  evil  of  slavery,  and, 
more  than  that,  it  was  beginning  to  see  that  the 


WAR  AND  POLITICS  71 

old  methods  of  dealing  with  it  would  no  longer  serve. 
Yet  the  leaders  in  public  life,  including  Douglas, 
continued  those  methods  almost  up  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  Civil  War.  The  Whig  party  never  won  an 
other  victory,  and  never  deserved  to. 

In  the  midst  of  all  this  manoeuvring,  in  February, 
1848,  a  treaty  of  peace  with  Mexico  was  signed. 
It  was  approved  by  the  President,  and  later  ratified 
by  the  Senate.  Under  its  provisions  Upper  Cali 
fornia  and  New  Mexico  became  American  terri 
tory.  New  Mexico  included  the  present  State  of 
that  name,  practically  all  of  Utah  and  Nevada, 
and  all  of  Arizona  except  the  southern  part  which 
came  in  five  years  later  under  the  Gadsden  purchase. 
Upper  California  was  substantially  the  California 
of  to-day.  Here  was  a  vast  territory  to  be  struggled 
over.  Douglas,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  sug 
gested  that  the  Missouri  Compromise  should  be  ex 
tended  through  Texas.  The  issue  was  first  raised 
over  Oregon,  which  had  been  long  waiting  for  a  terri 
torial  government.  The  Illinois  senator  had  also 
favored  extending  the  line  of  the  Compromise  to  the 
Pacific  Ocean.  Others  favored  the  attachment  to  the 
Oregon  bill  of  a  slavery-exclusion  clause  resembling 
the  now  famous  Wilmot  proviso.  Such  an  amend 
ment  was  offered  by  John  P.  Hale  to  the  bill  pre 
sented  by  Douglas.  Three  bills  had  been  introduced 
for  the  organization  of  Oregon.  The  fourth  was  in 
troduced  by  Douglas,  January  10, 1848.  No  one  be- 


72  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

lieved  that  slavery  could  ever  exist  in  the  new  Terri 
tory,  but  one  side  was  endeavoring  to  create  a 
precedent  that  would  be  useful  in  future  argument 
in  favor  of  the  power  of  Congress  to  legislate  with 
regard  to  slavery,  and  the  other  was  fearful  that 
the  precedent  might  be  created.  The  slavery  men 
were  thinking  of  the  territory  acquired  from  Mexico. 
Many  compromises  were  offered,  Douglas  again 
proposing  to  extend  the  Missouri  Compromise  to 
the  Pacific,  the  effect  of  which  would  have  been 
to  permit  slavery  in  New  Mexico,  Arizona,  and 
the  southern  half  of  California.  The  bill  as  passed 
was  identical  with  the  first  one  introduced  by  Doug 
las  in  the  House,  and  organized  Oregon  with  the 
restrictive  clause  of  the  Ordinance  of  1787  forbid 
ding  slavery.  Here,  indeed,  was  a  precedent  of  a 
rather  formidable  character,  and  it  was  one  that 
must  have  embarrassed  Douglas  considerably  when 
he  came  to  deny,  or  felt  forced  to  deny,  the  power 
of  Congress  to  legislate  either  for  or  against  slavery 
in  the  Territories.  For  in  the  Oregon  case  Congress 
certainly  did  legislate  on  the  subject,  and  did  ex 
clude  slavery.  It  was  in  connection  with  the  Oregon 
j  controversy  that  the  squatter-sovereignty  doctrine 
originated,  and  not  with  Douglas.  Cass  had  the 
year  before  expressed  the  opinion  that  it  was  the 
business  of  Congress  to  frame  governments  for  the 
Territories,  permitting  the  people  to  order  their 
internal  affairs  as  to  them  seemed  best.  In  the 


WAR  AND  POLITICS  73 

Oregon  debate  Dickinson  of  New  York  took  the 
same  view,  and  held  that  the  right  to  regulate  their 
affairs  was  inherent  in  the  people.  This  was  squat 
ter  sovereignty.  It  was  rejected  in  the  Oregon 
case.  It  was  at  this  time  also  that  the  theory  that 
the  Constitution  follows  the  flag  originated.  It 
was  evolved  by  Calhoun  in  the  interest  of  slavery. 
The  territory  acquired  from  Mexico  was  free,  and 
the  Mexican  Government  had  asked  that  it  con 
tinue  free  under  the  American  Government.  Mr. 
Rhodes  says:  "An  incident  in  the  negotiation  of 
the  treaty  displayed  whither  was  our  drift  in 
obedience  to  the  behest  of  the  slave  power.  .  .  . 
During  the  progress  of  the  negotiations,  Mexico 
begged  for  the  insertion  of  an  article  providing  that 
slavery  should  not  be  permitted  in  any  of  the  Terri 
tories  ceded.  Our  commissioner  replied  that  the 
bare  mention  of  the  subject  in  a  treaty  was  an  utter 
impossibility;  that  if  the  territory  should  be  in 
creased  ten-fold  in  value,  and,  besides,  covered  all 
over  a  foot  thick  with  pure  gold,  on  the  single  con 
dition  that  slavery  should  be  excluded  therefrom, 
he  could  not  then  even  entertain  the  proposition, 
nor  think  for  a  moment  of  communicating  it  to  the 
President.  The  ' invincible  Anglo-Saxon  race'  could 
not  listen  to  the  prayer  of  'superstitious  Catholi 
cism,  goaded  on  by  a  miserable  priesthood/  even 
though  the  prayer  was  on  the  side  of  justice,  progress, 
and  humanity."  So  we  paid  thousands  of  lives  and 


74  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

$15,000,000  for  the  purpose  of  widening  the  bounds 
of  slavery.  Calhoun  argued  that  the  Constitution 
went  with  the  flag,  and  that  it  carried  slavery  with 
it,  since  slavery  was  by  implication  recognized  in 
the  Constitution.  Benton  denounced  this  new 
doctrine  "of  the  transmigratory  function  of  the 
Constitution,  and  the  instantaneous  transportation 
of  itself  and  its  slavery  attributes  into  all  acquired 
territories."  If  this  dogma  had  prevailed  slavery 
would  have  existed  to-day  in  the  Hawaiian  Islands, 
the  Philippines,  Porto  Rico,  Alaska,  the  Panama 
zone,  and  the  Virgin  Islands.  Webster  denounced 
it  and  showed  its  utter  falsity.  But  Calhoun  and 
his  followers  were  interested,  not  in  the  Constitution 
but  slavery,  and  they  endowed  it  with  the  quality 
of  self-extension  and  self-perpetuation,  denying  not 
only  that  the  government  had  power  to  exclude  it 
but  that  even  the  people  of  the  Territories  could  say 
whether  they  wanted  it  or  not.  These  men  were 
as  strongly  opposed  to  squatter  sovereignty,  except 
when  they  saw  that  they  could  win  by  it,  as  to  the 
Wilmot  proviso. 

However,  the  Oregon  question  was  disposed  of, 
the  Territory  having  been  organized  under  the  Doug 
las  bill.  But  Congress  adjourned  without  taking 
any  action  in  regard  to  the  Mexican  cession. 
Nothing  was  done  during  the  short  session  of  1848- 
1849,  though  several  attempts  were  made.  Again 
the  issue  was  between  the  friends  and  the  opponents 


WAR  AND  POLITICS  75 

of  the  Wilmot  proviso.  The  question,  of  course, 
was  how  much  the  friends  of  freedom  could  barter 
away  by  compromise  without  utterly  surrendering 
the  principle.  No  one  knew  just  what  would  be 
the  attitude  of  President  Taylor.  But  it  was 
soon  learned  that  he  was  a  patriot,  and  as  de 
voted  to  the  Union  as  Jackson  had  been.  President 
Polk,  just  before  his  retirement,  had  urged  territorial 
governments  for  New  Mexico,  and  favored  the  ex 
tension  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  line.  The  only 
important  feature  of  the  session  was  the  debate 
between  Webster  and  Calhoun  in  which  the  former 
combated,  and  with  entire  success,  the  claim  that 
the  Constitution  recognized  slavery  except  as  a 
local  institution,  protected  by  local  laws.  That 
indeed  was  the  great  issue,  and  it  continued  to  be 
such  till  it  was  settled  by  the  Civil  War.  It  is  easy 
enough  now  to  see  that  there  was  no  possibility 
of  compromise,  but  the  situation  was  far  from  clear 
at  the  time.  The  great  object  of  the  slavery  men 
was  to  extend  slavery,  while  the  object  of  the  com 
promisers  was  to  prevent  the  dissolution  of  the  Union, 
a  possibility  which  many  of  the  Southern  leaders 
viewed  with  perfect  equanimity.  Manifestly  they 
occupied  the  stronger  position,  for  they  were  re 
solved  on  winning  at  any  cost.  But  there  was  a 
price  which  the  compromisers  were  unwilling  to 
pay.  The  Southerners  had,  from  their  point  of 
view,  everything  to  gain  and  nothing  to  lose. 


76  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

In  Congress  the  Southern  men  were  becoming 
increasingly  aggressive  under  the  leadership  of  Cal- 
houn,  ably  seconded  by  some  of  the  newer  men, 
notably  Jefferson  Davis.  From  the  North  men  were 
beginning  to  appear  in  Congress  who  were  strongly 
opposed  to  slavery,  as  Seward  of  New  York,  who 
was  elected  to  the  Senate  in  1849.  Theodore  Roose 
velt,  in  his  life  of  Thomas  H.  Benton,  insists  that 
the  abolitionists  did  little  or  nothing  that  contributed 
to  the  abolition  of  slavery.  The  Southern  men  of 
the  time  were  not  of  that  opinion.  It  is  something 
to  keep  a  great  issue  before  the  people,  to  state  it 
clearly  and  courageously,  and  to  agitate  it.  King 
Ahab  when  he  met  the  prophet  Elijah,  said:  "Art 
thou  he  that  troubleth  Israel?"  The  prophet  re 
plied:  "I  have  not  troubled  Israel,  but  thou  and 
thy  father's  house."  The  slavery  men  undoubtedly 
thought  that  the  abolitionists  had  greatly  troubled 
their  Israel,  and  such  was  the  fact.  Had  they  not 
felt  so  they  would  not  have  excluded  abolition 
pamphlets  from  the  South,  or  denied  the  right  of 
petition  to  Congress.  Prophets  do  not  often  cut 
a  great  figure  in  politics,  but  they  do  stir  the  con 
sciences  of  men.  Such  men  as  Garrison,  Phillips, 
and  Parker  exerted  an  influence  of  which  statesmen 
and  politicians  were  not  conscious  till  they  saw  the 
tide  begin  to  rise,  or— to  change  the  figure— felt 
the  ground  quaking  under  their  feet.  It  is  their 
great  and  lasting  distinction  that  they  and  their 


WAR  AND  POLITICS  77 

fellows  were  for  years  the  only  ones  who  appealed 
straight  to  the  conscience  of  the  American  people. 
Doubtless  they  were  not  "practical,"  but  they  did 
not  pretend  to  be.  For  years  they  and  the  extreme 
slavery  men  were  the  only  people  in  the  country 
who  said  exactly  what  they  thought.  A  nation 
in  which  the  political  spirit  widely  prevails,  and  in 
the  life  of  which  compromise  necessarily  plays  an 
important  part,  can  ill  afford  to  lose  out  of  that 
life  the  spirit  that  prompted  these  words  of  William 
Lloyd  Garrison :  "  I  am  in  earnest.  I  will  not  equivo 
cate;  I  will  not  excuse;  I  will  not  retreat  a  single 
inch;  and  I  will  be  heard."  The  language,  at  any 
rate,  was  such  as  the  South  could  understand.  Of 
course  there  were  other  influences  at  work.  The 
arrogance  and  aggressiveness  of  the  slavery  advo 
cates  played^an  important  part  in  rousing  the  friends 
of  freedom,  and  they  reacted  strongly.  Northern 
politicians  began  to  see  that  they  could  not  win 
elections,  or  get  offices  for  themselves,  by  truckling 
to  slavery.  But  this  was  because  the  people  were 
roused  against  slavery,  and  certainly  the  abolitionists 
had  something  to  do  with  rousing  them.  Even 
now  one  feels  a  sense  of  refreshment  in  turning  from 
the  speeches  of  even  the  greatest  men — such  as 
Webster  and  Clay — to  the  poems  of  Whittier  and 
Lowell  and  the  writings  of  Garrison.  These  men 
at  least  saw  that  sooner  or  later  truth  and  error 
would  have  to  stand  face  to  face,  and  that  com- 


78  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

promises  were  bound  to  fail.  Compromises  neither 
saved  the  Union  nor  destroyed  slavery.  We  can 
give  full  credit  to  the  men  who  honestly  and  labor 
iously  strove  to  accomplish  the  impossible  without 
depreciating  the  influence  of  the  men  who  were 
mobbed  and  martyred  because  of  their  passionate 
devotion  to  the  great  cause  of  liberty  and  humanity. 
Those  are  sad  days  for  any  nation  in  which  there 
is  no  "open  vision."  Prophets  are  not  always  law 
givers  or  statesmen,  but  even  so  they  serve  a  useful 
purpose.  The  prophetic  is  not  the  least  important 
element  in  the  life  of  nations  or  individuals. 

Douglas  was  quick  to  sense  a  change  of  condi 
tions,  though  it  cannot  be  said  that  his  course  was 
greatly  affected  by  it.  The  vote  in  Illinois  fo*r  Van 
Buren,  the  Free-Soil  candidate,  was  certainly  a 
danger-signal.  The  Whigs  made  a  large  gain  over 
the  vote  of  1844,  while  the  Democratic  vote  showed 
an  actual  falling  off,  though  there  had  been  a  heavy 
increase  in  the  voting  population.  The  people  of 
Illinois  had  supported  the  Mexican  War,  approved 
Douglas's  speech  in  defense  of  it,  and  returned  him 
to  the  House,  later  sending  him  to  the  Senate.  In 
1837  the  legislature  Had  adopted  a  joint  resolution 
condemning  abolitionism  as  "more  productive  of 
evil  than  of  moral  and  political  good."  There  was 
a  modified  form  of  slavery  in  the  State  under  the 
indenture  system  when  it  was  admitted  to  the  Union. 
But  the  coming  of  New  Englanders  into  the  northern 


WAR  AND  POLITICS  79 

part  of  the  State,  and  later  of  the  Germans,  wrought 
a  great  change  in  sentiment.  In  1840  the  Liberty 
party  polled  only  160  votes,  which  increased  to 
3,469  four  years  later.  In  1848  the  Free-Soil  party, 
as  has  been  seen,  polled  15,774  votes,  and  they  were 
practically  all  drawn  from  the  Democratic  party. 
Shortly  after  the  election  of  1848,  the  legislature, 
which  was  supposed  to  be  strongly  Democratic,  and 
which  elected  a  Democratic  speaker,  adopted  the 
following  resolution:  "Resolved,  That  our  senators 
in  Congress  be  instructed,  and  our  representatives 
requested,  to  use  all  honorable  means  in  their  power 
to  procure  the  enactment  of  such  laws  by  Congress 
for  the  government  of  the  countries  and  territories 
of  the  United  States,  acquired  by  the  treaty  of  peace, 
friendship,  limits,  and  settlement,  with  the  republic 
of  Mexico,  concluded  February  2,  A.  D.  1848,  as 
shall  contain  the- express  declaration  that  there  shall 
be  neither  slavery  nor  involuntary  servitude  in  said 
territories,  otherwise  than  for  punishment  for  crime, 
whereof  the  party  shall  have  been  duly  convicted." 
Fifteen  members  who  had  voted  for  the  Democratic 
candidate  for  speaker,  also  voted  for  this  resolution. 
The  action  was  construed,  and  naturally,  as  a  re 
buke  to  Douglas,  who  had  opposed  the  Wilmot 
proviso  that  would  have  kept  slavery  out  of  this 
new  Territory,  and  suggested  the  extension  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise  to  the  Pacific  coast,  the  effect 
of  which  would  have  been  to  throw  open  a  large 


80  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

part  of  the  Territory,  including  the  southern  part 
of  California,  to  slavery.  Men  of  all  parties  voted 
for  the  resolution  of  instruction,  while  it  was  op 
posed  solidly  only  by  the  Democrats  of  the  Southern 
counties.  Clearly  the  immediate  task  of  Douglas 
was  not  to  maintain  the  Union  but  to  keep  his 
party  together  in  Illinois.  He  did  not  resign,  as 
many  thought  he  would  be  forced  to.  He  did  obey 
the  instructions,  though  protesting  that  his  vote 
was  not  his  own,  but  a  mere  reflection  of  the  will 
of  his  constituents,  thus  remaining  true  to  the  theory 
adopted  by  him  in  his  youth,  when,  in  the  legislature, 
he  voted  for  internal  improvements.  But  he  did 
at  once  begin  to  look  for  a  way  out,  and  he  found 
it  in  squatter,  or  popular,  sovereignty.  He  would  not 
exclude  slavery  from  the  Territories,  but  he  would 
give  the  people  the  right  to  say  whether  they  would 
have  it  or  not.  The  appeal  went  home  in  Illinois, 
for  its  people  were,  and  for  years  had  been,  firm  be 
lievers  in  the  doctrine  of  local  self-government. 
This  feeling  was  strengthened  by  the  coming  into 
the  State  of  people  from  New  England  who  had 
lived  under  the  town-meeting  system. 

But  the  situation  was  ominous.  There  was  danger 
not  only  of  a  split  in  the  Democratic  party  of  Illi 
nois  but  of  a  sectional  division  separating  the 
northern  from  the  southern  part  of  the  State. 
Douglas  had  to  feel  his  way.  He  realized  that  his 
people  would  oppose  any  policy  that  contemplated 


WAR  AND  POLITICS  81 

the  extension  of  slavery,  or  even  seemed  to  permit 
it.  The  question  was  whether  they  would  be  con 
tent  with  not  forcing  slavery  on  the  Territories, 
but  leaving  their  people  to  decide  whether  they 
wanted  it  or  not.  Douglas's  interest  in  popular 
sovereignty  seems  to  have  developed  largely,  if 
not  wholly,  out  of  a  purely  local  situation. 

The  Free-Soil  party,  both  in  Illinois  and  the  na 
tion,  soon  disappeared,  the  men  who  had  gone  into 
it  returning  to  their  old  political  affiliations,  and 
for  a  time  it  seemed  as  though  the  political  life  of 
the  nation  were  to  continue  on  the  old  lines.  Doug 
las  was  again  master  in  Illinois,  and,  though  his  lead 
ership  was  several  times  challenged,  he  maintained 
his  hold  on  his  party  till  the  end  of  his  life.  But 
no  one  believed  that  the  slavery  menace  had  dis 
appeared,  or  that  any  solution  of  the  problem  was 
in  sight.  On  the  contrary,  there  were  the  gravest 
apprehensions-  The  older  men,  Webster,  Clay,  and 
Calhoun,  recognized  the  peril,  and  did  not  conceal 
from  themselves  or  others  their  belief  that  the  Union 
itself  was  in  jeopardy.  Douglas  does  not  seem  to 
have  been  greatly  disturbed,  nor  were  the  younger 
men,  broadly  speaking,  much  alarmed.  Probably 
the  politicians  felt  that,  with  the  dissolution  of  the 
Free-Soil  party,  the  old  party  organizations  would 
continue  much  as  they  had  been,  and  that  to  them 
would  fall  the  task  of  carrying  on  the  nation's  busi 
ness.  Yet  the  old  issues  were  mostly  dead.  The 


82  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

country  had  greatly  prospered  under  the  tariff  of 
1846,  and  there  was  no  disposition  to  change  it. 
Indeed,  it  continued  in  force  till  1857,  when  it  was 
considerably  lowered.  The  battle  over  the  bank 
had  long  ago  been  fought  out.  There  were  loose 
and  close  constructionists  of  the  Constitution  in 
both  parties.  Practically  the  only  issue  was  slavery, 
and  that  was  not  partisan  but  sectional,  both  parties 
being  divided  on  it.  Both  also  had  trifled  with  it. 
The  Whig  party,  though  it  had  its  President  in  the 
White  House,  was  practically  dead,  though  it  did 
not  know  it.  The  Democratic  party  carried  but 
two  more  elections,  and  never  won  another  one  till 
1884. 


CHAPTER  IV 
FREEDOM  OR  SLAVERY 

GENERAL  TAYLOR  was  inaugurated  as  President, 
and  Millard  Fillmore  as  Vice-President,  March  5, 
1849,  March  4  falling  on  Sunday.  The  President's 
inaugural  was  brief,  and  couched  in  the  most  general 
terms.  Having  sworn  to  "preserve,  protect  and 
defend"  the  Constitution,  he  said:  "For  the  inter 
pretation  of  that  instrument  I  shall  look  to  the  de 
cisions  of  the  judicial  tribunals  established  by  its 
authority,  and  to  the  practice  of  the  government 
under  the  earlier  Presidents,  who  had  so  large  a 
share  in  its  formation.  To  the  example  of  those 
illustrious  patriots  I  shall  always  defer  with  rever 
ence,  and  especially  to  his  example  who  was  by  so 
many  titles  'the  Father  of  his  country.' '  Refer 
ence  was  made  to  the  revolutionary  movements  in 
Europe,  coupled  with  a  reaffirmation  of  Washing 
ton's  warning  against  entangling  alliances.  The 
President  pledged  himself  to  promote  efficiency  both 
in  the  military  and  civil  service,  and  promised  to 
"make  honesty,  capacity  and  fidelity  indispensable 
requisites  to  the  disposal  of  office,  and  the  absence 
of  either  of  these  qualities  shall  be  deemed  sufficient 
cause  for  removal."  "Chosen  by  the  body  of  the 

83 


84  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

people/'  the  President  said,  "under  the  assurance 
that  my  administration  would  be  devoted  to  the 
welfare  of  the  whole  country,  and  not  to  the  support 
of  any  particular  section  or  merely  local  interest, 
I  this  day  renew  the  declaration  I  have  heretofore 
made,  and  proclaim  my  fixed  determination  to  main 
tain  to  the  extent  of  my  ability  the  government  in 
its  original  purity,  and  to  adopt  as  the  basis  of  my 
public  policy  those  great  Republican  doctrines  which 
constitute  the  strength  of  our  national  existence." 
The  closing  paragraphs  pointed  to  compromise, 
moderation,  and  peace.  "I  shall,"  the  President 
said,  "look  with  confidence  to  the  enlightened 
patriotism  of  that  body  [Congress]  to  adopt  such 
measures  of  conciliation  as  may  harmonize  conflict 
ing  interests,  and  tend  to  perpetuate  the  Union 
which  should  be  the  paramount  object  of  our  hopes 
and  affections.  In  any  action  calculated  to  promote 
an  object  so  dear  to  the  heart  of  every  one  who  truly 
loves  his  country,  I  will  zealously  unite  with  the 
co-ordinate  branches  of  the  government.  In  con 
clusion,  I  congratulate  you,  my  fellow-citizens, 
upon  the  high  state  of  prosperity  to  which  the  good 
ness  of  Divine  Providence  has  conducted  our  common 
country.  Let  us  invoke  a  continuance  of  the  same 
Protecting  Care  which  has  led  us  from  small  be 
ginnings  to  the  eminence  we  this  day  occupy,  and 
let  us  seek  to  deserve  that  continuance  by  prudence 
and  moderation  in  our  councils;  by  well-directed 


FREEDOM  OR  SLAVERY  85 

attempts  to  assuage  the  bitterness  which  too  often 
marks  unavoidable  differences  of  opinion;  by  the 
promulgation  and  practice  of  just  and  liberal  prin 
ciples,  and  by  an  enlarged  patriotism  which  shall 
acknowledge  no  limits  but  those  of  our  own  wide 
spread  republic."  The  President,  at  least,  made  it 
clear  that  he  did  not  regard  the  preservation  of 
slavery  as  paramount  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
Union.  He  could  not  well  have  gone  further  with 
out  rousing,  at  the  very  beginning  of  his  adminis 
tration,  those  passions  which  he  sought  to  allay.  His 
words  must  have  had  a  special  significance  as  com 
ing  from  one  who  was  a  citizen  of  Louisiana  and  a 
slaveholder.  General  Taylor  was  shortly  called  on 
to  prove  his  devotion  to  the  Union,  and  he  did  it 
in  impressive  and  unmistakable  fashion.  But  no 
one  could  tell  from  his  address  whether  he  was  a 
Whig  or  a  Democrat.  He  was  sincere  in  thinking 
of  himself  not  as  the  representative  of  any  party 
but  as  the  servant  of  all  the  people. 

The  new  cabinet  was  a  compromise  cabinet.  Of 
the  seven  members,  four  were  Whigs  from  the  slave- 
holding  States,  Crawford  of  Georgia,  the  Secretary 
of  War,  being  the  only  representative  of  the  extreme 
proslavery  faction.  Of  the  three  Northern  Whigs, 
Collamer  of  Vermont,  postmaster-general,  was  known 
as  an  antislavery  man.  In  the  closing  days  of  the 
Polk  administration  attempts  had  been  made  to 
settle  the  status  of  the  new  Territory,  attempts 


86  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

in  which  Douglas  played  a  leading  part.  It  was 
proposed  to  extend  the  Missouri  Compromise  line, 
to  admit  the  Territories,  leaving  the  question  of 
their  free  or  slave  status  to  be  determined  by  the 
judiciary,  to  admit — this  was  Douglas's  plan — New 
Mexico  and  California  forthwith  as  States  in  the 
hope  that  they  would  decide  their  own  destiny. 
All  these  plans  failed.  Douglas  then  proposed  to 
divide  California,  and  admit  the  western  part  of 
the  State,  and  to  admit  California  and  New  Mexico 
as  two  States.  But  he  met  with  no  better  success. 
Douglas  was  not  interested  in  the  slavery  question 
as  it  affected  the  issue,  but  he  did  earnestly  desire 
to  provide  a  government  of  some  sort  for  the  people 
of  the  new  Territory,  and  was  specially  interested 
in  California.  His  programme  was  entirely  fair  to 
the  South.  But  the  truth  was  that  the  extreme 
slavery  men  were  in  control,  and  they  did  not 
wish  any  more  free  territory  without  compensation. 
This  was  made  very  clear.  The  session  closed  in 
disorder  almost  amounting  to  riot.  There  were  in 
the  House  of  Representatives  two  personal  en 
counters  which  resulted  in  bloodshed.  Everything 
pointed  to  the  necessity  of  compromise,  unless  there 
was  to  be  war. 

The  compromisers  began  their  work  at  the  next 
session,  which  met  in  December,  1849.  But  before 
that  time  the  new  President  had  taken  an  important 
step.  He  gradually  revealed  himself,  if  not  as  a 


FREEDOM  OR  SLAVERY  87 

Whig,  at  least  as  an  opponent  of  the  extension  of 
slavery.  "The  people  of  the  North,"  he  said,  in 
a  speech  delivered  in  Pennsylvania  in  August,  "need 
have  no  apprehension  of  the  further  extension  of 
slavery;  the  necessity  of  a  third  party  organization 
on  this  score  would  soon  be  obviated."  The  Presi 
dent's  chief  adviser  in  New  York  was  not  Vice- 
President  Fillmore  but  William  H.  Seward,  lately 
elected  to  the  Senate.  The  situation  was  develop 
ing  in  such  a  way  as  greatly  to  alarm  the  slavery 
men,  who  felt  that  any  limitation  of  slavery  menaced 
its  existence.  It  was  no  longer  enough  that  they 
be  "let  alone";  they  insisted  that  the  bars  should 
not  be  put  up  anywhere,  and  that  the  people  should 
not  have  the  right  to  legislate  against  slavery  in 
their  own  communities.  In  April,  1849,  President 
Taylor  sent  a  special  representative  to  California, 
T.  Butler  King,  a  Whig  congressman  from  Georgia, 
to  co-operate  in  the  work  of  forming  a  State  govern 
ment.  Under  the  leadership  of  the  military  gov 
ernor,  General  Riley,  the  movement  had  already 
been  begun.  The  constitutional  convention  met 
on  September  1,  1849,  and  on  October  13  submitted 
to  the  people  a  constitution  containing  a  prohibi 
tion  of  slavery.  The  convention  voted  unanimously 
for  the  constitution,  though  fifteen  of  its  members 
had  come  from  slave  States.  The  people  ratified 
the  constitution  by  a  vote  of  12,066  to  811.  It  was 
hoped  by  the  President  that  the  people  of  New 


88  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Mexico  would  take  a  similar  course.  His  plan  was 
to  submit  to  Congress  territorial  organizations  as 
accomplished  facts. 

Hardly  a  legislature  met  that  did  not  express 
itself  on  the  great  issue,  those  of  the  Southern  States 
declaring  that  the  exclusion  of  slavery  was  in  deroga 
tion  of  Southern  rights,  while  every  Northern  legis 
lature  except  one  adopted  resolutions  favoring  the 
Wilmot  proviso.  A  meeting  held  at  Jackson,  Miss., 
in  May,  1849,  declared  in  favor  of  calling  a  State 
convention  to  devise  methods  to  protect  the  rights 
and  interests  of  the  South.  The  convention  met, 
issued  an  address  to  the  people,  and  proposed  that 
a  general  convention  be  held  in  June  of  the  follow 
ing  year  at  Nashville.  By  this  time  matters  had 
gone  so  far  that  some  Southern  men  had  come  to 
the  conclusion,  though,  as  Mr.  Schurz  says,  "re 
gretfully,"  that  "the  dissolution  of  the  Union  was 
necessary  to  the  salvation  of  slavery."  Such  was 
the  state  of  affairs  when  Congress  came  together 
in  December,  1849.  Though  California  had  adopted 
a  free  constitution  it  divided  when  it  came  to  elect 
ing  senators,  sending  John  C.  Fremont,  who  was 
opposed  to  slavery,  and  William  M.  Gwin,  who 
was  proslavery.  Henry  Clay  was  a  member  of 
the  new  Senate,  and  of  course  the  great  leader  in 
the  compromise  movement,  though  Douglas  was 
hardly  less  prominent.  The  refusal  of  Joshua  R. 
Giddings,  and  other  Free-Soilers,  to  vote  for  Robert 


FREEDOM  OR  SLAVERY  89 

C.  Winthrop  of  Massachusetts  as  speaker  of  the 
House  resulted  in  the  choice,  after  a  struggle  lasting 
three  weeks,  of  Howell  Cobb  of  Georgia,  of  whom 
Horace  Mann  said:  "He  loves  slavery;  it  is  his 
politics,  his  political  economy,  his  religion."  Mann 
voted  for  Winthrop  as  "the  best  man  we  could  pos 
sibly  elect."  There  were  those  scenes  of  violence 
that  had  almost  come  to  be  usual,  the  Southern 
men  being  most  arrogant  and  aggressive. 

The  storm  that  broke  over  the  election  of  a 
speaker  gathered  force  rapidly.  Southern  Whigs 
and  Democrats  alike  denounced  as  unconstitutional 
the  action  of  the  President  in  suggesting  to  the 
people  of  New  Mexico  and  California  that  they 
form  State  governments,  and  charged  the  President 
with  being  a  traitor  to  the  South.  Toombs  and 
Stephens  of  Georgia,  both  Whigs,  were  violent  in 
their  sectional  appeals.  The  message  of  the  Presi 
dent,  though  mild  and  pacific  in  tone,  gave  fresh 
cause  of  offense.  He  informed  Congress  that  Cali 
fornia  had  adopted  a  constitution,  and  would  shortly 
apply  for  admission  to  the  Union.  He  recommended 
favorable  action  on  the  application.  The  people 
of  New  Mexico  would,  he  was  advised,  take  a  similar 
course.  Congress,  the  President  suggested,  would 
do  well  to  wait  till  they  had  acted,  and  in  the  mean 
time  "abstain  from  the  introduction  of  those  ex 
citing  topics  of  a  sectional  character  which  have 
hitherto  produced  painful  apprehensions  in  the 


90  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

public  mind."  But  Clay  and  those  who  acted  with 
him  felt  that  delay  was  impossible,  that  the  prob 
lems  must  at  once  be  solved,  and  that  they  could  be 
solved  only  through  compromise.  On  January  29 
the  Kentucky  senator  brought  before  the  Senate 
a  series  of  resolutions  which  he  hoped  and  believed 
would  serve  as  the  basis  for  an  adjustment.  It  was 
proposed  to  admit  California  as  a  free  State;  to 
establish  territorial  governments  in  the  territory 
acquired  from  Mexico  without  any  reference  to 
slavery  since  it  was  not  likely  that  slavery  would 
ever  be  introduced  there;  to  determine  the  boundary 
between  Texas  and  New  Mexico,  and  pay  the  bona- 
fide  debt  of  Texas  if  she  would  relinquish  her  claim 
to  any  part  of  New  Mexico;  to  abolish  the  slave- 
trade  hi  the  District  of  Columbia,  though  not  to 
abolish  slavery  except  with  the  consent  of  Mary 
land  and  the  people  of  the  district,  and  compensa 
tion  to  the  owners  of  slaves;  to  strengthen  and  make 
more  effective  the  fugitive-slave  law;  and  to  commit 
Congress  to  the  doctrine  that  it  had  no  power  to 
interfere  with  the  slave-trade  between  the  States. 
Clay  supported  these  resolutions  in  a  speech  of  great 
power.  Manifestly  concessions  would  be  required 
from  both  sides,  but  the  speaker  thought  that  they 
were  concessions  "not  of  principle  but  of  feeling, 
of  opinion  in  relation  to  matters  in  controversy 
between  them."  The  South  was  asked  to  yield 
in  regard  to  California,  though  it  had  no  ground 


FREEDOM. OR  SLAVERY  91 

to  stand  on,  since  the  people  had  adopted  a  con 
stitution,  as  they  had  a  right  to  do.  As  for  the  North, 
it  was  pointed  out  that  it  would  gain  nothing  from 
a  formal  exclusion  of  slavery  from  the  Mexican 
territory  since  slavery  did  not  exist  there,  and  prob 
ably  never  would.  "What,"  Clay  asked,  "do  you 
want  who  reside  in  the  free  States  ?  You  want  that 
there  shall  be  no  slavery  introduced  into  the  terri 
tories  acquired  from  Mexico.  Well,  have  you  not 
got  it  in  California  already,  if  admitted  as  a  State? 
Have  you  not  got  it  in  New  Mexico,  in  all  human 
probability  also?  What  more  do  you  want?  You 
have  got  what  is  worth  a  thousand  Wilmot  provisos. 
You  have  got  nature  herself  on  your  side."  This 
was  the  view  of  Webster  and  Douglas.  Webster 
appealed  to  "the  law  of  nature,  of  physical  geog 
raphy,  the  law  of  the  formation  of  the  earth,"  as 
effectively  excluding  slavery.  Speaking  of  the  pos 
sibility  of  slavery  in  New  Mexico  and  Utah,  Douglas 
said:  "There  is  no  ground  for  apprehension  on  this 
point.  If  there  was  one  inch  of  territory  in  the 
whole  of  our  acquisition  from  Mexico,  where  slavery 
could  exist,  it  was  in  the  valleys  of  Sacramento  and 
San  Joaquin,  within  the  limits  of  the  State  of  Cali 
fornia.  It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  climate 
regulates  this  matter,  and  that  climate  depends 
upon  the  elevation  above  the  sea  as  much  as  upon 
parallels  of  latitude."  California,  he  said,  "is  now 
free  by  law  and  in  fact,  it  is  free  according  to  those 


92  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

laws  of  nature  and  of  God,  to  which  the  senator 
from  Massachusetts  alluded,  and  must  remain  for 
ever  free.  It  will  be  free  under  any  bill  you  may 
pass,  or  without  any  bill  at  all."  Douglas  argued 
that  the  Ordinance  of  1787  had  not  excluded  slavery, 
since  it  had  existed  in  the  Territory  covered  by  it; 
that  slavery  was  not  excluded  by  the  Missouri  Com 
promise,  or  by  the  Oregon  act;  in  all  these  cases 
it  had  disappeared  because  it  was  opposed  to  public 
sentiment,  and  incapable  of  adaptation  to  physical 
conditions.  The  difficulty,  of  course,  was  in  know 
ing  just  what  parallels  of  latitude  or  what  elevation 
above  the  sea  would  be  necessary  to  protect  the 
people  who  believed  in  freedom.  But  it  is  certain 
that  slavery  could  not  have  continued  to  endure 
in  any  industrial  and  progressive  community.  Doug 
las  was  not  serving  the  cause  of  slavery.  On  the 
contrary,  he  may  have  proved  too  much  in  the  eyes 
of  the  Southerners.  He  assuredly  approached  the 
subject  from  the  side  of  freedom.  He  spoke  of  Cal- 
houn's  "error  of  supposing  that  his  particular  sec 
tion  has  a  right  to  have  'a  due  share  of  the  terri 
tories'  set  apart  and  assigned  to  it,"  therein  agreeing 
with  Webster,  who,  in  a  very  convincing  speech, 
showed  that  slavery  was  sectional  and  local,  and 
freedom  universal.  "We  all,"  continued  Douglas, 
"look  forward  with  confidence  to  the  time  when 
Delaware,  Maryland,  Virginia,  Kentucky,  and  Mis 
souri,  and  probably  North  Carolina  and  Tennessee, 


FREEDOM  OR  SLAVERY  93 

will  adopt  a  gradual  system  of  emancipation.  In 
the  meantime  we  have  a  vast  territory,  stretching 
from  the  Mississippi  to  the  Pacific,  which  is  rapidly 
filling  up  with  a  hardy,  enterprising,  and  industrious 
population,  large  enough  to  form  at  least  seventeen 
new  free  States,  one-half  of  which  we  may  expect 
to  see  represented  in  our  body  during  our  day.  Of 
these  I  calculate  that  four  will  be  formed  out  of 
Oregon,  five  out  of  our  late  acquisitions  from  Mexico, 
including  the  present  State  of  California,  two  out 
of  the  Territory  of  Minnesota,  and  the  residue  out 
of  the  country  upon  the  Missouri  River,  including 
Nebraska.  I  think  I  am  safe  in  assuming  that  each 
of  these  will  be  free  Territories  and  free  States 
whether  Congress  shall  prohibit  slavery  or  not. 
Now,  let  me  inquire  where  are  you  to  find  the  slave 
Territory  with  which  to  balance  these  seventeen 
free  Territories  or  even  any  one  of  them?"  Un 
doubtedly  this  was  the  feeling  of  many  men — and 
it  was  wholly  justified — who  were  willing  to  com 
promise  with  slavery.  They  bargained  with  it 
not  for  the  purpose  of  saving  it  but  in  the  sure  con- 
fidence:'that  it  would  die  a  natural  death.  Nor  can 
there  be  any  question  that  the  slavery  men  felt 
that  slavery  was  in  peril  from  the  very  natural  and 
political  forces  on  which  Webster,  Clay,  and  Douglas 
so  largely  relied.  Had  they  not  been  they  would 
not  have  been  so  feverishly  eager  to  buttress  it, 
and  to  acquire  new  territory  to  which  they  hoped 


94  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

it  might  spread  or  be  carried.  What  they  feared 
was  not  the  abolition  of  slavery  by  law  but  its 
disappearance  through  collision  with  the  forces 
trusted  to  by  Douglas. 

There  was  not  the  slightest  reason  to  fear  that 
the  general  government  would  interfere  with  slavery 
in  the  States.  Men  of  all  parties,  always  excepting 
the  abolitionists,  were  opposed  to  any  such  policy, 
and  denied  that  Congress  had  any  power  to  inter 
fere.  Nor  was  there  any  thought  of  such  a  thing 
till,  in  the  midst  of  the  Civil  War,  Lincoln  decided 
to  emancipate  the  slaves  as  a  war  measure.  The 
fears  of  the  Southern  men  were  proofs  of  their  realiza 
tion  of  the  weakness  of  the  institution  and  of  the 
social  order  based  on  it.  That  is  why  they  attempted 
to  deny  to  the  people — and  largely  succeeded  in 
doing  so — the  right  to  petition  Congress  on  the 
subject,  and  demanded  the  exclusion  of  abolition 
literature  from  the  mails.  What  they  dreaded — at 
least  this  is  true  of  the  extreme  men — was  not  dis 
solution  of  the  Union  but  dissolution  of  Southern 
society  through  internal  strife,  and  even  insurrec 
tion.  Nothing,  in  other  words,  could  be  free  where 
men  were  not  free.  Great  Britain's  emancipation 
of  slaves  in  her  American  possessions,  and  every 
where,  was  felt  to  be  a  blow  at  American  slavery. 
There  was  strenuous  objection  to  granting  the 
privileges  of  the  floor  of  the  Senate  to  Father 
Mathew,  the  apostle  of  temperance,  because  he 


FREEDOM  OR  SLAVERY  95 

had  years  ago  signed,  with  Daniel  O'Connell,  an 
antislavery  appeal.  This  state  of  mind  was  the 
natural  product  of  existing  conditions.  The  fears 
of  Calhoun  and  his  followers  were  abundantly  justi 
fied.  But  they  served  to  make  the  work  of  com 
promise  much  more  difficult.  For  the  slavery  men 
felt  that  any  concessions  on  their  part  might  be 
construed  as  an  admission  by  them  that  slavery 
was  wrong,  and  have  the  effect  of  still  further 
weakening  it. 

Such  was  the  situation  that  Clay  faced  when  he 
offered  his  resolutions  which  were  the  result  of  his 
efforts  to  hit  upon  "some  comprehensive  scheme 
of  settling  amicably  the  whole  question  in  all  its 
bearings."  Believing — and  with  reason — that  the 
Union  was  in  danger,  his  great  object  was  to  save 
it.  There  can  be  no  question  as  to  the  sincerity  of 
his  motives,  or  the  patriotism  that  prompted  him. 
He  was  an  old  man,  with  nothing  to  look  forward 
to  hi  politics.  He  was  not  greatly  interested  in  the 
Whig  party,  or  in  any  policy  the  purpose  of  which 
was  to  "keep  it  together."  His  aim  was  well  set 
out  in  the  preamble  to  the  resolutions,  which  were 
declared  to  be  "for  the  peace,  concord,  and  harmony 
of  these  States,  to  settle  and  adjust  amicably  all 
existing  questions  of  controversy  between  them 
arising  out  of  the  institution  of  slavery,  upon  a  fair, 
equitable  and  just  basis."  The  bargain  offered 
seems  to-day  to  be  exceedingly  fair,  but  it  was  not 


96  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

thought  to  be  so  by  the  Southern  senators,  who 
were  in  the  beginning  of  the  debate  the  principal 
opposers  of  the  plan.  Jefferson  Davis  declared 
that  there  was  no  concession  in  the  plan  to  the 
South,  and  demanded  the  extension  of  the  Missouri 
Compromise  line,  the  effect  of  which  would  have 
been  to  make  the  southern  part  of  California  slave 
territory.  Even  that  did  not  satisfy  him,  for  he 
demanded  that  the  old  Compromise  be  amended 
so  as  positively  to  establish  slavery  in  all  territory 
south  of  the  line.  It  was  in  answer  to  Davis  that 
Clay  said:  "Coming  from  a  slave  State  as  I  do, 
I  owe  it  to  myself,  I  owe  it  to  the  truth,  I  owe  it 
to  the  subject,  to  say  that  no  earthly  power  could 
induce  me  to  vote  for  a  specific  measure  for  the  in 
troduction  of  slavery  where  it  had  not  before  existed, 
either  south  or  north  of  that  line." 

Clearly  Davis,  in  demanding  that  Congress  estab 
lish  slavery,  admitted  that  it  had  a  right  to  legislate 
on  the  subject,  and  if  it  had  that  right,  it  had  the 
right  to  exclude  it.  The  question  then  would  have 
been  not  as  to  the  existence  of  a  power  but  as  to 
the  way  in  which  it  should  be  exercised.  What 
Davis  meant  was  that  governments  should  be  set 
up  in  certain  territory  under  which  slavery  should 
be  established  as  a  matter  of  right.  To  men  of  this 
way  of  thinking  Douglas's  plan  to  leave  the  matter 
indifferent,  and  to  permit  the  people  freely  to  choose 
between  freedom  and  slavery,  was  quite  as  objection- 


FREEDOM  OR  SLAVERY  97 

able  as  the  programme  forbidding  slavery.  For 
there  was  the  chance  that  they  might  choose  wrongly 
— from  the  Southern  point  of  view.  The  great  sen 
sation  of  the  debate  was,  of  course,  the  speech  of 
Webster,  delivered  on  March  7.  In  it  the  speaker 
accepted  cordially  the  plan  proposed  by  Clay,  de 
clared  that  the  Wilmot  proviso  (which  he  had  al 
ways  advocated)  was  not  needed  to  keep  slavery  out 
of  New  Mexico,  condemned  the  abolitionists,  and 
professed  an  entire  willingness  to  support  an  effec 
tive  fugitive-slave  law.  Probably  no  man  in  our 
history  was  ever  so  bitterly  denounced  as  Webster 
was  because  of  this  speech.  He  was  charged  with 
an  utter  abandonment  of  principles  for  which  he 
had  always  stood,  and  with  making  a  bid  for  the 
presidency.  It  is  hardly  probable  that  personal 
ambition  influenced  Webster  in  the  slightest  de 
gree.  For  he  must  have  known  that  his  speech 
would  be  an  affront  to  a  very  formidable  sentiment 
in  the  North,  as  it  proved  to  be.  The  people  were 
expecting  a  bugle-blast  for  freedom,  and  they  got 
an  argument  for  compromise,  and  an  argument 
that  conceded  much  to  the  slavery  men.  But  his 
friends  rallied  to  his  support,  and  it  was  soon  realized 
that  the  most  violent  criticism  came  from  the  aboli 
tionists,  whom  Webster  himself  had  condemned. 
The  Springfield  Republican  undoubtedly  spoke 
for  many  people  when  it  said :  "  We  regard  the  speech 
as  a  whole  as  strictly  Websterian — broad,  patriotic, 


98  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

and  honest.  We  believe  that  it  will  have  a  good 
effect,  not  only  upon  the  fiery  South  in  soothing 
disunion  agitation,  but  upon  the  North,  in  impress 
ing  upon  it  its  constitutional  obligations.  We 
are  among  those,  however,  who  wish  it  had  been 
more  than  it  is."  Posterity  has  been  kinder  than 
his  contemporaries  to  this  great  man.  Viewing 
the  situation  through  the  clouds  of  civil  war,  all 
can  now  see  that  Webster's  fears  of  war  and  dis 
union  were  enough  and  more  than  enough  to  ex 
plain  any  apparent  surrender  that  he  may  have 
made.  It  is  clear  now  that  he  was  not  unduly 
alarmed,  not  frightened  by  mere  spectres.  Nor 
was  he,  as  were  the  younger  men,  such  as  Seward 
and  Chase,  willing  to  accept  the  alternative  of  war. 
His  watchword  had  always  been  "liberty  and  Union, 
one  and  inseparable."  Regarding  dissolution  of  the 
Union  and  slavery  as  alike  evils,  he  thought  that 
the  former  was  the  more  dreadful.  George  S.  Mer- 
riam,  the  biographer  of  Samuel  Bowles,  whose  hand 
no  doubt  penned  the  words  quoted  above  from  the 
Springfield  Republican,  very  truly  says:  "Webster 
and  his  followers  were  far  other  than  the  mere  apos 
tates  to  freedom  which  they  seemed  to  be  to  the 
men  possessed  by  the  passion  of  antislavery.  Web 
ster  was  identified  with  a  sublime  idea — the  idea 
of  American  nationality.  He  wrought  a  supreme 
service  in  the  earlier  days,  when  in  his  duels  with 
Calhoun  he  overmatched  the  acute  logic  which 


FREEDOM  OR  SLAVERY  99 

claimed  for  each  of  the  States  an  independent  sover 
eignty,  by  maintaining  with  equal  acumen  an  organic 
national  unity,  and  evoking  in  its  defense  a  grander 
and  mightier  sentiment.  No  American  of  the  first 
half  of  this  century  did  so  much  to  root  the  love 
of  the  Union  in  the  minds  and  hearts  of  the  people 
as  did  Webster.  It  was  that  love,  more  than  hos 
tility  to  slavery,  which  animated  the  North  in  the 
war  which  established  the  Union  and  destroyed 
slavery.  Webster  failed  to  measure  the  evil  of 
slavery,  and  the  abolitionists  failed  no  less  to  measure 
the  evil  of  disunion.  Each  of  them  was  devoted 
to  one  great  idea;  and  the  two  ideas,  which  conflicted 
for  a  while,  were  destined  to  blend  at  last  into  a 
harmonious  and  irresistible  force.  The  highest 
distinction  of  the  radical  antislavery  men  was  that 
they  gave  disinterested  service,  in  which  they  had 
nothing  to  gain  and  much  to  lose;  while  in  the  forces 
which  opposed  them  patriotism  had  its  allies  in 
the  ambition  of  politicians,  the  timidity  of  churches, 
and  the  selfishness  of  commerce."  The  parallel 
which  Mr.  Rhodes  draws  between  Webster  and 
Burke  is  a  true  one.  Of  the  former  he  says :  "Party 
passion  has  so  affected  opinions  about  Burke  that 
it  has  remained  for  the  present  generation  of  Eng 
lishmen  to  measure  fairly  the  worth  of  their  greatest 
statesman.  ...  It  is  quite  certain  that  we  shall 
not  be  less  generous  in  the  estimate  of  our  great 
conservative.  Until  the  closing  years  of  our  cen- 


100  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

tury,  a  dispassionate  judgment  could  not  be  made 
of  Webster;  but  we  see  now  that,  in  the  war  of  the 
secession,  his  principles  were  mightier  than  those  of 
Garrison.  It  was  not  'No  Union  with  slaveholders/ 
but  it  was  '  Liberty  and  Union/  that  won.  Lincoln 
called  the  joint  names  his  watchword,  and  it  was 
not  the  liberty  or  abolitionist,  but  the  Union  party 
that  conducted  the  war." 

There  were  other  speeches  made  in  the  debate 
that  are  of  great  historic  importance.  Those  of 
Seward  and  Chase  in  particular  reflected  the  moral 
sentiment  that  was  developing.  For  the  first  time 
the  men  of  the  South  were  confronted  by  men  from 
the  North  who  were  unwilling  to  compromise. 
Hitherto  only  the  abolitionists  and  Free-Soilers 
had  stood  firmly  on  the  moral  ground.  But  Seward 
and  Chase  were  Whigs  in  good  standing,  and  in 
no  sense  abolitionists.  Seward  was  quite  as  willing 
as  Webster  and  Clay  to  let  slavery  alone  in  the 
States  in  which  it  existed,  but  he  would  not  run  the 
risk  of  extending  it  through  compromise. 

He  declared  himself  opposed  to  all  legislative 
compromises  that  were  not  absolutely  necessary, 
and  as  in  this  case  the  only  necessity  for  compromise 
was  that  growing  out  of  the  danger  to  the  Union, 
and  as  Seward  did  not  believe  that  there  was  any 
such  danger,  he  could  not  admit  the  rightfulness 
of  the  proposed  compromise.  Clay  and  Webster 
undoubtedly  had  the  clearer  vision,  and  read  the 


FREEDOM  OR  SLAVERY  101 

situation  more  correctly.  Seward  was  wrong  in 
thinking  that  there  was  no  real  peril  of  disunion. 
If  he  had  felt  as  Webster  and  Clay  felt,  he  might 
have  seen,  as  they  did,  that  there  was  a  necessity 
for  compromise.  Calhoun's  scheme  for  preserving 
a  permanent  equilibrium  between  free  and  slave 
States,  Seward  declared  to  be  impossible,  since  it 
would  involve  the  control  of  a  majority  by  a  minor 
ity.  No  fugitive-slave  law,  he  said,  could  be  en 
forced,  since  it  was  opposed  to  the  moral  convictions 
of  the  North,  and  the  one  proposed  deprived  the 
fugitive  of  all  the  safeguards  of  liberty.  If  the  con 
stitutional  provision  for  the  return  of  slaves  were 
carried  out — and  he  thought  that  it  should  be — 
it  would  be  necessary  to  soften  the  rigors  of  the 
law.  "Has  any  government,"  he  asked,  "ever  suc 
ceeded  in  changing  the  moral  convictions  of  its  sub 
jects  by  force?  But  these  convictions  imply  no 
disloyalty.  We  reverence  the  Constitution,  although 
we  perceive  this  defect,  just  as  we  acknowledge  the 
splendor  and  power  of  the  sun,  although  its  surface 
is  tarnished  with  here  and  there  an  opaque  spot. 
Your  Constitution  and  laws  convert  hospitality  to 
the  refugee  from  the  most  degrading  oppression  on 
earth  into  a  crime;  but  all  mankind  except  you 
esteem  that  hospitality  a  virtue."  The  part  of  the 
speech  that  created  the  greatest  sensation  was  that 
in  which  he  dealt  with  the  relation  of  the  general 
government  to  the  public  domain.  "The  national 


102  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

domain  is  ours,"  he  said;  "it  was  acquired  by  the 
valor  and  with  the  wealth  of  the  whole  nation.  We 
hold,  nevertheless,  no  arbitrary  power  over  it.  The 
Constitution  regulates  our  stewardship;  the  Con 
stitution  devotes  the  domain  to  Union,  to  justice, 
to  defense,  and  to  liberty.  But  there  is  a  higher 
law  than  the  Constitution,  which  regulates  our 
authority  over  the  domain,  and  devotes  it  to  the 
same  noble  purposes.  The  territory  is  a  part  of 
the  common  heritage  of  mankind,  bestowed  upon 
them  by  the  Creator.  We  are  His  stewards,  and 
must  so  discharge  our  trust  as  to  secure  in  the  highest 
attainable  degree  their  happiness.  ...  I  cannot 
consent  to  introduce  slavery  into  any  part  of  this 
continent,  which  is  now  exempt  from  what  seems 
to  me  so  great  an  evil,  or  to  compromise  the  ques 
tions  relating  to  slavery,  as  a  condition  of  the  ad 
mission  of  Calif ornia."  Seward  was  not  the  first 
man  to  appeal  to  "the  higher  law,"  though  one 
would  think  so  in  reading  the  denunciations  of  the 
doctrine.  The  South  had  appealed  to  it  when  it 
appealed  to  the  Bible  and  the  law  of  God  as  au 
thorities  in  support  of  slavery.  Thornton  Kirkland 
Lothrop,  the  biographer  of  Seward,  quotes  the  fol 
lowing  from  a  speech  made  by  Jefferson  Davis  a 
few  days  before  Seward  spoke:  "It  is  the  Bible  and 
the  Constitution  on  which  we  rely,  and  we  are  not 
to  be  answered  by  the  dicta  of  earthly  wisdom  or 
earthly  arrogance  when  we  have  those  high  author- 


FREEDOM   OR  SLAVERY  103 

ities  to  teach  and  to  construe  the  decrees  of  God." 
But  it  was  intolerable  that  there  should  be  an  ap 
peal  to  "the  higher  law"  in  the  name  of  freedom. 
There  was,  after  all,  a  higher  law,  not  overriding 
the  Constitution,  but  one  in  accordance  with  which 
it  was  to  be  construed,  and  with  which  it  was  later 
brought  into  alignment.  The  words  rang  through 
the  nation.  When  everything  else  in  the  speech 
was  forgotten,  they  were  remembered.  The  speech 
was  known  as  "  the  higher  law  "  speech.  But  Seward 
did  not  ignore  the  great  arguments  of  Clay  and 
Webster  that  compromise  was  necessary  to  save 
the  Union.  He  had  of  course  heard  the  threats,  but 
he  was  not  impressed  by  them  "because  they  are 
uttered  under  the  influence  of  a  controlling  interest 
to  be  secured,  a  paramount  object  to  be  gained; 
and  that  is  an  equilibrium  of  power  in  the  republic." 
"The  question  of  dissolving  the  Union,"  he  said, 
"is  a  complex  question;  it  embraces  the  fearful 
issue  whether  the  Union  shall  stand,  and  slavery, 
under  the  steady,  peaceful  action  of  moral,  social, 
and  political  causes,  be  removed  by  gradual,  volun 
tary  effort,  and  with  compensation;  or  whether 
the  Union  shall  be  dissolved  and  Civil  War  ensue, 
bringing  on  violent  but  complete  and  immediate 
emancipation.  We  are  now  arrived  at  that  stage 
of  our  national  progress  when  that  crisis  can  be 
foreseen,  when  we  must  foresee  it.  ...  I  feel  as 
sured  that  slavery  must  give  way  "  and  that "  emanci- 


104  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

pation  is  inevitable."  "All  measures,"  he  continued, 
"which  fortify  slavery,  or  extend  it,  tend  to  the 
consummation  of  violence;  all  that  check  its  ex 
tension  and  abate  its  strength  tend  to  its  peaceful 
extirpation."  He  told  the  Southerners  that  they 
could  not  have  "the  surrender  of  fugitives  from 
labor"  "because  you  cannot  roll  back  the  tide  of 
social  progress."  He  concluded  by  saying  that 
"there  will  be  no  disunion  and  no  secession."  Such 
language  as  this  the  South  had  not  been  accustomed 
to  hear. 

The  speech  made  little  impression  in  the  Senate 
except  on  the  slavery  men,  whom  it  infuriated. 
Webster  sneered  at  it.  Clay  was  indignant  at  the 
blow  that  it  seemed  to  strike  at  his  compromise, 
and  in  a  letter  to  a  friend  spoke  of  it  as  "Seward's 
late  abolition  speech,"  which  had  "eradicated  the 
respect  of  almost  all  men  from  him."  The  speech 
that  weighed  in  the  debate  was  Webster's,  which, 
next  to  Clay's  skilful  management,  did  more  than 
anything  else  to  get  the  compromise  through  by 
winning  support  for  it  from  the  Northern  Whigs. 
The  choice,  as  the  older  men  saw  it,  was,  to  quote 
Mr.  Schurz,  "between  an  impossibility  on  one  side 
and  a  horror  on  the  other."  The  younger  men  were 
prepared  to  make  the  choice,  and  for  them  the 
time  for  compromise  had  forever  gone  by.  Douglas 
did  not  commit  himself  in  advance  to  the  Clay  res 
olutions,  but  he  did  commend  "the  self-sacrificing 


FREEDOM  OR  SLAVERY  105 

spirit  which  prompted  the  venerable  senator  from 
Kentucky  to  exhibit  the  matchless  moral  courage 
of  standing  undaunted  between  the  two  great  hostile 
factions,  and  rebuking  the  violence  and  excesses  of 
each,  and  pointing  out  their  respective  errors,  in  a 
spirit  of  kindness,  moderation  and  firmness,  which 
made  them  conscious  that  he  was  right."  "The 
Union,"  Douglas  said,  "will  not  be  put  in  peril; 
California  will  be  admitted;  governments  for  the 
Territories  must  be  established;  and  thus  the  con 
troversy  will  end,  and  I  trust  forever."  Yet  four 
years  later  Douglas  himself  reopened  the  con 
troversy  with  his  Kansas-Nebraska  bill.  .  .  . 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE 

ON  April  18  the  Senate  adopted  a  resolution  of 
Senator  Foote  of  Mississippi,  to  refer  the  President's 
message  and  all  resolutions  concerning  slavery, 
including  Clay's,  to  a  select  committee  of  thirteen 
senators  to  be  elected  by  the  Senate.  This  com 
mittee  was  composed  of  Cass  of  Michigan,  Dickin 
son  of  New  York,  Bright  of  Indiana,  Webster  of 
Massachusetts,  Phelps  of  Vermont,  Cooper  of 
Pennsylvania,  King  of  Alabama,  Mason  of  Vir 
ginia,  Downs  of  Louisiana,  Mangum  of  North 
Carolina,  Bell  of  Tennessee,  and  Berrien  of 
Georgia.  Clay  was  chairman,  a  sort  of  neutral  be 
tween  the  factions.  The  Whigs,  though  in  a  minor 
ity  in  the  Senate,  had  a  majority  of  the  committee. 
But  the  issue  was  not  partisan,  but  sectional,  and 
the  sections  were  equally  represented,  there  being 
six  members  from  the  slave  States  and  six  from  the 
free  States.  The  senators  to  whom  this  great  piece 
of  work  was  intrusted  were  moderate  men,  there 
being  only  two  extremists,  Phelps  of  Vermont  on 
one  side  and  Mason  of  Virginia  on  the  other.  There 
was  trouble  at  the  very  beginning,  due  to  the  Presi 
dent's  opposition  to  any  compromise  involving 

106 


THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE          107 

California.  The  administration  openly  antagonized 
the  programme.  When  the  so-called  "Omnibus 
Bill"  was  reported,  of  which  something  will  be  said 
later,  the  President  said  to  a  senator  who  announced 
his  intention  to  oppose  it:  "Stand  firm,  don't  yield; 
it  means  disunion,  and  I  am  pained  to  learn  that 
we  have  disunion  men  to  contend  with."  When 
faced  with  the  threat  of  rebellion  if  the  Wilmot 
proviso  were  passed,  President  Taylor  told  the  men 
making  it  that  he  would  sign  any  constitutional 
law  passed  by  Congress,  and  that  he  himself  would, 
if  necessary,  take  the  field  to  enforce  laws  of  the 
nation,  and  that  if  the  men  who  made  the  threat — 
Alexander  H.  Stephens  and  Robert  Toombs, 
Southern  Whigs — were  taken  in  rebellion  he  would 
hang  them  as  he  had  hanged  spies  and  deserters 
in  Mexico.  Zachary  Taylor,  who  had  once  said  to 
his  son-in-law,  Jefferson  Davis,  that  the  South  must 
stand  firm  against  Northern  encroachments,  now 
looked  on  Davis  and  other  Southern  leaders  as  con 
spirators  against  the  Union.  He  ordered  the  mili 
tary  governor  of  New  Mexico  to  resist  by  force  any 
movement  of  the  Texas  militia  against  him  in  the 
disputed  territory,  and  said  that  he  would,  if  neces 
sary,  take  command.  These  were  the  words  not 
of  a  fire-eater  or  radical  but  of  a  patriot,  and  one 
who  was  willing  to  go  far  on  the  path  of  compromise. 
But  he  clearly  thought  that  there  was  a  point  be 
yond  which  it  was  impossible  to  yield  without  bring- 


108  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

ing  on  the  nation  the  very  peril  that  it  was  sought 
by  compromise  to  avert.  He  was  not  a  man  whom 
it  was  easy  to  frighten.  Perhaps  if  there  had  been 
more  of  his  spirit  in  Congress  the  history  of  the 
United  States  would  have  taken  a  different  turn. 
As  it  was,  the  great  Whig  leader  in  the  Senate  and 
the  sturdy  Whig  President  were  at  outs  concerning 
one  of  the  most  important  measures  ever  brought 
before  Congress.  But  in  the  midst  of  the  struggle 
the  President  died,  respected,  honored,  and  lamented 
by  all  except  the  extreme  proslavery  men.  It  is 
possible  that,  had  he  lived,  the  compromise  might 
have  failed.  Another  event  contributed  to  the  suc 
cess  of  the  movement,  and  that  was  the  mildness 
and  comparative  failure  of  the  Nashville  convention 
that,  it  may  be  remembered,  had  been  called  the 
year  before.  There  was  little  interest  in  it,  the 
Southern  Whigs  mostly  opposing  it. 

It  might  have  been  thought  that  the  proof  af 
forded  by  the  convention  that  there  was  considerable 
Union  sentiment  in  the  South  would  have  deprived 
Clay  and  his  followers  of  the  argument  that  com 
promise  was  necessary  to  save  the  Union.  But  it 
seems  rather  to  have  discredited  the  extreme  South 
erners,  and  thus  to  have  weakened  Southern  opposi 
tion  to  the  compromise.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  Clay's  attitude  and  the  speech  of  Webster 
made  a  powerful  appeal  to  Southern  Whigs,  most 
of  whom  were  opposed  to  dissolution  of  the  Union, 


THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE          109 

and  some  of  whom  no  doubt  hoped  for  another  party 
victory.  The  growing  approval  of  Webster's  speech 
in  the  North  and  the  evident  fear  of  what  we  should 
now  call  "Big  Business"  lest  commercial  interests 
suffer  and  trade  be  lost  played  their  part  in  bring 
ing  about  a  better  feeling.  The  new  President, 
Millard  Fillmore,  was  a  man  of  mild  disposition. 
Clay  and  Webster  both  believed  that  he  would  favor 
the  compromise,  and  events  proved  that  they  were 
right.  The  President  appointed  Webster  Secretary 
of  State,  in  which  place  he  was  of  great  service, 
being  able  to  array  the  whole  power  of  the  adminis 
tration  on  the  side  of  the  compromise  measures. 
Four  of  the  members  of  the  new  cabinet  came  from 
slaveholding  States,  but  they  were  men  of  moderate 
views.  The  President  himself  was  a  man  in  whom 
the  political  instinct  was  strongly  developed.  In 
deed,  he  had  told  President  Taylor  that,  if  the  vote 
in  the  Senate  should  be  a  tie,  he  would,  as  presid 
ing  officer,  vote  for  the  Clay  programme.  Thus 
the  way  was  paved  for  success,  though  it  was  not 
achieved  till  after  a  bitter  struggle.  That  there 
was  on  the  part  of  the  Senate  a  hope  and  desire 
for  success  is  proved  by  its  refusal  to  place  extreme 
men  on  the  committee. 

Douglas,  though  not  a  member  of  the  committee 
of  thirteen,  played  an  important  part  in  getting 
the  legislation  through.  Before  the  special  com 
mittee  was  agreed  on,  namely,  on  March  25,  he,  as 


110  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

chairman  of  the  committee  on  Territories,  had  re 
ported  two  bills,  one  providing  for  the  admission 
of  California  and  the  other  "to  establish  the  terri 
torial  governments  of  Utah  and  New  Mexico,  and 
for  other  purposes."  These,  with  the  various  reso 
lutions,  went,  of  course,  to  the  committee  of  thirteen. 
Douglas  was  chiefly  interested  in  the  admission 
of  California.  The  territorial  bill,  which  left  the 
question  of  slavery  open,  was  designed  to  placate 
the  South,  and  to  get  votes  for  the  California  bill, 
which,  he  was  assured,  would  be  strongly  opposed 
unless  Congress  would  pledge  itself  to  leave  the 
people  of  the  two  Territories  to  frame  Constitutions 
with  or  without  slavery  as  they  might  choose. 
Mr.  Clay,  on  the  day  before  his  committee  reported, 
told  Douglas  that  the  report  would  recommend 
the  union  of  his  two  bills.  Douglas  suggested  that 
Clay  himself  unite  them,  and  present  them  as  part 
of  the  report  of  the  committee,  but  the  Kentucky 
senator  did  not  think  this  would  be  fair  to  Douglas. 
Sheahan  tells  the  story  thus:  "Mr.  Douglas  then 
said:  'I  respectfully  ask  you,  Mr.  Clay,  what  right 
have  you,  to  whom  the  country  looks  for  so  much, 
and  as  an  eminent  statesman  having  charge  of  a 
great  measure  for  the  pacification  of  a  distracted 
country,  to  sacrifice  to  any  extent  the  chances  of 
success  on  a  mere  punctilio  as  to  whom  the  credit 
may  belong  of  having  first  written  the  bills?  I, 
sir,  waive  all  claim  and  personal  consideration  in 


THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE          111 

this  matter,  and  insist  that  the  committee  shall 
pursue  that  course  which  they  may  deem  best  calcu 
lated  to  accomplish  the  great  end  we  all  have  in 
view,  without  regard  to  any  interest  merely  personal 
to  me/  Mr.  Clay  (extending  his  hand  to  Mr.  Doug 
las):  'You  are  the  most  generous  man  living.  I 
will  unite  the  bills  and  report  them;  but  justice 
shall  nevertheless  be  done  to  you  as  the  real  author 
of  the  measures/  The  next  morning  Mr.  Clay 
presented  his  report,  and  also  reported  the  bill  sub 
sequently  known  as  the  Omnibus  Bill,  being  a  bill 
consisting  of  Mr.  Douglas's  two  bills  attached 
together  by  a  wafer.  .  .  .  True  to  his  promise, 
Mr.  Clay  subsequently  bore  honorable  testimony 
to  the  ability,  fairness  and  patriotism  of  Mr.  Doug 
las  throughout  that  long  and  memorable  session." 
The  next  day,  May  8,  1850,  the  Clay  committee 
made  its  report.  The  Douglas  bills  for  the  admis 
sion  of  California  and  the  territorial  organization 
of  New  Mexico  and  Utah,  without  any  prohibition 
of  slavery,  were  recommended  for  passage  as  one 
measure.  The  committee  advised  that  the  admis 
sion  of  any  new  States  that  might  be  formed  out 
of  Texas  be  postponed  till  such  time  as  they  should 
ask  to  be  received  into  the  Union,  when  it  should 
be  the  duty  of  Congress  to  admit  them.  A  west 
ern  and  northern  boundary  was  fixed  for  Texas, 
excluding  the  whole  of  New  Mexico,  Texas  to  have 
a  money  equivalent.  A  more  effective  fugitive- 


112  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

slave  law  was  recommended,  and  the  abolition  of 
the,  slave-trade,  though  not  of  slavery,  in  the  Dis 
trict  of  Columbia  was  advised. 

There  was  no  minority  report,  though  five  mem 
bers,  including  the  two  radicals,  one  on  each  side, 
dissented  from  some  of  the  views  expressed  in  the 
report.  The  administration  was  strongly  opposed 
to  Clay's  "comprehensive  plan  of  adjustment." 
It  was  by  President  Taylor  that  the  combination 
of  Douglas's  measures  had  been  dubbed  "The  Om 
nibus  Bill."  But  General  Taylor  died  on  July  9, 
in  the  midst  of  the  struggle.  His  death  not  only 
removed  an  obstacle  but  insured  to  the  compromise 
a  friend  in  the  White  House  and  in  the  office  of 
Secretary  of  State,  and  greatly  weakened  Seward's 
influence  in  the  Senate.  There  was  one  very  im 
portant  change  made  in  Douglas's  territorial  bill. 
He  had  left  the  territorial  legislatures  free  to  vote 
on  slavery  as  they  chose.  In  the  bill  as  reported 
the  legislatures  were  forbidden  to  legislate  at  all 
on  slavery.  This  was,  of  course,  a  sort  of  Wilmot 
proviso,  since  under  the  bill  the  people  could  not 
have  established  slavery.  Also  it  was  in  violation 
of  the  Douglas  theory  of  squatter  or  popular  sover 
eignty.  There  were  many  amendments  offered, 
including  the  Wilmot  proviso,  Douglas  voting  for 
the  latter  every  time  it  was  proposed,  in  obedience 
to  instructions — or  what  were  conceived  by  him 
to  be  such — from  his  constituents.  The  Utah  bill 


THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE          113 

was  amended  so  as  to  permit  the  people  to  adopt 
a  slave  or  a  free  Constitution  as  to  them  seemed 
best.  This  amendment  was  carried  by  a  vote  of 
38  to  12,  Douglas,  of  course,  voting  for  it,  as  did 
Clay,  Webster,  Benton,  and  Cass.  The  principle 
was  in  entire  accord  with  Douglas's  views.  In  his 
discussion  of  the  subject  he  expressed  his  great  sur 
prise  that  it  had  ever  been  questioned,  and  then 
went  on  to  explain  his  votes  for  the  Wilmot  proviso, 
and  though  his  words  merely  reaffirm  his  youthful 
opinion,  they  are  not  without  interest:  "I  have 
always  held  that  the  people  have  a  right  to  settle 
these  questions  as  they  choose,  not  only  when  they 
come  into  the  Union  as  a  State,  but  that  they  should 
be  permitted  to  do  so  while  a  Territory.  If  I  have 
ever  recorded  a  vote  contrary  to  that  principle, 
even  as  applicable  to  Territories,  it  was  done  under 
the  influence  of  the  pressure  of  an  authority  higher 
than  my  own  will.  Each  and  every  vote  that  I 
have  given  contrary  to  that  principle  is  the  vote 
of  those  who  sent  me  here,  and  not  my  own.  I  have 
faithfully  obeyed  my  instructions,  in  letter  and 
spirit,  to  the  fullest  extent.  They  were  confined 
to  the  prohibition  of  slavery  in  the  Territories  while 
they  remained  Territories,  and  leaving  the  people 
to  do  as  they  please  when  they  shall  be  admitted 
into  the  Union  as  States.  The  vote  which  I  am  now 
about  to  give  is  entirely  consistent  with  those  in 
structions.  I  repeat  that,  according  to  my  view 


114  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

of  the  subject,  all  these  vexed  questions  ought  to 
be  left  to  the  people  of  the  States  and  Territories 
interested,  and  that  any  vote  which  I  have  given, 
or  may  give,  inconsistent  with  this  principle,  will 
be  the  vote  of  those  who  gave  the  instructions,  and 
not  my  own."  Mr.  Douglas  had,  however,  more 
than  once  moved  to  extend  the  Missouri  Compromise 
line  straight  through  to  the  Pacific  coast.  Had 
that  been  done  slavery  would  have  been  excluded 
from  all  territory  lying  north  of  it,  and  the  people 
living  in  that  territory  would  have  been  deprived 
of  the  right "  to  settle  these  questions  as  they  choose." 
The  people  south  of  the  line  could  have  had  slavery 
or  not  as  they  pleased;  those  north  of  it  would  have 
been  forced  to  accept  a  status  fixed  by  Congress. 
Yet  this  policy  was  favored  by  Douglas. 

Nothing  would  be  gained  by  attempting  to  follow 
this  legislation  through  its  many  vicissitudes.  There 
were  many  amendments  offered,  some  of  which 
were  adopted  only  to  be  rejected  on  subsequent 
votes.  What  is  important  is  the  attitude  of  Douglas 
toward  the  more  vital  of  them.  Generally  he  will 
be  found  to  have  voted  with  Webster  and  Clay. 
Partisan  politics  hardly  figured  at  all;  the  divisions 
were  mostly  sectional.  Jefferson  Davis  offered  an 
amendment  to  the  Omnibus  Bill — that  is,  the  bill 
made  up  of  the  two  Douglas  bills,  one  admitting 
California  and  the  other  organizing  Utah  and  New 
Mexico — forbidding  the  people  of  the  Territories 


THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE          115 

to  legislate  at  all  concerning  slavery,  and  providing 
that  nothing  in  the  act  should  prevent  the  territorial 
legislatures  from  passing  "such  laws  as  may  be 
necessary  for  the  protection  of  rights  of  property 
of  any  kind  which  may  have  been,  or  may  hereafter 
be,  lawfully  introduced  into  said  territory."  The 
amendment  was  rejected.  Davis  admitted  the 
right  of  the  Territories  to  legislate  on  slavery  or 
anything  else,  but  only  after  they  had  been  organized 
as  a  political  body.  "The  difference,"  he  said,  "be 
tween  the  senator  from  Illinois  and  myself  is  the 
point  at  which  the  people  do  possess  and  may  assert 
this  right.  It  is  not  the  inhabitants  of  the  Terri 
tory,  but  the  people  as  a  political  body — the  people 
organized — who  have  the  right,  and  on  becoming 
a  State  by  the  authority  of  the  United  States, 
exercising  sovereignty  over  the  territory,  they  may 
establish  a  fundamental  law  for  all  time  to  come." 
This  meant,  of  course,  that  the  people  could  not 
exclude  slavery  till  they  had  a  government,  and 
that  they  could  not  have  a  government  except  on 
the  condition  of  tolerating  at  least  the  possibility 
of  slavery. 

In  reply  Douglas  said:  "I  have  a  word  to  say  to 
the  honorable  senator  from  Mississippi  [Mr.  Davis]. 
He  insists  that  I  am  not  in  favor  of  protecting  prop 
erty,  and  that  his  amendment  is  offered  for  the 
purpose  of  protecting  property  under  the  Constitu 
tion.  Now,  sir,  I  ask  you  what  authority  he  has  for 


116  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

assuming  that?  Do  I  not  desire  to  protect  property 
because  I  wish  these  people  to  pass  such  laws  as  they 
deem  proper  respecting  their  rights  in  property  with 
out  any  exception  ?  He  might  just  as  well  say  that  I 
am  opposed  to  protecting  property  in  merchandise, 
in  steamboats,  in  cattle,  in  real  estate,  as  to  say  that 
I  am  opposed  to  protecting  property  of  any  other 
description;  for  I  desire  to  put  them  all  on  an  equal 
ity,  and  allow  the  people  to  make  their  own  laws 
in  respect  to  the  whole  of  them.  But  the  difference 
is  this:  he  desires  an  amendment  which  he  thinks 
will  recognize  the  institution  of  slavery  in  the  Terri 
tories  as  now  existing  in  this  country.  I  do  not 
believe  it  exists  there  by  law.  I  believe  it  is  pro 
hibited  there  by  law  at  this  time,  and  the  effect, 
if  not  the  object,  of  his  amendment  would  be  to  in 
troduce  slavery  into  a  country  from  which  I  think 
a  large  majority  of  this  Senate  are  of  opinion  it  is 
now  excluded,  and  he  calls  upon  us  to  vote  to  intro 
duce  it  there.  The  senator  from  Kentucky,  who 
brought  forward  this  Compromise,  tells  us  that  he 
can  never  give  a  vote  by  which  he  will  introduce 
slavery  where  it  does  not  exist.  Other  senators 
have  declared  the  same  thing  to  an  extent  which 
authorizes  us  to  assume  that  the  majority  of  this 
Senate  will  never  extend  slavery  by  law  into  terri 
tory  now  free.  What,  then,  must  be  the  effect  of 
the  adoption  of  the  provision  offered  by  the  senator 
from  Mississippi?  It  would  be  the  insertion  of  a 


THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE         117 

provision  that  must  infallibly  defeat  the  bill,  de 
prive  the  people  of  the  Territories  of  government, 
leave  them  in  a  state  of  anarchy,  and  keep  up  ex 
citement  and  agitation  in  this  country.  I  do  not 
say,  nor  would  I  intimate,  that  such  is  the  object 
of  the  senator  from  Mississippi.  I  know  that  he 
has  another  and  a  different  object — an  object  which 
he  avows.  That  object  is  to  extend  the  institution 
of  slavery  to  this  territory;  or  rather,  as  he  believes 
it  to  be  already  carried  there  by  law,  to  continue 
its  legal  existence.  ...  I  do  not  believe,  sir,  that 
the  Senate  can  agree  upon  any  principle  by  which 
a  bill  can  pass  giving  governments  to  the  Territories 
in  which  the  word  'slavery7  is  mentioned.  If  you 
prohibit — if  you  establish — if  you  recognize — if  you 
control — if  you  touch  the  question  of  slavery,  your 
bill  cannot,  in  my  opinion,  pass  this  body.  But 
the  bill  that  you  can  pass  is  the  one  that  is  open 
upon  these  questions,  that  says  nothing  upon  the 
subject,  but  leaves  the  people  to  do  just  as  they 
please,  and  to  shape  their  institutions  according 
to  what  they  may  conceive  to  be  their  interests 
both  for  the  present  and  the  future."  Obviously 
the  question  was  not  one  of  the  protection  of 
property  but  of  the  government  that  should  pro 
tect.  Davis  demanded  that  Congress  should  do 
it,  while  Douglas  would  have  left  the  protection 
in  the  hands  of  the  people.  There  was  also  the 
question  as  to  what  was  and  what  was  not  property. 


118  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Davis  feared  that  the  people  of  the  new  Territories 
would  not  recognize  slaves  as  property,  while  Doug 
las  was  sure  that  they  would  not.  He  was  quite 
right  in  saying  that  the  object  of  Davis  was  to  "ex 
tend  the  institution  of  slavery."  The  words  quoted 
give  a  very  fair  idea  of  the  position  of  the  Illinois 
senator  at  the  time.  Clay  finally  joined  with  Doug 
las  in  eliminating  the  clause  forbidding  legislation 
on  slavery,  thus  restoring  the  bill  to  its  original 
form. 

It  was  found,  as  Douglas  predicted,  to  be  im 
possible  to  pass  the  Omnibus  Bill.  All  that  related 
to  California  was  stricken  out  by  a  vote  34  to  25, 
and  the  same  fate  overtook  the  provisions  in  regard 
to  Texas  and  New  Mexico.  Thus  there  was  nothing 
left  of  the  famous  Omnibus  Bill  but  Utah,  the  people 
of  that  Territory  being  left  free  to  legislate  as  they 
chose  on  slavery. 

The  Senate  at  once  proceeded  to  consider  the 
various  bills  separately,  and  passed  them  all  by 
substantial,  and  sometimes  large,  majorities.  The 
Texas  boundary  bill  was  passed  August  9,  the  Cali 
fornia  bill  August  13,  and  the  bill  organizing  New 
Mexico  on  August  15.  The  house  promptly  ratified 
the  action  of  the  Senate.  On  September  16  the 
Senate  passed  the  bill  abolishing  the  slave-trade— 
though  not  slavery — in  the  District  of  Columbia, 
having  previously  passed  the  fugitive-slave  bill 
without  a  division,  in  a  form  much  more  unfavorable 


THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE          119 

to  the  negro  than  had  been  originally  proposed, 
since  it  deprived  fugitives  of  the  right  of  trial  by 
jury.  After  the  defeat  of  the  Omnibus  Bill,  Clay 
assumed  that  the  whole  Compromise  was  lost. 
Moved  by  sorrow,  disappointment,  anger,  and  ex 
alted  patriotism,  he,  on  the  day  following  his  re 
verse,  said:  "I  stand  here  in  my  place,  meaning  to 
be  unawed  by  any  threats,  whether  they  come  from 
individuals  or  States.  I  should  deplore,  as  much 
as  any  man  living  or  dead,  that  arms  should  be 
raised  against  the  authority  of  the  Union,  either 
by  individuals  or  States.  But  if,  after  all  that  has 
occurred,  any  one  State,  or  the  people  of  any  State, 
choose  to  place  themselves  in  military  array  against 
the  government  of  the  Union,  I  am  for  tiying  the 
strength  of  the  government.  Nor  am  I  to  be  alarmed 
or  dissuaded  from  any  such  course  by  intimations 
of  the  spilling  of  blood.  If  blood  is  to  be  spilt  by 
whose  fault  is  it  to  be  spilt  ?  Upon  the  supposition 
I  maintain,  it  will  be  the  fault  of  those  who  raise  the 
standard  of  disunion  and  endeavor  to  prostrate 
this  government;  and,  sir,  when  that  is  done,  so 
long  as  it  please  God  to  give  me  a  voice  to  express 
my  sentiments,  or  an  arm,  weak  and  enfeebled  as 
it  may  be  by  age,  that  voice  and  that  arm  will  be 
on  the  side  of  my  country,  for  the  support  of  the 
general  authority,  and  for  the  maintenance  of  the 
power  of  this  Union.  .  .  .  The  honorable  senator 
speaks  of  Virginia  being  my  country.  This  Union 


120  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

is  my  country;  the  thirty  States  are  my  country; 
Kentucky  is  my  country,  and  Virginia,  no  more 
than  any  other  of  the  States  of  this  Union.  She 
has  created  on  my  part  obligations  and  feelings 
and  duties  toward  her  in  my  private  character  which 
nothing  upon  earth  would  induce  me  to  forfeit  or 
violate.  But  even  if  it  were  my  own  State — if  my 
own  State  lawlessly,  contrary  to  her  duty,  should 
raise  the  standard  of  disunion  against  the  residue 
of  the  Union — I  should  go  against  her;  I  would 
go  against  Kentucky  in  that  contingency,  much 
as  I  love  her."  The  long  struggle  had  greatly  over 
taxed  his  strength,  and  he  must  have  felt  that  all 
the  concessions — some  of  them  amounting  to  sacri 
fices — had  been  in  vain.  Broken  and  disheartened 
he  abandoned  the  task,  and  went  away  ^to  rest. 
When  he  returned  he  found  that  his  whole  com 
promise  had  been  put  through  in  substantially  its 
original  form.  Douglas  had  a  great  part  in  it,  and 
voted  for  every  bill  except  the  fugitive-slave  bill. 
He  explained  his  failure  to  do  this  by  saying — what 
was  the  truth — that  he  was  unavoidably  absent. 
There  could  be  no  suspicion  of  dodging  in  his  case. 
As  to  the  Compromise,  it  must  be  said  that  it  was 
unsatisfactory  to  the  extremists  on  both  sides,  which 
is  usually  the  case  with  all  compromises.  Jefferson 
Davis  said:  "While  gentlemen  are  dividing  the 
honors  that  result  from  the  passage  of  these  bills, 
either  in  a  joint  or  separate  form,  I  have  only  to 


THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE          121 

say  that,  so  far  as  I  am  concerned,  tney  are  welcome 
to  the  whole.  I  do  not  represent  that  public  opinion 
which  required  the  passage  of  them,  either  jointly 
or  separately.  If  any  man  has  a  right  to  be  proud 
of  the  success  of  these  measures,  it  is  the  senator 
from  Illinois  [Mr.  Douglas].  They  were  brought 
before  the  Senate  by  the  committee,  which  it  is 
claimed  has  done  so  much  for  the  honor  of  the  Senate 
and  the  peace  of  the  country,  merely  stuck  together 
— the  work  of  other  men,  save  and  except  the  little 
bill  to  suppress  the  slave-trade  in  the  District  of 
Columbia.  I  merely  wish  to  say  that,  so  far  as  the 
public  opinion  of  the  community  which  I  represent 
has  been  shadowed  forth  in  public  meetings  and 
in  the  public  press,  it  has  been  wholly  adverse  to 
the  great  body  of  these  measures.  I  voted  for  one — 
that  which  the  senator  from  Virginia  originated, 
and  which  was  modified  in  the  Senate  till  I  thought, 
as  far  as  we  could  make  it  so,  it  became  efficient 
for  the  protection  of  our  rights.  That  was  the  only 
one  which  met  my  approval."  Indeed,  the  Com 
promise  was  no  triumph  for  the  South,  for  what  it 
specially  objected  to  was  the  bill  admitting  Cali 
fornia  as  a  free  State.  That  was,  of  course,  a  direct 
blow  at  slavery.  As  for  slavery  in  the  Territories 
acquired  from  Mexico,  the  contention  of  Clay,  Web 
ster,  and  Douglas  was  that  it  did  not  exist  there, 
being  forbidden  by  the  Mexican  law.  These  men 
further  believed  that  it  never  could  exist  there. 


122  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

This,  it  has  been  seen,  was  the  opinion  of  Webster, 
Clay,  and  Douglas.  It  was  because  he  believed 
thus  that  Webster  gave  up  the  Wilmot  proviso. 
What  the  South  wanted  was  additional  slave  terri 
tory  to  counterbalance  a  free  California.  It  was 
very  doubtful  whether  this  could  be  had.  The  right 
of  the  people  of  New  Mexico  to  exclude  or  permit 
slavery  was  left  for  the  Supreme  Court  to  deter 
mine.  Even  the  fugitive-slave  law  was  not  new, 
for  there  had  been  such  a  law  since  1793.  What 
the  South  got  was  a  considerable  strengthening 
of  that  ancient  statute. 

Yet  the  North  was  by  no  means  pleased,  and 
was  certainly  conscious  of  no  victory.  The  fugitive- 
slave  law  provoked  an  angry  outburst.  The  prin 
ciple  underlying  it  was  odious  to  a  steadily  growing 
number  of  people.  The  statute  itself  was  very  severe 
in  its  terms.  Under  it  the  negro  claimed  as  a  fugitive 
slave  could  not  testify  in  his  own  behalf.  There 
was,  as  has  been  said,  no  provision  for  a  jury  trial. 
All  good  citizens  were  commanded  to  co-operate 
in  enforcing  the  law,  and  the  harboring  of  fugitives 
was  made  a  crime.  There  was  a  recognition  of  the 
Southern  claim  that  slaves  were  property,  a  claim 
that  was  in  contravention  of  the  law  of  every  North 
ern  State.  It  was  felt  too  that  Congress  had  acted 
on  the  theory  that  it  had  no  power  to  exclude  slavery 
from  the  Territories,  for  it  was  felt  that  if  it  had 
the  power,  and  agreed  that  it  had,  it  would  have 


THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE          123 

exercised  it.  Mr.  Douglas  indeed  said  in  his  speech 
in  Chicago,  a  few  weeks  later,  which  he  made  in 
defense  of  his  action,  that  there  was  no  triumph 
for  any  section  or  faction.  "The  South,"  he  said, 
"has  not  triumphed  over  the  North,  nor  has  the 
North  achieved  a  victory  over  the  South.  Neither 
party  has  made  any  humiliating  concessions  to 
the  other.  Each  has  preserved  its  honor,  while 
neither  has  surrendered  an  important  right,  or  sacri 
ficed  any  substantial  interest.  The  measures  com 
posing  the  scheme  of  adjustment  are  believed  to 
be  in  harmony  with  the  principles  of  justice  and 
the  Constitution."  That,  of  course,  was  the  view 
of  the  leaders  of  the  movement,  who  were  one  and 
all  satisfied  with  their  work.  Clay's  thought  was 
that  the  compromise  was  "rather  a  triumph  for 
the  Union,  for  harmony  and  concord."  "No  man 
and  no  party,"  said  Douglas,  "has  acquired  a 
triumph,  except  the  party  friendly  to  the  Union." 
Webster  experienced  a  great  sense  of  relief.  "  My 
part  is  acted,"  he  said,  "and  I  am  satisfied.  It  is 
a  day  of  rejoicing  here  such  as  I  never  witnessed. 
The  face  of  everything  is  changed.  You  would 
suppose  nobody  had  ever  thought  of  disunion.  All 
say  they  always  meant  to  stand  by  the  Union  to 
the  last."  Perhaps  they  did;  perhaps  men  of  Web 
ster's  way  of  thinking  were  unnecessarily  alarmed. 
No  doubt  the  great  Massachusetts  senator  felt  that 
he  had  been  vindicated,  since  the  settlement  was 


124  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

on  the  lines  of  his  7th  of  March  speech.  The  coun 
try  as  a  whole  accepted  the  Compromise  in  good 
spirit,  almost,  it  may  be  said,  with  enthusiasm. 
The  principal  dissatisfaction  was  in  the  South, 
though  even  in  that  section  there  was  something 
more  than  acquiescence.  Even  a  truce  under  condi 
tions  such  as  then  existed  was  very  well  worth 
while.  Nothing  else  could  have  been  gained — as  is 
now  clear  enough — since  no  compromise  was  pos 
sible  that  did  not  involve  an  ignoring  or  a  slurring 
over  of  the  moral  issue,  and  there  never  can  be 
any  permanent  settlement  on  that  basis.  Even  the 
fugitive-slave  law,  and  it  was  peculiarly  odious,  was 
at  first  accepted  by  the  North,  though  there  were 
many  protests.  But  the  attempts  that  soon  fol 
lowed  to  enforce  the  law  roused  the  people  as  noth 
ing  else  had  done,  and  gave  the  abolitionists  their 
chance — and  nobly  did  they  use  it.  There  can  be 
no  question  of  the  sincerity  of  the  men  who  en 
gineered  the  Compromise.  Had  the  South  been 
less  insistent  in  its  demand  for  the  fugitive-slave 
law — and  there  were  men  in  the  South  who  both 
thought  and  said  that  it  was  not  necessary — and 
the  North  less  yielding  it  is  possible  that,  with  that 
odious  feature  eliminated,  the  Compromise  might 
have  survived  as  long  as  the  Missouri  Compromise 
had  done.  It  was  not  till  the  federal  government 
commanded  Northern  men  to  become  man-catchers 
that  their  consciences  were  roused  against  slavery. 


THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE          125 

Douglas  himself  was  forced  to  defend  before  his 
own  constituents  the  fugitive-slave  law.  When, 
shortly  after  the  adjournment  of  Congress,  he  re 
turned  to  Chicago,  then  the  city  of  his  residence, 
he  was  received  not  as  a  conqueror  but  as  a  traitor. 
The  people  were  greatly  excited  over  the  fugitive- 
slave  law,  and  violent  in  their  denunciations  of  those 
who  had  supported  it.  The  city  council  had  adopted 
resolutions  characterizing  the  act  as  in  violation 
of  the  Constitution  and  of  the  law  of  God.  Here 
was  an  appeal  to  Seward's  "higher  law,"  the  first 
of  many  that  were  to  be  made.  In  the  resolutions 
those  who  had  supported  the  bill,  as  well  as  those 
"who  basely  sneaked  away  from  their  seats  and 
thereby  evaded  the  question,"  were  denounced  as 
"fit  only  to  be  ranked  with  Benedict  Arnold  and 
Judas  Iscariot."  Here  was  a  double  drive  at  Doug 
las,  who  was  known  to  be  in  favor  of  the  measure, 
but  who  had  not  been  present  when  the  vote  was 
taken.  But  that  he  did  not  "sneak  away"  he  had 
no  difficulty  in  showing.  Dodging,  he  truly  said, 
was  never  a  part  of  his  political  tactics.  Nor  did 
he  dodge  now.  On  the  contrary,  he  attended  a 
mass-meeting  that  had  been  called  to  indorse  the 
action  of  the  council,  took  his  seat  on  the  platform, 
and  informed  the  audience  that  he  would  on  the 
next  night  defend  the  whole  Compromise,  includ 
ing  the  fugitive-slave  law.  This  appeal  for  fair 
play  did  not  go  unheeded,  and  the  meeting  adjourned 


126  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

without  taking  action  in  order  to  give  Douglas  a 
chance  to  present  his  side  of  the  case  and  to  make 
his  defense.  The  audience,  it  should  be  said,  was 
distinctly  and  almost  vehemently  hostile.  But  it 
was  willing  to  hear  the  other  side,  and  was  juster 
to  Douglas  than  the  law  that  he  was  to  defend  was 
to  the  fugitives  from  slavery. 

In  his  speech  the  following  night  he  dealt  with 
his  audience  fairly  and  frankly,  shirking  no  point 
that  was  raised,  and  answering  all  questions  that 
were  asked.  The  main  objections  to  the  statute 
were  that  it  denied  to  the  fugitive  the  right  of  trial 
by  jury  and  the  privilege  of  habeas  corpus.  Doug 
las  replied  that  the  law  was  in  these  respects  pre 
cisely  like  the  old  statute  enacted  in  1793,  and  that 
both  were  silent  on  these  subjects.  He  urged  further 
that  trial  by  jury  and  habeas  corpus  were  guaran 
teed  by  the  Constitution,  and  that  therefore  no 
one  could  be  deprived  of  them.  He  pointed  out 
that  whatever  trial  was  necessary  was  provided 
for,  and  would  and  should  be  held  in  the  State  from 
which  the  fugitive  fled,  and  that  the  only  function 
of  the  Northern  magistrate  was  to  determine  the 
identity  of  the  fugitive.  Of  course,  every  one  must 
have  known  that  a  trial  in  the  State  from  which 
the  man  or  woman  was  supposed  to  have  fled  would 
have  been  the  merest  farce,  for  in  the  South  the 
black  man  was  not  a  man,  but  a  chattel.  But  the 
argument  of  Douglas  was  plausible,  and  was  most 


THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE          127 

shrewdly  put.  He  called  attention  to  the  fact  that 
the  Constitution  provided  for  the  return  of  fugitive 
slaves,  and  asked  his  hearers  whether  they  were 
prepared  to  stand  by,  and  uphold,  the  Constitution. 
In  such  a  hearing  as  that  provided  for,  the  evidence 
— having  to  do  only  with  the  identity  of  the 
prisoner — was  necessarily  ex  parte.  When  he  was 
asked  whether  one  section  of  the  bill  that  forbade 
"all  molestation  of  said  person  or  persons  by  any 
process  issued  by  any  court,  judge,  magistrate,  or 
other  person  whomsoever/'  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
being  a  "process,"  did  not  amount  to  a  denial 
of  the  writ,  Douglas  answered  that  while  the  writ 
might  not  be  issued  for  the  purpose  of  "molesta 
tion,"  it  might  be  granted  for  the  purpose  of  de 
termining  whether  the  claimant  of  the  fugitive  nad 
the  certificate  required  to  be  issued,  whether  it  was 
in  due  form  of  law.  "Upon  the  return  of  the  writ 
of  habeas  corpus,"  said  Douglas,  "the  claimant 
will  be  required  to  exhibit  to  the  court  his  authority 
for  conveying  the  servant  back;  and  if  he  produces 
a  ' certificate'  from  the  commissioner  or  judge  in 
due  form  of  law,  the  court  will  decide  that  it  has 
no  power  to  ' molest  the  claimant'  in  the  exercise 
of  his  rights  under  the  law  and  the  Constitution. 
But  if  the  claimant  is  not  able  to  produce  such 
certificate,  or  other  lawful  authority,  or  produces 
one  which  is  not  in  conformity  with  the  law,  the 
court  will  set  the  alleged  servant  at  liberty,  for  the 


128  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

very  reason  that  the  law  has  not  been  complied 
with.  The  sole  object  of  the*  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
is  to  ascertain  by  what  authority  a  person  is  held 
in  custody;  to  release  him  if  no  such  authority  be 
shown;  and  to  refrain  from  any  molestation  of  the 
claimant  if  legal  authority  be  produced."  Yet  no 
judge  could  issue  such  a  writ  and  enforce  it  without 
being  guilty  of  "molestation,"  while  the  limita 
tion  of  the  power  of  the  court  granting  the  writ 
would  have  made  it  of  little  or  no  value.  As  to  trial 
by  jury,  Douglas  said  that  this  was  not  and  could 
not  be  denied,  but  that  it  must  be  had  in  the  State 
from  which  the  fugitive  was  supposed  to  have  come. 
The  rest  of  the  speech  was  devoted  to  answering 
questions  practically  none  of  which  went  to  the 
real  issues.  The  weakness  of  the  argument  was 
largely  in  what  was  not  said.  The  law  was  retro 
active,  and  under  it  men  and  women  who  had  lived 
for  years  in  a  Northern  State  might  be  seized  and 
carried  away  from  their  homes  back  into  slavery. 

The  process  was  summary.  United  States  com 
missioners  were  clothed  with  the  largest  powers 
over  colored  men  and  women  seeking  freedom,  and 
even  over  those  who  might  have  enjoyed  it  for  years. 
The  defendant  was  not  permitted  to  testify  in  his 
own  behalf.  All  good  citizens  were  commanded 
to  aid  in  the  prompt  execution  of  the  law,  includ 
ing  the  capture  of  fugitives.  United  States  marshals 
who  permitted  recaptured  fugitives  to  escape  from 


THE  GREAT  COMPROMISE          129 

their  custody  were  liable  for  the  full  value  of  the 
slave,  while  those  who  harbored  or  concealed  fugi 
tives  were  punishable  by  fine  and  imprisonment. 
The  law  was,  in  short,  odious.  Its  only  effect  was 
to  bring  the  evil  of  slavery  close  home  to  the  hearts 
of  the  Northern  people,  who  refused  to  be  enlisted 
against  their  will  in  the  great  army  of  man-catchers. 
The  speech  is  important  as  being  perhaps  the 
best  defense  of  the  fugitive-slave  law  that  was  ever 
made,  and  also  a  demonstration  of  the  power  of 
Douglas.  It  must  be  said  further  that  he  divined 
the  real  nature  of  the  opposition  to  the  statute. 
And  the  remarkable  thing  is  that  he  was  able  to 
overcome  objection  based  on  this  ground.  "The 
real  objection,"  he  said,  "is  not  to  the  new  law, 
nor  to  the  old  one,  but  to  the  Constitution  itself. 
Those  of  you  who  hold  these  opinions  do  not  mean 
that  the  fugitive  from  labor  shall  be  taken  back. 
That  is  the  real  point  of  your  objection.  You  would 
not  care  a  farthing  about  the  new  law  or  the  old 
law,  or  any  other  law,  or  what  provisions  it  con 
tained,  if  there  was  a  hole  in  it  big  enough  for  the 
fugitive  to  slip  through  and  escape.  Habeas  cor- 
puses — trials  by  jury — records  from  other  States — 
pains  and  penalties — the  whole  catalogue  of  ob 
jections  would  be  all  moonshine,  if  the  negro  was 
not  required  to  go  back  to  his  master.  Tell  me 
frankly,  is  not  this  the  true  character  of  your  ob 
jection?"  Many  admitted  that  it  was,  whereupon 


130  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Douglas  cited  the  constitutional  provision,  and 
declared  that  it  was  the  duty  of  all  men  to  uphold 
the  Constitution.  Then  he  offered  a  set  of  reso 
lutions  embodying  his  views,  and  they  were  adopted 
without  a  dissenting  voice,  as  was  a  resolution  re 
pudiating  the  action  of  the  council.  The  next  night 
the  council  met,  and,  by  a  vote  of  12  to  1,  rescinded 
its  resolutions  condemning  Douglas  and  others  and 
declaring  that  it  would  "not  require  the  city  police 
to  render  any  assistance  for  the  arrest  of  fugitive 
slaves."  It  was  a  great  victory  for  Douglas,  and 
the  result  was  still  further  to  strengthen  his  hold 
on  the  people.  The  issue,  however,  would  have 
been  extremely  doubtful  if  the  council  had  had 
a  champion  on  that  eventful  night — say  Lincoln 
or  Seward.  For  after  all  b'ut  one  side  of  the  ques 
tion  was  heard.  Even  the  questions  asked  from 
the  floor  Douglas  was  able  to  turn  very  shrewdly 
to  his  own  account,  and  it  was  impossible — as  it 
always  is  in  such  cases — for  the  questioner  to  ad 
vance  any  argument  in  support  of  his  position. 
Nevertheless,  it  was  a  great  triumph  for  Douglas, 
for  he  won  a  verdict  from  a  hostile  audience,  and 
in  a  community  that  had  been  greatly  outraged. 
Before  the  lines  were  drawn  on  a  political  question, 
Douglas  would  compromise  to  the  limit,  and  refrain 
from  forcing  the  issue;  but  when  the  issue  was  pre 
sented  he  invariably  met  it  directly  and  courageously. 
He  defended  the  fugitive-slave  law  precisely  as  he 


THE   GREAT  COMPROMISE          131 

had,  almost  twenty  years  before,  defended  the  bank 
policy  of  Jackson  and  Van  Buren  when  no  one  in 
Illinois  supposed  that  there  was  anything  to  be 
said  for  it.  So  the  great  Compromise  came  into 
being.  Up  to  this  time  it  cannot  be  said — and  this 
is  an  important  thing  to  remember — that  Douglas 
had  shown  any  special  consideration  to  the  South, 
or  to  slavery.  His  position  was  identical  with  that 
taken  by  Webster  and  Clay  and  other  Whigs.  In 
deed,  the  sneer  of  Jefferson  Davis  directed  at  Doug 
las  as  the  man  entitled  to  the  chief  credit  for  legis 
lation  which  in  no  way,  as  Davis  said,  benefited 
the  South,  may  perhaps  be  taken  as  the  opening 
of  the  rift  that  was  later  to  split  the  Democratic 
party,  and  to  make  impossible  the  realization  of 
the  ambition  of  Douglas  to  be  President.  The  time 
was  soon  to  come  when  he  would  be  forced  to  choose 
between  the  South  and  the  nation.  Meanwhile, 
the  manoeuvring  went  on.  But  the  slavery  question 
would  not  down,  though  Douglas  held  that  the 
Compromise  was  a  final  settlement,  and  declared 
that  he  would  never  speak  again  in  Congress  on 
the  slavery  question. 


CHAPTER  VI 
COMPROMISE  AND  FUGITIVE  SLAVES 

BUT  the  Congress  that  enacted  the  compromise 
legislation  did  not  wholly  neglect  other  matters. 
It  is  a  pleasure  to  turn  from  the  efforts  to  maintain 
the  Union  by  political  action  to  the  effort  to  bind 
the  people — rather  than  the  States — together  by 
the  construction  of  a  great  North  and  South  rail 
road  from  Chicago  to  the  Gulf.,  For  several  years 
Douglas  had  been  greatly  interested  in  the  con 
struction  of  what  was  later  known  as  the  Illinois 
Central  Railroad.  As  a  member  of  the  Senate  he 
had  introduced  a  bill  authorizing  a  grant  of  public 
lands  to  the  State  of  Illinois  to  aid  in  the  building 
of  the  road.  The  bill  was  passed  in  the  Senate, 
only  to  meet  with  defeat  in  the  House.  There  were, 
of  course,  constitutional  objections,  and  these,  with 
the  jealousy  of  the  States  without  public  lands, 
and  the  opposition  of  the  old  States  to  the  new, 
were  sufficient  to  prevent  the  passage  of  the  bill. 
Douglas  realized  that  he  would  have  to  give  the 
scheme  a  truly  national  aspect  if  he  hoped  to  suc 
ceed.  He  realized  that  Illinois  was  almost  as  sec 
tional  as  the  Union  itself  was,  a  truth  that  was  im 
pressed  on  him  when  he  removed  to  Chicago  in  1847. 

132 


FUGITIVE  SLAVES  133 

What  he  first  sought,  therefore,  was  unity  in  his  own 
State,  and  a  development  of  real  State  consciousness. 
Those  of  us  to-day  who  realize  what  a  great  part  the 
railroads  have  played  in  eliminating  the  perils  of 
sectionalism  must  credit  Douglas  with  a  large  vision. 
Indeed,  the  national  sense  was  strong  in  him.  The 
believer  in  squatter  sovereignty  believed  in  the 
nation  too,  and  in  the  national  idea.  He  certainly 
had  a  broader  vision  than  many  New  Englanders 
who  were  filled  with  apprehension  at  every  exten 
sion  of  the  national  boundaries. 

But  Douglas  needed  votes,  and  he  went  about 
getting  them  in  a  very  practical  way.  He  looked 
to  the  East  and  the  South  for  them,  not  of  course 
neglecting  other  sections  of  the  country.  He  offered 
to  the  officials  of  the  Mobile  Road  to  include  in 
his  bill  a  grant  of  lands  to  their  road  as  part  of  the 
system  of  the  Illinois  Central  in  return  for  the  votes 
of  the  senators  and  representatives  of  Alabama  and 
Mississippi.  When  Douglas  presented  his  Illinois 
Central  bill  in  the  Senate,  Senator  King  of  Ala 
bama  offered  an  amendment — said  to  have  been 
prepared  by  Douglas — providing  for  similar  land 
grants  to  his  State  for  the  purpose  of  continuing 
the  Illinois  Central  to  Mobile,  an  amendment  which 
was  adopted  without  division.  There  were  hints 
of  tariff  concessions  to  win  Eastern  support,  but 
Douglas  is  authority  for  the  statement  that  what 
won  the  support  of  New  England,  New  York,  and 


134  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Pennsylvania  was  the  promise  of  Eastern  connec 
tions  with  the  North  and  South  line.  The  amended 
bill  easily  passed  the  Senate,  and  was  agreed  to 
by  the  house  on  the  day  of  the  passage  of  the 
last  of  the  compromise  measures.  There  was  un 
doubtedly  a  bargain,  but  it  was  for  a  great  object. 
There  was  "nothing  in  it"  for  Douglas  except  in 
creased  popularity,  but  there  was  much  in  it  for  the 
nation.  "Nationality/'  said  Douglas,  "had  been 
imparted  to  the  project."  The  thought  was  not 
simply  of  the  exchange  of  commodities  as  between 
the  two  sections,  and  building  up  trade  between  the 
North  and  South,  but  of  bringing  the  people  them 
selves  closer  together,  and  of  making  it  possible  for 
them  to  intermingle.  "As  it  is  to  connect  the  North 
and  South  so  thoroughly,"  said  Senator  Shields, 
Douglas's  colleague,  "it  may  serve  to  get  rid  of  even 
the  Wilmot  proviso,  and  tie  us  together  so  effectu 
ally  that  the  idea  of  separation  will  be  impossible." 
If  the  road  has  not  realized  the  anticipations 
that  its  projectors  had  of  it  as  a  sort  of  melting- 
pot,  it,  nevertheless,  has  played  an  important  part 
in  the  life  of  the  nation.  The  fact  that  Douglas 
and  the  others  entertained  such  an  idea  is  of  itself 
proof  that  they  were  animated  by  no  sordid  motive. 
A  North  and  South  trade  was  quickly  built  up,  and 
the  road  was  of  great  service  to  the  Union  during 
the  Civil  War.  But  it  did  not  make  "the  idea  of 
separation  impossible."  And  before  many  years 


FUGITIVE  SLAVES  135 

the  Wilmot  proviso,  in  the  form  of  the  Emancipa 
tion  Proclamation,  was  applied  to  the  whole  na 
tion.    The  reply  of  Douglas  to  Webster  is  not  all 
buncombe  or  bombast:    " There  is  a  power  in  this 
nation  greater  than  either  the  North  or  the  South 
— a  growing,  increasing,  swelling  power,  that  will 
be  able  to  speak  the  law  to  this  nation,  and  to  execute 
the  law  as  spoken.   That  power  is  the  country  known 
as  the  Great  West — the  Valley  of  the  Mississippi, 
one  and  indivisible  from  the  Gulf  to  the  Great  Lakes; 
and  stretching  on  the  one  side  and  the  other,  to 
the  extreme  sources  of  the  Ohio  and  Missouri — 
from   the  Alleghanies   to   the  Rocky   Mountains. 
There,  sir,  is  the  hope  of  this  nation — the  resting- 
place  of  the  power  that  is  not  only  to  control,  but 
to  save  the  Union.    We  furnish  the  water  that  makes 
the  Mississippi,  and  we  intend  to  follow,  navigate 
and  use  it  until  it  loses  itself  in  the  briny  ocean. 
So  with  the  St.  Lawrence.    We  intend  to  keep  open 
and  enjoy  both  these  great  outlets  to  the  ocean, 
and  all  between  them  we  intend  to  take  under  our 
special  protection,  and  keep  and  preserve  as  one 
free,  happy  and  united  people.    This  is  the  mission 
of  the  great  Mississippi  Valley,  the  heart  and  soul 
of  the  nation  and  the  Continent."    It  reads  much 
like  the  meditations  of  those  of  our  day  who  have 
just  discovered  the  Middle  West. 

Douglas,  says  Mr.  Rhodes,  "was  a  great  friend 
to  the  material  development  of  the  West,  and  espe- 


136  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

cially  of  his  own  State,  having  broad  views  of  the 
future  growth  of  his  section  of  the  country."  That, 
of  course,  is  true,  but  his  feeling  in  regard  to  the 
West  was  not  sectional,  but  national.  What  he 
saw,  at  a  time  when  it  was  sparsely  settled,  or  not 
settled  at  all,  was  its  destiny.  Its  value  to  the  na 
tion,  and  its  influence  on  its  life — these  were  the 
things  that  interested  him.  Back  of  his  "Manifest 
Destiny "  doctrine,  even  in  its  most  jingoistic  and 
foolish  form,  was  a  realization  of  the  power  of  the 
nation.  Perhaps  it  was  because  of  this  feeling-^ 
that  is  that  the  West  was,  or  would  be,  truly  na 
tional — that  he  was  convinced  .that  slavery  could 
find  no  lodgment  in  its  territory.  It  seems  strange 
to  us  to-day,  who  have  seen  the  West  control  a  presi 
dential  election,  that  other  men  should  have  been 
so  blind  to  the  future,  or  that  it  should  be  thought 
remarkable  that  Douglas  should  have  been  so  true 
a  prophet.  Yet  short-sightedness  is  the  commonest 
of  human  failings,  and  the  inability  of  one  section 
of  as  vast  a  country  as  this  to  understand  other 
sections  has  by  no  means  disappeared.  From  the 
day  that  he  first  set  foot  on  the  soil  of  Illinois  Doug 
las  seems  never  to  have  been  unattended  by  the 
vision  of  the  future  greatness  of  the  West.  Prob 
ably  the  facts  have  not  gone  beyond  his  dream. 
He  was  no  romanticist  or  visionary,  and.  certainly 
he  was  quite  without  imagination  in  the  poetic  sense 
of  the  word.  But  he  was  clear-sighted  and  impres- 


FUGITIVE  SLAVES  137 

sionable,  which  is  more  than  can  be  said  for  some  of 
his  contemporaries,  even  those  who  were  far  greater 
than  he.  So  though  there  may  have  been  a  deal 
in  connection  with  his  railroad  bill,  there  was  much 
more. 

Douglas  always  showed  a  keen  interest  in  the 
people  residing  in  the  unorganized  Territories.  Even 
his  vehemence  in  the  assertion  of  our  supposed  claims 
in  Oregon  was  in  part  the  result  of  his  feeling  that 
the  people  should  have  some  form  of  government, 
and  the  protection  of  the  law.  Others  thought  that 
they  might  be  left  to  themselves,  and  to  get  along 
as  best  they  could.  There  were  some  who  even 
felt  that  Oregon  was  not  part  of  the  Union — or  at 
least  that  it  ought  not  to  be.  It  was  suggested  that 
the  people  should  be  protected  only  till  they  were 
prepared  to  form  a  republic  of  their  own.  The  men 
of  those  days  were  great  believers  in  what  they  spoke 
of  as  the  laws  of  nature.  By  those  laws  it  was  said 
by  Webster,  and  Douglas  also,  that  slavery  would  be 
excluded  from  the  territory  acquired  from  Mexico. 
Others  argued  that  there  were  "natural"  barriers 
beyond  which  we  could  not  go  without  jeoparding 
the  Union.  Oregon  lay  beyond  those  barriers,  and 
hence  the  suggestion  that  it  should  form  its  own 
government  without  any  relations,  but  those  of 
friendship,  with  Washington.  This,  to  Douglas,  was 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  disunion.  He  argued 
that  the  logic  of  this  argument  would  lead  inevitably 


138  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

to  the  establishment  of  many  republics.  But  at 
that  time  most  of  the  country  west  of  the  Mississippi 
was  known  as  the  Great  American  Desert,  and  Ore 
gon  was  farther  away  from  Boston  and  New  York 
than  the  centre  of  China  is  now.  But  it  was  not 
so  far  from  Illinois,  and  Douglas  himself  had  been 
a  pioneer.  He  knew  something  of  the  hardships 
endured  by  the  emigrants,  and  of  the  perils  by  which 
they  were  surrounded.  Indeed,  he  recognized  no 
barriers  to  American  expansion  on  this  continent. 
"I  would,"  he  said,  "blot  out  the  lines  on  the  map 
which  now  mark  our  national  boundaries  on  this 
continent,  and  make  the  area  qf  liberty  as  broad 
as  the  continent  itself." 

Later,  as  we  shall  see,  he  argued  strongly  for  the 
elimination  of  British  influence  in  Central  America, 
opposed  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  and  demanded 
its  denunciation.  Here,  of  course,  a  question  of 
foreign  policy  was  involved,  but  the  attitude  of 
Douglas  was  the  same  as  that  assumed  by  him  in 
the  case  of  Oregon.  As  he  desired  no  joint  occupa 
tion  in  the  latter  case,  he  was  opposed  to  any  partner 
ship  with  Great  Britain  in  the  former.  Indeed, 
but  for  its  rather  flamboyant  oratory,  the  speech 
does  not  read  unlike  those  delivered  a  few  years 
ago  in  connection  with  the  same  treaty,  and  with 
our  right  to  fortify  the  canal.  He  no  doubt  foresaw 
that  the  treaty  subjected  this  government  to  limi 
tations  from  which  it  would  one  day  desire  to  be 


FUGITIVE  SLAVES  139 

free,  as  has  proved  to  be  the  case.  He  was  for  break 
ing  through  them  even  at  the  cost  of  war.  But  in 
the  back  of  his  mind  was  the  feeling  that  this  con 
tinent  ought  to  be  all-American.  He  was  right 
about  Texas,  but  wrong  in  defending  the  methods 
by  which  it  was  won;  right  about  Oregon,  though 
wrong  in  insisting  on  the  54-40  boundary,  again 
at  the  cost  of  war.  What  he  did  not  see  was  that 
this  Northern  Hemisphere  might  be  in  a  very  real 
sense  American  without  the  assertion  of  American 
political  supremacy  over  Canada.  Not  even  the 
detractors  of  Douglas  can  deny  that  he  was  broadly 
and  aggressively  national  and  American,  and  was 
never  afraid  of  an  expansion  which  all  can  now  see 
was  as  desirable  as  it  was  inevitable.  Nor  did  he 
believe  that  there  was  anything  national  in  slavery, 
or  ever  could  be. 

It  was  during  the  session  of  Congress  that  passed 
the  compromise  bills,  namely  April  22,  1850,  that 
President  Taylor  transmitted  to  the  Senate  the 
treaty  agreed  on  between  his  Secretary  of  State, 
John  M.  Clayton,  and  the  British  Minister,  Sir 
Henry  Lytton  Bulwer.  It  was  before  the  Senate 
for  just  one  month,  and  was  the  subject  of  a  debate 
that  was  no  doubt  very  interesting.  But  as  the 
session  was  executive,  there  is  no  record  of  the 
speeches.  On  May  22  it  was  ratified  by  a  vote  of 
42  to  11.  The  eleven  who  voted  against  it  were 
Atchison  of  Missouri,  Borland  of  Arkansas,  Bright 


140  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

of  Indiana,  Clemens  of  Alabama,  Davis  of  Missis 
sippi,  Dickinson  of  New  York,  Douglas  of  Illinois, 
Turney  of  Tennessee,  Walker  of  Wisconsin,  Whit- 
comb  of  Indiana,  and  Yulee  of  Florida.  Among 
those  voting  for  ratification  were  Bell  of  Tennessee, 
Berrien  of  Georgia,  Cass  of  Michigan,  Chase  of 
Ohio,  Clay  of  Kentucky,  Corwin  of  Ohio,  Foote 
of  Mississippi,  Hale  of  New  Hampshire,  King  of 
Alabama,  Mangum  of  North  Carolina,  Seward  of 
New  York,  Shields  of  Illinois,  and  Webster  of  Mas 
sachusetts.  There  was  no  sectional  or  party  divi 
sion.  It  is  evident  that  the  weight  of  the  Senate, 
and  not  merely  numerical  strength,  was  for  ratifica 
tion.  Douglas  enrolled  himself  with  a  comparatively 
insignificant  minority.  He  had  declined  to  serve 
on  the  committee  on  foreign  relations  because  he 
disapproved  of  the  policy  of  the  majority.  Later 
he  made  the  ground  of  his  opposition  sufficiently 
plain,  when  the  issue  was  raised  in  another  way — in 
such  a  way,  as  he  thought,  as  to  free  him  from  any 
obligation  to  observe  secrecy.  Within  little  more 
than  a  month  after  the  ratification  of  the  treaty 
President  Taylor  died,  and  was  succeeded  by  Mil- 
lard  Fillmore,  Daniel  Webster  becoming  Secretary 
of  State  in  place  of  Mr.  Clayton. 

Congress  reassembled  in  December,  1850,  and 
listened  to  a  message  from  President  Fillmore 
warmly  commending  the  compromise  legislation. 
The  measures,  he  said,  "were  adopted  in  a  spirit 
of  conciliation  and  for  the  purpose  of  conciliation. 


FUGITIVE  SLAVES  141 

I  believe  that  a  great  majority  of  our  fellow-citizens 
sympathize  in  that  spirit  and  purpose,  and  in  the 
main  approve,  and  are  prepared,  in  all  respects, 
to  sustain,  these  enactments."  The  Southern  mem 
bers  were  not  slow  in  making  known  their  point 
of  view.  Ten  Northern  and  thirty-four  Southern 
members  signed  a  pledge  binding  them  to  withhold 
support  for  any  office  from  any  man  "who  is  not 
known  to  be  opposed  to  the  disturbance  of  this  settle 
ment,  and  to  the  renewal,  in  any  form,  of  agitation 
upon  the  subject  of  slavery."  The  Northern  Demo 
crats-  and  the  Northern  Whigs  for  the  most  part 
accepted  the  settlement.  Even  the  Seward  Whigs 
agreed  that  the  measures  were  the  law,  and  that 
even  the  fugitive-slave  law  should  be  obeyed,  though 
they  demanded  its  repeal.  For  a  time  it  looked  as 
though  peace  had  settled  down  over  the  land.  But 
it  was  only  a  truce,  as  will  soon  be  seen.  The  trouble 
arose  over  attempts,  successful  and  other,  to  enforce 
the  fugitive-slave  law.  As  the  enforcement  of  that 
law  was  held  by  the  South  to  be  essential  to  the 
success  of  the  Compromise,  and  as  the  North  was 
soon  in  revolt  against  the  law,  the  bitter  feeling 
between  the  two  sections  was  greatly  intensified. 
Even  those  who  favored  the  Compromise — that  is 
those  in  the  North — soon  came  to  feel  that  what 
had  been  proclaimed  as  such  a  triumph  of  states 
manship  might  be  found  to  be  of  little  or  no  value 
as  a  factor  in  preserving  the  unity  of  the  nation. 
But  the  peace  did  not  long  endure.  Indeed,  there 


142  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

was  an  apparent  nervousness  back  of  all  declara 
tions  that  the  settlement  was  permanent,  such  as 
that  signed  by  those  who  pledged  themselves  to 
oppose  for  any  office  any  man  who  should  reopen 
the  vexed  question.  Very  early  in  the  session  Clay 
spoke  with  great  emphasis  of  the  peace  and  quiet 
that  prevailed  throughout  the  country,  and  ex 
pressed  the  belief  that  the  session  would  be  undis 
turbed  by  discussions  of  slavery.  The  Whig  Almanac 
for  1851  announced  "as  yet  all  seems  quiet  in  the 
capitol,  and  there  is  a  prospect  of  a  quiet  and  useful 
session.  May  that  hope  be  realized!"  But  all 
such  pious  hopes  were  disappointed.  For  early 
in  the  session  Joshua  R.  Giddings  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  denounced  certain  action  that  had 
recently  been  taken  under  the  fugitive^slave  law, 
while  Clay  in  the  Senate  opened  up  the  whole  ques 
tion  by  presenting  petitions  calling  for  a  more  effec 
tual  suppression  of  the  slave-trade,  and  introduced 
a  resolution  demanding  legislation  forbidding  the 
use  of  American  vessels  in  that  trade.  This  action 
of  the  chief  of  the  compromisers  was  all  the  more 
remarkable  in  view  of  the  fact  that  he  had  only 
a  few  days  before  signed  the  declaration  above  re 
ferred  to,  and  had  expressed  the  hope  and  belief 
that  there  would  be  no  discussion  of  the  subject. 
Did  he,  deep  down  in  his  heart,  believe  that  there 
had  been  any  real  settlement?  But  the  storm  broke 
when  news  came  of  the  rescue  of  the  negro  Shad- 


FUGITIVE  SLAVES  143 

rach,  who  had  in  Boston  been  taken  and  held  as  a 
fugitive  slave.  There  had  been  trouble  even  before 
this.  Two  negroes,  known  to  be  fugitives,  had  been 
taken  from  Boston  to  England — where,  of  course, 
they  at  once  became  free.  A  Virginia  slaveholder 
had  only  with  the  greatest  difficulty  and  at  much 
expense  succeeded  in  securing  the  return  of  one 
of  his  negroes  from  Pennsylvania.  In  Detroit  it 
was  necessary  to  call  out  the  troops  in  order  to  quell 
a  mob  bent  on  the  rescue  of  a  fugitive.  Although 
there  were  said  to  be  15,000  fugitives  in  the  free 
States  only  four  or  five  had  been  reclaimed  under 
the  law. 

But  the  rescue  of  Shadrach  created  as  much  ex 
citement  as  a  declaration  of  war  on  the  United 
States  would  have  done.  Indeed,  the  act  was  con 
strued  as  an  act  of  war — war  on  the  law,  the  Con 
stitution,  and  the  authority  of  Congress.  The  Presi 
dent  issued  a  proclamation  calling  on  all  good  citizens 
to  observe  the  law,  and  on  all  officers,  civil  or  mili 
tary,  to  quell  all  unlawful  conspiracies,  and  to  aid 
in  the  arrest  of  all  who  should  violate  the  law.  Five 
men  were  indicted,  but  as  it  was  impossible  to  get  a 
jury  to  convict  them,  they  were  freed.  Yet  Boston 
was  by  no  means  radical  on  the  slavery  issue.  In 
deed  the  people  of  Boston  had,  almost  twenty  years 
before,  mobbed  William  Lloyd  Garrison.  They 
had,  too,  as  a  whole  stood  by  Webster  after  his  7th 
of  March  speech.  They  showed  their  comparatively 


144  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

moderate  temper  a  few  weeks  later  when  another 
fugitive,  Thomas  Sims,  was  arrested.  The  man  did 
have  a  fair  trial,  and  it  was  proved  that  he  was 
a  fugitive.  He  was  taken  to  the  ship  that  was  to 
carry  him  South  by  300  policemen,  and  the  militia 
was  put  under  arms.  But  there  was  not  the  slightest 
disturbance.  The  President's  proclamation  was 
obeyed.  When  it  was  proposed  to  hold  a  meeting 
of  protest  a  few  nights  later,  the  use  of  Faneuil  Hall 
was  denied  to  the  remonstrants.  But  these  two 
incidents  had  a  great  effect  on  public  opinion  in 
Boston.  Two  meetings  were  held,  one  addressed 
by  Henry  Wilson  and  Thomas  Wentworth  Higgin- 
son,  and  the  other  by  William  Lloyd  Garrison. 
Theodore  Parker  and  Wendell  Phillips  also  spoke 
to  large  audiences  on  the  day  of  the  arrest  of  Sims. 
It  was  at  least  made  clear  that  in  Boston  the  sur 
render  of  fugitive  slaves  would  not  be  a  mere  matter 
of  form.  In  this  crisis  the  city  was  neutral,  as  far 
as  it  was  represented  by  its  authorities,  who  a  few 
days  later  denied  the  use  of  Faneuil  Hall  to  the 
Whigs  and  Democrats  who  wished  to  tender  a  pub 
lic  reception  to  Daniel  Webster. 

But  the  Southern  representatives  in  Congress 
began  to  see  that  it  would  be  no  easy  matter 
to  reconcile  the  North  to  the  fugitive-slave  law. 
Whigs  and  Democrats  joined  in  condemning  all 
attempts  to  nullify  the  law.  Douglas  spoke  with 
his  usual  vehemence,  refusing  to  regard  the  rescue 


FUGITIVE  SLAVES  145 

of  Shadrach  as  trivial,  for  it  was  a  conspiracy  against 
the  government.  He  said  that  there  was  an  or 
ganization  in  many  States  the  object  of  which  was 
to  defy  the  law  and  thwart  its  execution,  and  he 
was  right.  For  abolitionism  was  growing  popular, 
liberty  societies  were  springing  into  life,  and  the 
Underground  Railway  soon  began  to  do  a  very  ex 
tensive  business.  But,  nevertheless,  the  feeling  in 
both  sections  was  still  generally  favorable  to  the 
Compromise,  and  the  leaders  of  both  parties  were 
anxious  to  minimize  the  slavery  issue,  in  the  hope 
that  it  might  gradually  disappear. 

In  the  Senate  Clay  labored  strenuously  for  peace, 
and  was  measurably  successful  in  calming  the  ap 
prehensions  of  the  South.  He  spoke  of  the  many 
cases  in  which  there  had  been  no  difficulty  in  secur 
ing  the  return  of  slaves,  although  he  added  there 
must  be  difficulty  in  enforcing  such  a  law  as  this. 
It  was  not  easy  to  secure  the  full  and  complete  en 
forcement  of  any  law.  The  President,  he  was  sure, 
would  do  his  full  duty,  since  both  he  and  his  cabinet 
were  fully  committed  to  the  enforcement  of  the 
statute,  as  to  the  whole  Compromise,  which  had, 
he  thought,  "worked  a  miracle."  There  was  no 
more  agitation  about  the  Wilmot  proviso,  Cali 
fornia,  or  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia.  In 
his  opinion  the  South  ought  not  to  be  too  exacting, 
since  it  had  fared  so  well,  and  the  country  as  a  whole 
had  benefited  so  greatly  from  the  Compromise.  Clay 


146  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

said  that  he  would  be  willing  to  dispense  with  the 
proclamation  now  required,  and  authorize  the  Presi 
dent  to  call  out  the  military  power  whenever  there 
was  reason  to  expect  a  disturbance  in  connection 
with  the  arrest  of  a  slave.  The  whole  speech  was 
designed  to  buttress  the  Compromise  and  to  win 
support  for  it  in  the  South.  He  said  that  the  trouble 
was  caused  not  by  the  people  of  the  North  as  a  whole 
but  by  the  abolitionists — who,  it  may  be  said,  were 
forced  to  carry  many  burdens,  all  of  which  did  not 
rightfully  belong  on  their  shoulders.  Southern 
senators  generally  took  Clay's  view,  though  there 
were  those  who  insisted  that  the  law  would  never 
be  enforced  till  the  people  of  the  North  accepted 
it  "cordially."  The  antislavery  senators,  on  the 
other  hand,  did  not  assent  to  Clay's  remarks — they 
knew  that  the  law  would  never  be  accepted  "cor 
dially."  But  peace  was  restored,  and  the  judiciary 
committee  to  which  the  President's  message  was 
referred  reported  that  no  change  in  the  law  was 
advisable  or  necessary.  Clay,  believing  that  the 
trouble  was  over,  said  that  he  "would  be  extremely 
delighted  if  the  subject  of  the  tariff  of  1846  could! 
be  taken  up  in  a  liberal,  kind  and  national  spirit." 


CHAPTER  VII 
PRESIDENT-MAKING 

THE  summer  of  1851  saw  the  launching  of  many 
presidential  movements.  Douglas,  despite  his  youth, 
had  been  "  mentioned "  in  1848,  but  he  probably 
did  not  think  of  himself  as  a  serious  quantity. 
But  now  he  did — as  did  many  others.  That  he 
was  a  national  figure,  and  a  man  of  influence  and 
power,  was  everywhere  recognized.  He  had,  too, 
popular  qualities  and  undoubted  "  magnetism."  His 
record  in  Congress  had  brought  him  prominently 
before  the  people,  and  his  work  in  that  body  had 
been  generally  approved.  Indeed,  it  was  thought 
by  many  in  1851  that  he  had  the  best  chance  of 
winning  the  Democratic  nomination.  Both  parties 
seemed  disposed  to  let  the  slavery  question  slumber, 
as  was  natural  with  a  presidential  campaign  just 
ahead.  The  Whigs  were  not  prepared  to  force  the 
moral  issue  lest  they  offend  the  Southern  members 
of  the  party,  while  the  Democratic  leaders  sought 
to  conciliate  the  Northern  Democrats.  But  there 
was  nevertheless  some  excitement  over  several  futile 
attempts  to  enforce  the  fugitive-slave  law  and  to 
punish  those  who  defied  it.  Among  these  latter 
were  men  of  the  highest  character,  such  as  Gerrit 

147 


148  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Smith,  an  old  abolitionist,  who  actively  led  in  the 
rescue  of  a  supposed  fugitive.  In  one  of  these  af 
fairs  a  slave-owner  was  killed  and  his  son  wounded. 
Not  one  of  the  accused  men  was  convicted.  Mr. 
Smith  defied  the  courts  to  bring  him  to  trial,  and 
openly  avowed  his  part  in  the  proceedings.  The 
challenge  was  not  accepted.  Thus  within  less  than 
a  year  after  the  passage  of  the  law  it  had  become 
clear  that  its  enforcement  was  practically  impos 
sible  in  the  North.  Once  again  it  was  demonstrated 
that  laws  could  be  of  no  force  unless  upheld  by  public 
sentiment.  It  was  also  clear  that  the  Northern 
people  could  not  be  brought  to  accept  the  Southern 
view  that  men,  even  though  black,  were  merely 
property.  As  Professor  Sumner  would  have  said, 
the  fugitive-slave  law  was  in  conflict  with  Northern 
mores.  But  the  remarkable  thing  about  it  all  is 
that  the  South  did  not  seem  to  be  much  excited. 
On  the  contrary,  there  was  during  the  year  1851 
a  strengthening  of  Union  sentiment.  The  Southern 
Rights  Association,  which  met  at  Charleston,  S.  C., 
in  May,  had  declared  in  favor  of  secession,  and  was 
supported  in  its  decision  by  twenty-eight  out  of 
thirty  prominent  newspapers.  The  people  of  South 
Carolina  were  prepared  to  take  this  step  even  though 
they  had  to  take  it  alone.  But  in  the  election  of 
delegates  to  a  State  convention,  which  took  place 
in  October,  two-thirds  of  the  delegates  chosen  were 
opposed  to  secession  without  the  co-operation  of 


PRESIDENT-MAKING  149 

other  States,  which  meant  that  they  were  for  the 
Union.  In  Mississippi,  which  was  hardly  less  rad 
ical,  Senator  Foote  and  Jefferson  Davis  were  candi 
dates  for  governor,  the  former  of  the  Unionist,  and 
the  latter  of  the  States'  rights  party.  The  canvass 
was  thorough,  and  the  issues  were  exhaustively 
discussed.  Foote  was  elected  by  a  majority  of 
1,009.  The  verdict  was  not  impressive,  but  it  was 
nevertheless  against  secession.  The  State  conven 
tion,  delegates  to  which  had  been  elected  prior  to 
the  election  of  governor,  committed  the  State  to 
the  Compromise,  and  declared  that  the  right  of 
secession  was  not  sanctioned  by  the  federal  Con 
stitution.  The  situation  was  clearly  improving. 
Little  was  expected  of  the  Congress  that  met  Decem 
ber  1,  1851.  Every  one  felt  that  it  would  be  little 
more  than  a  President-making  body.  Benton  was 
no  longer  a  member  of  the  Senate,  having  been  de 
feated,  after  a  gallant  fight,  by  the  proslavery  men 
of  Missouri  because  he  would  not  yield  his  convic 
tions  on  slavery.  Chase  of  Ohio,  Seward  of  New 
York,  and  Hale  of  New  Hampshire,  strong  opponents 
of  slavery,  were  reinforced  by  Benjamin  F.  Wade 
of  Ohio,  and  Charles  Sumner  of  Massachusetts, 
who  sat  in  Webster's  seat.  All  these  men  had  an 
intense  hatred  for  slavery,  and  they  were  not  slow 
to  show  it — especially  Wade  and  Sumner.  The 
latter  soon  proposed  a  repeal  of  the  fugitive-slave 
law,  the  only  effect  of  which  Douglas  thought  would 


150  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

be  to  "fan  the  flames  of  discord  that  have  so 
recently  divided  this  great  people."  The  Illinois 
senator  soon  plunged  into  a  debate  over  the  old 
issue,  challenged,  as  he  thought,  thereto,  by  Foote 
of  Mississippi,  who  on  the  day  after  the  session 
opened  offered  a  resolution  declaring  the  compromise 
measures  "a  definite  adjustment  and  settlement." 
The  Compromise  still  needed  much  buttressing,  espe 
cially  as  the  Southern  men  made  it  clear  that  they 
regarded  the  fugitive-slave  law  as  the  crux  of  the 
whole  situation.  Douglas,  feeling  that  his  consis 
tency,  was  impeached  by  the  charge  that  he  had  not 
voted  for  the  law,  felt  that  it  was  necessary  for  him 
to  defend  himself.  He  gave  the  same  explanation 
for  his  failure  to  do  so  that  he  had  given  in  his 
Chicago  speech  a  few  weeks  before,  and  it  was  suffi 
cient.  But  he  had  also  been  charged  with  having 
voted  for  the  Wilmot  proviso,  which  was  of  course 
the  fact.  He  showed  that  he  had  voted  against  the 
proviso  several  times,  and  that  whenever  he  had 
voted  for  it  it  had  been  in  obedience  to  instructions 
from  his  constituents.  He  had  always  declared  that 
those  votes  were  not  his  own,  but  those  of  the  peo 
ple  whom  he  represented.  "Notwithstanding  these 
instructions,"  he  said,  "I  wrote  the  bills  and  re 
ported  them  from  the  committee  on  Territories  with 
out  the  prohibitions,  in  order  that  the  record  might 
show  what  my  opinions  were;  but,  lest  the  trick 
might  fail,  a  Free-Soil  senator  offered  an  amend- 


PRESIDENT-MAKING  151 

ment  in  the  precise  language  of  my  instructions.  I 
knew  that  the  amendment  could  not  prevail,  even 
if  my  colleague  and  myself  recorded  the  vote  of 
our  State  in  its  favor.  But  if  I  resigned  my  place 
to  an  abolitionist,  it  was  almost  certain  that  the 
bills  would  fail  on  their  passage.  After  consulting 
with  my  colleague  and  with  many  senators  friendly 
to  the  bills,  I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  duty  re 
quired  that  I  should  retain  my  seat.  I  was  prepared 
to  fight  and  defy  abolitionism  in  all  its  forms,  but 
I  was  not  willing  to  repudiate  the  settled  doctrine 
of  my  State  in  regard  to  the  right  of  instruction." 
Presumably  he  would  have  resigned  had  he  known 
that  his  vote  would  have  carried  the  proviso — 
though  he  did  not  say  so. 

It  was  fortunate  for  Douglas  that  he  had  so  clear 
an  argument,  and  one  supported  by  a  record  that 
had  from  his  early  manhood  been  entirely  consistent 
with  it.  For  the  situation  was  exceedingly  critical. 
He  was  an  avowed  candidate  for  the  presidency, 
and  was  appealing  to  the  country  to  support  the 
Compromise,  and  to  rally  to  him  as  one  of  its  prin 
cipal  authors  and  chief  defenders.  The  issue,  he 
foresaw,  would  be  one  of  the  most  important  ones 
in  the  campaign  that  was  soon  to  open.  Indeed 
Douglas  was  already  sounding  the  people,  and  plan 
ning  his  campaign  for  the  nomination.  Was  Foote's 
speech  designed  to  cripple  him,  and  if  so  did  he  speak 
for  any  considerable  element  in  the  South?  The 


152  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

blow,  whether  maliciously  designed  or  not,  was 
shrewdly  struck.  The  South  had  been  bitterly  op 
posed  to  the  Wilmot  proviso,  and  it  had  been  sur 
rendered  by  Webster  and  Clay  in  order  to  placate 
that  section,  and  win  its  support  for  the  Compromise. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  fugitive-slave  law  was  held 
to  be  an  essential  part  of  the  Compromise,  and  was 
believed  by  many  to  be  the  only  thing  that  the  South 
got  out  of  it.  Nothing  worse,  therefore,  from  a 
political  point  of  view,  could  be  said  of  a  presiden 
tial  candidate  t/han  that  he  had  voted  for  the  Wil 
mot  proviso,  and  had  not  voted  for  the  fugitive- 
slave  law.  There  was  nothing  for  Douglas  to  do 
but  set  matters  straight.  In  doing  so  he  greatly 
strengthened  his  position,  and  won  the  approval 
of  his  party  associates.  Referring  to  his  Chicago 
speech  he  said:  "This  was  the  first  public  speech 
ever  made  in  a  free  State  in  defense  of  the  fugitive- 
slave  law,  and  the  Chicago  meeting  was  the  first 
public  assemblage  in  any  free  State  that  determined 
to  support  and  sustain  it.  At  Chicago  the  reaction 
commenced.  There  rebellion  and  treason  received 
their  first  check,  the  fanatical  and  revolutionary 
spirit  was  rebuked,  and  the  supremacy  of  the  Con 
stitution  and  laws  asserted  and  maintained.  I  claim 
no  credit  for  the  part  I  acted.  I  did  no  more  than 
my  duty  as  a  citizen  and  a  senator.  I  claim  to  have 
done  my  duty,  and  for  that  I  was  entitled  to  exemp 
tion  from  the  repeated  charges  by  the  special  organ 


PRESIDENT-MAKING  153 

of  the  administration,  and  other  partisan  prints, 
of  having  dodged  the  question.  I  never  dodge  a 
question.  I  never  shrink  from  any  responsibility 
which  my  position  and  duty  justly  devolve  upon 
me.  I  never  hesitate  to  give  an  unpopular  vote, 
or  to  meet  an  indignant  community,  when  I  know 
I  am  right.  My  political  opponents  in  my  own 
State  have  never  made  such  a  charge  against  me, 
and  I  feel  that  upon  this  point  I  can  appeal  to  the 
Senate  with  perfect  safety  for  a  unanimous  verdict 
in  my  favor."  "The  Democratic  party,"  he  said, 
"is  as  good  a  Union  party  as  I  want,  and  I  wish  to 
preserve  its  principles  and  its  organization  and  to 
triumph  upon  its  old  issues.  I  desire  no  new  tests, 
no  interpolations  into  the  old  creed."  He  declared 
it  to  be  his  purpose  never  to  address  Congress  again 
on  the  subject  of  slavery.  The  defense  served  its 
purpose,  though  there  must  have  been  some  who 
wondered  whether  the  casting  of  a  popular  vote  un 
der  instructions  was  not  equivalent  to  refusing  to 
cast  an  unpopular  vote.  A  Southern  senator  many 
years  later  refused  to  vote,  in  obedience  to  instruc 
tions,  for  a  financial  policy  which  he  disapproved; 
he  voted  his  convictions,  and  tendered  his  resigna 
tion — which  was  not  accepted.  Perhaps  the  same 
method  would  have  served  in  this  case.  However, 
Douglas  made  it  clear  that  he  was,  and  always  had 
been,  opposed  to  the  Wilmot  proviso,  and  a  friend 
to  the  fugitive-slave  law.  There  could  have  been 


154  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

no  doubt  in  any  mind  on  those  points.  Though  it 
might  still  have  been  asked  whether,  in  a  crisis, 
he  would  hold  his  convictions  above  any  instruc 
tions  he  might  receive.  Coming  from  a  Northern 
State,  there  could  be  no  telling  what  his  people  might 
demand  of  him.  There  were  some  signs  of  growing 
distrust  of  him  in  the  South,  of  which  the  sneer  of 
Jefferson  Davis  in  "crediting"  him  with  the  com 
promise  legislation  was  one  of  the  first.  But  he 
had  paved  the  way  very  satisfactorily  for  his  cam 
paign.  In  writing  to  a  friend  on  December  30, 1851, 
he  said:  "Things  look  well,  and  the  prospect  is 
brightening  every  day.  All  that  is  necessary  now 
to  insure  success  is  that  the  Northwest  should  unite 
and  speak  out."  This  was  one  week  after  the  de 
livery  of  his  apologia. 

Little  seems  to  have  been  expected  from  Con 
gress,  with  a  presidential  campaign  in  the  immedi 
ate  offing.  There  were  two  "possibilities"  in  the 
Senate — Douglas  and  Cass.  But  without  regard 
to  candidates  each  party  was  anxious  for  victory. 
The  Democrats,  no  more  than  the  Republicans  of 
our  own  day,  could  think  of  their  party  as  being 
out  of  power  except  as  the  result  of  an  accident, 
and  they  were  hungry  for  place.  Doubtless  the 
Whigs  were  quite  as  anxious  to  show  that  their  vic 
tory  of  1848  was  not  mere  luck.  Each  member  of 
Congress  had  his  own  personal  ambitions,  and  so 
all  were  interested  in  saying  and  doing  nothing  that 


PRESIDENT-MAKING  155 

might  spoil  their  chances.  The  Northern  Demo 
crats,  under  the  leadership  of  Douglas,  were  specially 
anxious  to  keep  things  quiet.  Perhaps  that  is  one 
reason  why  Douglas  was  so  quick  to  deprecate 
Foote's  efforts  to  open  up  the  slavery  question.  It 
was,  in  short,  a  President-making  session.  "A  poli 
tician  does  not  sneeze,"  said  an  observer,  "without 
reference  to  the  Presidency." 

"The  Democratic  party,"  Douglas  had  said,  "is 
as  good  a  Union  party  as  I  want,  and  I  wish  to  pre 
serve  its  principles  and  its  organization  and  to 
triumph  upon  its  old  issues."  It  was  indeed  as  good 
a  Union  party  as  there  was — quite  as  good  as  the 
Whig — but  it  was  not  easy  to  say  what  "the  old 
issues"  were.  The  senator  from  Illinois  does  not 
seem  to  have  been  wholly  content  with  them,  for 
he  sought  to  inject  himself  into  the  campaign  as 
the  representative  of  progressive  principles.  Dili 
gently  he  and  his  friends  labored  to  make  it  appear 
that  they  stood  for  what  would  later  have  been 
called  "a  new  deal,"  and  for  the  retirement  of  the 
"  Old  Fogies."  The  doctrine  of  an  intense  and  rather 
demagogical  nationalism  was  strenuously  preached, 
accompanied  by  many  manifestations  of  the  jingo 
spirit.  Of  course  there  was  nothing  new  in  all  this, 
for  it  was  hardly  more  than  a  revival  of  the  old 
"Manifest  Destiny"  doctrine  or  spirit.  The  pur 
pose  was  not  so  much  to  commit  the  party  to  any 
thing  new — indeed,  Douglas,  as  has  been  seen,  ex- 


156  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

pressly  disclaimed  any  such  purpose— as  to  "fire 
the  hearts  of  the  masses."  The  Democrats  were 
not  greatly  in  need  of  issues,  for  it  was  generally 
agreed  that  if  the  status  quo  were  maintained  they 
were  almost  certain  to  elect  their  presidential  candi 
date.  The  Compromise  had  seriously  divided  the 
Whig  party,  while  it  had  rather  tended  to  bind  their 
opponents  more  closely  together.  With  the  growth 
of  the  antislavery  sentiment  it  was  inevitable  that 
the  antislavery  party  should  become  increasingly 
sectional.  The  Northern  Whigs  had  made  their 
utmost  concession  to  the  Southern  members  of  the 
organization  when  they  accepted  the  Compromise. 
In  the  first  month  of  the  session  a  Whig  caucus  had 
been  called  to  consider  a  resolution  declaring  the 
Compromise  a  finality.  Not  more  than  fifty  of  the 
eighty-six  members  attended,  and  of  these  one- 
third  voted  to  table  the  resolution.  Another  caucus 
was  held  in  April  for  the  purpose  of  fixing  the  time 
and  place  for  the  national  convention,  and  at  this 
caucus  such  a  resolution  was  actually  laid  on  the 
table.  Several  members  left  the  meeting,  and  later 
eleven  Southern  Whigs  issued  an  address  in  which 
they  said  that  they  would  support  no  candidate  who 
did  not  openly  accept  the  Compromise  as  they  did. 
However,  the  Democrats  were  not  without  troubles 
of  their  own.  For  when  the  house  in  April  voted 
on  a  similar  resolution,  74  members  voted  against 
it  as  against  103  for  it.  Among  the  74  who  refused 


PRESIDENT-MAKING  157 

to  declare  that  the  Compromise  was  a  final  settle 
ment  were  26  Northern  Democrats  (including  two 
Free-Soilers),  28  Northern  Whigs,  19  Southern 
Democrats  and  one  Southern  Whig.  Twenty  South 
ern  Whigs  voted  for  the  resolution,  and  only  7 
Northern  Whigs  did  so.  Thus  there  was  a  division 
in  both  parties.  But  part  of  the  Democratic  op 
position  was  from  the  extreme  slavery  men,  includ 
ing  the  whole  delegation  from  South  Carolina.  It 
seemed  safe  to  assume  that  these  men  would  stand 
by  their  party  in  a  national  election,  rather  than 
take  their  chances  with  a  party  that  numbered  a 
Seward  and  a  Sumner  among  its  adherents.  Thus 
the  Compromise  worked  very  strongly  for  Demo 
cratic  success.  Webster  and  Clay  must  have  realized 
that,  whether  or  not  they  had  kept  the  Union  to 
gether,  they  had  certainly  disrupted  their  own  party, 
and  cemented  the  opposing  organization.  Nat 
urally,  therefore,  Douglas  was  for  the  old  issues, 
and  his  effort  was  to  rouse  the  people  on  them,  and 
for  himself.  Indeed,  he  went  clear  back  to  the 
palmy  days  of  Jackson  when  he  wrote:  "I  shall 
act  on  the  rule  of  giving  the  offices  to  those  who 
fight  the  battles."  Several  articles  appearing  in 
the  Democratic  Review  drew  the  picture  of  the  ideal 
candidate,  a  portrait  that  bore  a  striking  resemblance 
to  Stephen  A.  Douglas.  They  were  attacks,  at  least 
by  inference,  on  the  other  candidates,  and  are  sup 
posed  to  have  injured  Douglas.  At  any  rate  he 


158  STEPHEN  A.   DOUGLAS 

and  his  supporters  were  quick  to  disclaim  respon 
sibility  for  them.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
Douglas  believed  that  the  party  and  the  nation 
needed  a  man  of  the  present  rather  than  the  past, 
and  "a  tried  civilian,  not  a  second  and  third  rate 
general."  Here  was  a  direct  drive  at  General  Cass. 
It  is  amusing  to  recall  that  the  convention  nominated 
"a  third-rate  general,"  and  that  it  went  to  New 
Hampshire,  and  not  to  the  boundless  West,  for  him. 
But  the  campaign  of  Douglas  went  bravely  on,  and 
he  had  every  reason  to  feel  hopeful.  "Prospects," 
he  wrote,  "look  well  and  are  improving  every  day. 
If  two  or  three  Western  States  will  speak  out  in 
my  favor  the  battle  is  over.  Can  anything  be  done 
in  Iowa  and  Missouri?  That  is  very  important." 
He  very  naturally  looked  to  the  West,  nor  had  he 
any  reason  to  think  that  the  South  was  not,  as  a 
whole,  friendly  to  him.  He  had,  too,  appealed 
strongly  to  the  national  feeling,  had  been  an  ex 
pansionist,  holding  it  to  be  the  nation's  duty  to 
acquire,  not  only  Mexico,  but  Cuba  and  Central 
America.  Young  himself — he  was  only  thirty-nine 
— and  calling  for  new  blood  in  politics,  Douglas 
might  well  have  thought  that  the  young  men  would 
have  rallied  to  his  support.  But  the  old-timers, 
unfortunately  for  him,  were  in  control  of  the  ma 
chinery,  and  the  convention  proved  that  it  was 
one  that  was  susceptible  to  management,  and  that 
it  could  not  be  rushed.  It  met  in  Baltimore  June  1. 


PRESIDENT-MAKING  159 

The  leading  candidates  were  Cass,  Buchanan,  Marcy, 
and  Douglas,  not  one  of  whom — as  had  been  fore 
seen  before  the  convention  met — would  be  able  to 
command  a  two-thirds  vote.  The  "wise  ones/' 
understanding  this,  had  several  months  before  started 
a  movement  for  Franklin  Pierce,  though  they  re 
solved  not  to  present  his  name  till  it  was  clear  that 
the  leading  candidates  were  disposed  of.  On  the 
first  ballot  Cass  received  116  votes,  Buchanan  93, 
Marcy  27,  Douglas  20,  and  the  field  25.  Douglas 
got  only  2  votes  from  the  South.  His  strength 
rapidly  increased,  and  on  the  twenty-ninth  ballot 
he  had  91  votes,  Buchanan  receiving  93,  and  Cass 

27.  It  was  on  the  next  ballot  that  the  name  of  Pierce 
was  presented,  but  on  the  forty-eighth  ballot  he 
received  only  55  votes,  while  Cass  had  73,  Buchanan 

28,  Douglas  33,  and  Marcy  90.    On  the  next  ballot 
the  break  came,  and  Pierce  was  chosen,  his  vote 
being  282  as  against  6  for  all  other  candidates.    Wil 
liam  H .  King  of  Alabama  was  nominated  for  Vice- 
President.     Douglas  was  greatly  disappointed  at 
the  poor  showing  he  made  in  the  West.    California 
cast  her  vote  for  him  on  the  first  ballot,  but  only 
15  of  his  20  votes  came  from  the  West,  and  of  these 
11  were  from  Illinois.    He  got  no  votes  from  In 
diana.    Yet  Douglas  and  Cass  were  the  strongest 
in  the  West,  and  Buchanan  in  the  South.    It  was  in 
the  Middle  West  that  the  Illinois  senator's  greatest 
weakness  was  shown.    But  he  drew  support  from 


160  STEPHEN  A.   DOUGLAS 

all  sections  of  the  Union.  The  interpretation  of 
statistics  is  never  easy.  There  are  some  authorities 
who  hold  that  the  Baltimore  convention  showed 
that  Douglas  would,  if  he  were  to  be  a  formidable 
factor  in  the  future,  have  to  win  a  larger  following 
in  the  South,  and  they  interpret  every  act  from 
then  on  to  his  realization  of  that  need.  Others  hold 
that  he  had  much  to  hope  from  the  West  and  the 
East,  and  that — the  words  are  those  of  Professor 
Johnson — "to  attribute  to  Douglas,  from  this  time 
on,  as  many  writers  have  done,  a  purpose  to  pander 
to  the  South,  is  not  only  to  discredit  his  political 
foresight,  but  to  misunderstand  his  position  in  the 
Northwest  and  to  ignore  his  reiterated  assertions." 
Certain  it  is  that  his  subsequent  action  was  bitterly 
displeasing  to  the  North.  Perhaps  he  had  no  idea 
that  it  would  be — and  did  not  mean  it  to  be.  The 
truth  is  that  though  his  support  was  widely  scattered, 
it  was  not  of  commanding  strength  anywhere.  He 
took  his  defeat  in  good  spirit,  and  sent  the  usual 
congratulatory  telegram  to  the  successful  candidate, 
in  which  he  said:  "I  congratulate  the  Democratic 
party  upon  the  nomination,  and  Illinois  will  give 
Franklin  Pierce  a  larger  majority  than  any  other 
State  in  the  Union."  The  only  important  planks 
of  the  platform  are  those  dealing  with  the  slavery 
question,  which  are  as  follows:  "Resolved,  that 
Congress  has  no  power  under  the  Constitution  to 
interfere  with  or  control  the  domestic  institutions 


PRESIDENT-MAKING  161 

of  the  several  States,  and  that  such  States  are  the 
sole  and  proper  judges  of  everything  appertaining 
to  their  own  affairs,  not  prohibited  by  the  Constitu 
tion;  that  all  efforts  of  the  abolitionists  or  others 
made  to  induce  Congress  to  interfere  with  questions 
of  slavery,  or  to  take  incipient  steps  in  relation  there 
to,  are  calculated  to  lead  to  the  most  alarming  and 
dangerous  consequences;  and  that  all  such  efforts 
have  an  inevitable  tendency  to  diminish  the  hap 
piness  of  the  people,  and  to  endanger  the  stability 
and  permanence  of  the  Union,  and  ought  not  to 
be  countenanced  by  any  friend  of  our  political  in 
stitutions.  Resolved,  that  the  foregoing  proposition 
covers,  and  was  intended  to  embrace  the  whole 
subject  of  slavery  agitation  in  Congress;  and,  there 
fore,  the  Democratic  party  of  the  Union,  standing 
on  this  national  platform,  will  abide  by  and  adhere 
to  a  faithful  execution  of  the  acts  known  as  the  Com 
promise  measures  settled  by  the  last  Congress,  'the 
act  for  reclaiming  fugitives  from  service  or  labor' 
included;  which  act,  being  designed  to  carry  out 
an  express  provision  of  the  Constitution,  cannot, 
with  fidelity  thereto,  be  repealed,  or  so  changed 
as  to  destroy  or  impair  its  efficiency.  Resolved, 
That  the  Democratic  party  will  resist  all  attempts 
at  renewing,  in  Congress,  or  out  of  it,  the  agitation 
of  the  slavery  question,  under  whatever  shape  or 
color  the  attempt  be  made."  So  once  again  the 
Compromise  was  declared  to  be  "a  permanent  settle- 


162  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

ment."  Did  any  other  piece  of  legislation  receive 
so  many  and  so  frequent  ratifications?  The  Whig 
convention  also  met  in  Baltimore,  on  June  17.  It 
is  chiefly  remarkable  as  marking  the  final  and  crush 
ing  defeat  of  the  ambition  of  Daniel  Webster.  The 
candidates  were  President  Fillmore,  Webster — his 
Secretary  of  State — and  General  Scott.  The  Presi 
dent  had  a  large  number  of  pledged  delegates,  and 
was  popular  in  the  South  because  of  his  enforce 
ment  of  the  fugitive-slave  law.  Patronage  was 
used  in  his  behalf.  He  had  the  support  of  Clay. 
On  the  first  ballot  he  received  133  votes,  to  131  for 
Scott,  and  29  for  Webster.  On. the  fiftieth  ballot 
the  South  turned  to  Scott,  and  he  was  nominated 
on  the  next  ballot,  his  vote  being  159  to  112  for 
Fillmore.  There  might  have  been  a  combination 
by  the  conservative  Whigs  on  either  Fillmore  or 
Webster,  between  whom  the  relations  were  most 
cordial,  and  the  President  did  write  a  letter  author 
izing  the  withdrawal  of  his  name,  but  it  was  not 
made  public.  Probably,  however,  the  South  would 
not  have  voted  for  Webster,  though  it  would  have 
supported  Fillmore.  Webster  had  only  6  votes  out 
side  of  New  England,  every  New  England  State 
except  Maine  giving  him  votes. 

Strange  as  it  may  seem,  Webster  had  been  con 
fident  of  success,  and  with  Clay  out  of  the  way  there 
was  indeed  no  one  in  the  Whig  party  that  could  on 
the  score  of  merit  contest  the  nomination  with  him. 


PRESIDENT-MAKING  163 

To  be  beaten  by  another  Mexican  war  hero,  and 
beaten  with  a  terrible  decisiveness,  must  have  been 
humiliating  to  him.  But  the  South  would  have 
none  of  him,  feeling  that  it  had  got  from  him  all  that 
it  could  hope  for.  The  supporters  of  General  Scott, 
on  the  other  hand,  were  mostly  men  who  had  op 
posed  the  Compromise.  The  friends  of  the  Com 
promise  in  the  South  were  mostly  for  the  nomina 
tion  of  President  Fillmore.  The  result  was  the  nom 
ination  of  a  man  supposed  to  be  hostile  to  slavery  on 
a  platform  that  favored  the  Compromise.  Webster 
refused  to  support  General  Scott,  and  openly  ad 
vised  his  friends  to  vote  for  General  Pierce,  on  the 
ground  that  the  Whigs  were  hopelessly  divided, 
while  the  Democrats  were  unanimously  determined 
to  resist  any  further  agitation  of  slavery.  It  is  hardly 
necessary  to  consider  his  action  from  the  ethical 
point  of  view.  Yet  it  may  be  said  that  the  Whig 
party  was  hardly  more  divided  after  the  convention 
than  it  was  before  when  Webster  sought  a  nomina 
tion  at  its  hands,  and  probably  no  more  divided 
under  the  leadership  of  Scott  than  it  would  have 
been  under  that  of  Webster.  The  great  man  was 
sorely  disappointed — and  also  he  might  honestly 
have  despaired  of  the  future  of  the  Whig  party, 
which  was,  as  the  election  showed,  practically  dead 
in  1852.  The  slavery  plank  is  as  follows:  "The 
series  of  acts  of  the  31st  Congress,  commonly  known 
as  the  Compromise  or  adjustment  (the  act  for 


164  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

the  recovery  of  fugitives  from  labor  included),  are 
received  and  acquiesced  in  by  the  Whigs  of  the 
United  States  as  a  final  settlement,  in  principle 
and  substance,  of  the  subjects  to  which  they  relate; 
and  so  far  as  these  acts  are  concerned,  we  will  main 
tain  them,  and  insist  on  their  strict  enforcement, 
until  time  and  experience  shall  demonstrate  the 
necessity  of  further  legislation  to  guard  against  the 
evasion  of  the  laws  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  abuse 
of  their  powers  on  the  other,  not  impairing  their 
present  efficiency  to  carry  out  the  requirements  of 
the  Constitution;  and  we  deprecate  all  further 
agitation  of  the  questions  thus  settled,  as  dangerous 
to  our  peace,  and  will  discountenance  all  efforts 
to  renew  or  continue  such  agitation,  whenever, 
wherever,  or  however  made;  and  we  will  maintain 
this  settlement  as  essential  to  the  nationality  of 
the  Whig  party  and  the  integrity  of  the  Union." 
As  "the  nationality  of  the  Whig  party"  could  be 
maintained  only  by  holding  its  Southern  members, 
the  leaders  found  it  necessary  to  commit  their  party 
to  a  position  practically  identical  with  that  taken 
by  the  Democrats.  So  the  national  character  of 
the  party  was  preserved  for  what  it  was  worth  at 
the  cost  of  its  moral  character.  The  Whigs  could 
hardly  have  had  any  hope  of  success.  "The  North, 
the  free  States,"  Seward  wrote,  "are  divided  as 
usual,  the  South  united.  Intimidation,  usual  in 
that  quarter,  has  been  met,  as  usual,  by  concession, 


PRESIDENT-MAKING  165 

and  so  the  platform  adopted  is  one  that  deprives 
Scott  of  the  vantage  position  he  enjoyed.  I  antic 
ipate  defeat  and  desertion.  When  will  there  be 
a  North?"  Later  in  the  summer  he  said:  "I  still 
remain  strongly  inclined  to  give  up  this  place  and 
public  life.  If  the  State  Whig  convention  adopt 
the  platform,  I  think  I  shall  be  justified  in  resigning 
at  once."  Yet  Scott  suffered  because  it  was  sup 
posed  that  he  would  be  dominated  by  Seward.  So 
strong  was  this  feeling  that  Mr.  Seward  felt  con 
strained  to  write  and  make  public  a  letter  in  which 
he  said  that  he  would  neither  ask  nor  accept  "any 
public  station  or  preferment  whatever  at  the  hands 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  whether  that 
man  were  Winfield  Scott  or  any  other  man."  Seven 
Whig  representatives  from  the  South,  including 
Toombs  and  Stephens,  publicly  declared  that  they 
would  not  support  Scott  because  he  was  "the  favor 
ite  candidate  of  the  Free-Soil  wing  of  the  Whig 
party."  There  was  in  truth  disaffection  everywhere. 
The  Free-Soilers  had  a  ticket  of  their  own,  having 
met  at  Pittsburgh  in  August  and  nominated  John 
P.  Hale  of  New  Hampshire,  and  George  W.  Julian 
of  Indiana  as  their  candidates  for  President  and 
Vice-President.  The  platform  declared  for  "free 
speech,  free  soil,  free  labor,  and  free  men."  The 
party  served  as  a  refuge  for  discontented  Whigs, 
and  paved  the  way  for  the  Republican  party  four 
years  later.  Indeed  there  was  significant  movement 


166  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

from  both  sides  to  the  Free-Soil  party.  Charles 
Francis  Adams,  Henry  Wilson,  and  Joshua  R.  Gid- 
dings,  who  were  Whigs,  voted  for  Hale,  as  did  Sal 
mon  P.  Chase,  a  Democrat.  On  the  other  hand, 
William  H.  Seward,  Horace  Greeley,  and  Benjamin 
F.  Wade  supported  Scott.  The  rift,  that  was  soon 
to  become  a  chasm,  was  opening.  The  campaign 
as  a  whole  was  humiliating.  There  were  many  per 
sonal  charges  brought  against  the  candidates,  most 
of  which  were  false.  General  Scott  made  a  speak 
ing  tour  which  did  him  no  good,  and  only  served 
to  discredit  him  as  a  candidate  with  thoughtful 
men.  Douglas,  of  course,  made  many  speeches, 
none  of  the  slightest  importance.  Though  he  had 
said  several  months  before  that  he  would  "act  on 
the  rule  of  giving  the  offices  to  those  who  fight  the 
battles,"  he  boasted  in  one  of  his  campaign  speeches 
that  "there  had  never  been  a  Democratic  adminis 
tration  in  this  Union  that  did  not  retain  at  least  one- 
third  of  their  political  opponents  in  office,"  and, 
after  Pierce  had  been  elected,  he  said  that  Demo 
crats  should  have  the  offices.  "The  best  men/7 
he  said,  "should  be  selected,  and  everybody  knows 
that  the  best  men  voted  for  Pierce  and  King." 
Though  a  Democratic  victory  was  looked  for,  no 
one  anticipated  such  a  landslide  as  took  place.  Pierce 
received  254  electoral  votes  as  against  42  for  Scott, 
and  carried  twenty-seven  States  as  against  four 
carried  by  Scott.  Pierce's  popular  majority  was 


PRESIDENT-MAKING  167 

202,008  in  a  total  vote  of  3,126,378.  Only  Vermont, 
Massachusetts,  Kentucky,  and  Tennessee  gave  their 
votes  to  the  Whig  candidate.  In  Illinois  the  Whigs 
increased  their  vote  over  1848  by  11,719,  and  the 
Democrats  by  24,968,  the  Democratic  majority 
rising  from  2,414  to  15,663.  The  Free-Soil  vote 
shrank  from  15,804  to  9,966.  The  Democrats  had 
evidently  profited  from  the  Whig  compromise,  for 
they  won  largely  because  the  people,  who  were  weary 
of  the  slavery  agitation,  believed  that  the  Demo 
cratic  party  was  more  strongly  committed  than  its 
rival  to  the  compromise.  The  feeling  undoubt 
edly  was  that  the  end  of  the  long,  painful,  and 
dangerous  controversy  had  at  last  come.  Nat 
urally,  therefore,  there  was  a  feeling  of  elation  at 
the  overwhelming  triumph  of  the  party  which  was 
supposed  to  stand  for  national  peace  and  stability. 
The  people  were  soon  to  be  rudely  awakened  by 
Douglas  with  his  Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  which  re 
opened  the  whole  controversy,  and  brought  freedom 
and  slavery  face  to  face  in  free  territory.  But  in 
November,  1852,  there  was  a  great  feeling  of  relief, 
and  the  people  could  not  realize — perhaps  could 
not  have  been  expected  to  realize — that  it  was  a 
mere  breathing  spell. 

Both  Clay  and  Webster  died  before  the  election, 
the  former  on  June  29,  and  the  latter  on  October 
23.  The  passing  of  these  great  men  was  itself  part 
of  the  change  that  was  coming  over  the  nation. 


168  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

The  day  of  the  compromisers  was  closing,  and  new 
men  were  coming  to  the  front — Seward,  Sumner, 
Wade,  Chase,  Giddings,  and  others  of  less  promi 
nence — who  were  strangers  to  their  methods,  and 
who  felt  very  strongly  that  the  limit  of  concessions 
had  been  reached.  It  was  soon  seen  that  the  land 
was  not  "settling  to  its  rest." 

As  had  been  predicted,  the  session  of  Congress, 
which  lasted  till  August  31,  transacted  no  business 
of  importance.  Perhaps  the  most  interesting  in 
cident  was  Sumner's  attack  on  the  fugitive-slave 
law.  Early  in  the  session  the  Massachusetts  sena 
tor  had  proposed  the  repeal  of  .the  law,  and  been 
rebuked  by  Douglas  for  so  doing.  Later  he  sug 
gested  that  the  judicary  committee  consider  the 
expediency  of  repeal,  but  his  motion  to  that  effect 
received  only  10  votes.  Five  days  before  the  close 
of  the  session  he  returned  to  the  attack,  and  dis 
cussed  the  question  in  his  first  formal  speech.  But 
the  only  effect  was  to  bring  on  himself  the  denuncia 
tion  and  ridicule  of  the  extreme  slavery  men — for 
which  he  cared  nothing — and  to  prove  how  firm 
was  the  hold  that  the  Compromise  then  had  on  the 
country.  Only  four  senators — Chase,  Hale,  Sumner, 
and  Wade — voted  for  his  resolution.  The  fight  from 
now  on,  as  far  as  the  South  was  concerned,  was  to 
make  slavery  national,  for  every  one  could  see  that 
if  it  did  not  expand  it  would  die.  Webster,  too, 
had  argued  that  freedom  was  national,  and  slavery 


PRESIDENT-MAKING  169 

peculiar,  exceptional,  municipal,  and  sectional. 
Sumner's  appeal,  however,  was  not  to  the  Senate, 
but  to  the  conscience  of  the  nation  and  to  the 
future.  It  was  not  unresponded  to.  Slavery  had 
more  to  fear  from  him  at  that  time  than  from  any 
other  one  man. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
PIERCE'S  SURRENDER 

As  far  as  Douglas  was  concerned,  the  election  of 
1852  was  in  every  way  satisfactory.  He  was,  if 
anything,  more  strongly  intrenched  than  ever  in 
the  confidence  of  the  people.  He  had  taken  a  very 
conspicuous  part  in  the  compromise  legislation  that 
had  been  approved  by  the  country,  and  had  indeed 
shared  the  credit  for  it  with  Clay  and  Webster.  He 
was  recognized  throughout  the  country  as  the  leader 
of  his  party.  His  State  had  given  Pierce  a  handsome 
majority,  and  he  could  claim  the  credit  of  "carry 
ing  it."  Douglas  had  accepted  his  defeat  in  the 
convention  manfully,  and  had  thrown  himself  into 
the  national  campaign  with  all  his  vigor.  There 
was,  of  course,  no  doubt  of  his  re-election  to  the 
Senate,  nor  was  there  a  cloud  in  his  political  sky. 
Even  his  losing  campaign  for  the  presidential  nomi 
nation  had  helped  him,  for  he  had  made  a  good 
showing.  Both  he  and  his  constituents  had  every 
reason  to  be  content  with  the  present,  and  to  look 
to  the  future  with  high  hopes.  The  Whig  party 
was  visibly  going  to  pieces,  while  the  Democratic 
party  never  seemed  to  be  stronger.  That  man  would 

have  been  thought  insane  who  should  have  pre- 
170 


PIERCE'S  SURRENDER  171 

dieted  in  1853  that  the  election  of  1856  would  be 
the  lasii  one  carried  by  the  Democratic  party  till 
1884.  There  was  no  end  in  sight — at  least  not  to 
the  superficial  observer— to  the  Democratic  party's 
control  of  the  government.  '  The  Illinois  legislature 
met  in  January,  1853,  and  re-elected  Mr.  Douglas 
to  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  75  to  20.  The  period 
covered  by  this  his  last  full  term  was  one  of  the  most 
exciting  and  turbulent  in  our  national  history.  But 
when  he  went  back  to  Washington  in  December, 
1852,  he  must  have  felt  a  sense  of  security  and  ela 
tion  both  in  regard  to  himself  and  his  party.  He 
began  his  second  term  in  the  Senate  before  he  had 
reached  his  fortieth  birthday.  Trade  was  good 
and  the  country  in  a  highly  prosperous  condition, 
so  much  so  that  there  was  a  demand  that  the  low 
tariff  of  1846  be  reduced — a  demand  that  was  heeded 
five  years  later.  Yet  Douglas  soon  saw  difficulties 
ahead  of  the  administration,  though  not  one  of  them 
spoken  of  by  him  had  any  relation  to  slavery. 

He  must  have  realized  that  the  parties  had  been 
divided  on  no  real  question  of  principle.  Both  had 
indorsed  the  compromise  legislation,  the  only  ad 
vantage  that  the  Democrats  had  being  the  credit 
that  the  people  gave  them  for  greater  sincerity. 
Such  as  the  issue  had  been,  the  general  belief  was 
that  it  had  disappeared — this  certainly  was  at  the 
time  the  belief  of  Douglas.  He  may  not  have  de 
liberately  sought  to  bring  new  issues  to  the  front, 


172  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

but  he  probably  realized  that  a  party  must  have 
policies  as  well  as  principles.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  he  was  thinking  of  the  presidency,  though  he 
later  wrote  that  he  did  not  think  that  he  would  be 
willing  to  have  his  name  used  in  that  connection. 
"The  party/'  he  said,  "is  in  a  distracted  condition, 
and  it  requires  all  our  wisdom,  prudence,  and  energy 
to  consolidate  its  power  and  perpetuate  its  princi 
ples/'  The  administration,  he  thought,  "has  diffi 
culties  ahead,"  as  indeed  it  had,  but  not  such  as 
Douglas  dreamed  of.  His  thought  was  of  tariffs, 
revenue,  surplus,  rivers  and  harbors,  and  Pacific  rail 
roads.  "These,"  he  said,  "are  the  main  questions." 
At  any  rate,  shortly  after  the  election,  he  gave  out  a 
statement  of  Democratic  policies,  as  he  conceived 
them,  and  in  that  he  reverted  to  his  old  doctrine 
of  "Manifest  Destiny."  "Whenever,"  he  said, 
"the  people  of  Cuba  show  themselves  worthy  of 
freedom  by  asserting  and  maintaining  independence, 
and  apply  for  annexation,  they  ought  to  be  annexed; 
whenever  Spain  is  willing  to  sell  Cuba,  with  the 
consent  of  its  inhabitants,  we  ought  to  accept  it 
on  fair  terms;  and  if  Spain  should  transfer  Cuba 
to  England  or  any  other  European  power,  we  should 
take  and  hold  Cuba  anyhow."  This  doctrine  was 
pleasing  to  the  slavery  men  who  had  long  looked 
on  Cuba  as  good  slave  territory.  There  was  in  it 
too  an  appeal  to  "  the  popular  heart."  Douglas  took 
the  same  tone  in  his  discussion  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 


PIERCE'S  SURRENDER  173 

treaty.    He  had,  it  may  be  remembered,  been  op 
posed  to  the  treaty  at  the  time  of  its  ratification 
three  years  before,  but  had  not  given  his  reasons 
since  he  could  not  do  so  without  violating  the  secrecy 
of  an  executive  session.     By  this  convention,  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  had  covenanted 
to  further  the  construction  of  a  ship  canal  through 
Nicaragua,   and  to  guarantee  its  neutrality,   and 
also  the  neutrality  of  any  other  regions  through 
which  a  canal  might  be  built.    Further  Great  Brit 
ain  had  renounced  any  "dominion  over  Nicaragua, 
Costa  Rica,  the  Mosquito  Coast  or  any  part  of  Cen 
tral  America."   The  question  was — and  it  was  raised 
by  the  rumor  that  Great  Britain  had  established 
a  new  colony  in  Honduras— as  to  whether  the  Brit 
ish   Government  had  abandoned  its   claim   to   a 
protectorate  over  the  Mosquito  Coast.    Before  the 
ratifications  were  exchanged,  Bulwer,  the  British 
minister,  informed  Secretary  of  State  Clayton,  that 
he  had  been  instructed  to  insist  on  an  explanatory 
declaration  that  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  did  not 
apply  to  British  Honduras,  long  recognized  as  a 
British  colony.     Mr.   Clayton   asked   William   R. 
King,  at  the  time  chairman  of  the  committee  on 
foreign  relations,  who  had  been  elected  vice-presi 
dent  on  the  ticket  with  Pierce,  what  had  been  the 
understanding  of  the  Senate  when  the  treaty  was 
ratified,  and  King  said  that  "the  Senate  perfectly 
understood  that  the  treaty  did  not  include  British 


174  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Honduras."  Thus  the  Secretary  of  State  who  nego 
tiated  the  treaty,  and  the  chairman  of  the  committee 
that  recommended  its  ratification,  seem  to  have  had 
no  doubts  about  what  was  intended,  and  the  latter 
is  authority  for  the  statement  that  the  Senate  was 
clear  on  the  matter.  British  jurisdiction  over  the 
Mosquito  strip  was  maintained,  without  objection 
from  our  government,  till  a  few  years  ago,  when  it 
was  voluntarily  renounced.  And  the  Clayton-Bul- 
wer  treaty  lasted  till  the  negotiation  of  the  treaty 
under  which  we  built  the  canal,  and  which  gave  us 
full  control  of  it.  So  that  all  that  Douglas  demanded 
was  finally  brought  to  pass.  But  he  was  for  bringing 
it  to  pass  at  once,  and  by  war,  if  necessary.  When 
a  British  man-of-war  fired  on  an  American  steam 
ship  for  refusing  to  pay  port  dues  on  entering  the 
harbor  of  Greytown  the  issue  was  raised,  and  Doug 
las  made  the  most  of  it. 

Many  of  the  points  made  by  him  against  the 
treaty  must  be  admitted  to  be  sound  in  the  light 
of  later  experience.  When  this  country  was  ready 
to  begin  the  construction  of  the  canal  it  at  once 
sought  relief  from  the  restrictions  imposed  by  it. 
Our  government  was  unwilling  to  become  a  partner 
with  Great  Britain  in  the  work,  or  to  enter  into  an 
international  agreement  for  the  maintenance  of 
neutrality  of  the  canal  or  on  the  isthmus.  What 
was  desired  was  an  American  canal,  and  one  that 
should  be  fortified.  Such  in  substance  was  the  argu- 


PIERCE'S  SURRENDER  175 

ment  of  Douglas.  There  is  much  in  his  speech  that 
is  not  argument,  much  that  hardly  rises  above 
demagogism.  His  distrust  of  England,  if  not  hatred 
of  her,  was  profound.  The  spirit  that  he  showed 
in  this  discussion  was  the  same  as  that  manifested 
in  his  discussion  of  the  Oregon  boundary  question. 
Our  concessions  in  regard  to  Oregon  were,  he  had 
held,  in  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Such, 
he  argued,  would  be  the  effect  of  any  recognition 
by  this  government  of  British  influence  on  the  isth 
mus,  much  more  any  admission  of  her  right  to  par 
ticipate  in  the  building  of  the  canal,  or  in  a  guaranty 
of  neutrality.  Yet  there  were  British  colonies  in 
that  region,  as  there  are  to-day  such  colonies  on 
this  side  of  the  Atlantic,  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
itself  bound  us  not  to  interfere  in  any  way  with 
such  possessions.  But  Douglas  did  discriminate 
here,  since  he  agreed  that  colonies  existing  at  the 
time  of  the  promulgation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
were  not  forbidden  by  it.  What  he  had  in  mind 
was  the  supposed  attempt  of  Great  Britain  to  estab 
lish  a  new  colony  in  the  bay  of  Honduras.  "I  am 
unwilling,"  said  Douglas,  "to  enter  into  any  treaty 
stipulations  with  Great  Britain  or  any  other  Euro 
pean  power  in  respect  to  the  American  continent, 
by  the  terms  of  which  we  should  pledge  the  faith 
of  this  republic  not  to  do  in  all  coming  time  that 
which  in  the  progress  of  events  our  interests,  duty 
and  even  safety  may  compel  us  to  do.  I  have  al- 


176  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

ready  said,  and  now  repeat,  that  every  article,  clause, 
and  provision  of  that  treaty  is  predicated  upon  a 
virtual  negation  and  repudiation  of  the  Monroe 
declaration  in  relation  to  European  colonization 
on  this  continent.  The  article  inviting  any  power 
on  earth  with  which  England  and  the  United  States 
are  on  terms  of  friendly  intercourse  to  enter  into 
similar  stipulations,  and  which  pledges  the  good 
offices  of  each,  when  requested  by  the  other,  to  aid 
in  the  new  negotiations  with  the  other  Central  Amer 
ican  States,  and  which  pledges  the  good  offices  of 
all  the  nations  entering  into  the  'alliance'  to  settle 
disputes  between  the  States  and  governments  of 
Central  America,  not  only  recognizes  the  right  of 
European  powers  to  interfere  with  the  affairs  of 
the  American  continent,  but  invites  the  exercise 
of  such  right,  and  makes  it  obligatory  to  do  so  in 
certain  cases.  It  establishes,  in  terms,  an  alliance 
between  the  contracting  parties,  and  invites  all 
other  nations  to  become  parties  to  it."  Growing 
more  bitter  as  he  proceeded,  he  launched  into  an 
attack  on  Great  Britain,  denied  the  possibility  of 
any  firm  and  lasting  friendship  between  her  and  the 
United  States,  and  later  in  the  debate,  replying  to  a 
senator  who  spoke  of  what  we  owed  to  English  liter 
ature  and  science,  he  said:  "Is  he  not  aware  that 
nearly  every  English  book  circulated  and  read  in  this 
country  contains  lurking  and  insidious  slanders  and 
libels  upon  the  character  of  our  people  and  the  in- 


PIERCE'S  SURRENDER  177 

stitutions  and  policy  of  our  government?"  He  de 
manded  that  we  insist  on  an  immediate  withdrawal 
of  the  British  from  the  islands  they  were  supposed 
to  have  seized — which  seizure,  if  there  had  been 
one,  was  in  violation  of  the  very  treaty  denounced 
by  Douglas — and  immediately  annul  the  treaty. 
Nothing  came  of  all  this.  Indeed,  the  appeal  was 
to  the  country  rather  than  to  the  Senate.  The  treaty 
was  ably  defended  by  Seward,  former  Secretary 
Clayton,  who  had  just  been  re-elected  to  the  Senate, 
and  Edward  Everett.  Yet  the  situation  that  exists 
on  the  isthmus  to-day  is  precisely  the  one  that 
Douglas  would  have  created.  His  speech,  however, 
showed  him  at  his  worst.  He  proved  himself  to 
be  the  prototype  of  another  American  senator  who 
years  afterward  asked:  "What  have  we  got  to  do 
with  abroad?"  Of  his  visit  to  Europe  shortly  after 
the  inauguration  little  need  be  said.  He  went  with 
a  mind  filled  with  prejudice,  firmly  convinced  that 
Europe  had  nothing  to  teach  us  except  by  way  of 
warning.  Though  he  is  said  to  have  "spent  several 
months  in  personal  observation  of  the  various  gov 
ernments  of  Europe,"  the  most  important  thing 
about  his  trip,  if  one  may  trust  his  biographer,  Shea- 
han,  was  the  opportunity  to  teach  Europe  a  lesson 
in  democracy.  "He  was,"  says  Sheahan,  "pre 
sented  to  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  and  was  not  pre 
sented  to  the  Queen  of  England."  Court  dress 
was  required,  and  Douglas  refused  to  make  any 


178  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

concessions,  though  the  American  Minister,  Mr. 
Buchanan,  found  no  difficulty  in  doing  so.  But 
in  Russia  the  rule  was  dispensed  with,  and  Douglas 
was  told  that  he  was  right  in  his  attitude,  the  au 
thority  being  Count  Nesselrode.  Sheahan  says: 
"The  emperor  was  at  the  time  celebrating,  at  some 
distance  from  St.  Petersburg,  a  great  Russian  na 
tional  festival,  and  was  reviewing  the  national  army. 
Accompanied  by  Baron  Stoeckle,  Mr.  Douglas  pro 
ceeded  in  an  imperial  carriage  and  under  an  imperial 
escort  to  the  neighborhood  of  the  camp,  where  he 
left  the  carriage  and  proceeded  on  horseback  toward 
the  position  on  the  field  occupied  by  the  emperor. 
At  a  proper  distance  he  was  met  by  officers  of  the 
imperial  staff  and  conducted  to  the  emperor.  He 
was  the  only  American  present  at  that  magnificent 
display  of  the  power  and  wealth  of  the  empire;  rep 
resentatives  from  all  quarters  of  the  world  were  pres 
ent  to  witness  one  of  the  grandest  festivals  of  Rus 
sia,  graced  by  the  presence  of  the  imperial  house 
hold  and  of  all  the  most  distinguished  individuals 
of  the  empire,  and  yet  into  this  scene  of  royal  mag 
nificence  Mr.  Douglas  was  admitted  and  welcomed 
with  a  frank  cordiality  by  the  emperor,  in  the  same 
black  suit  of  cloth  in  which,  just  before  his  departure, 
he  had  visited  Franklin  Pierce."  Thus  was  won 
another  victory  for  democracy.  It  was  excellent 
campaign  material,  nor  is  the  incident  without  value 
historically  as  throwing  some  light  on  the  character 


PIERCE'S  SURRENDER  179 

of  the  man.  He  did  not  return,  says  Professor  John 
son,  "a  larger  man  either  intellectually  or  morally." 
There  was  of  course  no  doubt  as  to  the  attitude 
of  the  new  administration.  Franklin  Pierce  was  a 
man  of  respectable  ability,  a  good  lawyer,  and  a 
prominent  figure  in  his  own  State.  He  entered  the 
Mexican  war  as  a  private,  and  came  out  a  brigadier- 
general,  with  a  good  record.  He  was  the  fourth 
candidate,  and  the  second  president  to  be  graduated 
from  that  war.  Ambition  was  not  one  of  his  fail 
ings,  as  he  had  refused  an  appointment  as  attorney- 
general  in  the  Polk  administration,  and  had  de 
clined  his  party's  nomination  as  its  candidate  for 
governor.  Nor  had  he  any  special  desire  to  be 
President,  though  he  must  have  known,  and  per 
haps  participated  in  the  efforts  of  his  friends.  At 
least  he  would  have  been  quite  happy  had  the  choice 
fallen  on  another.  There  is  no  reason  to  think  that 
the  humility  that  he  showed  in  his  inaugural  address 
was  assumed.  He  spoke  of  himself  as  having  been 
"borne  to  a  position,  so  suitable  for  others  rather 
than  desirable  for  myself."  "You  have,"  he  said, 
"summoned  me  in  my  weakness;  you  must  sustain 
me  by  your  strength."  Only  two  features  of  the 
address  call  for  special  comment.  After  speaking 
of  the  strength  that  the  government  showed  in  the 
days  of  its  physical  weakness,  and  of  the  justifiable 
fear  of  the  fathers  that  the  acquisition  of  new  terri 
tory  might  prove  disastrous,  the  President  said: 


180  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

"The  actual  working  of  our  system  has  dispelled  a 
degree  of  solicitude,  which,  at  the  outset,  disturbed 
bold  hearts  and  far-reaching  intellects.  The  ap 
prehension  of  dangers  from  extended  territory, 
multiplied  States,  accumulated  wealth,  and  aug 
mented  population,  has  proved  to  be  unfounded. 
The  stars  upon  your  banner  have  become  nearly 
threefold  their  original  number;  your  densely  pop 
ulated  possessions  skirt  the  shores  of  the  two  great 
oceans;  and  yet  this  vast  increase  of  people  and 
territory  has  not  only  shown  itself  compatible  with 
the  harmonious  action  of  the  States  and  federal 
government  in  their  respective  spheres,  but  has 
afforded  an  additional  guaranty  of  the  strength  and 
integrity  of  both.  With  an  experience  thus  sugges 
tive  and  cheering,  the  policy  of  my  administration 
will  not  be  controlled  by  any  timid  forebodings  of 
evil  from  expansion.  Indeed  it  is  not  to  be  dis 
guised  that  our  attitude  as  a  nation,  and  our  posi 
tion  on  the  globe,  render  the  acquisition  of  certain 
possessions,  not  within  our  jurisdiction,  eminently 
important  for  our  protection,  if  not,  in  the  future, 
essential  for  the  preservation  of  the  rights  of  com 
merce  and  the  peace  of  the  world.  ...  It  is  not 
your  privilege  as  a  nation  to  speak  of  a  distant  past. 
The  striking  incidents  of  your  history,  replete  with 
instruction,  and  furnishing  abundant  grounds  for 
hopeful  confidence,  are  comprised  in  a  period  com 
paratively  brief.  But  if  your  past  is  limited,  your 


PIERCE'S  SURRENDER  181 

future  is  boundless."  These  words  must  have  glad 
dened  the  hearts  of  "Young  America/'  and  won 
the  unbounded  approval  of  Douglas.  Whether  the 
President  was  thinking  of  Cuba,  the  isthmus  and 
the  future  canal,  or  of  Mexico,  is  not  a  matter  of 
much  importance.  It  was  enough  to  know  that  he 
was  an  expansionist,  and  also  that  any  territory 
acquired  under  his  administration  that  was  suitable 
for  slavery  would  have  been  dedicated  to  slavery. 
The  address  was  in  this  particular  little  more  than 
a  polished  and  polite  echo  of  the  speech  of  Douglas 
on  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  less  than  three  weeks 
before.  But  of  course  the  greatest  interest  was  in 
the  President's  attitude  toward  slavery.  It  was 
all  that  could  have  been  desired  by  the  South.  In 
his  discussion  of  the  great  issue  Mr.  Pierce  said 
that  he  was  "moved  by  no  other  impulse  than  a 
most  earnest  desire  for  the  perpetuation  of  that 
Union  which  has  made  us  what  we  are,  showering 
upon  us  blessings,  and  conferring  a  power  and  in 
fluence  which  our  fathers  could  hardly  have  antic 
ipated,  even  with  the  most  sanguine  hopes  directed 
to  a  far-off  future."  "My  own  position,"  he  con 
tinued,  "  upon  this  subject  was  clear  and  unequivocal, 
upon  the  record  of  my  words  and  acts,  and  it  is  only 
recurred  to  at  this  time  because  my  silence  might 
perhaps  be  misconstrued."  After  further  dilating 
on  the  glories  of  the  Union,  the  President  proceeded 
to  indicate  the  policy  that  was  necessary  to  save 


182  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

it:  "Every  measure  tending  to  strengthen  the  fra 
ternal  feelings  of  all  the  members  of  our  Union, 
has  had  my  heartfelt  approbation.  To  every  theory 
of  society  or  government,  whether  the  offspring 
of  feverish  ambition  or  of  morbid  enthusiasm,  cal 
culated  to  dissolve  the  bonds  of  law  and  affection 
which  unite  us,  I  shall  interpose  a  ready  and  stern 
resistance.  I  believe  that  involuntary  servitude, 
as  it  exists  in  different  States  of  this  confederacy, 
is  recognized  by  the  Constitution.  I  believe  that 
it  stands  like  any  other  admitted  right,  and  that 
the  States  where  it  exists  are  entitled  to  efficient 
remedies  to  enforce  the  constitutional  provisions. 
I  hold  that  the  laws  of  1850,  commonly  called  the 
'compromise  measures/  are  strictly  constitutional, 
and  to  be  unhesitatingly  carried  into  effect.  I  be 
lieve  that  the  constituted  authorities  of  this  republic 
are  bound  to  regard  the  rights  of  the  South  in  this 
respect,  as  they  would  any  other  legal  and  con 
stitutional  right,  and  that  the  laws  to  enforce  them 
should  be  respected  and  obeyed,  not  with  a  reluc 
tance  encouraged  by  abstract  opinions  as  to  their 
propriety  in  a  different  state  of  society,  but  cheer 
fully,  and  according  to  the  decisions  of  the  tribunal 
to  which  their  exposition  belongs.  Such  have  been 
and  are  my  convictions,  and  upon  them  I  shall  act. 
I  fervently  hope  that  the  question  is  at  rest,  and 
that  no  sectional,  or  ambitious,  or  fanatical  excite 
ment  may  again  threaten  the  durability  of  our  in- 


PIERCE'S  SURRENDER  183 

stitutions,  or  obscure  the  light  of  our  prosperity." 
It  would  have  been  impossible  for  the  President  to 
go  further.  Those  who  loved  liberty  were  spoken 
of  as  the  victims  of  "feverish  ambition  or  of  morbid 
enthusiasm,"  and  the  love  of  liberty  itself  was 
classed  with  "abstract  opinions"  as  to  the  prefera 
ble  social  order.  The  President  demanded  that  all 
laws  protecting  slavery,  softened  down  by  him  into 
"involuntary  servitude,"  including  the  fugitive-slave 
law,  should  be  "respected  and  obeyed,"  and  "cheer 
fully."  Otherwise  the  Union  might  be  dissolved. 
It  was,  in  short,  a  strong  proslavery  speech. 

But  the  Democrats  were  again  in  power,  and  they 
were  more  than  satisfied  with  the  situation,  and 
the  country  too,  it  must  be  admitted,  was  content. 
The  Democrats  of  that  day  felt  much  as  many  Re 
publicans  feel  to-day.  The  following  state  of  mind, 
as  described  by  Mr.  Rhodes,  has  its  counterpart 
in  our  own  time:  "The  enthusiastic  cheers  and  noise 
of  cannon  which  greeted  the  President  when  he 
closed  his  address  was  typical  of  the  joy  of  Demo 
crats  all  over  the  country  on  their  restoration  to 
power.  In  truth,  they  had  always  felt,  since  the 
first  election  of  Jackson,  that  the  duty  of  administer 
ing  the  government  belonged  rightfully  to  them, 
and  that  in  their  hands  only  were  the  interests  of 
the  whole  people  properly  protected.  Aristocratic 
cabals  and  money  combinations  certainly  fared 
better  at  the  hands  of  the  Whigs,  but  a  party  whose 


184  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

support  was  largely  derived  from  these  elements 
did  not,  the  Democrats  thought,  deserve  popular 
success.  The  Whigs  had  twice  elected  a  President, 
but  it  was  by  means  of  the  trick  of  playing  upon 
the  universal  fancy  for  military  prestige.  It  was 
now  the  general  Democratic  feeling  that  the  installa 
tion  of  Pierce  into  office  was  a  restoration  simply 
of  the  power  and  patronage  justly  due  the  Demo 
crats."  However,  the  inaugural  address  was  well 
received  except  by  the  abolitionists — who  were 
growing  in  numbers — and  the  Free-Soilers.  Un 
doubtedly  the  country  longed  for  peace  and  quiet. 
The  cabinet  was  as  follows:  William  L.  Marcy 
of  New  York,  Secretary  of  State;  James  Guthrie 
of  Kentucky,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury;  Jefferson 
Davis  of  Mississippi,  Secretary  of  War;  James  C. 
Dobbin  of  North  Carolina,  Secretary  of  the  Navy; 
Robert  McClelland  of  Michigan,  Secretary  of  the 
Interior;  James  Campbell  of  Pennsylvania,  Post 
master-General;  Caleb  Gushing  of  Massachusetts, 
Attorney-General.  These  men  were  none  of  them 
afflicted  with  any  "abstract  opinions"  as  to  the 
right  and  wrong  of  slavery.  Marcy  had  opposed 
the  Free-Soilers  in  his  own  State;  Gushing  was 
lacking  in  convictions  of  any  sort;  while  Davis  had 
made  his  opinions  very  plainly  known.  He  was, 
or  was  soon  to  be,  the  leader  of  the  South  and  of 
the  slavery  men. 
Perhaps  the  greatest  tragedy  in  our  history  was 


PIERCE'S  SURRENDER  185 

the  failure  of  many  of  our  political  leaders  to  recog 
nize  and  support  the  strong  Union  sentiment  in 
the  South,  and  it  had  been  very  strong.  There  were 
men  in  that  section  who,  whatever  they  might  have 
thought  of  slavery,  held  that  the  question  of  pre 
serving  the  Union  was  far  more  important.  These 
men  got  practically  no  encouragement  from  Presi 
dent  Polk,  and  they  were  to  receive  as  little  from 
President  Pierce.  In  his  Political  History  of  Slavery, 
William  Henry  Smith  says:  "The  President  in 
constituting  his  cabinet  invited  dissensions  in  the 
party.  He  unfortunately  fell  under  the  influence 
of  the  extreme  States'-rights  leaders  of  the  South, 
although  he  had  it  in  his  power  to  strengthen  the 
Union  sentiment  in  the  South  by  throwing  the  in 
fluence  of  the  administration  with  the  majority, 
and,  by  strengthening  it  there,  to  strengthen  it  every 
where,  and  so  to  secure  to  a  conservative  Democratic 
party  the  confidence  and  cordial  support  of  an  irre 
sistible  preponderance  of  the  American  people." 
The  Union  cause,  Mr.  Smith  recalls,  triumphed  in 
the  contests  in  Georgia,  Alabama,  and  Mississippi 
in  1850-51.  There  were  secessionists  in  those  States, 
but  Davis,  who  was  one  of  them,  though  he  rather 
resented  the  imputation  when  he  came  to  write  of 
The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Confederate  Government, 
says  that  a  desire  to  destroy  the  Union  was  "enter 
tained  by  few,  very  few,  if  by  any  in  Mississippi, 
and  avowed  by  none."  This  is  a  manifest  exaggera- 


186  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

tion.  But  it  is  true,  as  another  authority  says,  that 
when  the  issue  of  secession  was  "presented  clearly 
and  distinctly  to  the  people  of  Mississippi,  it  was 
clearly  and  distinctly  repudiated."  This  was  the 
sentiment  that  triumphed,  but  the  President  utterly 
failed  to  recognize  it.  There  was  plenty  of  material 
to  work  with,  and  yet  he  took  Davis  into  his  cabi 
net,  a  man  who  had  been  the  political  associate 
of  such  secessionists  as  Yancey  and  Quitman,  a 
man  on  whom  had  fallen  the  mantle  of  Calhoun. 
Thus  President  Pierce's  policy  seems  to  have  been 
to  save  the  Union  by  surrendering  to  those  who 
were  prepared  to  destroy  it  if  they  could  not  have 
their  own  way,  and  abandoning  those  who  were  so 
strongly  for  the  Union  that  they  were  prepared  to 
support  it  even  against  their  own  interests.  "Were 
not,"  Mr.  Smith  asks,  "the  Unionists  of  Georgia, 
Alabama  and  Mississippi  justified  in  regarding  them 
selves  as  under  the  condemnation  of  the  adminis 
tration?"  What  could  the  people  as  a  whole  think 
of  the  policy  of  supporting  the  compromise  of  1850 
by  appointing  to  a  cabinet  position  a  man — Jeffer 
son  Davis — who  had,  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate, 
boasted  that  he  had  voted  for  but  one  of  the  bills, 
and  had  said  that  "so  far  as  the  public  opinion 
of  the  community  which  I  represent  has  been 
shadowed  forth  in  public  meetings  and  in  the 
public  press,  it  has  been  wholly  adverse  to  the 
great  body  of  these  measures"?  So  fatuous  does 


PIERCE'S  SURRENDER  187 

this  policy  seem  that  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that 
it  was  honestly  adopted  or  pursued.  Naturally 
the  friends  of  liberty  in  the  North  were  greatly 
distressed,  all  the  more  so  because  the  people  for 
a  time  seemed  to  be  satisfied — as  "business" 
certainly  was.  Seward  said:  "I  look  around  me 
in  the  Senate  and  find  all  demoralized.  Maine, 
New  Hampshire,  Connecticut,  Rhode  Island,  and 
Vermont !  All,  all  in  the  hands  of  the  slave 
holders;  and  even  New  York  ready  to  howl  at  my 
heels  if  I  were  only  to  name  the  name  of  freedom, 
which  they  once  loved  so  much."  Wade  may 
well  have  asked  whether  freedom  or  slavery  was 
to  be  national.  Certain  it  is  that  during  the  Pierce 
administration  the  nation  sank  to  the  lowest  level 
it  ever  touched,  except  under  Buchanan.  What 
ever  may  have  been  the  purpose  of  the  President, 
his  policy  clearly  indicated  that  he  was  firm  in  the 
belief  that  the  Union  could  be  saved  only  by  a  sur 
render  to  slavery.  The  surrender  was  made,  but 
the  Union  was  not  saved  by  any  such  means. 
Nevertheless,  the  political  situation  was,  from  the 
Democratic  point  of  view,  all  that  could  have  been 
desired.  The  party  was  strongly  intrenched  in  the 
confidence  of  the  people.  It  had  administered  the 
affairs  of  the  country  for  many  years,  with  only 
two  interregnums.  By  many  it  was  looked  on  as 
the  only  true  national  party.  Every  one  wished 
the  new  administration  well.  "The  prosperity," 


188  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

says  William  Henry  Smith,  "everywhere  prevalent, 
the  marvellous  growth  of  new  communities,  the  ab 
sorption  of  thought  and  energy  in  the  development 
of  agriculture,  commerce,  and  mining,  rendered 
the  people  indifferent  to  the  discussion  of  political 
subjects.  They  confidently  looked  to  the  President 
for  a  continuance  of  good  times,  and  would  most 
cordially  give  support  to  a  policy  having  for  its 
purpose  the  promotion  of  pure  Democratic  prin 
ciples  in  the  practical  administration  of  the  busi 
ness  affairs  of  the  government.  The  winning  manners 
of  the  President  insured  the  good-will  of  those  who 
had  intercourse  with  him.  He  was  fortunate  also 
in  having  the  support  of  both  Houses  of  Congress 
by  decided  majorities,  as  it  was,  therefore,  possible 
to  carry  out  any  party  policy  that  might  be  adopted. 
No  preceding  administration  began  under  more 
favorable  auspices."  The  party  had  just  won  a 
tremendous  victory.  There  were  probably  few 
people  who  believed  that  the  Whig  party  would 
ever  again  be  able  to  offer  any  effective  opposition. 
No  political  party  in  our  history  ever  had  a  better 
right  than  had  the  Democratic  party  in  1852  to  be 
satisfied  with  the  status  quo.  The  people  asked 
only  for  peace  and  a  good  business  administration. 
Yet  the  leaders,  Douglas  among  them,  with  the 
sympathy  and  support  of  the  President,  within 
less  than  a  year  plunged  the  party  and  the  country 
into  the  bitterest  strife  by  re-opening  the  slavery 


PIERCE'S  SURRENDER  189 

question,  which  Douglas  had  said  in  1850  he  would 
never  again  discuss  in  Congress,  and  they  did  it 
by  striking  at  the  Missouri  Compromise,  which 
had  since  1820  been  regarded  by  the  people  as  per 
manently  defining  the  status  of  the  territory  to 
which  it  applied.  What  is  the  explanation? 


CHAPTER  IX 
POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY 

THERE  can  of  course  be  no  question  as  to  the  mo 
tives  of  the  Southern  men  who  favored  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  bill,  the  effect  of  which  was  to  repeal  the 
Missouri  Compromise,  and  to  open  to  slavery,  if 
the  people  should  choose  to  adopt  it,  the  territory 
of  Nebraska,  which  comprised  what  are  now  the 
States  of  Kansas,  Nebraska,  Montana,  the  two 
Dakotas  and  parts  of  Colorado  and  Wyoming.  This 
land  had  been  twice  dedicated  to  freedom,  under 
the  Ordinance  of  1787  and  the  Missouri  Compromise. 
Now  the  proposition  was  to  remove  the  barriers, 
and  give  to  the  people  the  privilege  of  establishing 
slavery  if  they  cared  to  do  so.  What  the  South 
wanted  was  more  slave  territory.  What  did  Douglas 
want  ?  His  interest  in  the  West  has  been  shown,  and 
it  has  been  shown  also  that  it  was  sincere.  As  early 
as  1844  he  had  introduced  a  bill  for  the  organization 
of  Nebraska,  and  this  was  followed  by  other  bills 
in  1848  and  1852.  But  Congress  treated  them  with 
scant  consideration.  The  East  was  not  interested, 
and  the  South  was  unwilling  to  create  States — or 
even  to  take  the  preliminary  steps — that  must  under 
the  law  of  the  land  be  free.  "It  looks  to  me,"  said 

190 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  191 

Douglas  on  one  occasion,  "as  if  the  design  was  to 
deprive  us  of  everything  like  protection  in  that  vast 
region.  ...  I  must  remind  the  Senate  again  that 
the  pointing  out  of  these  objections,  and  the  sug 
gesting  of  these  large  expenditures  show  us  that  we 
are  to  expect  no  protection  at  all;  they  evince  direct, 
open  hostility  to  that  section  of  the  country."  He 
felt  that  this  middle  section  had  been  neglected, 
and  that  if  it  were  properly  organized,  and  adequate 
protection  were  assured,  people  would  flock  into  it. 
Probably  too  he  realized  that  it  would  be  impossible 
to  get  through  Congress  any  bill  dealing  with  the 
subject  in  which  there  were  not  some  concessions 
to  the  South.  And  of  course  the  only  concessions 
that 'the  South  cared  about  were  those  in  the  in 
terest  of  slavery.  The  question  was  how  far  Douglas 
could  go.  He  went  very  far,  much  further,  one  can 
not  help  thinking,  than  he  would  have  gone  had  his 
motive  been  solely  his  desire  to  provide  for  the  wel 
fare  of  Nebraska. 

It  was  on  January  4,  1854,  that  Douglas,  as  chair 
man  of  the  committee  on  Territories,  made  his  fa 
mous  report  on  the  Nebraska  questioni  The  bill 
accompanying  it  provided  that  the  territory  of  Ne 
braska,  or  any  part  of  it,  when  admitted  as  a  State 
"  shall  be  received  into  the  Union  with  or  without 
slavery,  as  their  Constitution  may  prescribe  at  the 
time  of  their  admission. "  There  has  been  much  dis 
cussion  as  to  whether  Douglas  at  the  outset  in- 


192  STEPHEN  A.   DOUGLAS 

tended  to  repeal  the  Missouri  Compromise  which  ex 
cluded  slavery  from  the  territory.  It  is  certain  that 
the  North  had  no  doubt  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  re 
port  and  the  original  bill.  Yet  Douglas — for  the  re 
port  was  his — declared  that  there  was  grave  doubt  in 
the  minds  of  many  whether  slavery  was  prohibited 
in  Nebraska  by  "  valid "  enactment — that  is,  there 
was  doubt  as  to  the  validity  of  the  Missouri  Com 
promise.  The  report  favored  the  incorporation  in 
the  bill  of  the  provisions  of  the  compromise  of 
1850  under  which  the  people  of  New  Mexico  and 
Utah  had  been  permitted  to  settle  the  slavery  ques 
tion  for  themselves.  Very  naturally  the  friends  of 
freedom  were  alarmed,  and  with  good  reason.  Doug 
las  was  quite  right  when  he  said  later  in  answer  to 
criticism  that  "the  bill  in  the  shape  in  which  it  was 
first  reported  as  effectually  repealed  the  Missouri 
restriction  as  it  afterward  did  when  the  repeal  was 
put  in  express  terms."  He  could  have  had  no  other 
idea,  since  his  whole  argument  was  that  the  adop 
tion  of  the  compromise  measures  of  1850  had  in 
principle  repealed  the  Missouri  restriction,  and 
therefore  the  adoption  of  the  principles  of  the  com 
promise  in  connection  with  Nebraska  must  have 
repealed  the  restriction.  But  the  Southerners  in 
sisted  on  making  the  matter  clear  beyond  dispute. 
An  amendment  was  offered  by  Dixon,  a  Whig,  and 
successor  of  Henry  Clay,  which  formally  and  in 
express  terms  repealed  the  Missouri  Compromise. 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  193 

This  was  more  than  Douglas  was  looking  for.  Per 
haps  he  felt  that  the  point  had  already  been  covered, 
and  that  the  success  of  the  bill  might  be  jeoparded 
by  the  amendment.  Perhaps  his  purpose  was  to 
make  a  concession  to  the  South  which  was  no  real 
concession,  and  to  leave  the  North  in  a  state  of  un 
certainty,  such  as  he  admitted  in  his  report  to  exist. 
But  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  after  he  had  con 
sented  to  the  Dixon  amendment  he  adopted  the  view 
that  it  did  not  alter  the  nature  of  his  bill,  which 
was  from  the  beginning,  as  he  then  insisted,  a  repeal 
bill.  While  Douglas  had  in  his  measure  declared 
for  the  principle  of  non-intervention  in  the  Terri 
tories  Dixon  insisted  that  legislation  was  needed 
to  make  the  declaration  good.  The  fact  that  Doug 
las  did  not  yield  easily — though  he  did  completely 
— may  possibly  be  taken  to  indicate  that  he  pre 
ferred  to  leave  the  matter  indefinite,  and  even  that 
he  did  not  desire  to  seem  to  repeal  the  Missouri 
Compromise,  since  he  had  committed  himself 
strongly  to  it.  In  his  report  he  had  said  that  the 
"committee  are  not  prepared  now  to  recommend 
a  departure  from  the  course  pursued  on  that 
memorable  occasion  [the  adoption  of  the  com 
promise  of  1850]  either  by  affirming  or  repealing 
the  Eighth  section  of  the  Missouri  act,  or  by  any 
act  declaratory  of  the  meaning  of  the  Constitution 
in  respect  to  the  legal  points  in  dispute."  In  a  very 
rhetorical  and  overstrained  statement  to  Dixon, 


194  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

;  >   •  •* 

Douglas  pledged  himself  to  incorporate  the  amend 
ment  in  the  bill.  The  country  was  greatly  stirred, 
the  people  of  the  North  having  little  doubt  of  the 
effect  of  the  bill.  It  was  felt  that  a  good  deal  of 
management  might  be  necessary  to  get  it  through 
the  House,  as  proved  to  be  the  case.  The  adminis 
tration  seemed  disposed  to  hold  aloof,  the  President 
doubtless  being  fearful  of  disturbing  the  peace  and 
repose  that  he  had  less  than  a  year  before  pledged 
himself  to  maintain.  But  after  a  conference  partic 
ipated  in  by  the  President,  Secretary  of  War  Davis, 
and  Senator  Douglas,  it  was  decided  that  the  ad 
ministration  should  throw  its  influence  in  support 
of  the  bill,  which  finally  emerged  in  the  form  of  two 
bills,  for  the  organization  of  Kansas  and  Nebraska 
respectively.  There  was  some  question  as  to  whether 
it  should  be  declared  that  the  Missouri  Compromise 
was  "superseded,"  or  had  become  "inoperative." 
The  latter  word  was  decided  on,  and  it  was  declared 
that  the  Missouri  Compromise  "being  inconsistent 
with  the  principle  of  non-intervention  by  Congress 
with  slavery  in  the  States  and  Territories,  as  recog 
nized  by  the  legislation  of  1850  (commonly  called 
the  compromise  measures),  is  hereby  declared  in 
operative  and  void,  it  being  the  true  intent  and 
meaning  of  this  act  not  to  legislate  slavery  into  any 
Territory  or  State,  nor  to  exclude  it  therefrom,  but 
to  leave  the  people  thereof  perfectly  free  to  form 
and  regulate  their  domestic  institutions  in  their 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  195 

own  way,  subject  only  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States."  The  bill  passed  the  Senate  by  a 
vote  of  29  to  12,  on  March  2,  and  on  May  22  it  passed 
the  House,  after  a  bitter  controversy,  by  a  vote  of 
113  to  110.  The  President  signed  it  on  May  30. 
It  is  often  dangerous  to  accept  the  contemporary 
view  of  public  men  and  their  actions,  but  in  this 
case  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that  contemporary 
opinion,  which  was  unfavorable  to  Douglas,  was 
largely  right.  Douglas  undoubtedly  believed  that 
there  never  would  be  slavery  in  either  Kansas  or 
Nebraska,  but  had  he  any  warrant  for  thinking 
thus?  This  was  not  the  opinion  of  the  Southern 
men,  for  they  notoriously  expected  to  capture  Kan 
sas,  as  indeed  they  tried  to  do.  There  can  be  no 
denying  the  fact  that  the  legislation  gave  slavery 
another  chance,  and  that  this  was  understood  by 
the  South.  Senator  Brown  of  Mississippi  said  in 
the  course  of  the  debate:  "If  I  thought  in  voting 
for  the  bill  as  it  now  stands,  I  was  conceding  the 
right  of  the  people  in  the  Territory,  during  their 
Territorial  existence,  to  exclude  slavery,  I  would 
withhold  my  vote."  The  very  division  of  the  Terri 
tory  into  two  States  seemed  to  point  to  a  purpose 
to  recur  to  the  old  precedent  of  admitting  slave 
States  and  free  States  in  pairs.  In  1850  Douglas 
had  not  been  prepared  to  abandon  the  theory  that 
the  national  government  had  supreme  control  over 
the  Territories.  It  seems  strange  to-day  that  any 


196  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

one  at  any  time  should  have  held  any  other  theory. 
But  Douglas  was  also  on  record  in  regard  to  the 
Missouri  Compromise.  Only  four  years  before, 
when  the  compromise  measures  were  under  con 
sideration,  he  had  said  that  the  Missouri  Compromise 
was  "  canonized  in  the  hearts  of  the  American  people 
as  a  sacred  thing,  which  no  ruthless  hand  would 
ever  be  reckless  enough  to  disturb."  There  was  then 
no  suggestion  from  him,  or  any  one  else,  that  it  had 
been  repealed  by  the  Clay  compromise  legislation. 
It  was  absurd  to  argue,  as  Douglas  did,  that  the 
refusal  of  Congress  to  extend  the  Missouri  restric 
tion  to  territory  to  which  it  did  not  apply,  and  never 
had  applied,  was  equivalent  to  a  repeal  of  it  as  to 
territory  to  which  it  did  apply.  Congress  had  said 
that  there  should  never  be  slavery  in  any  part  of 
the  Louisiana  purchase  north  of  36-30.  That  it 
had  the  power  so  to  order  could  not  be  disputed. 
Nor  could  it  be  denied  that  Congress  had  a  right 
to  repeal  the  statute.  But  the  point  is  that  it  was 
repealed  by  Congress  in  1854,  and  not  by  the  Con 
gress  of  1850  in  enacting  the  compromise  measures. 
Douglas  argued  that  in  adopting  those  measures, 
Congress  had  not  merely  settled  an  immediately 
pressing  question,  but  had  established  a  principle 
— namely,  popular  sovereignty.  But  Senator  Chase 
and  others  showed  very  clearly  that  this  was  not 
the  case.  "What  rights,"  he  asked,  "are  precious 
if  those  secured  to  free  labor  and  free  laborers  in 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  197 

that  vast  territory  are  not  ?  "  There  was  no  declara 
tion  of  a  general  principle,  but  only  the  prescribing 
of  conditions  under  which  certain  Territories  should 
be  organized.  The  men  who  refused  to  extend  the 
Missouri  Compromise  to  the  Pacific  when  the  effect 
would  have  been  to  increase  the  area  of  slave  terri 
tory  which  was  at  the  time  free,  could  not  be  said 
to  have  favored  the  abrogation  of  the  compromise 
when  it  guarded  free  territory.  The  Appeal  of  the 
Independent  Democrats,  which  was  given  to  the 
country  just  prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  Kan 
sas-Nebraska  bill,  told  the  truth,  though  perhaps 
with  unnecessary  heat  and  fervor.  It  denounced 
the  bill  as  "a  gross  violation  of  a  sacred  pledge;  as 
a  criminal  betrayal  of  precious  rights."  "Not  a 
man,"  the  signers  declared,  "in  Congress  or  out  of 
Congress,  in  1850,  pretended  that  the  compromise 
measures  would  repeal  the  Missouri  prohibition. 
Mr.  Douglas  himself  never  advanced  such  a  pre 
tence  until  this  session.  His  Nebraska  bill,  of  last 
session,  rejected  it.  It  is  a  sheer  afterthought.  To 
declare  the  prohibition  inoperative,  may,  indeed, 
have  effect  in  law  as  a  repeal,  but  it  is  a  most  dis 
creditable  way  of  reaching  an  object.  Will  the 
people  permit  their  dearest  interests  to  be  thus  made 
the  mere  hazards  of  a  presidential  game,  and  de 
stroyed  by  false  facts  and  false  inferences?" 
Whether  the  last  charge  is  true  or  not — and  it  is 
difficult  either  to  prove  or  disprove,  since  it  relates 


198  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

to  motive — it  is  beyond  dispute  that  the  theory 
of  a  conflict  between  the  Missouri  Compromise  and 
that  of  1850  was  an  "afterthought."  In  the  course 
of  the  debate  Seward  said,  and  with  perfect  truth, 
that  not  a  representative  from  a  non-slave-holding 
State  would  have  voted  for  the  compromise  of  1850 
if  he  had  believed  that  it  repealed  the  Missouri  Com 
promise  either  directly  or  by  implication.  Certainly 
Henry  Clay  and  Daniel  Webster  would  not.  It 
may  be  doubted  whether  Douglas  himself  would 
have  done  so,  since  he  had  at  the  time  said  that  the 
Missouri  legislation  was  "canonized  in  the  hearts 
of  the  American  people  as  a  sacred  thing,  which  no 
ruthless  hand  would  ever  be  reckless  enough  to 
disturb."  Douglas  further  argued  that  neither 
the  Ordinance  of  1787  nor  the  Missouri  restriction 
had  kept  slaves  out  of  the  territory  supposed  to 
be  protected  by  them,  and  that  therefore  they  were 
of  no  help  to  the  North  and  no  harm  to  the  South. 
If  that  was  so,  why  repeal  the  compromise?  Why 
should  the  slavery  people  have  demanded  its  re 
peal?  If  it  was  harmless  there  does  not  seem  to 
be  any  reason  why  such  a  stir  should  have  been 
made  over  it.  The  South  did  not  take  that  view. 
Senator  Atchison,  proslavery  senator  from  Missouri, 
said  that  he  had  always  said  that  the  first  great 
error  in  our  political  history  was  the  Ordinance  of 
1787  making  the  Northwest  territory  free,  and  the 
second  was  the  Missouri  Compromise.  "But,"  he 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  199 

continued,  "they  are  both  irremediable.  We  must 
submit  to  them.  I  am  prepared  to  do  it.  It  is  evi 
dent  that  the  Missouri  Compromise  cannot  be  re 
pealed."  Those  words  were  spoken  in  1853.  It  is 
hardly  necessary  to  summarize  the  arguments  of 
Douglas — the  statement  of  his  points  is  sufficient. 
Yet  his  speech  closing  the  debate  was  admitted, 
even  by  those  who  had  most  strongly  opposed  him, 
to  be  a  great  one.  He  threw  into  it  all  his  powers, 
speaking,  one  would  think,  as  he  could  not  have 
spoken  had  he  not  been  sincere.  His  bill,  he  said, 
repealed  both  a  guaranty  and  a  prohibition,  both  of 
which  were  wrong  in  principle,  unconstitutional,  and 
opposed  to  sound  principle.  Yet  it  had  taken  thirty 
years  to  discover  that  a  great  statute,  under  which 
the  country  had  lived,  which  most  men  had  ac 
cepted  as  final,  and  which  Douglas  only  four  years 
before  had  said  was  "canonized  in  the  hearts  of 
the  American  people  as  sacred,"  and  "which  no  ruth 
less  hand  would  ever  be  reckless  enough  to  disturb," 
was  unconstitutional.  Douglas,  with  a  curious  twist 
in  logic,  argued  that  the  Missouri  Compromise  was  a 
restriction  on  the  liberties  of  the  people  of  the  North, 
since  it  forbade  them  to  hold  slaves,  while  it  gave 
that  right  to  the  people  of  the  South.  "It  was," 
he  said,  "a  restriction  which  in  terms  and  effect 
discriminated  against  the  intelligence  and  capacity 
of  the  Northern  people."  What  they  looked  on 
as  a  protection,  and  as  a  great  charter  of  freedom, 


200  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Douglas  construed  as  a  denial  of  rights.  "The  legal 
effect  of  this  bill,"  he  continued,  "is  neither  to  legis 
late  slavery  into  these  Territories  nor  out  of  them, 
but  to  leave  the  people  to  do  as  they  please.  If 
they  wish  slavery  they  have  a  right  to  it.  If  they 
do  not  want  it  they  will  not  have  it,  and  you  should 
not  force  it  upon  them."  The  bill  did  not  indeed 
legislate  slavery  into  the  Territories,  but  it  did  legis 
late  into  them  the  possibility  of  slavery,  from  which 
they  were  under  the  compromise  free.  The  Illinois 
senator  throughout  his  speech  made  no  distinction 
whatever  between  slavery  and  freedom,  but  treated 
them  as  equally  entitled  to  consideration  and  pro 
tection.  His  speech  is  utterly  without  moral  quality. 
Yet  one  cannot  read  it  to-day  without  feeling  its 
plausibility  and  being  impressed  by  its  power. 
Seward  interrupted  Douglas  long  enough  to  say: 
"I  hope  the  senator  will  yield  for  a  moment,  be 
cause  I  have  never  had  so  much  respect  for  him  as 
I  have  to-night." 

To  this  speech  we  may  apply  Macaulay's  charac 
terization  of  Boyle's  answer  to  Bentley's  demons 
tration  of  the  spuriousness  of  the  Epistles  of  Phalaris : 
"A  most  remarkable  book  it  is,  and  often  reminds 
us  of  Goldsmith's  observation  that  the  French  would 
be  the  best  cooks  in  the  world  if  they  had  any 
butcher's  meat,  for  that  they  can  make  ten  dishes 
out  of  a  nettle-top.  It  really  deserves  the  praise, 
whatever  that  praise  may  be  worth,  of  being  the 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  201 

best  book  ever  written  by  any  man  on  the  wrong 
side  of  a  question."  Seward,  Sumner,  Wade,  Chase, 
and  Edward  Everett  all  spoke,  and  spoke  well. 
Everett  showed  with  the  greatest  clearness  that  the 
principle  of  non-intervention  on  the  part  of  Con 
gress  was  not  enacted  by  the  legislation  of  1850, 
and  said  that  it  was  "a  mere  begging  of  the  question 
to  say  that  those  compromise  measures  adopted 
in  this  specific  case  amount  to  such  a  general  rule." 
Sumner  welcomed  the  issue  as  one  which,  because 
it  was  moral,  would  now  have  to  be  faced.  Old 
questions,  he  said,  "have  disappeared,  leaving  the 
ground  to  be  occupied  by  a  question  grander  far. 
The  bank,  subtreasury,  the  distribution  of  public 
lands,  are  each  and  all  obsolete  issues.  And  now, 
instead  of  these  superseded  questions,  which  were 
filled  for  the  most  part  with  the  odor  of  the  dollar, 
the  country  is  directly  summoned  to  consider  face 
to  face  a  cause  which  is  connected  with  all  that  is 
divine  in  religion,  with  all  that  is  pure  and  noble 
in  morals,  and  with  all  that  is  truly  practical  and 
constitutional  in  politics.  Unlike  the  other  ques 
tions,  it  is  not  temporary  or  local  in  its  character. 
It  belongs  to  all  times  and  to  all  countries.  Though 
long  kept  in  check,  it  now,  by  your  introduction, 
confronts  the  people,  demanding  to  be  heard.  To 
every  man  in  the  land  it  says,  with  clear,  penetrat 
ing  voice,  'Are  you  for  freedom  or  are  you  for 
slavery?'  And  every  man  in  the  land  must  answer 


202  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

the  question  when  he  votes."    Here  was  a  prophecy 
that  was  fulfilled  to  the  letter. 

There  has  been  a  disposition  to  soften  somewhat 
the  contemporary  judgment  of  Douglas,  which 
was  that  he  was  playing  politics,  and  diligently 
seeking  the  presidency.  Much  has  been  made  of 
his  statement  in  a  letter  written  in  the  preceding 
November  in  which  he  said:  "I  see  many  of  the 
newspapers  are  holding  me  up  as  a  candidate  for 
the  next  presidency.  I  do  not  wish  to  occupy  that 
position.  I  do  not  think  I  will  be  willing  to  have 
my  name  used.  I  think  such  a  state  of  things  will 
exist  that  I  shall  not  desire  the  nomination.  Yet 
I  do  not  intend  to  do  any  act  which  will  deprive 
me  of  the  control  of  my  own  action.  I  shall  remain 
entirely  non-committal  and  hold  myself  at  liberty 
to  do  whatever  my  duty  to  my  principles  and  my 
friends  may  require  when  the  time  for  action  ar 
rives.  Our  first  duty  is  to  the  cause — the  fate  of 
individuals  is  of  minor  consequence.  The  party 
is  in  a  distracted  condition  and  it  requires  all  our 
wisdom,  prudence,  and  energy  to  consolidate  its 
power  and  perpetuate  its  principles.  Let  us  leave 
the  presidency  out  of  view  for  at  least  two  years 
to  come."  But  that  is  a  very  mild  disclaimer,  and 
may  be  considered  merely  as  an  expression  of  belief 
that  it  was  too  early  to  "launch  his  boom."  Be 
sides  Douglas  had  been  a  candidate  in  1852,  an  ac 
tive  and  aggressive  one.  And  he  must  have  known 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  203 

that  his  name  would  almost  certainly  be  presented 
to  the  next  convention,  as  indeed  it  was.    He  was 
not  the  man  to  do  anything  that  he  thought  might 
injure  him  politically.    Though  he  had  undoubted 
personal  courage,  he  was  yet  a  politician.    But  could 
he  have  felt  that  he  would  be  helped  by  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  bill?    Of  this  there  can  be  little  doubt, 
for  he  believed — and  said  so — that  it  would  help 
solidify  and  strengthen  his  party,  which  he  thought 
to  be  "in  a  distracted  condition."    "We  shall  pass 
the  Nebraska  bill,"  he  wrote,  "in  both  Houses  by 
decisive  majorities  and  the  party  will  be  stronger 
than  ever,  for  it  will  be  united  upon  principle." 
That  it  would  please  the  South  he  could  not  have 
doubted.    He  was  equally  sure  that  it  would  be  "as 
popular  at  the  North  as  at  the  South  when  its  pro 
visions  and  principles  shall  have  been  fully  developed, 
and  become  well  understood."    He  relied  wholly  on 
the  principle  of  popular  sovereignty  or  local  self- 
government.    It  had  served  him  well  in  the  past, 
and  it  was  to  serve  him  in  the  future.    Those  writ 
ing  of  past  events  and  historic  characters  have  a 
very  natural  distrust  of  contemporary  testimony 
with  reference  to  them.     But  that  testimony  has 
its  strong  as  well  as  its  weak  points.    Men  who  are 
parties  to  great  controversies  are  usually  violently 
partisan,  and  almost  always  prejudiced,  and  are 
quick  to  impute  motives.    The  mere  fact  that  they 
may  not  happen  to  like  the  one  whom  they  judge 


204  STEPHEN  A.   DOUGLAS 

is  a  disturbing  factor.  Rarely  are  they  capable  of 
taking  a  broad  view.  It  is  well  known  that  many 
such  judgments  have  been  reversed.  Often  memoirs 
or  confidential  correspondence  come  to  light  that 
put  an  entirely  different  face  on  the  subject.  But 
contemporaries,  on  the  other  hand,  have  a  much 
more  intimate  knowledge  of  the  movements  of  their 
time,  and  of  the  men  who  participated  in  them,  and 
through  their  closer  relationship  and  acquaintance 
with  those  men,  are  better  able,  except  for  their 
prejudice,  to  appraise  them.  The  law  furnishes  a 
parallel.  Appellate  courts  are  very  reluctant  to 
disturb  the  verdict  of  a  jury  in  a, criminal  case  on 
the  weight  of  evidence,  holding  that,  as  the  jury  had 
had  the  opportunity  to  observe  the  conduct  and 
bearing  of  the  prisoner  and  the  witnesses,  its  con 
clusion  is  entitled  to  great  respect.  The  parallel 
is  not  exact,  but  it  makes  the  principle  clear.  The 
opinions  of  Douglas's  associates,  and  of  the  people 
of  his  day,  cannot  be  set  aside.  It  was  altogether 
unfavorable.  When  this  judgment  is  affirmed  by 
so  competent  a  historian  as  Mr.  Rhodes  it  must, 
it  is  to  be  feared,  stand.  Mr.  Rhodes  says:  "The 
motives  which  actuate  men  who  alter  the  current 
of  their  time  are  ever  an  interesting  study;  and  in 
this  case  no  confidential  letters  or  conversations 
need  be  unearthed  to  arrive  at  a  satisfactory  ex 
planation.  We  may  use  the  expression  of  the  In 
dependent  Democrats  in  Congress  and  say  that  the 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  205 

dearest  interests  of  the  people  were  made  'the  mere 
hazards  of  a  presidential  game';  or  we  may  employ 
the  words  of  John  Van  Buren,  an  astute  politician 
who  was  in  the  secrets  of  the  party,  and  ask, '  Could 
anything  but  a  desire  to  buy  the  South  at  the  presi 
dential  shambles  dictate  such  an  outrage?'  And 
this  true  statement  and  the  inference  from  the 
trenchant  question  explain  the  motives  prompting 
Douglas  to  this  action.  Even  those  who  were  very 
friendly  to  the  measure  did  not  scruple  openly  to 
express  this  opinion.  One  wrote  that  Douglas  had 
betrayed  'an  indiscreet  and  hasty  ambition';  an 
other  granted  that  the  object  of  Douglas  'was  to 
get  the  inside  track  in  the  South.'  The  defenses 
made  by  Douglas  and  his  friends  at  the  time  and  in 
succeeding  years,  when  his  political  prospects  de 
pended  upon  the  justification  of  his  course,  are 
shuffling  and  delusive.  None  are  satisfactory,  and 
it  may  with  confidence  be  affirmed  that  the  action 
of  the  Illinois  senator  was  a  bid  for  Southern  sup 
port  in  the  next  Democratic  convention.  In  truth 
Douglas  might  have  used  the  words  of  Frederick 
the  Great  when  he  began  the  unjust  war  against 
Austria  for  the  conquest  of  Silesia:  'Ambition,  in 
terest,  the  desire  of  making  people  talk  about  me, 
carried  the  day,  and  I  decided'  to  renew  the  agita 
tion  of  slavery."  It  should  not  be  forgotten  that 
the  doctrine  of  popular  sovereignty  was  brought 
forward  by  Douglas  seven  years  before  to  save  the 


206  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

situation  created  in  Illinois  by  his  opposition  to 
the  Wilmot  proviso.  In  both  cases  there  was  a 
personal  interest  involved.  This  is  not  to  say  that 
Douglas  did  not  believe  in  the  principle — since  it 
was  thoroughly  Democratic — but  that  he  went  far 
in  applying  it  when  it  was  useful  to  him.  He  easily 
overcame  his  scruples  when  it  came  to  voting  aid 
to  internal  improvements.  Nor  need  it  be  believed 
that  he  worked  for  or  desired  the  extension  of  slavery, 
or  deliberately  planned  to  introduce  slavery  into  the 
Northwest.  What  can  be  said  is  that  he  was  in 
different  to  slavery,  without  any  feeling  of  moral 
revolt  against  it,  and  that  he  was  willing  to  run  a 
great  risk,  and  to  wipe  out  the  last  legal  restriction 
for  political  and  personal  reasons.  The  great  mo 
tive  that  inspired  Webster  and  Clay — a  desire  to 
save  the  Union — was  not  present  in  this  case.  The 
Union  was  in  no  danger,  and  there  was  no  pretense 
that  it  was.  President  Pierce  had  in  his  inaugural 
congratulated  the  people  only  a  few  months  before 
on  the  better  feeling  that  prevailed  throughout  the 
nation.  Douglas  himself  made  no  claim  that  there 
was  any  such  necessity  as  that  which  was  believed 
to  have  dictated  the  compromise  of  1850.  On  the 
contrary  he  had  professed  to  believe  that  the  slavery 
question  was  a  dead  issue,  and  had  said  that  he  would 
never  discuss  it  again.  There  was  not  even  any 
demand  for  the  legislation  till  Douglas  created  it. 
Instead  of  calming  the  strife  it  brought  such  a  storm 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  207 

on  the  country  as  it  had  never  known  before,  and 
was  never  to  know  again  except  in  the  days  of  the 
Civil  War.  Two  things,  it  is  believed,  have  con 
tributed  to  the  toning  down  of  the  contemporary 
verdict.  One  is  the  natural  disposition  of  historians 
to  take  the  charitable  and  kindly  view,  which  is 
much  to  their  credit.  And  it  is  true,  too,  that  Doug 
las  fairly  deserves  some  measure  of  protection  against 
the  extreme  harshness  of  some  of  his  critics,  for  he 
was  an  honest  man  and  a  patriot.  In  the  second 
place,  he  did  much  to  redeem  his  fame  in  the  last 
years  of  his  life,  when  he  broke  with  his  party  on 
one  of  the  issues  that  rose  out  of  this  very  Kansas- 
Nebraska  legislation,  and  by  the  vigor  of  his  cam 
paign  as  the  candidate  of  the  Union  Democracy, 
contributed  in  no  small  degree  to  the  election  of 
Abraham  Lincoln.  It  may  be  said  of  him  as 
Macaulay  said  of  Sir  Robert  Walpole:  "It  was 
only  in  matters  of  public  moment  that  he  ...  had 
recourse  to  compromise.  In  his  contests  for  per 
sonal  influence  there  was  no  timidity,  no  shrink 
ing."  When  a  man  with  presidential  ambitions 
adopts  a  course  that  he  has  reason  to  believe  will 
conciliate  one  section  of  the  country,  and,  when 
understood,  be  popular  in  the  other  section,  it  does 
not  seem  unfair  or  unkind  to  say  that  personal  mo 
tives  influenced  him  to  a  considerable  extent.  He 
was  not,  as  we  have  seen,  above  playing  politics, 
but  he  did  it  boldly  and  as  a  master. 


208  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Douglas  could  hardly  have  been  surprised  at  the 
fury  roused  by  his  bill.  For  he  is  reported  by  Dixon 
to  have  said  when  he  agreed  to  accept  the  Dixon 
amendment:  "The  repeal,  if  we  can  effect  it,  will 
produce  much  stir  and  commotion  in  the  free  States 
of  the  Union  for  a  season.  I  shall  be  assailed  by 
demagogues  and  fanatics  there,  without  stint  or 
moderation.  Every  opprobrious  epithet  will  be 
applied  to  me.  I  shall  probably  be  hung  in  effigy 
in  many  places.  It  is  more  than  probable  that  I 
may  become  permanently  odious  among  those  whose 
friendship  and  esteem  I  have  heretofore  possessed. 
This  proceeding  may  end  my  political  career.  But, 
acting  under  the  sense  of  duty  which  animates  me, 
I  am  prepared  to  make  the  sacrifice."  The  prophecy 
was  fulfilled  to  the  letter.  Benton,  who  has  not 
received  the  honor  that  is  his  due  as  a  man  of  in 
dependence  and  courage,  spoke  of  the  bill  as  "a 
bungling  attempt  to  smuggle  slavery  into  the  terri 
tory,  and  throughout  all  the  country,  up  to  the  Cana 
dian  line  and  out  to  the  Rocky  Mountains,"  and 
denounced  the  attempt  as  an  outrage.  He  certainly, 
though  a  Southern  man,  a  Democrat,  and  a  slave 
holder,  spoke  for  the  North.  Mass-meetings  were 
held  everywhere  to  protest  against  what  was  char 
acterized  as  a  crime.  A  memorial  signed  by  3,000 
New  England  clergymen  protesting  against  the 
legislation  as  a  breach  of  faith  was  presented  to 
Congress.  A  similar  protest,  signed  by  500  clergy- 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  209 

men  of  the  Northwest,  was  presented  in  the  Senate 
by  Douglas  himself.  Great  meetings  were  held  in 
New  York  and  Boston  and  adopted  resolutions 
condemning  the  bill  and  its  author.  The  Whig 
papers,  and  many  of  the  Democratic  papers,  were 
vigorous  in  their  denunciations  of  it.  In  Illinois 
but  one  paper  favored  it.  The  five  Chicago  papers, 
one  of  which  Douglas  had  helped  to  establish,  were 
opposed  to  it.  Legislatures  all  over  the  North 
adopted  resolutions  against  the  bill,  that  of  Illinois 
being  an  exception,  since  it  reluctantly,  and  under 
pressure,  approved,  though  the  affirmative  vote 
in  both  branches  was  less  than  one-half  the  legis 
lature.  Sheahan  was  greatly  outraged  by  the  atti 
tude  of  the  clergymen,  people,  and  papers  of  Chicago. 
He  says:  "He  had  no  paper  in  Chicago  to  defend 
the  bill  or  himself.  He  was  exposed  to  constant 
warfare  from  all  quarters,  and  had  no  means  of  de 
fense.  All  the  Chicago  papers  were  open  to  con 
demn,  none  ventured  a  word  in  his  behalf.  It  was 
his  home;  it  was  the  great  city  of  the  Northwest. 
There,  in  preference  to  all  other  places,  he  needed 
defense,  yet  there  he  was  left  alone  to  meet  the 
storm  which  falsehood,  private  and  political  malice, 
disappointed  ambition  and  open  knavery,  were 
fast  gathering  to  meet  him  on  his  return."  It  does 
not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  the  amiable  biographer 
that  about  the  worst  thing  that  can  be  said  of  a 
man  is  that  there  is  no  one  in  his  home  town  to  de- 


210  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

fend  him.  Nor  did  he  see  that  he  was  charging  all 
the  clergymen,  all  the  people,  and  all  the  papers 
of  Chicago  with  "falsehood,  private  and  political 
malice,  disappointed  ambition  and  open  knavery" 
in  order  to  exculpate  a  man  who  could  find  no  one 
to  take  his  part.  "Traitor,"  "Benedict  Arnold," 
"Judas,"  were  among  the  mildest  epithets  hurled 
at  him.  In  one  Ohio  town  he  was  presented  with 
thirty  pieces  of  silver.  When  he  returned  to  Chicago 
he  announced  that  on  September  1  he  would  ad 
dress  the  people.  Flags  were  hung  at  half-mast  on 
the  shipping,  bells  were  tolled  as  the  hour  for  the 
meeting  approached.  When  Douglas  appeared  on 
the  platform  he  faced  an  angry  audience  which 
greeted  him  with  hisses.  In  spite  of  his  utmost 
efforts  he  could  not  get  a  hearing,  and  after  a  two 
hours'  struggle  he  gave  it  up.  It  has  been  said  that 
the  opposition  was  organized,  but  there  was  no 
need  for  organization.  Wherever  Douglas  went 
in  the  State  in  his  canvass — an  election  for  congress 
men  and  State  Treasurer  being  on — he  was  treated 
in  much  the  same  fashion.  "Burning  effigies," 
says  Sheahan,  "effigies  suspended  by  ropes,  banners 
with  all  the  vulgar  mottoes  and  inscriptions  that 
passion  and  prejudice  could  suggest,  were  displayed 
at  various  points." 

All  this  was  not  a  mere  outburst  of  wrath  against 
one  man,  or  of  opposition  to  an  act  of  Congress — 
it  was  rather  the  awakening  of  the  North.  It  had 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  211 

become  clear  to  all  men — as  it  had  been  to  the  aboli 
tionists  and  Free-Soilers  for  years — that  the  policy 
of  compromise  and  concession  would  no  longer  serve. 
This  was  the  view  of  Benton,  who  said  that  hence 
forth  it  would  be  necessary  to  oppose  the  extension 
of  slavery  by  every  constitutional  means,  and  de 
clared  that  it  was  an  outrage  to  propose  to  extend 
the  domain  of  slavery  by  repealing  all  that  part  of 
a  compromise  measure  that  worked  against  it,  after 
the  South  had  had  all  the  advantage  of  such  parts 
of  the  law  as  worked  in  its  favor.  "We  have  never 
known,"  said  the  Richmond  Whig,  "such  unanimity 
of  sentiment  at  the  North  upon  any  question  affect 
ing  the  rights  of  the  South  as  now  prevails  in  opposi 
tion  to  the  Missouri  Compromise  repeal."  The 
Springfield  Republican,  which  had  been  exceedingly 
moderate  and  conservative  in  its  tone,  and  had 
stood  by  Webster  even  after  the  Seventh  of  March 
Speech,  and  had  welcomed  the  compromise  measures 
of  1850,  said:  "The  North  had  acquiesced  in  these 
compromises;  it  sustained  and  abided  by  them. 
But  the  South  and  its  Northern  political  allies  have 
broken  the  peace  of  the  country.  They  make  fresh 
and  monstrous  demands.  These  demands  will  arouse 
the  whole  nation;  they  will  widen  and  deepen  the 
antislavery  feeling  of  the  country  as  no  other  con 
ceivable  proposition  could.  The  signs  are  unmis 
takable.  No  mere  party  or  faction  will  array  itself 
against  this  Nebraska  scheme.  The  whole  people 


212  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

are  against  it.  The  moral  force  of  the  North — the 
influence,  the  learning,  the  wealth,  and  the  votes 
of  the  North — are  against  it,  and  will  make  them 
selves  effectively  heard  ere  the  agitation,  now  re 
opened  by  the  insanity  of  the  slaveholding  interest, 
and  in  behalf  of  the  schemes  of  ambitious  partisans, 
shall  have  ceased.  The  South  and  its  allies  have 
sown  the  wind — will  they  not  reap  the  whirlwind?" 
The  utterances  of  Southerners  in  defense  of  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  bill  served  to  strengthen  the 
North  in  its  opinion  that  the  whole  campaign  was 
one  for  the  extension  of  slavery.  Doubtless  injustice 
was  done  to  Douglas,  for  it  would  be  hard  to  prove 
that  he  had  any  such  purpose.  But  there  can  be 
no  doubt  as  to  the  aim  of  the  slavery  men.  Though 
they  distrusted  Douglas,  and  were  somewhat  slow 
in  comprehending  the  benefits  that  would  come  to 
them  as  a  result  of  his  bill,  they  were  not  long  in 
accepting  it  as  wholly  in  their  interest.  "The 
South,"  said  a  South  Carolina  newspaper,  "are 
united  for  a  removal  of  the  Missouri  restriction." 
There  were  men  in  the  Southern  States  who  thought, 
not  only  that  slavery  was  a  blessing,  but  that  free 
dom  unmixed  with  servitude  was  an  evil.  In  dis 
cussing  the  railroad  riots  at  Erie  in  1853,  Represen 
tative  Boyce  of  South  Carolina,  addressing  the 
Northern  members,  said:  "It  is  one  of  the  misfor 
tunes  to  which  you  are  exposed  by  having  your 
whole  population  made  up  of  freemen."  "At  the 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  213 

North  and  in  Western  Europe,"  said  the  Richmond 
Enquirer,  "by  attempting  to  dispense  with  a  natural 
and  necessary  and  hitherto  universal  institution  of 
society,  you  have  thrown  everything  into  confusion. 
In  dispensing  with  domestic  slavery  you  have  de 
stroyed  order,  and  removed  the  strongest  argument 
to  prove  the  existence  of  Deity,  the  author  of  that 
order.  They  inculcate  competition  as  the  life  of 
trade  and  essence  of  morality.  The  good  order, 
the  peace,  the  protection  and  affectionate  relations 
of  society  at  the  South,  induce  the  belief  in  a  de 
signer  and  author  of  this  order,  and  thus  'lift  the 
soul  from  nature  up  to  nature's  God/  The  chaotic 
confusion  of  free  society  has  the  opposite  effect." 
Another  Richmond  paper  said:  "But  the  worst  of 
all  these  abominations  is  the  modern  system  of  free 
schools,  because  the  cause  and  prolific  source  of 
the  infidelities  and  treasons  that  have  turned  her 
cities  into  Sodoms  and  Gomorrahs,  and  her  land  into 
the  common  nesting-places  of  howling  Bedlamites." 
All  of  which  reads  very  much  like  the  outgivings  of 
the  Pan-Germanists  in  glorification  of  Teutonic  kul- 
tur.  The  battle  was  between  two  types  of  culture, 
with  the  Southern  type,  as  it  had  been  for  years,  on 
the  aggressive.  When  men  began  to  talk  of  human 
slavery  as  necessary  to  the  preservation  of  order, 
and  to  denounce  the  free  schools,  it  certainly  is  not 
surprising  that  the  lovers  of  freedom  should  have 
taken  alarm.  But  Douglas  had  established  his 


214  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

great  principle  of  popular  sovereignty,  and  it  soon 
became  necessary  to  find  a  sovereign  in  Kansas  to 
exercise  the  conferred  power.  But  before  we  come  to 
that  something  should  be  said  of  the  immediate  effect 
of  the  action  of  Congress,  under  Douglas's  leader 
ship,  on  politics.  The  Whig  party  was  in  a  moribund 
condition,  and  party  lines  generally  were  disrupted. 
Many  of  its  members  drifted  into  the  American 
or  Know-Nothing  party,  since  there  did  not  seem 
to  be  any  other  place  to  go.  The  anti-foreign  and 
anti-Catholic  principles  of  the  Know-Nothings  were 
fiercely  denounced  by  Douglas  and  many  others. 
Gradually  the  friends  of  freedom  came  together — 
Whigs,  Free-Soilers,  Anti-Administration  Democrats 
and  Americans — into  what  was  known  as  the  Anti- 
Nebraska  party.  This  party  in  Michigan  on  July 
6,  1854,  christened  itself  the  Republican  party,  and 
this  name  was  adopted  a  week  later  by  the  Anti- 
Nebraska  people  in  Ohio  and  Wisconsin.  The  Ger 
mans  of  the  Northwest  deserted  the  Democratic 
party  in  large  numbers.  There  was  in  the  elections 
of  1854  no  effective  opposition  party,  and  the  people 
had  to  find  as  best  they  could  a  means  of  expressing 
their  opinion.  Douglas  had,  however,  done  much 
to  consolidate  the  opposition,  for,  as  the  New  York 
Times  said,  "the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise 
has  done  more  than  any  event  of  the  last  ten  years 
to  strengthen  antislavery  sentiment  in  the  free 
States."  The  Illinois  senator  plunged  into  the  cam- 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  215 

paign  of  1854  in  Illinois  with  his  usual  vigor.  Lyman 
Trumbull,  an  old  Democrat,  was  the  Anti-Nebraska 
leader.  The  election  was  of  special  importance 
since  the  new  legislature  would  be  called  on  to  choose 
a  successor  to  Senator  Shields,  whose  term  was  about 
to  expire.  Of  course  the  question  of  vindicating 
Douglas  was  involved. 

The  legislature  had  been  heavily  Democratic, 
and  it  was  felt  that  if  the  hold-overs  continued  to 
be  Democrats,  there  would  be  little  difficulty  in 
securing  the  re-election  of  Senator  Shields.  The 
speaking  campaign  of  Douglas  lasted  for  two  months. 
On  October  3  he  met  Lincoln  in  joint  debate  in 
Springfield.  Lincoln  had  lost  his  interest  in  politics 
till  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  so  Doug 
las  was  responsible  for  bringing  him  back  into  polit 
ical  life.  The  Democrats,  though  they  elected  their 
candidate  for  State  Treasurer  by  a  greatly  reduced 
plurality — 2,915  as  against  more  than  15,000  for 
Pierce  two  years  before — lost  the  legislature,  and 
the  United  States  senatorship.  When  the  legisla 
ture  met  in  January,  it  was  found  that  it  was  con 
trolled  by  the  Fusion  forces.  It  was  suggested  that 
Shields  withdraw,  the  assumption  being  that  he  was 
objectionable  because  of  his  Irish  birth.  That  also 
was  Douglas's  theory  as  to  the  result  of  the  election, 
but  he  refused  to  consider  the  question  of  withdrawal. 
"Our  friends,"  he  said,  "should  stand  by  Shields 
and  throw  the  responsibility  on  the  Whigs  of  beating 


216  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

him  because  he  was  born  in  Ireland.  The  Nebraska 
fight  is  over,  and  Know-Nothingism  has  taken  its 
place  as  the  chief  issue  in  the  future.  If  therefore 
Shields  shall  be  beaten  it  will  be  apparent  to  the 
people  and  to  the  whole  country  that  a  gallant  sol 
dier  and  faithful  public  servant  has  been  stricken 
down  because  of  the  place  of  his  birth."  But  the 
Nebraska  fight  was  not  over;  it  was  only  beginning. 
Douglas  would  have  been  glad  to  change  the  issue, 
but  he  could  not  do  so.  It  lasted  till  the  firing  on 
Fort  Sumter.  Shields  was  beaten.  On  the  first 
ballot  he  received  41  votes,  3  other  Democratic 
votes  being  cast  for  as  many  other  candidates;  Lin 
coln  received  45  votes,  and  Lyman  Trumbull  5, 
with  5  scattering.  The  Anti-Nebraska  vote  was 
55,  and  the  Democratic  vote  44.  On  the  tenth  ballot 
Trumbull  was  elected,  receiving  51  votes.  The 
congressional  delegation  which  had  consisted  of 
five  Democrats  and  four  Whigs  was,  as  a  result  of 
the  election,  changed  into  one  consisting  of  four 
Democrats  and  five  Anti-Nebraska  men.  The 
Democrats  were  returned  by  reduced  pluralities. 
In  the  Sixth  district,  however,  in  which  Douglas 
made  his  strongest  fight,  his  friend  Harris  was  elected 
over  Yates.  The  result  was  certainly  not  encourag 
ing  to  the  Democrats.  Even  Douglas,  optimistic 
as  he  was,  admitted  that  "the  heavens  were  par 
tially  overcast."  The  attempt  to  explain  the  de 
feat  as  due  to  Know-Nothingism  was  not  successful, 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  217 

as  every  one  knew  that  the  real  issue  was  the  Ne 
braska  bill.  This  was  made  clear  by  the  general 
result,  even  in  districts  and  States  where  there  was 
a  large  foreign  population.  Out  of  the  42  men  of 
the  North  who  had  voted  for  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
bill  only  7  were  re-elected.  In  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives  the  Democratic  representation  shrank 
from  159  to  79,  and  the  Democratic  majority  of 
84  over  all  became  a  Democratic  minority  of  75. 
There  is  no  other  construction  to  put  upon  the  re 
sult  than  that  it  was  a  tremendous  rebuke  to  the 
national  administration  and  to  Douglas.  The  Fu- 
sionists  carried  Indiana,  Ohio,  and  Michigan  by  very 
large  majorities.  Maine,  Rhode  Island,  New  York, 
Pennsylvania,  and  Iowa,  all  of  which  had  given 
Pierce  majorities  in  1852,  were  lost  to  the  Demo 
crats.  Clearly  the  immediate  result  of  the  Douglas 
policy  was  not  to  strengthen  his  party.  Nor  was 
that  its  ultimate  result,  although  it  won  another 
national  election.  He  had  met  defeat  for  the  first 
time  in  his  life,  even  his  own  State,  which  he  had 
apparently  held  in  the  hollow  of  his  hand,  having 
turned  against  him.  But  he  faced  it  bravely,  never 
for  one  moment  weakening,  never  giving  up  the 
fight.  Not  only  had  his  party  lost  political  power 
as  a  result  of  the  revulsion  of  feeling;  it  had  raised 
up  a  permanent  opposition  to  itself  that  could  be 
neither  quelled  nor  cajoled.  Northern  men  who 
formerly  repudiated  with  indignation  the  charge 


218  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

that  they  were  abolitionists  were  beginning  to  get 
at  least  a  glimmer  of  the  truth  that  there  could  be 
no  peace  or  assured  unity  till  slavery  was  wiped 
out.  And  everything  that  happened  during  the  next 
six  years  strengthened  that  opinion,  and  for  much 
of  what  happened  Douglas  was  responsible.  The 
Kansas  Civil  War — for  it  amounted  to  that — the 
Dred  Scott  decision,  the  Lecompton  Constitution 
which  forced  Douglas  himself  into  the  opposition, 
the  John  Brown  raid,  and  the  growth  of  the  Re 
publican  party,  were  all  acts  in  the  great  drama 
which  ended  only  with  Appomattox — and  hardly 
then.  Something  of  the  sentiment  of  the  aboli 
tionists  was  permeating  the  whole  body  of  the  North 
ern  people.  Douglas  was  either  unable  to  realize 
this,  or  unwilling  to  admit  it.  He  said  that  the  whole 
trouble  was  caused  by  the  abolitionists,  but  he  did 
not  see  that  even  if  there  were  no  more  abolitionists 
than  there  had  been,  there  was  a  good  deal  more 
abolitionism.  Men  did  not  believe  that  it  was  neces 
sary  to  choose  between  the  Union  and  freedom,  but 
they  had  pretty  well  made  up  their  minds  that  the 
time  had  come  for  a  choice  between  freedom  and 
slavery. 

When,  therefore,  they  were  told  that  in  getting 
one  compromise  they  had  bartered  away  another — 
and  an  infinitely  more  important  one — they  naturally 
were  alarmed.  Sumner  was  entirely  right  when  he 
said  that  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  "is  at  once  the 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  219 

worst  and  the  best  bill  on  which  Congress  ever  acted. 
It  is  the  worst  bill,  inasmuch  as  it  is  a  present  vic 
tory  of  slavery.  ...  It  is  the  best  bill,  ...  for 
it  prepares  the  way  for  that  'All  hail  hereafter/ 
when  slavery  must  disappear.  It  annuls  all  past 
compromises,  and  makes  all  future  compromises 
impossible.  Thus  ib  puts  freedom  and  slavery  face 
to  face,  and  bids  them  grapple.  Who  can  doubt 
the  result?" 

The  country  had  not  been  without  its  prophets, 
but  now  every  one  was  beginning  to  prophesy.  The 
new  note  is  easily  discernible.  But  Douglas  was 
deaf  to  it.  He  was  angered  rather  than  enlightened. 
It  was  plain  that  he  had  utterly  misread  the  pre 
vailing  opinion,  and  now  he  misinterpreted  the  de 
feat  that  had  come  to  him  and  his  party.  When 
twitted  on  the  subject  by  his  victorious  enemies, 
he  said:  "The  fact  is,  and  the  gentleman  knows 
it,  that  in  the  free  States  there  has  been  an  alliance, 
I  will  not  say  whether  holy  or  unholy,  at  the  recent 
elections.  In  that  alliance  they  had  a  crucible  into 
which  they  poured  abolitionism,  Maine  liquor- 
lawism,  and  what  there  was  left  of  Northern  Whig- 
ism,  and  then  the  Protestant  feeling  against  the 
Catholic,  and  the  native  feeling  against  the  for 
eigner.  All  these  elements  were  melted  down  in 
that  crucible,  and  the  result  was  what  was  called 
the  Fusion  party."  He  was  specially  bitter  toward 
Trumbull,  the  newly  elected  senator  from  Illinois, 


220  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

whom  he  regarded  as  a  renegade.  "When  he  was 
elected/'  Douglas  said,  "he  received  every  abolition 
vote  in  the  legislature  of  Illinois.  He  received  every 
Know-Nothing  vote  in  the  legislature  of  Illinois. 
So  far  as  I  am  advised  and  believe,  he  received  no 
vote  except  from  persons  allied  to  abolitionism  or 
Know-Nothingism.  He  came  here  as  the  Know- 
Nothing-Abolition  candidate,  in  opposition  to  the 
united  Democracy  of  the  State,  and  to  the  Demo 
cratic  candidate."  Amid  the  shifting  of  the  founda 
tions  of  political  power  Douglas  could  see  only  the 
triumph  of  a  conspiracy  engineered  by  shrewd  and 
unscrupulous  political  leaders.  Many  men  far  more 
removed  from  greatness  than  he  was  were  far  less 
blind.  He  was  almost  wholly  lacking  in  imagina 
tion,  and  knew  little  history  except  that  of  his  own 
country.  He  had  all  the  limitations  of  the  prac 
tical  man,  of  the  politician  absorbed  in  the  imme 
diate  task.  Such  men  are,  and  always  have  been, 
pitiably  helpless  in  those  days  when  the  universe 
seems  to  be  changing  front.  Nevertheless,  it  would 
be  doing  him  a  grave  injustice  to  put  him  in  that 
class.  For  something  more  than  political  shrewd 
ness  was  necessary  to  enable  him  to  recover  from 
the  blow — for  recover  he  did.  Even  in  these  dark 
days  he  was  recognized  as  the  leader  of  the  Demo 
cratic  party,  and  he  retained  the  leadership  of  the 
Northern  wing  of  it  to  the  last.  Mr.  Rhodes  says, 
and  with  perfect  truth:  "Douglas  had  the  quality 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  221 

of  attaching  men  to  him;  he  was  especially  fond  of 
young  men,  and  they  repaid  his  complaisance  by 
devotion.  No  American  statesman  but  Clay  ever 
had  such  a  personal  following.  .  .  .  Since  Andrew 
Jackson,  no  man  has  possessed  the  influence,  re 
ceived  the  confidence,  or  had  the  support  that  it 
was  the  lot  of  Douglas  to  enjoy  from  the  Democrats 
in  the  Northern  half  of  the  Union.  From  1854  to 
1858  he  was  the  centre  of  the  political  history  of 
the  country;  from  1858  to  1860  he  was  the  best- 
known  man  in  the  United  States;  but  after  the 
contest  with  Lincoln  in  1858  it  became  apparent 
that  the  ' Little  Giant'  had  met  his  match  in  that 
other  son  of  Illinois."  Of  no  man  who  did  not  have 
many  of  the  elements  of  greatness  could  such  words 
be  truthfully  spoken,  and  they  are  true  in  this  case. 
But,  nevertheless,  he  was  dwelling  in  the  past,  at 
least  the  past  of  1850.  He  got  out  of  step  with  the 
march  of  events,  lost  touch  with  the  movements 
of  the  time.  Nothing  showed  it  better  than  the 
changed  attitude  toward  the  fugitive-slave  law. 
The  people  had  almost  become  reconciled  to  it,  or 
at  least  resigned,  for  they  believed  that  slavery  was 
in  process  of  extinction.  There  had,  as  we  have 
seen,  been  troubles  attending  its  enforcement,  but 
these  were  not  serious,  and  had  roused  no  great 
feeling  at  the  North.  The  attempted  rescue  of  the 
fugitive  Burns  in  Boston,  while  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
bill  was  being  driven  through  Congress  by  Douglas, 


222  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

revealed  the  situation  in  its  true  light.  The  lead 
ing  citizens  of  Boston — Theodore  Parker,  Wendell 
Phillips,  and  Thomas  Wentworth  Higginson  (who 
was  wounded  in  an  assault  on  the  prison) — were 
the  leaders.  When  the  fugitive  was  awarded  to 
his  owner  he  was  marched  to  the  ship  that  was  to 
take  him  south  under  the  guard  of  the  city  police, 
twenty-two  companies  of  the  Massachusetts  national 
guard,  a  company  of  cavalry,  a  United  States  ar 
tillery  battalion,  one  platoon  of  United  States  ma 
rines,  a  civil  posse  of  125  men  specially  guarding 
the  fugitive,  a  field-piece  and  two  platoons  of  marines 
guarding  it.  Fifty  thousand  people  witnessed  the 
march  and  greeted  it  with  hisses  and  groans.  The 
cost  of  recovering  Burns  is  said  to  have  been,  ac 
cording  to  different  authorities,  between  $40,000  and 
$100,000.  The  whole  city  was  in  an  uproar.  As 
has  been  said  the  mob — if  it  may  be  called  that — 
was  made  up  of  the  leading  citizens,  while  the  mar 
shal's  deputies  were  drawn  from  the  lowest  classes. 
The  Richmond  Enquirer  said:  "We  rejoice  at  the 
recapture  of  Burns,  but  a  few  more  such  victories 
and  the  South  is  undone."  Burns  was  the  last 
fugitive  slave  removed  from  Massachusetts.  The 
legislature  later  passed  a  personal  liberty  act  which 
was  in  direct  conflict  with  the  fugitive-slave  law. 
Another  case  arose  in  Wisconsin,  in  which  a  man 
was  arrested  and  charged  with  having  been  party  to 
the  rescue  of  a  fugitive — as  he  was.  An  associate 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  223 

justice  of  the  State  Supreme  Court  discharged  him 
in  habeas-corpus  proceedings,  holding  that  the 
fugitive-slave  law  was  unconstitutional.  This  judg 
ment  was  subsequently  affirmed  by  the  entire  bench. 
In  Massachusetts  a  judge  was  removed  by  the  gov 
ernor  for  enforcing  the  law;  in  Wisconsin  the  highest 
tribunal  of  the  State  declared  the  law  unconstitu 
tional.  Surely  there  could,  after  these  happenings, 
be  no  mistake  as  to  the  temper  of  the  people. 
They  felt  that  they  had  been  betrayed,  that  the 
repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  by  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  bill  was  an  altering  of  the  terms  of  the 
bargain  they  had  made  in  the  interest  of  peace  and 
union. 


CHAPTER  X 

WAR  IN  KANSAS 

THERE  was,  of  course,  no  hope  for  such  a  party  as 
the  Know-Nothing  party.  It  began  to  go  to 
pieces,  indeed,  shortly  after  the  elections  of  1854. 
Douglas  was  merciless  in  his  assaults  on  it,  chal 
lenged  its  principles  even  in  localities  where  they 
were  most  strongly  held,  and  denounced  those  who 
would  proscribe  a  man  because  he  happened  to  be 
born  abroad  or  to  be  a  member  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church.  Here  he  took  high  and  strong 
ground.  It  was  not  with  him  a  question  of  win 
ning  the  Irish  vote  or  the  German  vote,  but  of  true 
Americanism.  Nor  can  there  be  any  doubt  that 
his  attitude  had  much  to  do  with  maintaining  unity 
at  the  North,  and  commending  to  its  new  citizens 
their  government  in  its  true  light.  Undoubtedly 
the  Know-Nothing  party  served  as  a  refuge  for 
many  men  who  could  find  nowhere  else  to  go,  and 
was  used  as  a  means  for  making  effective  the  op 
position  to  the  Kansas-Nebraska  policy  and  the 
party  that  was  responsible  for  it. 

Congress  met  December  4,  1854,  the  last  session 
of  the  Thirty-first  Congress.  In  the  President's 
message  there  was  no  reference  to  slavery,  or  to 

224 


WAR  IN  KANSAS  225 

the  Kansas-Nebraska  question,  though  there  was 
a  hinting  at  them  in  the  following  pious  gener 
alities:  "We  have  to  maintain  inviolate  the  great 
doctrine  of  the  inherent  right  of  popular  self-govern 
ment  ;  to  reconcile  the  largest  liberty  of  the  individual 
citizen  with  complete  security  of  public  order;   to 
render  cheerful  obedience  to  the  laws  of  the  land, 
to  unite  in  enforcing  their  execution,  and  to  frown 
indignantly  on  all  combinations  to  resist  them." 
The  problem  of  finding  a  sovereign  in  Kansas  was 
rapidly  taking  shape.    Prior  to  the  passage  of  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  bill  there  was  not  one  white  man 
lawfully  in  the  vast  territory.    There  was  no  trouble 
about  Nebraska,  since  every  one  admitted  that  it 
would  be  a  free  State.    That  there  was  trouble  over 
Kansas — and  of  the  gravest  sort — was  due  to  the 
fact  that  an  effort  was  made — and  vigorously  re 
sisted — to  make  it  a  slave  State.    Douglas  had  con 
ferred  popular  sovereignty  on  a  territory  in  which 
there  was  not  one  person  legally  qualified  to  exercise 
it.    All  other  laws  had  provided  that  only  actual 
residents,  otherwise  qualified,  at  the  time  of  the 
passage  of  the  laws,  should  vote.    The  present  law 
simply  demanded  actual  residence.    It  did  not  de 
fine  what  residence  was,  or  when  it  should  date 
from.    It  was  impossible  to  make  a  qualification 
of  residence  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  law, 
for  there  were  at  that  time  no  residents  in  Kansas. 
Thus  at  the  very  outset  was  laid  the  basis  for  dis- 


226  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

pute  and  contention.  Apparently  any  one  who 
came  to  Kansas  after  the  passage  of  the  law  could 
vote.  So  the  struggle  that  had  been  raging  through 
out  the  country  was  transferred  to  the  prairies  of 
Kansas.  The  battle  that  had  been  fought  between 
the  North  and  the  South  over  the  enforcement  of 
the  fugitive-slave  law  was  now  to  be  fought  by  men 
with  arms  in  their  hands.  The  intellectually  and 
morally  hostile  elements  were  at  last  brought  into 
violent  contact,  the  conflicting  currents  were  to 
come  into  collision. 

It  is  to-day  hard  to  see  how  anything  else  could 
have  been  looked  for,  except  on  the  theory  that  the 
North  was  not  in  earnest,  or  that,  if  it  was,  it  would 
yield,  as  it  had  so  often  done  before.  All  Douglas's 
eloquent  talk  about  popular  sovereignty  as  applicable 
in  this  case  must  have  sounded  very  hollow  to  all 
who  realized  that  the  sovereignty  was  to  be  con 
ferred  on  a  vacuum.  Douglas's  idea  was  that 
the  country  would  soon  fill  up  when  it  was  known 
that  it  was  to  have  an  organized  government. 
Here  he  was  right.  It  is  said  that  ten  or  fifteen 
thousand  people  of  Missouri  waited  on  the  border 
for  the  opening  of  the  territory,  though  there  was 
some  disappointment  in  the  South  over  the  num 
ber  of  bona  fide  settlers  from  Missouri.  How 
ever,  bona  fide  settlers  were  not  needed  to  con 
trol  Kansas  in  the  interest  of  slavery.  In  July, 
1854,  the  Emigrant  Aid  Society  of  New  England, 


WAR  IN  KANSAS  227 

organized  by  Eli  Thayer,  sent  its  first  party  to  Kan 
sas,  the  avowed  object  of  the  society  being  to  make 
Kansas  a  free  State.  There  was  a  large  exodus  from 
Illinois,  Indiana,  and  Iowa.  From  Kentucky  a 
company  of  seventy  went  out,  provided  with  every 
convenience,  including  several  ready-made  houses, 
the  members  paying  all  their  own  expenses,  and  all 
being  free-State  men.  These  latter,  before  they 
left  home,  framed  a  Constitution  and  by-laws  to 
which  they  severally  subscribed.  Thayer,  it  should 
be  said,  was,  like  Douglas,  a  believer  in  popular 
sovereignty*  He  was  also  sure  that  the  cause  of 
freedom  would  win  in  Kansas*  Emigration,  except 
from  Missouri,  was  mostly  from  the  free  States, 
and  it  swelled  rapidly.  The  census  of  February, 
1855,  gave  Kansas  a  population  of  8,600,  of  whom 
196  were  slaves. 

As  we  annexed  a  war  when  we  annexed  Texas, 
we  made  war  sovereign  when  we  decreed  popular 
sovereignty  for  Kansas.  The  South  had  assumed 
that  the  State  would  be  a  slave  State,  while  the 
North  had  resolved  that  it  should  not  be.  The  issue 
was  vital  to  the  slaveholding  interest,  at  least  that 
was  the  opinion  of  the  slavery  leaders.  The  Mis- 
sourians  were  moving  into  the  State,  and  organizing 
themselves  into  Blue  Lodges,  secret  organizations 
the  purpose  of  which  was  to  extend  slavery  into 
the  new  State.  This  was  in  October,  1854.  But 
this  was  not  the  first  attempt  to  organize  the 


228  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

sovereignty  of  the  State.  The  New  England  Emi 
grant-Aid  Company  had  been  formed  in  July.  On 
June  20,  nineteen  days  after  the  opening  of  the  terri 
tory,  the  "Platte  County  Self-Defensive  Associa 
tion"  assembled  at  Weston,  and  declared  that  "when 
called  upon  by  any  citizen  of  Kansas,  its  members 
would  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  assist  in  re 
moving  any  and  all  emigrants  who  should  go  there 
under  the  aid  of  Northern  emigrant  societies" — a 
pledge  that  these  men  afterward  attempted  to  make 
good.  It  was  not  till  October  that  the  new  Governor, 
Andrew  H.  Reeder,  reached  the  territory.  He  was, 
of  course,  appointed  by  President  Pierce,  and  a 
thorough  believer  in  Douglas's  popular  sovereignty 
— and  a  proslavery  man.  That  he  was  a  man  of 
character  and  ability,  and  disposed  to  be  fair,  is 
generally  agreed.  The  governor  called  an  election 
for  territorial  delegate  for  November  29.  Seventeen 
hundred  and  twenty-nine  Missourians  came  across 
the  line  to  vote,  though  their  votes  were  not  needed, 
since  their  candidate,  Whitfield,  would  have  been 
elected  without  them,  the  free-State  people  taking 
little  interest  in  the  election.  The  delegate  was 
seated  without  any  objection.  But  the  battle  was 
only  postponed.  The  antislavery  men  made  no 
move  till  the  time  came  for  electing  a  territorial 
legislature,  March  30,  1855.  Every  effort  was  made 
by  the  governor  to  guard  against  fraud  or  violence, 
and  to  secure  an  honest  declaration  of  the  will  of 


WAR  IN  KANSAS  229 

the  people.  But  the  task  was  beyond  his  powers. 
Here  the  issue  was  directly  presented,  for  it  was 
through  the  legislature  that  the  boon  of  popular 
sovereignty,  that  Douglas  had  conferred  on  the 
territory,  would  be  exercised.  Three-fourths  of 
the  vote  was  cast  by  organized  and  armed  invaders 
from  Missouri.  The  election  judges  were  mostly 
proslavery  men.  Those  who  were  not  were  either 
awed  by  the  mob,  or  driven  away  from  the  polls. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  go  into  detail  in  regard  to  the 
frauds  and  outrages,  but  it  is  important  that  the 
reader  should  have  a  picture  of  popular  sovereignty 
in  Kansas.  Governor  Reeder  knew,  and  said,  that 
the  election  was  illegal.  Mr.  Rhodes  says  :  "The 
scene  in  the  executive  chamber  when  the  governor 
canvassed  the  returns  was  an  apt  illustration  of 
the  result  of  the  Douglas  doctrine,  when  put  in 
force  by  a  rude  people  in  a  new  country,  and 
when  a  question  had  to  be  decided  over  which  the 
passions  of  men  were  excited  to  an  intense  degree. 
The  thirty-nine  members  who,  on  the  face  of  the 
returns,  were  elected  were  seated  on  one  side  of  the 
room,  the  Governor  and  fourteen  friends  on  the 
other.  All  were  armed  to  the  teeth.  Reeder's  pis 
tols,  cocked,  lay  on  the  table  by  the  side  of  the  papers 
relating  to  the  elections.  Protests  of  fraud  were 
received  from  only  seven  districts.  Although  the 
Governor  did  not  assume  to  throw  out  members 
on  account  of  force  and  fraud,  he  did  set  aside, 


230  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

on  technicalities,  the  elections  in  those  districts 
and  ordered  new  elections.  To  the  others  he 
issued  certificates,  so  that  the  proslavery  party 
was  largely  in  the  ascendancy  in  the  legislature." 
Such  was  popular  sovereignty  in  Kansas.  The 
North  and  South  divided  over  the  question,  each 
maintaining  that  the  representatives  of  the  other 
were  the  aggressors.  Into  that  matter  it  is  not 
necessary  to  go,  further  than  to  say  that  the 
Northern  men  stood  for  freedom.  There  were 
acts  of  violence  on  both  sides,  and  many  innocent 
people  suffered.  The  attempts  to  make  the  Emi 
grant-Aid  Society  the  justification  for  the  lawless 
ness  of  the  Missourians,  in  which  the  President 
joined,  were  certainly  not  impressive.  The  Presi 
dent  subsequently  endeavored  to  persuade  Reeder 
to  resign,  and  failing  in  this,  removed  him. 

But  Kansas  was  before  long  to  have  two  sover 
eigns.  The  proslavery  legislature  met  at  Pawnee, 
the  place  designated  by  the  Governor,  in  July,  1855, 
and  at  once  adjourned  to  Shawnee  Mission.  It 
enacted  a  code  of  laws  that  would  have  disgraced 
a  community  of  savages.  In  order  to  insure  the 
slavery  of  the  blacks  they  imposed  slavery  on  the 
whites.  The  laws  filled  a  volume  of  823  pages.  The 
death  penalty  was  provided  for  all  raising  or  as 
sisting  to  raise  "an  insurrection  of  slaves,  free  negroes 
or  mulattoes,"  and  also  for  any  person  who  by 
speaking,  writing,  printing,  or  circulating  any  book, 


WAR  IN  KANSAS  231 

paper,  magazine,  or  circular  for  the  purpose  of  stir 
ring  up  insurrection  among  the  slaves,  free  blacks,  or 
mulattoes.  For  enticing  a  slave  to  run  away,  or 
harboring  a  slave  the  penalty  was  death  or  ten  years' 
imprisonment.  One  who  refused  to  become  a  slave- 
catcher  was  to  be  fined  in  the  sum  of  $500.  Even 
to  declare,  whether  orally  or  in  writing,  that  slavery 
did  not  legally  exist  in  Kansas  subjected  the  citizen 
to  imprisonment  for  not  less  than  two  years.  No 
man  might  hold  office  or  practise  in  the  courts  un 
less  he  took  an  oath  to  support  the  fugitive-slave 
law.  It  was  unlawful  even  to  deny  the  right  to  hold 
slaves.  No  man  could  sit  on  a  jury  in  a  case  under 
the  fugitive-slave  law  who  was  conscientiously  op 
posed  to  holding  slaves,  or  who  would  not  admit  that 
it  was  right.  Nor  could  any  one  vote  who  refused 
to  take  an  oath  to  sustain  the  fugitive-slave  law— 
a  clear  disfranchisement  of  the  Eastern  immigrants. 
Such  was  popular  sovereignty.  It  was  nothing 
more  than  government  by  a  minority,  as  subsequent 
events  were  to  prove.  The  free-State  people,  to 
whom  former  Governor  Reeder  had  joined  himself, 
held  a  constitutional  convention  at  Topeka,  October 
23,  1855.  Though  nineteen  of  the  thirty-four  dele 
gates  were  Democrats,  and  a  majority  favored  the 
Douglas  policy,  the  convention  adopted  a  Consti 
tution  prohibiting  slavery,  and  provided  for  its  sub 
mission  to  the  people.  The  proslavery  legislature 
was  repudiated;  Charles  Robinson,  leader  of  the 


232  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

free-State  movement,  was  elected  governor;  and 
former  Governor  Reeder  was  chosen  as  delegate  to 
Congress.  Kansas  was  now  blessed  with  two  gov 
ernments,  and  two  sovereigns.  On  December  16  the 
Topeka  Constitution  was  ratified  by  the  people  by 
a  vote  of  1,731  to  46.  On  January  15, 1856,  there 
was  an  election  at  which  Robinson  was  chosen  for 
governor,  and  a  legislature  was  elected.  But  prior 
to  that  there  had  been  actual  war.  The  slavery 
men  found  a  pretext  for  attacking  Lawrence,  the 
headquarters  of  the  Emigrant-Aid  Company.  A 
free-State  man  had  been  murdered  by  a  slavery 
man,  and  the  friends  of  the  former  sought  revenge. 
One  of  those  said  to  have  been  loudest  in  his  threats 
was  arrested  by  a  proslavery  sheriff.  The  man  was 
rescued  by  his  friends,  who  were  heavily  armed, 
without  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  sheriff.  Here 
was  the  chance  that  had  been  looked  for.  The  sheriff 
summoned  help  from  Missouri,  and  a  column  of 
1,500  invaders  marched  on  Lawrence.  But  the 
people  were  prepared,  and  armed  with  rifles  sent 
from  Boston.  They  acted  strictly  on  the  defensive, 
and  finally  the  Missourians  withdrew,  one  free-State 
man  having  been  killed.  Several  buildings  were 
burned,  and  there  was  some  pillage.  The  new  Gov 
ernor,  Shannon — a  proslavery  man — acted  as  media 
tor,  and  the  result  was  a  treaty  that  deprived  the 
invaders  of  all  legal  standing.  But  there  were  many 
affrays.  When  a  proslavery  man  was  killed,  his 


WAR  IN  KANSAS  233 

death  was  avenged  by  such  organizations  as  the 
Kickapoo  rangers.  Popular  sovereignty  had  de 
veloped  from  rule  of  the  minority  into,  first,  a  dual 
government,  and,  second,  civil  war.  Such  was  the 
situation  which  Congress  faced  when  it  met  on  De 
cember  3,  1855,  with  a  presidential  election  looming 
in  the  immediate  foreground.  It  looked  very  much 
as  though  Congress  would,  after  all,  have  to  decide 
who  or  what  was  sovereign  in  Kansas,  in  what  or 
ganization  sovereignty  was  lodged.  The  country 
was  more  excited  than  it  had  ever  been.  Never 
were  the  two  parties  more  determined.  Each  had 
seen  that  violence  was  possible,  for  they  had  seen 
that  in  Kansas  it  was  actual.  The  Douglas  plan 
had  been  bad  for  the  nation,  for  Congress,  for  the 
Democratic  party.  It  did  not  bring  on  the  Civil 
War,  but  it  certainly  hastened  its  coming. 

Of  course  one  of  the  effects  was  to  bring  Douglas 
again  into  the  arena.  Congress,  which  met  in  De 
cember,  1855,  went  through  a  preliminary  fight  over 
the  speakership,  the  details  of  which  have  no  rela 
tion  to  the  present  subject.  There  were  no  clear- 
cut  party  divisions  in  the  House.  Probably  our 
government  approximated  the  group  system  more 
nearly  than  at  any  other  time  in  its  history.  Richard 
son,  the  man  through  whom  Douglas  had  worked 
in  the  House  to  put  through  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
bill,  was  the  Democratic  candidate.  Gradually 
the  anti-Nebraska  men  concentrated  on  Nathaniel 


234  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

P.  Banks,  of  Massachusetts,  a  Democrat  who  had 
opposed  Douglas's  bill,  and  had  been  re-elected  as 
a  Know-Nothing.  Only  shortly  before  he  went 
over  to  the  Republican  party.  He  favored  con 
gressional  prohibition  of  slavery  in  the  Territories, 
and  the  re-enactment  of  the  Missouri  Compromise. 
The  struggle  lasted  for  two  months,  and  finally  on 
February  2,  1856,  Banks  was  elected.  The  result 
was  a  clear  victory  for  freedom.  It  also  made  plain 
the  issue  on  which  the  new  Republican  party  would 
go  to  the  country.  After  waiting  three  weeks  for 
the  House  to  organize,  President  Pierce  sent  in  his 
message  on  the  last  day  of  the  year.  Mr.  Pierce's 
academic  discussion  of  the  slavery  question  is  with 
out  interest  to-day,  except  that  it  showed  that  he 
was  drifting  more  and  more  to  the  Southern  side. 
Its  temper  is  sufficiently  indicated  by  one  extract: 
"It  has  been  a  matter  of  painful  regret  to  see  States 
conspicuous  for  their  services  in  founding  this  re 
public  and  equally  sharing  its  advantages  disregard 
their  constitutional  obligations  to  it.  Although 
conscious  of  their  inability  to  heal  admitted  and 
palpable  social  evils  of  their  own,  and  which  are 
completely  within  their  jurisdiction,  they  engage 
in  the  offensive  and  hopeless  undertaking  of  reform 
ing  the  domestic  institutions  of  other  States,  wholly 
beyond  their  control.  In  the  vain  pursuit  of  ends 
by  them  entirely  unattainable,  and  which  they  may 
not  legally  attempt  to  compass,  they  peril  the  very 


WAR  IN  KANSAS  235 

existence  of  the  Constitution  and  all  the  countless 
benefits  which  it  has  conferred.  While  the  people 
of  the  Southern  States  confine  their  attention  to 
their  own  affairs,  not  presuming  officiously  to  inter 
meddle  with  the  social  institutions  of  the  Northern 
States,  too  many  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  latter  are 
permanently  organized  in  associations  to  inflict  in 
jury  on  the  former  by  wrongful  acts,  which  would 
be  cause  of  war  as  between  foreign  powers  and  only 
fail  to  be  such  in  our  system  because  perpetrated 
under  cover  of  the  Union."  Yet  for  years  it  had  been 
plain  that  the  South  could  maintain  its  "domestic 
institutions"  only  by  spreading  them  to  new  terri 
tory,  and  by  forcing  the  North  to  recognize  property 
in  slaves  that  came  under  their  jurisdiction.  Only 
a  few  months  before  several  thousand  Missourians 
had  attempted  by  force,  not  to  maintain  "the  do 
mestic  institutions"  of  Missouri,  but  to  extend  them 
to  Kansas.  But  the  President  was  already,  to  all 
intents  and  purposes,  proslavery.  He  commended 
strongly  the  Kansas-Nebraska  legislation.  It  was 
plain  that  Douglas  was  to  have  the  full  back 
ing  of  the  administration.  Three  weeks  later  Mr. 
Pierce  reviewed  the  events  in  Kansas  in  a  special 
message,  and  recognized  the  legislature  elected  by 
the  Missourians,  which  had  enacted  the  slave  code, 
as  regular  and  legal,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  im 
possible  to  go  behind  the  returns.  The  Topeka 
convention  was  held  to  be  illegal.  Undoubtedly 


236  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

regularity  was  with  the  legislature  and  the  governor. 
But  little  was  gained  by  affirming  the  proposition, 
since  it  was  clear  that  the  people  of  Kansas  would 
not  fail  to  resist  attempts  to  fasten  slavery  on  them. 
It  might  be  true,  as  the  President  said  in  his  Decem 
ber  message,  that  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  "was 
the  final  consummation  and  complete  recognition 
of  the  principle  that  no  portion  of  the  United  States 
shall  undertake  through  the  assumption  of  the  powers 
of  the  general  government  to  dictate  the  social  in 
stitutions  of  any  other  portions,"  but  it  is  quite  as 
true  that  the  people  of  the  North,  and  the  majority 
of  the  people  of  Kansas  believed  that  Congress  had 
the  power  to  prohibit  slavery  in  the  Territories, 
and  that  it  was  a  power  that  should  be  exercised. 
Even  Douglas  himself  had  said  during  the  debate 
of  the  compromise  measures  of  1850:  "I  am  not, 
therefore,  prepared  to  say  that  under  the  Consti 
tution  we  have  not  the  power  to  pass  laws  exclud 
ing  negro  slaves  from  the  Territories,"  though  he 
added  that  it  was  his  belief  that  "the  whole  subject 
should  be  left  to  the  people  of  the  Territories."  This 
right,  he  thought,  should  be  "conceded  to  the  Terri 
tories  the  moment  they  have  governments  and  legis 
latures  established  for  them."  It  is  hard  to  see  how 
there  could  be  any  question  of  the  power.  As  to 
conceding  sovereignty  to  them  after  the  people  had 
established  a  government,  it  was  conceded  to  Kan 
sas  before  it  had  either  government  or  inhabitants. 


WAR  IN  KANSAS  237 

The  question  still  was  as  to  the  wisdom  of  Douglas's 
plan.  The  President  closed  his  message  by  recom 
mending  that  a  bill  be  passed  "providing  that  when 
the  inhabitants  of  Kansas  may  desire  it  and  shall 
be  of  sufficient  number  to  constitute  a  State,  a  con 
vention  of  delegates,  duly  elected  by  the  qualified 
voters,  shall  assemble  to  frame  a  Constitution,  and 
thus  to  prepare  through  regular  and  lawful  means 
for  its  admission  into  the  Union  as  a  State."  It 
never  occurred  to  the  President  that  he  could  have 
set  aside  both  the  constitutional  convention  and 
the  fraudulent  legislature,  and  have  used  the  power 
in  his  hands  to  see  that  the  will  of  the  people  was 
honestly  expressed.  Indeed,  he  disclaimed  the  right 
to  use  any  such  power.  No  power,  apparently,  was 
constitutional  that  might  interfere  with  the  plans 
and  purposes  of  the  slavery  leaders,  with  Jefferson 
Davis,  who  was  in  the  complete  confidence  of  the 
President,  at  their  head. 

Douglas,  just  recovering  from  a  protracted  illness, 
did  not  reach  Washington  till  after  the  President's 
special  message  had  been  sent  in,  but  when  he  came 
he  took  full  charge  of  the  situation.  But  before  he 
acted,  the  President  issued  a  proclamation  in  re 
gard  to  Kansas,  calling  on  the  people  to  maintain 
order  and  obey  the  law,  and  putting  the  military 
force  of  the  government  at  the  disposal  of  Governor 
Shannon,  though  he  was  not  to  use  it  unless  neces 
sary  to  maintain  the  peace  and  enforce  the  law. 


238  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

The  people  of  the  South  and  the  Northern  Demo- 
cratfe  were  greatly  pleased  by  the  proclamation. 
The  House  had  resolved  by  a  close  vote  that  the 
Missouri  Compromise  should  be  restored.  The 
House  also  voted,  one  week  after  Douglas  made  his 
report,  to  send  a  committee  of  three  to  Kansas  to 
look  into  the  trouble,  and  especially  to  investigate 
election  frauds.  By  this  time  it  was  sufficiently 
evident  that  the  whole  subject  would  figure  largely 
in  the  presidential  campaign.  The  Douglas  report 
was  made  on  March  12.  It  is  hardly  more  than  an 
amplification  of  the  President's  messages.  There 
is  one  point  in  it,  however,  that  is.  of  special  interest, 
since  the  question  came  up  again  in  connection  with 
the  discussion  as  to  the  relation  of  the  Philippines 
to  this  government.  It  involves  the  construction 
of  the  clause  of  the  Constitution  which  provides 
that  "Congress  shall  have  power  to  dispose  of  and 
make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations  respecting 
territory  or  other  property  belonging  to  the  United 
States."  "The  language  of  this  clause,"  Douglas 
said  in  his  report,  "is  much  more  appropriate  when 
applied  to  property  than  to  persons.  It  would  seem 
to  have  been  employed  for  the  purpose  of  conferring 
upon  Congress  the  power  of  disposing  of  the  public 
lands  and  other  property  belonging  to  the  United  States, 
and  to  make  all  needful  rules  and  regulations  for 
that  purpose,  rather  than  to  govern  the  people  who 
might  purchase  those  lands  from  the  United  States 


WAR  IN  KANSAS  239 

and  become  residents  thereon.  The  word  '  territory ' 
was  an  appropriate  expression  to  designate  that  large 
area  of  public  lands  of  which  the  United  States  had 
become  the  owner  by  virtue  of  the  Revolution,  and 
the  cession  by  the  several  States.  The  additional 
words,  'or  other  property  belonging  to  the  United 
States/  clearly  show  that  the  word  ' territory'  was 
used  in  its  ordinary  geographical  sense  to  designate 
the  public  domain,  and  not  as  descriptive  of  the 
whole  body  of  the  people,  constituting  a  distinct 
political  community,  who  have  no  representation 
in  Congress,  and  consequently  no  voice  in  making 
the  laws  upon  which  all  their  rights  and  liberties 
would  depend,  if  it  were  conceded  that  Congress 
had  the  general  and  unlimited  power  to  make  'all 
needful  rules  and  regulations  concerning'  their  in 
ternal  affairs  and  domestic  concerns.  ...  In  view 
of  these  considerations,  your  committee  are  not 
prepared  to  affirm  that  Congress  derives  authority 
to  institute  governments  for  the  people  of  the  Terri 
tories  from  that  clause  of  the  Constitution  which 
confers  the  right  to  make  needful  rules  and  regula 
tions  concerning  the  territory  or  other  property  of 
the  United  States.  ...  Is  not  the  organization  of 
a  territory  eminently  necessary  and  proper  as  a 
means  of  enabling  the  people  thereof  to  form  and 
mould  their  local  and  domestic  institutions,  and 
establish  a  state  government  under  the  authority 
of  the  Constitution,  preparatory  to  its  admission 


240  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

into  the  Union?  If  so,  the  right  of  Congress  to  pass 
the  organic  act  for  the  temporary  government  is 
clearly  included  in  the  provision  which  authorizes 
the  admission  of  new  States.  .  .  .  The  organic  act 
of  the  territory,  deriving  its  validity  from  the  power 
of  Congress  to  admit  new  States,  must  contain  no 
provision  or  restriction  which  would  destroy  or 
impair  the  equality  of  the  proposd  State  with  the 
original  States,  or  impose  any  limitation  upon  its 
sovereignty  which  the  Constitution  has  not  placed 
on  all  the  States,"  but  "must  leave  the  people  en 
tirely  free  to  form  and  regulate  their  domestic  in 
stitutions  and  internal  concerns  in  their  own  way, 
subject  only  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
to  the  end  that  when  they  attain  the  requisite  pop 
ulation,  and  establish  a  State  government  in  con 
formity  with  the  Constitution,  they  may  be  admitted 
to  the  Union  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  original 
States  in  all  respects  whatsoever" — that  is,  with  an 
equal  right  to  hold  slaves. 

Thus  Douglas  traced  his  popular  sovereignty  to 
the  Constitution  itself.  He  amplified  somewhat  the 
President's  theory  that  "while  all  the  States  of 
the  Union  are  united  in  one  for  certain  purposes, 
yet  each  State,  in  respect  to  everything  which  affects 
its  domestic  policy  and  internal  concerns,  stands 
in  the  relation  of  a  foreign  power  to  every  other 
State."  To  such  an  extreme  view  had  Douglas 
been  forced.  His  report  upheld  the  governor  and 


WAR  IN  KANSAS  241 

legislature  of  Kansas,  not  only  on  the  ground  of 
regularity,  but  also  on  the  ground  that  the  emigrants 
from  New  England  had  been  at  least  as  guilty  as 
the  other  party.  Indeed,  he  traced  most  of  the 
trouble  to  the  Emigrant-Aid  Company,  whose  mem 
bers  were  denounced  as  revolutionists.  "If  these 
unfortunate  troubles,"  the  words  are  from  the  re 
port,  "have  resulted  as  a  natural  consequence  from 
unauthorized  and  improper  schemes  of  foreign  inter 
ference  with  the  internal  affairs  and  domestic  con 
cerns  of  the  territory,  it  is  apparent  that  the  remedy 
must  be  sought  in  a  strict  adherence  to  the  principles 
and  rigid  enforcement  of  the  organic  law."  The 
President's  discussion  of  the  subject  was  commended, 
and  leave  was  asked  to  report  a  bill  in  accordance 
with  his  suggestion,  providing  for  the  admission  of 
Kansas  as  a  State  with  such  Constitution  as  it  might 
see  fit  to  adopt,  when  she  should  have  a  popula 
tion  of  93,420  inhabitants.  It  seems  strange  that 
men  to-day  should  have  argued  at  such  length  over 
such  subjects.  Douglas  was  yet  to  find  his  sovereign 
in  Kansas.  Indeed,  he  came  perilously  near  ad 
mitting  that  there  was  none  when  he  said  in  his 
report:  "The  sovereignty  of  a  territory  remains  in 
abeyance,  suspended  in  the  United  States,  in  trust 
for  the  people,  until  they  shall  be  admitted  into  the 
Union."  If  that  was  true,  was  not  the  sovereignty, 
after  all,  in  Congress,  even  though  it  held  it  in  trust  ? 
This  report  was  signed  by  four  members  of  the  com- 


242  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

mittee;  but  there  was  a  minority  report  signed  by 
Senator  Collamer  of  Vermont.  This  upheld  the 
Topeka  convention,  and  demanded  the  repeal  of 
the  Kansas-Nebraska  act.  If  Congress  should  be 
unwilling  to  do  this,  it  should  "declare  all  action 
by  the  spurious  foreign  legislative  assembly  utterly 
inoperative  and  void,  and  direct  a  reorganization, 
providing  proper  safeguards  for  legal  voting  and 
against  foreign  force."  It  was  suggested  also  that 
Kansas  might  be  admitted  as  a  free  State  under 
the  Topeka  Constitution.  After  the  reports  were 
read  Senator  Sumner  declared  that  "in  the  ma 
jority  report  the  true  issue  is  smothered;  in  that 
of  the  minority,  the  true  issue  stands  forth  as  a  pillar 
of  fire  to  guide  the  country."  Douglas  argued  as 
a  lawyer  pledged  to  maintain  a  theory,  and  was 
utterly  untouched  by  the  moral  issues.  Even  yet 
he  did  not  appreciate  the  intensity  of  the  popular 
feeling  on  the  subject.  It  was  fitting  that  Sumner 
should  speak  a  word  in  defense  of  the  Emigrant- 
Aid  Company  which  had,  by  the  President  and 
Douglas,  been  ranked  in  the  moral  scale  below  the 
Border  Ruffians  from  Missouri.  Douglas  spoke 
on  his  bill  March  20,  and  his  speech  is  admitted 
by  all  to  have  been  a  great  one,  and  certainly  it 
made  a  profound  impression.  Yet  he  travelled 
over  old  and  familiar  ground,  advancing  no  new 
arguments.  What  he  said  was  exactly  in  line  with 
his  report.  The  best  comment  on  it  is  that  of  Har- 


WAR  IN  KANSAS  243 

riet  Beecher  Stowe,  who  heard  it  from  the  Senate 
gallery.  Admitting  its  power,  and  the  power  of 
the  man,  Mrs.  Stowe  said:  "His  forte  in  debating 
is  his  power  of  mystifying  the  point.  With  the  most 
offhand  assured  airs  in  the  world,  and  a  certain  ap 
pearance  of  honest  superiority,  like  one  who  has  a 
regard  for  you  and  wishes  to  set  you  right  on  one 
or  two  little  matters,  he  proceeds  to  set  up  some 
little  point  which  is  not  that  in  question,  but  only 
a  family  connection  of  it,  and  this  point  he  attacks 
with  the  very  best  of  logic  and  language;  he  charges 
upon  it  horse,  foot,  and  dragoons,  runs  it  down, 
tramples  it  in  the  dust,  and  then  turns  upon  you 
with — 'Sir,  there  is  your  argument !  Did  not  I  tell 
you  so?  You  see  it  is  all  stuff7;  and  if  you  have 
allowed  yourself  to  be  dazzled  by  his  quickness  as 
to  forget  that  the  touted  point  is  not,  after  all,  the 
point  in  question,  you  suppose  all  is  over  with  it. 
He  contrives  to  mingle  up  so  many  stinging  allusions 
to  so  many  piquant  personalities  that  by  the  time 
he  has  done  his  mystification  a  dozen  others  are 
ready  to  spring  on  their  feet  to  repel  some  direct 
or  indirect  attack,  all  equally  wide  of  the  point. 
His  speeches,  instead  of  being  like  an  arrow  sent 
at  the  mark,  resemble  rather  a  bomb  which  hits 
nothing  in  particular,  but  bursts  and  sends  red-hot 
nails  in  every  direction."  That  is  a  very  shrewd 
and  veiy  true  characterization  of  Douglas's  method. 
In  this  case,  for  instance,  it  was  Douglas's  theory 


244  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

of  popular  sovereignty  that  was  on  trial,  rather 
than  Kansas,  the  Emigrant-Aid  Company,  or  the 
Missourians.  Senator  Collamer  met  the  issue  when 
he  demanded  the  repeal  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
bill.  Douglas  evaded  it  when  he  argued  that  the 
bill  would  have  worked  well  except  for  the  fraud 
and  violence  that  marked  the  election,  which  were 
the  direct  results  of  the  application  of  the  Douglas 
theory.  One  of  the  results  of  this  debate  in  which 
Sumner  and  Douglas  were  guilty  of  using  the  most 
violent  language — Sumner  in  particular — was  the 
assault  of  Preston  Brooks,  a  representative  of  South 
Carolina,  on  the  Massachusetts  senator  on  May  22. 
The  provocation  was  an  attack  by  Sumner  on  Sena 
tor  Butler  of  South  Carolina,  a  relative  of  Brooks. 
Why  Butler  should  have  been  specially  singled  out 
for  attack  is  not  clear,  since  he  had  been  rather  more 
moderate  than  others  in  his  speeches.  However,  he 
had  broken  off  personal  relations  with  Sumner,  and 
had  reflected  on  him  personally.  It  was  a  case  of 
shattered  friendship.  But  nothing  could  justify 
the  cowardly  assault  of  Brooks  on  Sumner,  made 
in  the  Senate  Chamber,  after  that  body  had  ad 
journed,  when  Sumner  was  writing  at  his  desk.  It 
narrowly  missed  being  fatal.  It  was  not  till  four 
years  later  that  Sumner  was  able  to  resume  his  sena 
torial  duties,  and  he  never  fully  recovered  his  health 
and  strength.  A  committee  of  the  Senate  reported 
that  the  assault  was  a  breach  of  the  privileges  of 


WAR  IN  KANSAS  245 

that  body,  but  that  the  House  alone  had  jurisdic 
tion  over  Brooks.  The  House  vote  on  a  resolution 
to  expel  Brooks  was  121  to  95,  the  resolution  fail 
ing  as  a  two-thirds  vote  was  required.  Brooks  was 
later  elected  to  succeed  himself,  only  6  votes  in  the 
whole  district  being  cast  against  him.  It  should 
be  said  that  Douglas  was  one  of  the  first  on  the 
scene  after  the  attack  had  been  made,  and  he  was 
criticized  severely  for  not  coming  to  the  assistance 
of  the  stricken  man.  Feeling  that  a  defense  was 
necessary,  he  said  that  he  was  in  an  antechamber 
of  the  Senate  at  the  time,  and  his  first  impulse,  on 
being  informed  of  what  was  taking  place,  was  to 
do  what  he  could  to  put  an  end  to  the  "affray." 
But  fearing  that  his  motives  might  be  misconstrued, 
he  did  not  yield  to  the  impulse.  The  brutal  assault 
was  fiercely  denounced  in  Congress,  and  by  none 
more  fiercely  than  by  Anson  Burlingame,  represen 
tative  from  Massachusetts,  later  minister  to  China, 
a  man  of  the  highest  character  and  greatest  courage. 
Brooks,  he  said,  had  acted  in  violation  of  "that 
fair  play  which  bullies  and  prize-fighters  respect." 
The  speech  brought  a  challenge  from  Brooks,  which 
Burlingame  very  promptly  accepted,  appointing, 
through  his  second,  a  meeting-place  on  the  Cana 
dian  side  of  Niagara  Falls.  This  was  unsatisfactory 
to  Brooks,  who  said  that  he  could  not  travel  in  safety 
to  Canada  through  an  "enemy"  country.  This  af 
fair  did  as  much  as  anything  else  to  intensify  public 


246  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

feeling,  and  to  divide  the  country.  The  issue  raised 
by  it  was  as  sectional  as  the  slavery  question  itself. 
"The  blows  that  fell  on  the  head  of  the  senator 
from  Massachusetts  have/7  said  Seward,  "done 
more  for  the  cause  of  human  freedom  in  Kansas 
and  in  the  Territories  of  the  United  States  than  all 
the  eloquence — I  do  not  call  it  agitation — which 
has  resounded  in  these  halls  from  the  days  when 
Rufus  King  asserted  that  cause  in  this  chamber, 
and  when  John  Quincy  Adams  defended  it  in  the 
other  House,  until  the  present  hour."  Popular 
sovereignty  was  working  out  into  strange  results, 
and  there  were  more  to  follow.  As  has  been  seen 
there  was  practical  civil  war  in  Kansas.  While 
Congress  was  debating,  and  witnessing  scenes  of 
violence,  the  two  sovereigns  in  Kansas  were  strug 
gling  for  the  supremacy.  The  North  was  beginning 
to  send  rifles  as  well  as  men.  Emigration  was  or 
ganized  and  assisted  in  both  sections.  Only  the 
day  before  the  attack  on  Sumner,  the  town  of  Law 
rence,  the  headquarters  of  the  Emigrant-Aid  Com 
pany,  was  pillaged  and  partly  destroyed  by  the 
slavery  men.  It  was  in  revenge  for  this  that  John 
Brown,  his  four  sons,  his  son-in-law,  and  two  other 
men,  killed  five  proslavery  men  in  the  most  cruel 
manner.  Out  of  all  the  lawlessness,  violence,  and 
murder,  was  born  a  spirit  that  pointed  directly  to 
civil  war.  The  Brown  massacre  was  denounced 
in  Kansas  by  men  without  distinction  of  party. 


WAR  IN  KANSAS  247 

The  free-State  leaders,  Reeder,  Robinson,  and  Lane 
were  indicted  for  treason.  It  was  even  proposed 
to  arrest  former  Governor  Reeder  while  he  was 
engaged  in  examining  a  witness  before  the  congres 
sional  investigating  committee,  which  had  reached 
Kansas  in  April.  Governor  Shannon  refused  to 
send  federal  troops  to  protect  the  free-State  men, 
or  to  defend  Lawrence.  Both  sides  armed,  and 
there  was  the  wildest  sort  of  guerilla  warfare  all 
over  the  territory.  There  was  no  more  popular 
sovereignty,  in  the  true  sense  of  the  words,  in  Kan 
sas  than  there  was  in  Russia  under  the  so-called 
government  of  the  Bolsheviki.  It  was  not  proving 
an  easy  task  to  find  a  sovereign.  The  congressional 
committee  made  its  report  on  Kansas  affairs  on 
July  1,  declaring  that  the  territorial  elections  were 
fraudulent,  that  the  territorial  legislature  was  il 
legally  constituted,  that  neither  Whitfield  nor  Reeder 
had  been  legally  elected  as  congressional  delegate, 
and  that  under  present  conditions  a  legal  election 
in  Kansas  was  impossible.  In  this  report,  which 
was  signed  by  two  of  the  three  members  of  the  com 
mittee,  it  was  found  that  the  Constitution  framed 
by  the  Topeka — or  free-State — convention  repre 
sented  the  will  of  the  majority  of  the  people.  From 
this  it  would  seem  that  the  Topeka  convention  had 
at  least  called  a  sovereign — the  majority  of  the 
people — into  being.  The  minority  member  of  the 
committee,  Oliver,  dealt  mainly  with  the  John 


248  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Brown  massacres,  into  which  he  said  that  his  as 
sociates  refused  to  go  on  the  ground  that  they  had 
no  authority  to  deal  with  events  that  had  taken 
place  since  the  appointment  of  the  committee.  The 
Oliver  report  was  excellent  campaign  material,  but 
for  some  reason  little  use  was  made  of  it  by  the 
Democrats.  There  was  nothing  in  either  report 
that  could  be  used  as  an  argument  in  favor  of  the 
Douglas  theory  of  popular  sovereignty.  That  is 
all  that  concerns  us  in  this  discussion.  If  not  the 
provocation  of  the  numerous  atrocities,  it  at  least 
paved  the  way  for  them,  and,  one  may  almost  say, 
insured  and  guaranteed  them.  .Congress  found  it 
necessary  to  do  something  about  Kansas,  supposedly 
sovereign,  but  what  should  it  be? 


CHAPTER  XI 
FREEDOM    VERSUS    SLAVERY 

THE  year  1856  is  an  important  one  in  our  history 
for  many  reasons,  one  of  them  being  that  it  saw 
the  first  Republican  national  convention.  Indeed, 
there  were  two  such  conventions.  One  was  held 
at  Pittsburg  on  February  22  on  the  call  of  the  State 
committees  of  Maine,  Vermont,  Massachusetts, 
New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  Indiana,  Michigan, 
and  Wisconsin.  This  convention  served  practically 
as  a  sort  of  national  committee.  Twenty-three 
States  were  represented  by  delegates.  In  an  ad 
dress,  prepared  by  Henry  J.  Raymond,  and  adopted 
by  the  convention,  it  was  demanded  that  all  laws 
permitting  the  introduction  of  slavery  "into  Terri 
tories  once  consecrated  to  freedom"  be  repealed, 
and  the  new  party  was  pledged  to  "resist  by  every 
constitutional  means  the  existence  of  slavery  in 
any  of  the  Territories  of  the  United  States."  Sup 
port  was  promised  to  the  friends  of  freedom  in  Kan 
sas,  and  the  convention  declared  "in  favor  of  the 
immediate  admission  of  Kansas  as  a  free  and  in 
dependent  State."  "It  is,"  said  the  address,  "a 
leading  purpose  of  our  organization  to  oppose  and 
overthrow  the  present  national  administration." 

249 


250  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

A  call  was  issued  for  a  national  convention  to  meet 
in  Philadelphia  June  17 — Bunker  Hill  day — for 
the  purpose  of  nominating  candidates  for  President 
and  Vice-President.  Wilson,  in  his  "Division  and 
Reunion,"  says  of  the  new  Republican  party:  "It 
got  its  programme  from  the  Free-Soilers,  whom  it 
bodily  absorbed;  its  radical  and  aggressive  spirit 
from  the  Abolitionists,  whom  it  received  without 
liking;  its  liberal  views  upon  constitutional  ques 
tions  from  the  Whigs,  who  constituted  both  in  num 
bers  and  in  influence  its  commanding  element;  and 
its  popular  impulse  from  the  Democrats,  who  did 
not  leave  behind  them,  when  they  joined  it,  their 
faith  in  their  old  party  ideals."  The  convention 
met  on  the  determined  date,  and  nominated  John 
C.  Fr&nont  for  President,  and  William  L.  Dayton 
for  Vice-President.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  on 
the  informal  ballot  Abraham  Lincoln  received  110 
votes  for  Vice-President.  Seward  was  not  a  candi 
date,  and  Chase  had  withdrawn  his  name.  Judge 
McLean  was  Fremont's  rival.  The  attitude  of  the 
party  toward  slavery  is  sufficiently  indicated  by 
the  following  extracts  from  the  platform:  "As 
our  Republican  fathers,  when  they  had  abolished 
slavery  in  all  our  national  territory,  ordained  that 
no  person  should  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or 
property  without  due  process  of  law,  it  becomes 
our  duty  to  maintain  this  provision  of  the  Consti 
tution  against  all  attempts  to  violate  it  for  the  pur- 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        251 

pose  of  establishing  slavery  in  any  territory  of  the 
United  States,  by  positive  legislation  prohibiting  its 
existence  upon  or  extension  therein.  The  Constitu 
tion  confers  on  Congress  sovereign  power  over  the 
Territories  of  the  United  States  for  their  govern 
ment,  and  in  the  exercise  of  this  power  it  is  both 
the  right  and  the  duty  of  Congress  to  prohibit  in 
the  Territories  those  twin  relics  of  barbarism- 
polygamy  and  slavery.  The  dearest  constitutional 
rights  of  the  people  of  Kansas  have  been  fraudu 
lently  and  violently  taken  from  them — their  terri 
tory  has  been  invaded  by  an  armed  force — spurious 
and  pretended  legislative,  judicial,  and  executive 
officers  have  been  set  over  them,  by  whose  usurped 
authority,  sustained  by  the  military  power  of  the 
government,  tyrannical  and  unconstitutional  laws 
have  been  enacted  and  enforced — the  rights  of  the 
people  to  keep  and  bear  arms  have  been  infringed 
— test  oaths  of  an  extraordinary  and  entangling 
nature  have  been  imposed  as  a  condition  of  exercis 
ing  the  right  of  suffrage  and  holding  office/'  and 
so  on  through  the  whole  category  of  crimes.  "All 
these  things/'  the  platform  declared,  "have  been 
done  with  the  knowledge,  sanction,  and  procure 
ment  of  the  present  administration,  and  for  this 
high  crime  against  the  Constitution,  the  Union, 
and  humanity,  we  arraign  the  administration,  the 
President,  his  advisers,  agents,  supporters,  apologists, 
and  accessories,  either  before  or  after  the  facts,  be- 


252  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

fore  the  country  and  before  the  world,  and  it  is  our 
fixed  purpose  to  bring  the  actual  perpetrators  of 
these  atrocious  outrages,  and  their  accomplices  to 
a  sure  and  condign  punishment  hereafter."  The 
immediate  admission  of  Kansas  as  a  free  State  under 
the  Topeka  Constitution  was  demanded.  The  Re 
publicans  clearly  welcomed  "Bleeding  Kansas"  as 
a  campaign  issue. 

The  Democrats  were  first  in  the  field,  their  con 
vention  having  been  held  at  Cincinnati  June  2. 
The  sole  question  was  as  to  what  man  would  be 
most  likely  to  hold  the  Northern  wing  of  the  party 
in  line,  since  any  one  of  the  possibilities  was  satis 
factory  to  the  South.  The  President  hoped  for  a 
renomination,  and  Douglas  of  course  was  a  candi 
date.  Pierce  was,  perhaps,  the  South's  favorite, 
with  Douglas  a  close  second.  And  it  might  have 
been  thought  that,  with  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill 
the  principal  issue,  one  of  the  two  men — preferably 
Douglas — would  have  been  chosen.  The  vote  of 
Pennsylvania  was  indispensable,  and  so  the  party 
turned  toward  James  Buchanan,  a  citizen  of  that 
State.  He  had  been  out  of  the  country  when  Doug 
las's  bill  was  passed,  serving  as  Minister  to  Great 
Britain.  His  orthodoxy  on  the  Kansas  question 
was  proved  by  a  letter  written  by  him  to  Slidell  in 
London,  six  months  before,  in  which  he  said  that 
the  Missouri  Compromise  was  gone  for  ever,  and 
that  the  principle  of  popular  sovereignty  as  applied 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        253 

to  Kansas  must  be  upheld  and  maintained.  On 
the  first  ballot  Buchanan  received  135  votes,  Pierce 
122,  Douglas  33,  and  Cass  5.  One  hundred  and 
three  of  the  Buchanan  votes  came  from  the  North, 
and  32  from  the  slave  States.  On  the  succeeding 
ballots  Douglas  gained  at  the  expense  of  the  Presi 
dent,  Buchanan  receiving  a  majority  on  the  tenth, 
the  result  being  168  for  Buchanan  and  118  for  Doug 
las.  After  the  sixteenth  ballot,  which  showed  no 
change,  Buchanan  being  still  short  of  the  necessary 
two-thirds,  Richardson,  chairman  of  the  Illinois 
delegation,  read  the  following  despatch  from  Doug 
las:  "If  the  withdrawal  of  my  name  will  contribute 
to  the  harmony  of  our  party  or  the  success  of  our 
cause,  I  hope  you  will  not  hesitate  to  take  the 
step.  ...  If  Mr.  Pierce  or  Mr.  Buchanan,  or  any 
other  statesman  who  is  faithful  to  the  great  issues 
involved  in  the  contest,  shall  receive  a  majority 
of  the  convention,  I  earnestly  hope  that  all  my 
friends  will  unite  in  insuring  him  two-thirds,  and 
then  making  his  nomination  unanimous.  Let  no 
personal  consideration  disturb  the  harmony  or  en 
danger  the  triumph  of  our  principles."  Buchanan 
was  then  unanimously  chosen.  John  C.  Brecken- 
ridge,  of  Kentucky,  was  nominated  for  Vice-Presi 
dent. 

The  convention  declared  itself  opposed  to  the 
principles  of  Know-Nothingism,  and  denounced 
"the  crusade  against  Catholics  and  foreign-born" 


254  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

as  "neither  justified  by  the  past  nor  the  future, 
nor  in  unison  with  our  spirit  of  toleration  or  en 
lightened  freedom."  The  convention  resolved  that 
Congress  had  no  power  to  interfere  with  slavery 
in  the  States,  and  that  "all  efforts  to  induce  Con 
gress  to  interfere  with  questions  of  slavery  ought 
to  be  discountenanced,  as  they  lead  to  dangerous 
consequences."  The  compromise  of  1850  was  in 
dorsed,  and  the  principles  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
bill  were  approved.  Sectionalism  was  repudiated, 
and  non-interference  by  the  general  government 
with  slavery  was  accepted  as  good  Democratic  doc 
trine.  Thus  the  issue  was  drawn.  Again  threats 
of  secession  in  case  of  Fremont's  election  were 
heard.  It  was  contended  that  the  Republican  party 
was  sectional,  and  indeed  it  had  no  strength  in  the 
South.  Many  men  were  undoubtedly  held  by  the 
Democrats  on  that  argument.  Rufus  Choate,  the 
great  Massachusetts  lawyer  and  Whig,  declared 
for  Buchanan,  and  made  a  powerful  argument  in 
his  behalf.  The  situation  was  further  complicated 
by  the  nomination  of  Fillmore  by  the  American 
party,  who  was  later  indorsed  by  a  Whig  convention. 
With  the  candidates  and  their  principles  before  the 
country,  it  is  necessary  to  turn  again  to  the  efforts 
of  Congress  to  solve  the  Kansas  problem.  The 
best  bill  offered  was  that  of  Toombs,  the  Southern 
Whig.  It  was  accepted  by  Douglas,  though  it  was 
later  amended  in  a  way  that  was  thought  to  reflect 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        255 

on  the  Illinois  senator.  The  Democrats  felt  that 
something  would  have  to  be  done  in  an  affirmative 
way,  but  the  Republicans  were  satisfied  to  let  things 
drift.  They  distrusted,  and  with  reason,  the  ad 
ministration,  and  were  not  sorry  to  have  such  an 
issue  as  that  presented  by  Kansas.  The  Toombs 
bill  passed  the  Senate  but  was  defeated  in  the  House, 
which  voted  to  admit  Kansas  under  the  Topeka 
Constitution.  On  August  18,  Congress  adjourned 
without  action.  Having  failed  to  pass  the  army 
appropriation,  it  was  called  together  in  extraordinary 
session  August  21,  passed  the  army  bill  without 
the  objectionable  Kansas  amendment  ten  days 
later,  and  adjourned. 

So  the  issue  was  left  to  the  people.  For  the  first 
time  there  was  a  party  in  the  field  that  was  not 
afraid  to  draw  the  line  sharply  between  freedom  and 
slavery.  The  Republican  party  drew  to  itself  the 
support  of  the  great  moral  influences  of  the  North. 
Men  gradually  began  to  realize  that  it  might  be 
possible  to  get  rid  of  slavery  and  save  the  Union 
without  making  any  further  surrenders  to  slavery. 
The  religious  press  was  practically  solid  against 
Buchanan,  and  it  fairly  represented  the  feeling  that 
prevailed  in  the  churches.  Clergymen,  college  pro 
fessors — it  was  not  till  later  that  Republican  orators 
sneered  at  "  pale-faced  professors" — school-teachers, 
literary  men  were  among  the  strongest  and  most 
active  supporters  of  Fremont.  Emerson,  Long- 


256  .  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

fellow,  Bryant,  George  William  Curtis,  and  Wash 
ington  Irving  all  spoke  for  the  Republican  ticket. 
Perhaps  even  the  scorners  of  Victorianism  will  re 
call  Whittier's  lines  to  Fremont: 

"  Still  take  thou  courage !     God  has  spoken  through  thee, 

Irrevocable,  the  mighty  words,  Be  free ! 

The  land  shakes  with  them,  and  the  slave's  dull  ear 

Turns  from  the  rice-swamp  stealthily  to  hear. 

Who  would  recall  them  now  must  first  arrest 

The  winds  that  blow  down  from  the  free  North-west, 

Ruffling  the  gulf  or  like  a  scroll  roll  back 

The  Mississippi  to  its  upper  springs. 

Such  words  fulfil  their  prophecy,  and  lack 

But  the  full  time  to  harden  into  thiiigs." 

The  Republicans  pressed  the  Kansas  issue  with 
the  utmost  vigor,  and  the  Democrats  did  not  seem 
even  to  try  to  meet  it.  Yet  they  had  good  material 
in  the  Oliver  report,  but  apparently  they  did  not 
realize  its  importance.  The  initiative,  enthusiasm, 
and  dash  were  all  with  the  new  party.  Douglas 
was  one  of  the  most  conspicuous  leaders  on  the 
Democratic  side,  contributing  liberally  to  the  cause, 
and  speaking  with  his  usual  effectiveness,  mostly 
in  the  doubtful  States,  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey, 
Illinois,  and  Indiana.  He  gave  with  special  liberality 
to  the  Pennsylvania  campaign,  as  that  was  Bu 
chanan's  own  State,  and  its  vote  was  necessary  to 
the  election  of  the  Democratic  ticket.  Everything 
that  he  could  do  he  did  for  the  success  of  his  party. 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        257 

The  Democratic  party,  however,  was  still  strong, 
and  still  national.  Its  appeal  to  the  men  who  feared 
that  Fremont's  election  would  break  up  the  Union 
was  powerful.  Business,  always  timid,  was  not 
easily  roused  by  the  Republican  war-cry.  There 
were  no  doubt  many  men  like  Choate  who  did  not 
believe  that  Buchanan's  election  would  fasten  slavery 
on  the  country,  but  who  did  fear  that  secession  might 
follow  a  Republican  victory.  Buchanan,  too,  had 
a  creditable  record  in  public  affairs,  and  was  much 
respected,  while  Fremont  had  no  reputation  as  a 
statesman.  Had  he  been  elected,  and  had  secession 
followed,  one  does  not  even  at  this  late  day  like  to 
think  of  what  would  have  happened.  At  any  rate 
Buchanan  was  elected,  carrying  every  slave  State, 
and  the  great  doubtful  States  of  the  North — New 
Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Indiana,  Illinois,  and  Cali 
fornia.  His  total  vote  was  1,837,337  to  1,341,812 
for  Fremont;  Fillmore  was  a  good  third,  polling 
873,055  votes.  On  the  popular  vote  Buchanan 
was  a  minority  President.  Fillmore  carried  Mary 
land.  Buchanan's  electoral  vote  was  174  as  against 
114  for  Fremont,  and  8  for  Fillmore.  Douglas  could 
hardly  have  viewed  the  result  in  Illinois  without 
grave  misgivings.  In  the  October  election  the  Demo 
cratic  candidate  for  governor — Richardson,  the  man 
who  had  helped  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  through 
the  House — was  beaten  by  the  candidate  of  the 
anti-Nebraska  forces,  a  Democrat  who  had  refused 


258  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

to  sanction  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise. 
In  November  Buchanan  had  indeed  a  plurality  of 
9,159,  but  four  years  before  Pierce's  plurality  had 
been  in  excess  of  15,000.  Buchanan's  vote  was 
105,348;  that  of  Fremont  96,189;  and  that  of  Fill- 
more  37,444.  The  aggregate  vote  of  the  opposition 
was  133,633,  or  28,285  in  excess  of  that  given  to 
Buchanan.  Douglas  had  anticipated  the  loss  of 
the  State  in  October,  and  had  only  hoped  for  vic 
tory  in  November.  Disappointed  he  no  doubt  was, 
but  hardly  surprised.  But  on  the  whole  he  might 
well  have  claimed  that  the  country  had  indorsed 
his  popular  sovereignty  doctrine..  His  party  had 
championed  it,  and  his  party  had  won.  .  .  . 

We  have  a  startling  picture  of  these  times  from 
the  pen  of  Walt  Whitman,  who  has  shown  that  for 
years  the  North  had  been  quite  as  responsible  as 
the  South  for  slavery.  "For  twenty-five  years, " 
says  Whitman,  "prior  to  the  outbreak,  the  con 
trolling  Democratic  nominating  conventions  of  our 
republic — starting  from  their  primaries  in  wards 
or  districts,  and  so  expanding  to  counties,  powerful 
cities,  States,  and  to  the  great  presidential  nominat 
ing  conventions — were  getting  to  represent  and  be 
composed  of  more  and  more  putrid  and  dangerous 
materials.  Let  me  give  a  schedule  or  list  of  one  of 
these  representative  conventions  for  a  long  time  be 
fore,  and  inclusive  of  that  which  nominated  Bu 
chanan.  .  .  .  The  members  who  composed  it  were, 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        259 

seven-eighths  of  them,  the  meanest  kind  of  bawling 
and  blowing  office-holders,  office-seekers,  pimps, 
malignants,  conspirators,  murderers,  fancy-men,  cus 
tom-house  clerks,  contractors,  kept  editors,  spaniels 
well-trained  to  carry  and  fetch,  jobbers,  infidels, 
disunionists,  terrorists,  mail-riflers,  slave-catchers, 
pushers  of  slavery,  creatures  of  the  President,  crea 
tures  of  would-be  Presidents,  spies,  bribers,  com 
promisers,  lobbyers,  sponges,  ruined  sports,  expelled 
gamblers,  policy-backers,  monte-dealers,  duellists, 
carriers  of  concealed  weapons,  deaf  men,  pimpled 
men,  scarred  inside  with  vile  disease,  gaudy  outside 
with  gold  chains  made  from  the  people's  money  and 
harlots7  money  twisted  together;  crawling  men, 
serpentine  men,  the  lousy  combings  and  born  free 
dom-sellers  of  the  earth.  And  whence  came  they? 
From  back-yards  and  bar-rooms;  from  out  of  the 
custom-houses,  marshals'  offices,  post-offices,  and 
gambling  hells:  from  the  President's  house,  the 
jail,  the  station-house;  from  unnamed  by-places 
where  devilish  disunion  was  hatched  at  midnight; 
from  political  hearses,  and  from  the  coffins  inside, 
and  from  the  shrouds  inside  of  the  coffins;  from 
the  tumors  and  abscesses  of  the  land;  from  the 
skeletons  and  skulls  in  the  vaults  of  the  federal  alms- 
houses;  and  from  the  running  sores  of  the  great 
cities.  Such,  I  say,  formed,  or  absolutely  controlled 
the  forming  of  the  entire  personnel,  the  atmosphere, 
nutriment  and  chyle  of  our  municipal,  State,  and 


260  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

national  politics — substantially  permeating,  han 
dling,  deciding,  and  wielding  everything — legislation, 
nominations,  elections, ' public  sentiment/  etc.,  while 
the  great  masses  of  the  people,  farmers,  mechanics, 
and  traders,  were  helpless  in  their  grip.  These  con 
ditions  were  mostly  prevalent  in  the  North  and 
West,  and  especially  in  New  York  and  Philadelphia 
cities;  and  the  Southern  leaders  (bad  enough,  but 
of  a  far  higher  order),  struck  hands  and  affiliated 
with  them.  Is  it  strange  that  a  thunder-storm  fol 
lowed  such  morbid  and  stifling  cloud  strata?  .  .  . 
The  sixteenth,  seventeenth,  and  eighteenth  terms 
of  the  American  presidency  have  shown  that  the 
villainy  and  shallowness  of  rulers  (backed  by  the 
machinery  of  great  parties)  are  just  as  eligible  to 
these  States  as  to  any  foreign  despotism,  kingdom, 
or  empire — there  is  not  a  bit  of  difference.  History 
is  to  record  those  three  Presidentiads,  and  especially 
the  administrations  of  Fillmore  and  Buchanan,  as 
so  far  our  topmost  warning  and  shame.  Never 
were  publicly  displayed  more  deformed,  mediocre, 
snivelling,  unreliable,  false-hearted  men.  Never  were 
these  States  so  insulted,  and  attempted  to  be  be 
trayed.  All  the  main  purposes  for  which  the  govern 
ment  was  established  were  openly  denied.  The 
perfect  equality  of  slavery  with  freedom  was  flaunt- 
ingly  preached  in  the  North — nay,  the  superiority 
of  slavery.  The  slave-trade  was  proposed  to  be 
renewed.  Everywhere  frowns  and  misunderstand- 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        261 

ings — everywhere  exasperations  and  humiliations." 
There  may  be  some  exaggeration,  but  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  in  those  disheartening  days  American 
politics  sank  to  a  disgracefully  low  level.  It  was  soon 
shown,  and  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  it  clear  even 
to  those  who  were  most  hopeful  for  freedom,  that 
Buchanan's  election  was  a  victory  for  slavery.  When 
the  new  President  was  inaugurated  a  third  governor 
was  trying  to  establish  popular  sovereignty  in  Kan 
sas.  The  administration  of  Shannon  had  come  to 
be  such  a  scandal  as  to  be  a  burden  in  the  campaign, 
and  so  he  was  removed  in  August,  1856,  after  having 
incurred  the  enmity  even  of  the  proslavery  faction. 
In  his  place  was  appointed  J.  W.  Geary,  a  man  of 
good  character.  Peace  in  Kansas  was,  he  said,  neces 
sary  if  Buchanan  was  to  be  elected.  And  he  did 
much  to  restore  peace,  and  probably  would  have 
succeeded  but  for  the  proslavery  men.  It  is  a  note 
worthy  fact  that  Democrats  and  Southern  men  of 
intelligence  and  character  almost  invariably  took 
the  side  of  freedom  when  they  were  called  on  as 
residents  of  new  States  and  Territories  to  frame 
Constitutions  for  them.  It  had  been  so  in  Cali 
fornia.  It  was  so  in  the  case  of  the  Topeka  Conven 
tion.  And  now  we  find  Governor  Geary,  who  had 
maintained  entire  impartiality,  opposed  by  the 
radical  slavery  interest.  Governor  Reeder,  another 
proslavery  man,  met  the  same  fate.  Geary  was  able 
to  say  within  a  month  after  his  arrival  in  Kansas  that 


262  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

"peace  now  reigns,"  and  "confidence  is  being  grad 
ually  restored."  In  a  speech  delivered  after  the 
October  victory  in  Pennsylvania,  Buchanan  said: 
"Peace  has  been  restored  in  Kansas.  .  .  .  We 
shall  hear  no  more  of  bleeding  Kansas.  There  will 
be  no  more  shrieks  for  her  unhappy  destiny/ '  Things 
continued  to  go  well,  and  the  report  of  the  governor, 
who  had  won  the  confidence  of  the  free-State  people, 
made  in  November,  was  very  encouraging.  Presi 
dent  Pierce  in  his  last  message  congratulated  the 
country  on  "the  peaceful  condition  of  things  in 
Kansas,"  and  praised  "the  wisdom  and  energy  of 
the  present  executive."  But  it  soon  appeared  that 
Pierce  cared  more  for  the  good-will  of  the  slavery 
interest  than  for  the  welfare  of  Kansas.  It  is  pos 
sible  that  the  Kansas  problem  might  have  been 
solved  by  Geary  had  he  been  supported  by  either 
Pierce  or  Buchanan.  But  he  had  offended  the  slavery 
men  by  his  fairness,  and  was  hampered  in  every 
way  possible  by  federal  officers  in  Kansas.  His 
removal  was  demanded.  Finding  that  there  was 
no  intention  on  the  part  of  Washington  to  deal  hon 
orably  with  the  matter,  Geary,  feeling  that  he  could 
accomplish  nothing,  resigned  on  March  4,  the  day 
of  the  inauguration  of  Buchanan. 

In  his  inaugural  address  the  new  President 
radiated  good-will.  "The  voice  of  the  majority," 
he  said,  speaking  of  the  recent  election,  "speaking 
in  the  manner  prescribed  by  the  Constitution,  was 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        263 

heard,  and  instant  submission  followed.  Our  own 
country  could  alone  have  exhibited  so  grand  and 
striking  a  spectacle  of  the  capacity  of  man  for 
self-government."  From  this  not  wholly  original 
generalization  Mr.  Buchanan  drew  the  following 
moral:  "What  a  happy  conception,  then,  was  it 
for  Congress  to  apply  this  simple  rule,  that  the  will 
of  the  majority  shall  govern,  to  the  settlement  of 
the  question  of  domestic  slavery  in  the  Territories ! 
Congress  is  neither  'to  legislate  slavery  into  any 
territory  or  State  nor  to  exclude  it  therefrom,  but 
to  leave  the  people  perfectly  free  to  form  and  regu 
late  their  domestic  institutions  in  their  own  way, 
subject  only  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States/  .  .  .  The  whole  territorial  question  being 
thus  settled  upon  the  principle  of  popular  sover 
eignty — a  principle  as  ancient  as  free  government 
itself — everything  of  a  practical  nature  has  been 
decided.  No  other  question  remains  for  adjustment, 
because  all  agree  that  under  the  Constitution  slavery 
in  the  States  is  beyond  the  reach  of  any  human 
power  except  that  of  the  respective  States  wherein 
it  exists.  May  we  not,  then,  hope  that  the  long 
agitation  on  this  subject  is  approaching  its  end,  and 
that  the  geographical  parties  to  which  it  has  given 
birth,  so  much  dreaded  by  the  Father  of  his  Coun 
try,  will  speedily  become  extinct?  Most  happy 
will  it  be  for  the  country  when  the  public  mind  shall 
be  diverted  from  this  question  to  others  of  more 


264  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

pressing  and  practical  importance.  .  .  .  This  ques 
tion  of  domestic  slavery  is  of  far  graver  importance 
than  any  mere  political  question,  because  should 
the  agitation  continue  it  may  eventually  endanger 
the  personal  safety  of  a  large  portion  of  our  country 
men  where  the  institution  exists.  In  that  event  no 
form  of  government,  however  admirable  in  itself, 
and  however  productive  of  material  benefits,  can 
compensate  for  the  loss  of  peace  and  domestic  secur 
ity  around  the  family  altar.  Let  every  Union-loving 
man,  therefore,  exert  his  best  influence  to  suppress 
the  agitation,  which  since  the  recent  legislation  of 
Congress  is  without  any  legitimate  object."  Two 
days  later  came  the  Dred  Scott  decision,  of  which 
something  will  be  said  later,  which  roused  the  na 
tion  as  it  had  never  been  roused  before.  What  we 
are  concerned  with  now  is  the  new  administration. 
Little  need  be  said  of  the  President,  who  was  simply 
a  weak,  well-meaning  man,  surrounded  by  others 
of  much  greater  force  who  knew  exactly  what  they 
wanted.  Four  members  of  the  cabinet  came  from 
slave,  and  three  from  free,  States.  Lewis  Cass  of 
Michigan,  Secretary  of  State,  a  survivor  of  the  old 
compromise  days,  was  in  his  seventy-fifth  year. 
The  attorney-generalship  fell  to  Jeremiah  S.  Black 
of  Pennsylvania,  a  man  of  character  and  ability. 
The  other  Northern  man  was  Isaac  Toucey  of  Con 
necticut,  who  was  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  But 
Toucey  was  so  strongly  Southern  in  his  sympathies 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        265 

as  to  have  alienated  from  himself  the  support  of 
his  constituents.  His  term  as  senator  from  Con 
necticut  had  just  expired.  The  strongest  man  in 
the  new  cabinet  was  Howell  Cobb  of  Georgia,  Secre 
tary  of  the  Navy.  In  1850  he  had  been  known  as 
a  Unionist,  and  was  thought  to  be  conservative. 
Jacob  Thompson  of  Mississippi,  Secretary  of  the 
Interior,  was  an  extreme  States'  rights  man.  John 
B.  Floyd  of  Virginia,  Secretary  of  War,  was  not 
known  to  have  any  special  qualifications  for  high 
place.  The  postmaster-general  was  Aaron  V.  Brown 
of  Tennessee.  From  such  a  President  and  cabinet 
the  foes  of  slavery  had  nothing  to  hope.  Indeed 
as  events  showed  the  true  friends  of  popular  sover 
eignty  were  betrayed  by  them,  for  it  soon  developed 
that  the  administration  thought  it  more  important 
that  the  decision  of  Kansas  should  be  "right"  from 
the  slavery  point  of  view  than  that  it  should  be 
the  decision  of  the  people.  The  Kansas  question 
immediately  began  to  press  for  consideration.  Gov 
ernor  Geary,  as  has  been  said,  resigned  on  the  day 
of  Buchanan's  inauguration.  He  had  quarrelled 
with  the  slavery  men  over  the  election  held  in 
October,  1856 — in  which  the  free-State  men  had 
refused  to  participate — for  territorial  delegate,  and 
members  of  the  legislature.  The  governor  was  de 
nounced  by  the  proslavery  faction,  and  even  threat 
ened  with  assassination.  A  delegation  headed  by 
John  Calhoun,  surveyor-general  of  the  territory, 


266  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

visited  Washington  to  bring  about  the  removal  of 
the  governor.  It  was  necessary  to  find  a  new  gov 
ernor,  since  the  legislature  chosen  in  October,  1856, 
had  fixed  the  third  Monday  in  June,  1857,  as  the  day 
for  the  election  of  delegates  to  the  constitutional 
convention.  After  much  persuasion  Robert  J. 
Walker  consented  to  undertake  the  thankless  job. 
He  was  a  Democrat,  of  course,  a  Mississippian,  and 
friendly  to  slavery.  Also  he  was  a  man  of  good 
character,  and  fine  ability.  He  had  served  as  Secre 
tary  of  the  Treasury  under  President  Polk,  and  as 
senator,  and  was  the  author  of  the  famous  Walker 
tariff  of  1846.  Douglas  strongly  .urged  him  to  ac 
cept  the  governorship  of  Kansas.  But  before  he 
went,  the  Supreme  Court  had  handed  down  the 
Dred  Scott  decision,  which  had  a  very  important 
bearing  on  Kansas  affairs.  In  that  famous  opinion 
of  Chief  Justice  Taney  much  was  decided  beside 
the  point  at  issue,  which  was  whether  the  court  had 
jurisdiction  of  the  case.  The  court  held  that  a  negro 
descended  from  slave  parents  was  not  a  citizen  of 
the  United  States,  and  so  could  not  sue  in  its  courts. 
If  the  court  had  stopped  there,  little  would  have 
been  heard  of  the  ruling.  But,  ambitious  to  settle 
the  slavery  question,  the  court  held  further  that  the 
Missouri  Compromise  was  unconstitutional,  and 
therefore  that  the  master's  property  right  in  his 
slave  could  not  be  extinguished  in  any  territory. 
Probably  no  more  far-reaching  decision  was  ever 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        267 

handed  down  by  the  Supreme  Court.  Its  bearing 
on  the  politics  of  the  day  is  clear  enough.  If  the 
chief  justice  was  right  there  were  thousands  of 
negroes  scattered  over  the  country  who  had  been 
for  years  citizens  of  the  States  in  which  they  re 
sided  who  were  not  citizens  of  the  United  States. 
The  decision  amounted  to  a  declaration  of  the  un- 
constitutionality  of  the  new  Republican  party,  the 
fundamental  doctrine  of  which  was  that  Congress 
had  the  power,  and  should  exercise  it,  to  prohibit 
slavery  in  the  Territories.  The  majority  opinion 
was  hardly  more  than  a  judicial  declaration  of  the 
old  Calhoun  theory  that  slavery  was  self-extending, 
and  was  taken  everywhere  by  the  Constitution. 
But  the  bearing  of  the  decision  on  Douglas,  and  on 
the  situation  in  Kansas  is  what  chiefly  interests  us. 
The  Illinois  senator,  strangely  enough,  looked  on 
it  as  an  indorsement  of  his  theory  of  popular  sover 
eignty.  The  right  which  the  court  had  said  was 
lodged  in  the  master  to  take  his  slave  into  any  part 
of  the  country,  and  hold  him  in  servitude,  was,  said 
Douglas,  "a  barren  and  worthless  right,  unless  sus 
tained,  protected  and  enforced  by  appropriate  police 
regulations  and  local  regulations,  prescribing  ade 
quate  remedies.  These  regulations  and  remedies 
must  necessarily  depend  entirely  upon  the  will  and 
wishes  of  the  people  of  the  territory,  as  they  can 
only  be  prescribed  by  the  local  legislatures."  And 
he  concluded  that  "the  great  principle  of  popular 


268  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

sovereignty  and  self-government  is  sustained  and 
firmly  established  by  the  authority  of  this  decision." 
In  other  words,  a  right  enjoyed  by  an  American 
citizen  under  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
was  of  no  value  since  the  people  of  a  territory  might 
lawlessly  set  it  aside,  or  refuse  to  enforce  it.  Great 
constitutional  rights  are  not  to  be  left  to  the  local 
police  to  enforce.  One  cannot  but  wonder  whether 
Douglas  really  believed  that  the  court  had  upheld 
popular  sovereignty,  or  whether  he  was  merely  try 
ing  to  make  the  best  of  a  bad  case.  He  was  to 
use  the  argument  set  out  above  many  times,  pressing 
it  very  hard  in  his  debate  with  Lincoln.  In  a  sense 
the  North  "accepted"  the  decision,  for  it  could  do 
nothing  else.  There  was  a  raising  of  the  old  ques 
tion  as  to  the  respect  due  the  courts.  Many  ex 
cellent  lawyers  held  that  the  decision  was  not  bind 
ing  on  the  people  in  its  broad  scope,  since,  as  they 
held,  all  of  it  dealing  with  the  constitutional  ques 
tion  was  obiter.  This  was  the  view  of  Justice  Cur 
tis,  who  delivered  the  dissenting  opinion,  which  was 
affirmed  later  by  the  Emancipation  Proclamation 
and  Appomattox.  "I  do  not  consider,"  said  Justice 
Curtis,  "it  to  be  within  the  scope  of  the  judicial 
power  of  the  majority  of  the  court  to  pass  upon 
any  question  respecting  the  plaintiff's  citizenship 
in  Missouri,  save  that  raised  by  the  plea  to  the  juris 
diction;  and  I  do  not  hold  any  opinion  of  this  court 
or  any  court  binding  when  expressed  on  a  question 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        269 

not  legitimately  before  it.  The  judgment  of  this 
court  is  that  the  case  is  to  be  dismissed  for  want 
of  jurisdiction,  because  the  plaintiff  was  not  a  citizen 
of  Missouri,  as  he  alleged  in  his  declaration.  Into 
that  judgment,  according  to  the  settled  course  of 
this  court,  nothing  occurring  after  a  plea  to  the 
merits  can  enter.  A  great  question  of  constitutional 
law,  deeply  affecting  the  peace  and  welfare  of  the 
country,  is  not,  in  my  opinion,  a  fit  subject  to  be 
thus  reached."  The  South  was  enthusiastic  over 
the  decision,  recognizing  it  for  what  it  was — one 
of  the  most  formidable  blows  ever  struck  in  behalf 
of  slavery.  Southern  men  laughed  at  Douglas's 
theory  that  the  decision  maintained  his  doctrine 
of  popular  sovereignty.  "It  is  obvious,"  said  Judah 
P.  Benjamin,  later  holder  of  three  positions  in  the 
Confederate  cabinet,  "that  since  the  decision  of 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  the  Dred 
Scott  case,  it  is  decided  that  from  the  origin  all  this 
agitation  of  the  slavery  question  has  been  directed 
against  the  constitutional  rights  of  the  South;  and 
that  both  Wilmot  provisos  and  Missouri  Com 
promise  lines  were  unconstitutional."  The  slavery 
men  realized  the  extent  of  their  victory.  They  saw 
in  it,  too,  a  victory,  not  only  over  the  Missouri  Com 
promise,  but  over  popular  sovereignty  as  well.  For 
if  Congress  could  not  prohibit  slavery  how  could 
a  territorial  legislature  do  so?  All  that  popular 
sovereignty  under  the  new  conditions  could  mean 


270  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

was  that  the  people  might  vote  whether  they  would 
have  slavery  or  not,  but  that  only  the  votes  for 
slavery  would  count.  The  court  in  effect  adopted 
the  theory  that  since  the  negro  was  inferior  to  the 
white  man  he  was  rightfully  and  forever  doomed 
to  slavery.  The  negroes,  said  the  chief  justice,  "had 
for  more  than  a  century  before  been  regarded  as 
beings  of  an  inferior  order,  and  altogether  unfit 
to  associate  with  the  white  race,  either  in  social 
or  political  relations;  and  so  far  inferior  that  they 
had  no  rights  which  the  white  man  was  bound  to 
respect,  and  that  the  negro  might  justly  and  law 
fully  be  reduced  to  slavery  for  his  benefit.  He  was 
bought  and  sold,  and  treated  as  an  ordinary  article 
of  merchandise  and  traffic,  wherever  a  profit  could 
be  made  by  it.  The  opinion  was  at  that  time  fixed 
and  universal  in  the  civilized  portion  of  the  white 
race.  It  was  regarded  as  an  axiom  in  morals  as 
well  as  in  politics,  which  no  one  thought  of  disput 
ing,  or  supposed  to  be  open  to  dispute;  and  men 
in  every  grade  and  position  of  society  daily  and 
habitually  acted  upon  it  in  their  private  pursuits, 
as  well  as  in  matters  of  public  concern,  without 
doubting  for  a  moment  the  correctness  of  this 
opinion."  It  is  hard  to  imagine  a  chief  justice  of 
the  United  States  giving  expression  to  such  views. 
Douglas  earnestly,  and  with  apparent  enthusiasm, 
defended  the  decision.  He,  too,  made  much  of  the 
argument  based  on  the  negro's  inferiority,  and  re- 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        271 

joiced  that  the  country  was  to  continue  to  enjoy 
white  supremacy  and  be  spared  negro  equality. 
With  a  quotation  from  Lincoln,  who  declared  that 
in  his  opinion  the  decision  was  wrong,  the  considera 
tion  of  it  will  be  brought  to  a  close:  "There  is  a 
natural  disgust  in  the  minds  of  nearly  all  white 
people  to  the  idea  of  an  indiscriminate  amalgama 
tion  of  the  white  and  black  races ;  and  Judge  Douglas 
evidently  is  basing  his  chief  hope  upon  the  chances 
of  his  being  able  to  appropriate  the  benefit  of  this 
disgust  to  himself.  If  he  can,  by  much  drumming 
and  repeating,  fasten  the  odium  of  that  idea  upon 
his  adversaries  he  thinks  he  can  struggle  through 
the  storm.  He  therefore  clings  to  this  hope,  as  a 
drowning  man  to  the  last  plank.  He  makes  an  oc 
casion  for  lugging  it  in  from  the  opposition  to  the 
Dred  Scott  decision.  He  finds  the  Republicans  in 
sisting  that  the  Declaration  of  Independence  in 
cludes  all  men,  black  as  well  as  white,  and  forth 
with  he  boldly  denies  that  it  includes  negroes  at 
all,  and  proceeds  to  argue  gravely  that  all  who  con 
tend  it  does,  do  so  only  because  they  want  to  vote, 
and  eat,  and  sleep,  and  marry  with  negroes!  He 
will  have  it  that  they  cannot  be  consistent  else. 
Now  I  protest  against  the  counterfeit  logic  which 
concludes  that,  because  I  do  not  want  a  black  woman 
for  a  slave  I  must  necessarily  want  her  for  a  wife. 
I  need  not  have  her  for  either.  I  can  just  leave  her 
alone.  In  some  respects  she  certainly  is  not  my 


272  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

equal;  but  in  her  natural  right  to  eat  the  bread 
she  earns  with  her  own  hands  without  asking  leave 
of  any  one  else,  she  is  my  equal,  and  the  equal  of 
all  others.  .  .  .  The  Republicans  inculcate,  with 
whatever  of  ability  they  can,  that  the  negro  is  a 
man,  that  his  bondage  is  cruelly  wrong,  and  that 
the  field  of  his  oppression  ought  not  to  be  enlarged. 
The  Democrats  deny  his  manhood;  deny,  or  dwarf 
to  insignificance,  the  wrong  of  his  bondage;  so  far 
as  possible,  crush  all  sympathy  for  him,  and  culti 
vate  and  excite  hatred  and  disgust  against  him; 
compliment  themselves  as  Union-savers  for  doing 
so;  and  call  the  indefinite  outspreading  of  his  bond 
age  '  a  sacred  right  of  self-government/  The  plainest 
print  cannot  be  read  through  a  gold  eagle;  and  it 
will  be  hard  ever  to  find  many  men  who  will  send 
a  slave  to  Liberia,  and  pay  his  passage,  while  they 
can  send  him  to  a  new  country — Kansas,  for  in 
stance — and  sell  him  for  fifteen  hundred  dollars, 
and  the  rise." 

The  issue  between  Douglas  and  Lincoln  is  here 
clearly  presented.  It  was  fundamentally  moral. 
Lincoln  recognized  slavery  as  an  institution  in  the 
States  that  were  cursed  with  it,  and  one  with  which 
the  federal  government  had  no  constitutional  right 
to  interfere.  But  he  also  saw  in  it  a  great  evil,  the 
spread  of  which  the  federal  government  had  the 
power,  and  was  under  solemn  obligation,  to  pre 
vent.  Douglas  looked  on  it  as  a  matter  of  indiffer- 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        273 

ence,  and  did  not  care  whether  the  people  chose 
slavery  or  not  as  long  as  they  were  permitted  to 
have  a  choice.  Indeed  he  held  that  it  was  an  abridg 
ment  of  the  people's  rights  to  say  that  they  should 
not  have  slavery  if  they  wanted  it.  It  was  to  him 
much  as  it  would  be  to-day  to  allow  the  people  of 
a  territory  to  say  whether  they  preferred  the  direct 
primary  or  the  convention  system. 

When  Governor  Walker — to  return  to  Kansas- 
reached  the  scene  of  his  labors  he  might  have  thought 
that  it  was  a  matter  of  unimportance  whether  the 
slavery  men  or  the  free  men  won,  since  under  the 
Dred  Scott  decision  the  territory  would,  as  most 
men  believed,  be  slave  territory.  But  the  effect 
of  the  decision  does  not  appear  till  later.  For  the 
present  the  struggle  was  to  go  on  with  the  new  gov 
ernor  doing  everything  in  his  power  to  see  that  both 
sides  had  fair  play.  It  should  be  said  that  he  had 
as  a  coadjutor  Frederick  P.  Stanton  of  Tennessee, 
a  man  of  high  character  and  exceptional  talent, 
who  had  been  appointed  secretary  of  the  territory. 
Walker  arrived  in  Kansas  May  26,  1857,  and  his  in 
augural  address,  which  had  been  approved  by  the 
President  and  Douglas,  was  published  next  day. 
These  men  shared  the  opinion,  generally  prevalent 
in  the  South,  that  the  free-State  settlers  were  the 
disturbers,  but  like  Governor  Reeder  and  Governor 
Geary,  they  soon  changed  their  views.  It  was  clear 
to  Walker  that  Kansas  was  destined  to  freedom, 


274  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

and  that,  though  he  would  have  preferred  to  see 
it  admitted  as  a  slave  State,  the  slavery  men  could 
never  win  honestly.  What  he  hoped  was  that  Kan 
sas  could  be  saved  to  the  Democratic  party.  He 
found  that  a  majority  of  the  Democrats  was  favor 
able  to  freedom.  His  effort  to  bring  the  Democrats 
together  failed,  as  it  could  only  have  been  done  on 
the  basis  of  freedom.  The  case  is  typical  of  what 
followed  throughout  the  nation.  But  there  seemed 
to  be  a  chance  of  peace.  The  free-State  men  agreed 
to  abandon  their  proceedings  under  the  Topeka 
Constitution,  which  certainly  was  irregular,  to  say 
the  least.  He  promised  them  that,  if  the  constitu 
tional  convention  shortly  to  be  held,  should  refuse 
to  submit  the  Constitution  to  the  people,  he  would 
join  them  in  opposing  that  course.  He  also  pledged 
— as  far  as  this  was  possible — the  President  to  sub 
mission.  President  Buchanan  wrote  confidentially 
to  Walker  saying:  "On  the  question  of  submitting 
the  Constitution  to  the  bona  fide  residents  of  Kan 
sas,  I  am  willing  to  stand  or  fall."  On  June  15, 
1857,  the  election  for  delegates  was  held.  The  free- 
State  men  refused  to  vote,  and  the  result  was  that 
out  of  9,250  registered  voters,  only  2,200  voted. 
Here  was  proof  conclusive  that  Kansas  was  for  free 
dom.  The  election  was  peaceable,  and  in  conform 
ity  with  the  law.  The  fruit  of  its  work  was  the 
Lecompton  Constitution,  framed  at  the  town  of 
that  name,  of  unsavory  fame,  which  did  as  much 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        275 

as  any  other  one  thing  to  split  the  Democratic 
party  by  driving  Douglas  into  opposition.  Be 
fore  the  convention  began  its  work,  there  was 
an  election  on  October  5  for  members  of  the  legis 
lature  and  delegate  to  Congress.  The  free-State 
men  changed  their  policy,  and  participated  in  the 
election,  which  was  probably  the  first  fair  election 
ever  held  in  Kansas  up  to  that  time.  The  free- 
State  men  chose  a  majority  of  both  branches  of 
the  legislature  and  elected  their  candidate  as  dele 
gate  to  Congress  by  a  majority  of  4,089.  The  slavery 
men  did  not  yield  with  good  grace.  They  exhibited 
to  the  governor  what  purported  to  be  poll  books 
from  several  precincts  showing  enough  votes  which 
would,  if  counted,  change  the  complexion  of  the 
legislature.  These  palpably  fraudulent  returns  were 
rejected  by  the  governor,  who  gave  certificates  to 
the  free-State  candidates,  and  issued  a  proclama 
tion,  in  which  he  said: 

"The  consideration  that  our  own  party  by  this 
decision  will  lose  the  majority  in  the  legislative  as 
sembly  does  not  make  our  duty  in  the  premises 
less  solemn  and  imperative.  The  elective  franchise 
would  be  utterly  valueless  and  free  government 
itself  would  receive  a  deadly  blow,  if  so  great  an 
outrage  as  this  could  be  shielded  under  the  cover 
of  mere  form  and  technicalities."  The  proslavery 
people,  both  in  Kansas  and  throughout  the  nation, 
raised  a  cry  against  the  governor.  Leaders  in  Con- 


276  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

gress,  headed  by  Jefferson  Davis,  denounced  him, 
and  Democratic  conventions  in  the  South  adopted 
resolutions  censuring  him.  As  late  as  July  the  Presi 
dent  had  seemed  disposed  to  stand  by  him,  for  it  was 
in  that  month  that  the  letter  just  referred  to  was 
written.  Here  it  is  that  the  Dred  Scott  decision 
enters  in.  The  President  had,  by  August,  discovered 
that  Kansas  was  already  a  slave  State.  "This 
point,"  he  said,  "has  at  last  been  finally  decided 
by  the  highest  tribunal  known  to  our  laws.  How 
it  could  ever  have  been  seriously  doubted  is  a  mys 
tery.  If  a  confederation  of  sovereign  States  acquire 
new  territory  at  the  expense  of  their  common  blood 
and  treasure,  surely  one  set  of  partners  can  have 
no  right  to  exclude  the  other  from  its  enjoyment 
by  prohibiting  them  taking  into  it  whatever  is  recog 
nized  to  be  property  by  the  common  Constitution. " 
Yet  the  President  himself  had  held  only  a  few  weeks 
before  that  the  people  of  Kansas  had  a  right  to  say 
whether  they  would  have  slavery  or  not.  Now  he 
had  reached  the  conclusion  that  it  was  "a  mys 
tery"  how  any  one,  including  himself,  had  ever 
thought  so.  When  the  Southern  leaders  learned 
that  the  Lecompton  convention  would  be  controlled 
by  their  friends  they  began  to  demand  that  it  adopt 
a  proslavery  Constitution  and  ask  admittance  to 
the  Union.  Such  in  fact  were  the  instructions  from 
Washington,  though  the  President  was  not  in  the 
plot.  The  convention  met  for  business  October  19, 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        277 

1857,  representing  but  one-fourth  of  the  registered 
voters  of  the  territory.  It  did  its  work  under  the  pro 
tection  of  United  States  troops,  but  for  which  its 
members  would  have  been  driven  from  the  Territory. 
The  convention  very  promptly  adopted  a  proslavery 
Constitution,  and  provided  for  a  submission  to  the 
people  in  an  election  to  be  held  December  21,  which 
was  really  no  submission  at  all.  When  Governor 
Walker  visited  Washington  in  November,  he  found 
that  he  had  lost  the  favor  of  the  administration, 
and  won  the  hatred  of  the  Southern  Democratic 
leaders.  There  was  nothing  for  him  to  do  but  re 
sign,  which  he  did  in  a  letter  declaring  his  opposi 
tion  to  the  Lecompton  Constitution,  which,  he  said, 
was  also  opposed  by  an  overwhelming  majority  of 
the  people  of  Kansas.  In  his  absence  Secretary 
Stanton  had,  in  response  to  the  requests  of  the  free- 
State  men,  summoned  a  special  session  of  the  legis 
lature,  which  called  an  election  at  which  a  fair  vote 
might  be  had  on  the  Constitution  adopted  by  the 
Lecompton  convention.  Thus  two  elections  were 
to  be  held — that  ordered  by  the  convention  on  De 
cember  21,  and  that  ordered  by  the  free-State  legis 
lature  on  January  4,  1858.  For  his  action  in  calling 
the  legislature  together  Stanton  was  promptly  re 
moved,  and  Denver  was  appointed  in  his  place. 
By  this  time  it  was  clear  to  all  that  no  man  who 
conducted  himself  with  courage,  fairness,  and  honesty 
could  be  satisfactory  to  those  who  were  bent  on 


278  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

making  Kansas  a  slave-State.  The  Lecompton 
trick  is  perfectly  transparent.  The  people  were 
asked  to  vote,  not  for  or  against  the  Constitution, 
but  for  the  Constitution  with  or  without  slavery. 
In  either  case  the  vote  would  have  been  one  for  the 
Constitution.  And  even  if  it  had  been  favorable 
to  the  Constitution  without  slavery  it  would  have 
ratified  the  following  provision:  "The  right  of  prop 
erty  is  before  and  higher  than  any  constitutional 
sanction,  and  the  right  of  the  owner  of  a  slave  to 
such  slave  and  its  increase  is  the  same  and  as  in 
violable  as  the  right  of  the  owner  of  any  property 
whatever."  It  was  further  provided  that  the  Con 
stitution  could  not  be  amended  in  any  particular 
till  after  the  year  1864,  and  never  amended  so  as 
to  "affect  the  right  of  property  in  the  ownership 
of  slaves."  To  this  had  popular  sovereignty  come. 
At  the  December  election  the  vote  was  for  the  Con 
stitution  with  slavery,  6,226;  for  the  Constitution 
without  slavery,  569.  It  was  later  proved  that 
2,720  of  these  votes  were  fraudulent.  In  the  January 
election,  the  vote  was  for  the  Constitution  with 
slavery,  138;  for  the  Constitution  without  slavery, 
24;  against  the  Constitution,  10,226.  Here  is  clear 
proof  that  the  State  was  heavily  hostile  to  slavery. 
But  no  better  proof  could  be  asked  than  the  un 
willingness  of  the  slavery  conspirators  to  give  to 
the  people  an  honest  chance  at  a  fair  election  to 
express  their  will.  The  proslavery  men  both  in 
Kansas  and  Washington  knew  perfectly  well  that 


FREEDOM  VERSUS  SLAVERY        279 

the  people  of  Kansas  were  opposed  to  slavery.  That 
is  the  reason  why  it  was  found  necessary  to  cheat 
them  out  of  their  rights  by  a  dastardly  trick.  Gov 
ernor  Walker  denounced  the  proposed  "submission 
of  the  question  as  a  vile  fraud,  a  base  counterfeit," 
and  said :  "  I  will  not  support  it,  but  I  will  denounce 
it,  no  matter  whether  the  administration  sustains 
it  or  not."  This  was  in  response  to  the  statement 
of  John  Calhoun,  surveyor-general  of  the  territory, 
and  president  of  the  convention,  that  the  programme 
"was  the  programme  of  the  administration,"  though 
he  admitted  that  he  had  no  letter  from  the  Presi 
dent.  There  are  good  reasons  for  believing  that 
Buchanan  was  not  a  party  to  the  conspiracy,  though 
it  undoubtedly  centred  in  Washington.  The  Presi 
dent,  however,  supported  the  conspirators  after  they 
had  put  through  their  scheme.  The  whole  question 
was  now  transferred  to  Congress,  and  in  the  great 
drama  that  followed  Mr.  Douglas  played  a  leading 
part,  and  a  part  that  did  him  infinite  credit.  He 
saw  that  his  popular  sovereignty  programme  had 
at  last  been  ditched,  and  that  he  himself  had  been 
betrayed,  and,  what  was  worse,  had  been  the  un 
conscious  instrument  in  the  betrayal  of  the  people  of 
Kansas.  The  necessity  for  a  break  with  the  slavery 
interest  was  now  forced  on  him.  Had  he  been  brave 
enough  or  great  enough  to  break  completely  the 
history  of  the  country  might  have  been  very  dif 
ferent  from  what  it  actually  was.  .  .  . 


CHAPTER  XII 
DOUGLAS  BREAKS  WITH  THE  ADMINISTRATION 

IN  his  message  of  December  8,  1857,  President  Bu 
chanan  said  that  Congress  in  passing  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  act  had  declared  it  to  be  "the  true  intent 
and  meaning  of  this  act  not  to  legislate  slavery  into 
any  territory  or  State,  nor  to  exclude  it  therefrom, 
but  to  leave  the  people  perfectly  free  to  form  and 
regulate  their  domestic  institutions  in  their  own 
way."  He  held  that  the  question  of  the  existence 
or  non-existence  of  slavery  must  be  submitted  to 
the  people,  but  that  there  was  no  reason  why  the 
whole  Constitution  should  be  so  submitted.  That 
he  would  have  preferred  that  method  he  made  clear. 
But  as  Constitutions  had  been  adopted  without 
a  direct  vote  of  the  people  on  them,  and  as — so  Mr. 
Buchanan  argued — the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  did 
not  provide  for  or  require  such  submission,  he  held 
that  it  was  not  necessary.  All  that  was  necessary 
was  that  the  people  should  be  allowed  to  vote  on 
the  slavery  question.  Douglas  must  have  been 
profoundly  astonished  by  this  presidential  burk 
ing  of  popular  sovereignty  in  the  interest  of,  and 
at  the  demand  of,  the  slave-power.  But  before  the 
message  he  had  been  alarmed  at  the  prospect  of  the 

280 


BREAKS  WITH  ADMINISTRATION    281 

success  of  the  Lecompton  trick.  In  an  interview 
with  the  President  shortly  after  his  arrival  at 
Washington,  Douglas  discovered  that  there  was  a 
wide  difference  between  them.  When  Mr.  Buchanan 
said  that  he  would  advise  the  adoption  of  the 
policy  of  the  slave-power,  Douglas  said  that  he 
would  denounce  and  fight  it  in  the  Senate.  Thus 
war  was  declared,  a  war  that  probably  kept  Doug 
las  out  of  the  White  House,  and  banished  the 
Democratic  party  from  power  for  a  quarter  of  a 
century.  After  the  reading  of  the  President's  mes 
sage,  Douglas  moved  that  it  be  printed,  and  said 
that  he  dissented  from  "that  portion  of  the  message 
which  may  fairly  be  construed  as  an  approving  of 
the  proceedings  of  the  Lecompton  convention." 
The  next  day  he  addressed  the  Senate  on  the  sub 
ject  in  a  speech  of  great  power.  As  this  is  Douglas's 
declaration  of  independence,  a  somewhat  extended 
summary  of  it  seems  necessary.  Mr.  Douglas  said: 
"The  President,  after  expressing  his  regret,  and 
mortification,  and  disappointment  that  the  Con 
stitution  had  not  been  submitted  to  the  people  in 
pursuance  of  his  instructions  to  Governor  Walker, 
and  in  pursuance  of  Governor  Walker's  assurances 
to  the  people,  says,  however,  that  by  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  act  the  slavery  question  only  was  required 
to  be  referred  to  the  people,  and  the  remainder  of 
the  Constitution  was  not  thus  required  to  be  sub 
mitted.  He  acknowledges  that,  as  a  general  rule, 


282  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

on  general  principles,  the  whole  Constitution  should 
be  submitted;  but,  according  to  his  understanding 
of  the  organic  act  of  Congress,  there  was  an  impera 
tive  obligation  to  submit  the  slavery  question  for 
their  approval  or  disapproval,  but  no  obligation  to 
submit  the  entire  Constitution.  In  other  words, 
he  regards  the  organic  act,  the  Nebraska  bill,  as 
having  made  an  exception  of  the  slavery  clause, 
and  provided  for  the  disposition  of  that  question 
in  a  mode  different  from  that  in  which  other  domestic 
or  local  affairs,  as  contradistinguished  from  federal 
questions,  should  be  decided."  After  suggesting 
that  the  President  was  not  familiar  with  the  sub 
ject,  as  he  was  out  of  the  country  at  the  time,  serv 
ing  as  Minister  to  Great  Britain,  Mr.  Douglas  con 
tinued:  "What  was  the  principle  enunciated  by  the 
authors  and  supporters  of  that  bill  when  it  was 
brought  forward?  Did  we  not  come  before  the 
country  and  say  that  we  repealed  the  Missouri  re 
striction  for  the  purpose  of  substituting  and  carry 
ing  out  as  a  general  rule  the  great  principle  of  self- 
government,  which  left  the  people  of  each  State 
and  each  territory  free  to  form  and  regulate  their 
domestic  institutions  in  their  own  way,  subject 
only  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States?  In 
support  of  that  proposition,  it  was  argued  here, 
and  I  have  argued  it  wherever  I  have  spoken  in 
various  States  of  the  Union,  at  home  and  abroad, 
everywhere  I  have  endeavored  to  prove  that  there 


BREAKS  WITH  ADMINISTRATION    283 

was  no  reason  why  an  exception  should  be  made 
in  regard  to  the  slavery  question.  .  .  .  The  very 
first  proposition  in  the  Nebraska  bill  was  to  show 
that  the  Missouri  restriction,  prohibiting  them 
from  deciding  the  slavery  question  for  themselves, 
constituted  an  exception  to  a  general  rule,  in  viola 
tion  of  the  principle  of  self-government;  and  hence 
that  that  exception  should  be  repealed,  and  the 
slavery  question,  like  all  other  questions,  submitted 
to  the  people,  to  be  decided  by  themselves.  That 
was  the  principle  on  which  the  Nebraska  bill  was 
defended  by  its  friends.  Instead  of  making  the 
slavery  question  an  exception,  it  removed  an  odious 
exception  which  before  existed.  .  .  .  We  repealed 
the  Missouri  restriction  because  it  was  confined  to 
slavery.  That  was  the  only  exception  there  was 
to  the  general  principle  of  self-government.  That 
exception  was  taken  away  for  the  avowed  and  ex 
press  purpose  of  making  the  rule  of  self-government 
general  and  universal,  so  that  the  people  should 
form  and  regulate  all  their  domestic  institutions  in 
their  own  way."  Douglas's  purpose  had  been  to 
enable  the  people  to  legislate  directly  on  slavery 
as  on  all  other  questions.  Now  the  President  held 
that  they  could  not  be  allowed  to  pass  on  anything 
else  than  slavery.  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the 
truth  of  the  statements  of  Douglas  or  the  soundness 
of  his  logic.  What  he  did  not  or  could  not  see,  or, 
if  he  did  see,  would  not  admit,  was  that  the  only 


284  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

reason  why  the  slavery  leaders  favored  the  repeal 
of  the  Missouri  Compromise  was  that  they  believed 
that  the  effect  would  be  to  give  them  a  chance  to 
get  slavery  into  Kansas.  They  cared  for  popular 
sovereignty  only  as  a  means  to  accomplish  their 
end.  But  Douglas  went  on  to  show  that  under  the 
Lecompton  scheme  there  was  no  real  chance  to 
vote  even  on  the  slavery  issue.  He  said:  "The 
President  tells  us  in  his  message  that  the  whole 
party  pledged  our  faith  and  our  honor  that  the 
slavery  question  should  be  submitted  to  the  people, 
without  any  restriction  or  qualification  whatever. 
Does  this  schedule  submit  it  without  qualification  ? 
It  qualifies  by  saying,  'You  may  vote  on  slavery  if 
you  will  vote  for  the  Constitution,  but  you  shall 
not  do  so  without  doing  that.'  That  is  a  very  im 
portant  qualification — a  qualification  that  controls 
a  man's  vote,  and  his  action,  and  his  conscience, 
if  he  is  an  honest  man — a  qualification  confessedly 
in  violation  of  our  platform.  We  are  told  by  the 
President  that  our  faith  and  our  honor  are  pledged 
that  the  slavery  clause  should  be  submitted  with 
out  any  qualification  of  any  kind  whatever;  and 
now  am  I  to  be  called  upon  to  forfeit  my  faith  and 
my  honor  in  order  to  enable  a  small  minority  of 
the  people  of  Kansas  to  defraud  the  majority  of 
that  people  out  of  their  elective  franchise  ?  Sir,  my 
honor  is  pledged;  and  before  it  shall  be  tarnished 
I  will  take  whatever  consequences  personal  to  my- 


BREAKS  WITH  ADMINISTRATION    285 

self  may  come;  but  never  ask  me  to  do  an  act  which 
the  President  in  his  message  has  said  is  a  forfeiture 
of  faith,  a  violation  of  honor,  and  that  merely  for 
the  expediency  of  saving  the  party.  I  will  go  as 
far  as  any  one  of  you  to  save  the  party.  I  have  as 
much  heart  in  the  great  cause  that  binds  us  together 
as  any  man  living.  I  will  sacrifice  anything  short 
of  principle  and  honor  for  the  peace  of  the  party; 
but  if  the  party  will  not  stand  by  its  principles, 
its  faith,  its  pledges,  I  will  stand  there,  and  abide 
whatever  consequences  may  result  from  the  posi 
tion.  ...  If  this  Constitution  is  to  be  forced  down 
our  throats,  in  violation  of  the  fundamental  prin 
ciple  of  free  government,  under  a  submission  that 
is  a  mockery  and  an  insult,  I  will  resist  it  to  the 
last.  I  have  no  fear  of  any  party  associations  being 
severed.  I  should  regret  any  social  or  political 
estrangement,  even  temporarily;  but  if  it  must 
be,  if  I  can  not  act  with  you  and  preserve  my  faith 
and  my  honor,  I  will  stand  on  the  great  principle 
of  popular  sovereignty,  which  declares  the  right 
of  all  people  to  be  left  perfectly  free  to  form  and 
regulate  their  domestic  institutions  in  their  own 
way.  I  will  follow  that  principle  wherever  its  logical 
consequences  may  take  me,  and  I  will  endeavor 
to  defend  it  against  assault  from  any  and  all  quar 
ters.  No  mortal  man  shall  be  responsible  for  my 
action  but  myself.  By  my  action  I  will  compromit 


no  man." 


286  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

The  speech  created  a  great  sensation.  Douglas 
had  always  been  known  as  a  strict  party  man — 
as  indeed  he  was — and  a  great  believer  in  party 
regularity.  At  the  time  he  thus  challenged  the 
national  administration  he  was  the  leader  of  his 
party,  and  the  most  powerful  man  in  it.  His  at 
tack  on  the  President  was  none  the  less  vigorous 
for  being  couched  in  courteous  language,  and  in 
ferential  rather  than  direct.  "Henceforth,"  wrote 
Seward,  "Douglas  is  to  tread  the  thorny  path  I 
have  pursued.  The  administration  and  the  slave- 
power  are  broken.  The  triumph  of  freedom  is  not 
only  assured  but  near."  Northern  papers,  both 
Democratic  and  Republican,  praised  the  speech. 
"What  can  equal,"  Seward  wrote  again,  "the  ca 
prices  of  politics !  The  triumph  of  slavery  [in  1850] 
would  have  been  incomplete,  indeed  it  could  not 
have  occurred,  had  it  not  been  for  the  accession 
to  it  of  Stephen  A.  Douglas.  By  that  defection 
he  became  soon,  and  has,  until  just  now,  continued 
(under  the  favor  or  fear  of  successive  administra 
tions)  legislative  dictator  here,  intolerant  yet  ir 
resistible.  .  .  .  Yesterday  he  broke  loose  from 
all  that  strong  host  he  had  led  so  long,  and  although 
he  did  not  at  the  first  bound  reach  my  position,  as 
an  ally,  yet  he  leaped  so  far  towards  it  as  to  gain 
a  position  of  neutrality  altogether  unsafe  and  inde 
fensible."  Unlike  some  other  Republicans  Seward 
welcomed  all  accessions  from  the  opposing  party 


BREAKS  WITH  ADMINISTRATION    287 

to  the  anti-Lecompton  forces.  He  wrote:  "Since 
Walker,  Douglas,  and  Stanton  have  been  converted, 
at  least  in  part,  we  are  sure  to  hear  the  gospel 
preached  (though  with  adulteration)  to  the  Gen 
tiles."  Seward  continued:  "God  forbid  that  I 
should  consent  to  see  freedom  wounded,  because 
my  own  lead,  or  even  my  own  agency  in  serving 
it,  should  be  rejected.  I  will  cheerfully  co-operate 
with  these  new  defenders  of  this  sacred  cause  in 
Kansas,  and  I  will  award  them  all  due  praise  for 
their  large  share  of  merit  in  its  deliverance."  There 
was,  however,  considerable  distrust  of  Douglas's 
motives.  The  Republicans  were  very  glad  to  see 
the  Democratic  party  split,  and  quick  to  recognize 
and  improve  to  the  utmost  the  opportunity  that  he 
had  given  them.  In  the  East  there  were  some  who 
favored  a  union  on  Douglas  in  Illinois  by  the  friends 
of  freedom  as  their  candidate  for  United  States 
senator.  Later  there  was  talk  of  making  him  the 
presidential  candidate  of  the  Republican  party. 
But  there  was  in  the  West  little  sympathy  with 
these  plans.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  Douglas  made 
any  attempts  to  conciliate  his  old  foes.  He  was 
still  for  popular  sovereignty,  still  indifferent  to  the 
moral  aspect  of  slavery.  But  there  does  not  seem 
to  be  any  reason  to  question  the  sincerity  of  his 
motives.  It  is  true  that  his  term  as  senator  was 
about  to  expire,  and  that  his  constituents  had  made 
clear  their  opposition  to  the  Lecompton  scheme. 


288  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Perhaps  he  could  not  have  been  elected  if  he  had 
favored  it.  But  he  might  have  kept  still,  and  voted 
against  it  quietly  and  with  regret.  And  he  might 
well  have  thought  that  he  could  go  back  to  Illinois 
and  meet  the  people  bravely,  as  he  had  done  four 
years  before,  and  win  them  to  his  support.  The 
thing  might  have  been  impossible,  since  the  feeling 
against  slavery  had  grown  much  more  intense.  But 
he  might  very  easily  have  felt  that  the  victory  could 
have  been  won.  On  the  other  hand,  he  knew  that 
by  his  speech  he  had  won  the  undying  opposition  of 
the  administration,  and  that  it  would  not  only  fail 
to  support  him,  but  actively  oppose  him  in  his  cam 
paign  for  re-election — which  it  did.  He  could  not 
have  failed  to  realize  that  he  had  put  the  presidency 
forever  beyond  his  grasp.  The  case  is  well  summed 
up  by  William  Henry  Smith  in  his  Political  His 
tory  of  Slavery :  "  Mr.  Douglas's  senatorial  term 
was  about  expiring,  and  he  had  to  consider  what 
effect  his  support  of  the  Lecompton  swindle  would 
have  on  his  chances  of  being  returned.  To  break 
with  the  administration  would  be  to  invite  his 
deposition  as  a  leader,  even  his  expulsion  from  the 
party.  In  times  past  the  resentment  of  the  Presi 
dent  had  been  fatal  to  any  Democratic  independent. 
By  keeping  terms  with  the  administration  Doug 
las's  nomination  at  Charleston  was  almost  certain 
to  follow  in  1860,  and  his  election  with  the  help  of 
Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Cali- 


BREAKS  WITH  ADMINISTRATION    289 

forma,  and  Oregon  was  probable.  Instead  of  hav 
ing  the  opposition  of  the  administration  in  his  sena 
torial  canvass  in  1858,  he  would  have  had  its  power 
ful  support,  and  his  success  does  not  admit  of  a 
doubt.  The  devotion  of  his  friends  was  the  same 
devotion  that  made  Jefferson  and  Jackson  party 
heroes  despite  occasional  vagaries.  We  must  con 
clude  that  there  was  a  consideration  of  greater 
moment  than  the  presidency,  of  importance  in  con 
nection  with  a  return  to  the  Senate.  Douglas  was 
too  deeply  compromised  in  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
legislation  safely  to  renounce  what  he  had  pro 
claimed,  as  it  were,  from  the  housetops  as  the  great 
principle  of  popular  sovereignty  and  to  defend  a 
flagrant  fraud  even  if  his  soul  did  not  revolt  from 
it.  When  he  threw  down  the  gage  to  the  President 
he  denounced  the  wrong  with  characteristic  vigor 
and  with  apparent  sincerity.  He  was  enlisted  on 
the  side  of  morality,  and  the  consciousness  of  that 
fact  gave  a  sublime  effect  to  his  vindication  of  his 
course.  He  was  first  of  all  a  leader  of  men,  and 
the  possession  of  that  power  was  greater  than  the 
presidency.  The  session  of  the  Senate  closed  with 
Douglas  the  hero  of  the  debate,  and  he  returned 
to  Illinois  accompanied  by  the  plaudits  of  the  ma 
jority  of  his  own  party,  of  the  conservative  Whigs 
and  of  many  influential  Republicans  who  favored 
his  re-election  to  the  Senate."  No  one  knew  better 
than  he  the  power  of  party,  especially  of  such  a 


290  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

great  and  historic  party  as  the  Democratic  party 
then  was,  which  had  hardly  known  defeat.  Doug 
las,  then,  it  seems  fair  to  say,  performed  a  great 
and  patriotic  public  service,  from  motives  as  near 
unmixed  as  often  inspire  men,  and  showed  himself 
on  a  very  trying  occasion  to  be  both  a  patriot  and 
a  statesman.  He  withstood  enormous  pressure, 
endured  the  bitterest  detraction,  and  was  for  the 
rest  of  his  life  fiercely  fought  by  the  ruling  influences 
in  his  party.  But  he  never  wavered.  Nothing  hap 
pened  to  him  as  a  result  of  his  action  that  he  did 
not  foresee.  Indeed,  the  President  had  warned 
him  that  he  would  be  "crushed."  Under  such  cir 
cumstances  it  is  unfair  and  ungenerous  to  go  poking 
round  for  a  mean  motive  when  a  noble  one  stands 
out  so  clearly. 

On  February  2,  1858,  the  President  transmitted 
the  Lecompton  Constitution  to  Congress.  The 
new  governor,  Denver,  like  his  predecessors,  under 
stood  the  situation,  and  advised  the  President  against 
the  course  he  was  about  to  take.  Even  Governor 
Wise  of  Virginia  sided  with  Douglas  and  Walker. 
"If  Congress/'  he  said  later,  "adopts  that  Lecomp 
ton  schedule,  Democracy  is  dead;  and  the  adminis 
tration  can  save  it  now;  it  cannot  after  that  act." 
His  theory  was  that  the  disunionists  were  trying 
to  drive  all  the  Northern  Democrats  away  from 
Buchanan.  The  Constitution,  it  will  be  remem 
bered,  had  been  rejected  by  a  crushing  majority 


BREAKS  WITH  ADMINISTRATION    291 

at  the  January  election.  But  the  President  had  by 
this  time  surrendered  abjectly  to  the  slave-power. 
His  message  was  hardly  more  than  an  amplification 
of  the  regular  message  of  December.  The  Presi 
dent  reviewed  the  troubles  in  Kansas  in  a  way  wholly 
favorable  to  the  slave-State  men,  condemned  the 
free-State  men  as  revolutionists,  and  declared  that 
the  Lecompton  Constitution  had  been  regularly 
adopted.  He  elaborated  the  theory  that  it  was 
enough  to  allow  the  people  to  vote  for  or  against 
slavery,  apparently  oblivious  of  the  fact  that  they 
could  not  vote  even  on  that  narrow  issue  without 
taking  an  oath  to  sustain  the  fugitive-slave  laws. 
The  whole  territory  had  by  Mr.  Buchanan 's  friends 
and  masters  been  organized  on  a  slave  basis.  But 
there  is  one  paragraph  in  the  message  that  deserves 
special  consideration:  "It  has  been  solemnly  ad 
judged  by  the  highest  judicial  tribunal  known  to 
our  laws  that  slavery  exists  in  Kansas  by  virtue 
of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  Kansas 
is  therefore  at  this  moment  as  much  a  slave-State 
as  Georgia  or  South  Carolina.  Without  this  the 
equality  of  the  sovereign  States  composing  the  Union 
would  be  violated  and  the  use  and  enjoyment  of  a 
territory  acquired  by  the  common  treasure  of  all 
the  States  would  be  closed  against  the  people  and 
the  property  of  nearly  half  the  members  of  the  Con 
federacy.  Slavery  can  therefore  never  be  prohibited 
in  Kansas  except  by  means  of  a  constitutional  pro- 


292  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

vision,  and  in  no  other  manner  can  this  be  obtained 
so  promptly,  if  a  majority  of  the  people  desire  it, 
as  by  admitting  it  into  the  Union  under  its  present 
Constitution."  If  Kansas  was  indeed  already  a 
slave  State  there  surely  could  have  been  no  point 
in  permitting  the  people  to  vote  for  the  Constitu 
tion  either  with  or  without  slavery,  since  a  vote 
against  slavery  would  have  had  no  effect,  as  slavery 
already  existed.  In  July  of  the  preceding  year  the 
President  had  written  to  Governor  Walker  thus: 
"On  the  question  of  submitting  the  Constitution 
to  the  bona  fide  resident  settlers  of  Kansas  I  am 
willing  to  stand  or  fall.  In  sustaining  such  a  prin 
ciple  we  cannot  fail.  It  is  the  principle  of  the  Kan 
sas-Nebraska  bill,  the  principle  of  popular  sover 
eignty,  and  the  principle  at  the  foundation  of  all 
popular  government.  The  more  it  is  discussed  the 
stronger  it  will  become."  Here  is  no  suggestion 
that  only  a  part  of  the  Constitution — the  slavery 
part — should  be  submitted,  much  less  any  intima 
tion  that  Kansas  was  already  a  slave  State.  But 
in  the  next  month  he  had  arrived  at  the  conclusion 
that  slavery  was  a  fact  in  Kansas  beyond  the  power 
of  the  people  to  alter.  So  he  shifted  more  and  more 
to  the  slavery  side,  until  in  December  he  said  that 
it  was  enough  to  give  the  people  an  opportunity 
to  vote  on  slavery,  though  they  could  not  vote  either 
for  or  against  it  without  voting  for  the  Constitu 
tion.  And  finally  in  a  formal  and  official  way  he 


BREAKS  WITH  ADMINISTRATION    293 

announced  to  Congress,  the  country  and  the  world, 
that  "  Kansas  is  at  this  moment  as  much  a  slave 
State  as  Georgia  or  South  Carolina."  Thus  he  aban 
doned  the  principle  on  which  he  had  said  in  the 
preceding  July  he  was  "  willing  to  stand  or  fall,  the 
principle  of  popular  sovereignty,  and  the  principle 
at  the  foundation  of  all  popular  government."  The 
old  Calhoun  theory,  which  had  been  scouted  by 
pretty  nearly  every  one  when  it  was  announced 
by  the  great  South  Carolinian,  and  which  had  been 
demolished  by  Webster,  was  now  solemnly  pro 
claimed  by  a  President  of  the  United  States.  Does 
Whitman's  characterization  of  the  Buchanan  "Presi- 
dentiad"  seem,  after  all,  to  be  overly  severe?  Un 
parliamentary  it  may  be,  but  one  can  hardly  ques 
tion  its  accuracy. 

The  message  was  referred  to  the  committee  on 
Territories,  which  already  had  under  consideration 
a  bill  introduced  by  Douglas  authorizing  the  people 
of  Kansas  to  frame  a  Constitution  preliminary  to 
admission  into  the  Union.  On  the  President's  recom 
mendations  three  reports  were  made.  The  only  one 
that  interests  us  is  that  of  Douglas.  In  it  the  Le- 
compton  Constitution  was  denounced  as  not  being 
"the  act  of  the  people  of  Kansas,"  or  embodying 
"their  will."  He  referred  to  "the  trickery  in  the 
mode  of  submission"  by  which  "a  large  majority, 
probably  amounting  to  three-fourths  of  all  the  legal 
voters  of  Kansas,  were  disfranchised  and  excluded 


294  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

from  the  polls  on  December  2 1,"  while  at  the  Jan 
uary  election  "a  majority  of  more  than  10,000  of 
the  legal  voters  rejected  the  Constitution."  There 
is  little  or  nothing  new  in  the  debate  that  followed. 
It  was  heated  and  intense.  Douglas  was  bitterly 
attacked  by  the  slavery  men,  one  of  them  saying 
that  but  for  him  "there  would  not  have  been  a  ripple 
on  the  surface."  He  was  assailed  as  a  traitor  and 
renegade.  But  he  again  showed  that  he  was  amply 
able  to  defend  himself,  and  even  to  carry  the  war 
to  his  enemies.  The  whole  power  of  the  adminis 
tration  was  thrown  against  him.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  there  ever  was  a  more  shameless  use  of 
patronage  in  behalf  of  a  piece  of  legislation.  "  When 
ever,"  Douglas  said,  "the  time  comes  that  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States  can  change  the  allegiance 
of  senators  from  the  States  to  himself,  what  be 
comes  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  States?  When  the 
time  comes  that  a  senator  is  to  account  to  the  execu 
tive  and  not  to  his  State,  whom  does  he  represent? 
If  the  will  of  my  State  is  one  way  and  the  will  of 
the  President  the  other,  am  I  to  be  told  that  I  must 
obey  the  executive  and  betray  my  State,  or  else 
be  branded  as  a  traitor  to  the  party,  hunted  down 
by  all  the  newspapers  that  share  the  patronage  of 
the  government  ?  and  every  man  who  holds  a  petty 
office  in  any  part  of  my  State  to  have  the  question 
put  to  him,  'Are  you  Douglas's  enemy ?'  if  not  cyour 
head  comes  off/  Why?  'Because  he  is  a  recreant 


BREAKS  WITH  ADMINISTRATION    295 

senator;  because  he  chooses  to  follow  his  judgment 
and  his  conscience,  and  represent  his  State  instead 
of  obeying  my  executive  behest.7  I  should  like  to 
know  what  is  the  use  of  Congress;  what  is  the  use 
of  Senates  and  Houses  of  Representatives,  when 
their  highest  duty  is  to  obey  the  executive  in  dis 
regard  of  the  wishes,  rights,  and  honor  of  their  con 
stituents?  What  despotism  on  earth  would  be 
equal  to  this,  if  you  establish  the  doctrine  that  the 
executive  has  a  right  to  command  the  votes,  the 
consciences,  the  judgment  of  the  senators  and  rep 
resentatives,  instead  of  their  own  constituents? 
...  Is  it  seriously  intended  to  brand  every  Demo 
crat  in  the  United  States  as  a  traitor  who  is  opposed 
to  the  Lecompton  Constitution?  If  so,  do  your 
friends  in  Pennsylvania  desire  any  traitors  to  vote 
with  them  next  fall?  We  are  traitors  if  we  vote 
against  Lecompton,  our  constituents  are  traitors  if 
they  do  not  think  Lecompton  is  right,  and  yet  you 
expect  those  whom  you  call  traitors  to  vote  with 
and  sustain  you.  Are  you  to  read  out  of  the  party 
every  man  who  thinks  it  wrong  to  force  a  constitu 
tion  on  a  people  against  their  will?  If  so,  what 
will  be  the  size  of  the  administration  party  in  New 
York?  What  will  it  be  in  Pennsylvania?  How 
many  will  it  number  in  Ohio,  or  in  Indiana,  or  in 
Illinois,  or  in  any  other  Northern  State?  Surely 
you  do  not  expect  the  support  of  those  whom  you 
brand  as  renegades?  Would  it  not  be  well  to  allow 


296  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

all  freemen  freedom  of  thought,  freedom  of  speech, 
and  freedom  of  action?"  Thus  Douglas  had  at 
last  learned  that  there  could  be  no  freedom  of  any 
sort  where  slavery  was  concerned.  "Neither  the 
frowns  of  power/'  he  continued,  "nor  the  influence 
of  patronage  will  change  my  action,  or  drive  me 
from  my  principles.  I  stand  firmly,  immovably 
upon  those  great  principles  of  self-government  and 
State  sovereignty  upon  which  the  campaign  was 
fought  and  the  election  won.  I  stand  by  the  time- 
honored  principles  of  the  Democratic  party,  illus 
trated  by  Jefferson  and  Jackson — those  principles 
of  State  rights,  of  State  sovereignty,  strict  construc 
tion,  on  which  the  great  Democratic  party  has  ever 
stood.  I  will  stand  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  with  all  its  compromises,  and  perform  all 
my  obligations  under  it.  I  will  stand  by  the  Amer 
ican  Union  as  it  exists  under  the  Constitution.  If, 
standing  firmly  by  my  principles,  I  shall  be  driven 
into  private  life,  it  is  a  fate  that  has  no  terrors  for 
me.  I  prefer  private  life,  preserving  my  own  self- 
respect  and  manhood,  to  abject  and  servile  sub 
mission  to  executive  will.  If  the  alternative  be 
private  life  or  servile  obedience  to  executive  will, 
I  am  prepared  to  retire.  Official  position  has  no 
charms  for  me  when  deprived  of  that  freedom  of 
thought  and  action  which  becomes  a  gentleman  and 
a  senator."  This  speech  raised  Douglas  high  in 
the  opinion  of  the  country.  It  did  not  remove  all 


BREAKS  WITH  ADMINISTRATION    297 

doubt  as  to  his  motives  or  his  sincerity.  This  was 
too  much  to  expect,  since  he  had  travelled  long  in 
company  with  the  slavery  men,  and  had  always 
been  known  as  a  narrow  and  strict  partisan.  But 
the  speech  did  convert  many,  as  well  it  might  have 
done.  For  it  meant  a  complete  break  with  the  ad 
ministration,  and  an  open  fight  between  him  and 
the  controlling  influences  in  the  Democratic  party. 
On  the  next  day  the  Senate  passed  the  bill  by  a 
vote  of  33  to  25,  having  previously  rejected  the 
Crittenden  amendment  providing  for  the  admission 
of  Kansas  under  the  Lecompton  Constitution,  on 
the  condition  that  it  again  be  submitted  to  the 
people.  Only  three  Northern  Democrats,  Bro- 
derick  of  California,  Pugh  of  Ohio,  and  Stuart  of 
Michigan,  voted  with  Douglas  against  the  bill.  Two 
Southerners,  Bell  of  Tennessee,  and  Crittenden  of 
Kentucky,  members  of  the  American  party,  also  cast 
their  votes  against  the  bill.  When  the  bill  came  be 
fore  the  House  an  amendment,  practically  the  same 
as  that  presented  by  Crittenden  in  the  Senate,  was 
offered,  and  agreed  to.  The  Senate  refused  to  ac 
cept  the  amendment.  Out  of  the  dispute,  neither 
House  being  willing  to  yield,  came  the  bill  offered 
by  Representative  William  H.  English  of  Indiana. 
By  this  bill  the  government  agreed  to  donate  to 
Kansas  a  large  tract  of  government  land;  if  this 
grant  was  accepted  by  popular  vote,  Kansas  would 
be  admitted  under  the  Lecompton  Constitution; 


298  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

if  it  were  rejected,  the  State  would  have  to  wait 
for  admission  till  it  had  population  equal  to  the 
unit  of  representation  required  for  the  House  of 
Representatives.  This  bill  became  a  law.  Douglas 
voted  against  it.  Many  of  his  followers  left  him, 
feeling  sure  that  the  people  of  Kansas  would  refuse 
the  bribe,  as  they  indeed  did.  But  Douglas  stood 
fast,  refusing  to  accept  "a  way  out."  The  bill,  he 
said,  "is  intervention  with  inducements  to  control 
the  result.  It  is  intervention  with  a  bounty  on  the 
one  side  and  a  penalty  on  the  other."  The  bill 
passed  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  31  to  22,  Pugh  going 
over  to  the  enemy,  and  Douglas,  Broderick,  and 
Crittenden  maintaining  their  position.  The  House 
adopted  it  by  a  vote  of  120  to  112.  In  the  following 
August  the  people  of  Kansas  refused  the  grant, 
11,300  votes  out  of  a  total  of  13,088  being  against 
it.  Thus  ends  the  war  over  the  Lecompton  Con 
stitution.  Kansas,  to  anticipate  somewhat,  was 
finally  admitted  as  a  free  State  in  January,  1861, 
before  the  expiration  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  term. 


CHAPTER  XIII 
THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE 

DOUGLAS  had  a  much  wider  interest  in  public  affairs 
than  might  be  supposed  by  those  who  have  seen 
how  completely  he  was  absorbed  in  the  slavery 
question.  One  of  the  first  gifts  that  the  Univer 
sity  of  Chicago  received  was  ten  acres  of  land 
from  Douglas.  He  was  greatly  interested  in  the 
Smithsonian  Institution,  and  one  of  its  regents. 
But  for  the  precipitation  of  the  battle  over 
slavery  by  his  introduction  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
bill  it  is  possible  that  Douglas  might  have 
worked  out  a  system  of  internal  improvements  that 
would  forever  have  saved  the  nation  from  the  shame 
and  disgrace  of  "pork-barrel"  legislation.  No  man 
favored  more  strongly  than  he  the  disposition  of 
the  public  lands  in  such  a  way  as  to  promote  im 
migration,  and  stimulate  the  development  of  the 
country.  He  was  a  strong  believer  in  internal 
improvements  wisely  undertaken  and  honestly 
prosecuted.  In  this  he  was  opposed  by  the  slavery 
men,  who  did  not  care  to  see  any  increase  of  free 
territory  or  of  population  within  it,  and  by  many 
Easterners,  who  showed  a  strange  indifference  to 
the  West,  and  even  a  fear  that  we  might  expand 

299 


300  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

too  rapidly.  He  favored  the  placing  of  works  of 
art  on  the  free  list,  saying:  "I  wish  we  could  get 
a  model  of  every  work  of  art,  a  cast  of  every  piece 
of  ancient  statuary,  a  copy  of  every  valuable  paint 
ing  and  rare  book,  so  that  our  artists  might  pursue 
their  studies  and  exercise  their  skill  at  home,  and 
that  our  literary  men  might  not  be  exiled  in  the 
pursuits  which  bless  mankind."  It  has  been  said 
that  Douglas  had  no  imagination,  but  that  he  had 
vision.  Perhaps  there  was  something  of  both  in 
the  man  when  he  got  away  from  the  slavery  ques 
tion.  Certainly  he  saw  this  nation,  not  solely  as 
it  was,  but  as  it  was  one  day  to  be.  To  him  there 
was  nothing  unreasonable  in  the  memorial  of  an 
inventor,  which  he  presented  and  supported  in  the 
Senate,  asking  for  aid  in  making  experiments  with 
dirigible  balloons.  Years  afterward,  and  in  our 
own  time,  Professor  Langley  was  ridiculed  in  Con 
gress  when  he  asked  for  similar  help  in  developing 
flying  machines.  Douglas  was  an  earnest  and  per 
sistent  advocate  of  a  Pacific  railroad,  favoring  every 
bill  authorizing  that  enterprise,  and  introducing 
one  of  his  own  immediately  following  the  end  of 
the  Lecompton  controversy.  Not  the  least  of  the 
tragedies  connected  with  slavery  was  the  hindrance 
that  it  interposed  to  national  development.  But 
for  slavery  Douglas  might  have  rendered  far  greater 
service  to  the  nation — and  this  is  true  of  all  the  men 
of  the  time — than  any  that  can  be  credited  to  him. 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    301 

Lincoln  was  right  when  he  said  in  his  speech  ac 
cepting  the  Republican  nomination  for  the  senator- 
ship,  on  June  16,  1858:  "We  are  now  far  into  the 
fifth  year  since  a  policy  was  initiated  with  the 
avowed  object,  and  confident  promise  of  putting 
an  end  to  the  slavery  agitation.  Under  the  opera 
tion  of  that  policy,  that  agitation  has  not  only  not 
ceased,  but  has  constantly  augmented.  In  my 
opinion,  it  will  not  cease  until  a  crisis  shall  have 
been  reached  and  passed.  'A.  House  divided  against 
itself  cannot  stand/  I  believe  this  government 
cannot  endure  half  slave  and  half  free.  I  do  not 
expect  the  Union  to  be  dissolved — I  do  not  expect 
the  house  to  fall — but  I  do  expect  it  will  cease  to 
be  divided.  It  will  become  all  one  thing  or  all  the 
other.  Either  the  opponents  of  slavery  will  arrest 
the  further  spread  of  it,  and  place  it  where  the  public 
mind  shall  rest  in  the  belief  that  it  is  in  the  course 
of  ultimate  extinction;  or  its  advocates  will  push 
it  forward  till  it  shall  become  alike  lawful  in  all  the 
States,  old  as  well  as  new — North  as  well  as  South. " 
This  speech  marks  the  opening  of  the  great  debate 
between  Douglas  and  Lincoln,  and  nothing  received 
more  attention  from  Douglas  than  the  declaration 
that  "a  house  divided  against  itself  cannot  stand." 
The  senator  had  been  warmly  received  by  his  con 
stituents,  who  were  in  complete  accord  with  him 
on  the  Lecompton  question.  The  Democratic  State 
convention,  which  met  in  April,  indorsed  Douglas, 


302  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

and  condemned,  at  least  inferentially,  the  adminis 
tration  for  its  repudiation  of  the  Cincinnati  plat 
form.  Douglas  had  carried  his  State  with  him 
in  his  war  on  the  Buchanan  administration.  That 
administration  accepted  the  challenge,  and  exerted 
itself  to  the  utmost  to  defeat  the  man  who  had 
defied  it.  The  "crushing"  process  was  ruthlessly 
put  into  effect.  Douglas's  friends  were  swept  out 
of  office,  and  his  enemies  appointed  in  their  place. 
There  was  an  attempt  to  set  up  an  opposition 
ticket,  and  every  effort  was  made  to  divide  the 
Democratic  vote  for  senator.  Every  federal  officer 
in  the  State  was  an  agent  of  the  administration, 
and  an  active  and  aggressive  one,  in  the  campaign 
for  the  defeat  of  Douglas.  On  the  9th  of  July, 
1858,  the  senator  arrived  in  Chicago  and  was  re 
ceived  as  a  conqueror.  In  his  speech  on  the  eve 
ning  of  that  day  he  reviewed  the  Lecompton  con 
troversy,  declared  again  his  adherence  to  the  pop 
ular  sovereignty  doctrine — which  he  said  had  been 
vindicated — and  spoke  of  his  own  unwillingness 
to  compromise  or  betray  Democratic  principles. 
Then  he  took  up  the  speech  of  Lincoln — who  was 
in  the  audience — delivered  on  June  16  to  the  con 
vention  that  had  nominated  him  for  senator.  "I 
take  great  pleasure,"  said  Douglas,  "in  saying  that 
I  have  known  personally  and  intimately,  for  about 
a  quarter  of  a  century,  the  worthy  gentleman  who 
has  been  nominated  for  my  place,  and  I  will  say 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    303 

that  I  regard  him  as  a  kind,  amiable,  and  intelligent 
gentleman,  a  good  citizen  and  an  honorable  op 
ponent;  and  whatever  issue  I  may  have  with  him 
will  be  of  principle,  and  not  involving  personali 
ties."  From  this  the  speaker  proceeded  to  an  at 
tack  on  "the  house  divided  against  itself"  state 
ment.  This  the  speaker  took  to  be  a  plea  for  uni 
formity  in  local  institutions,  involving  war  by  one 
section  on  the  other  to  make  the  whole  nation  either 
free  or  slave.  Lincoln  was  charged  with  favoring 
such  a  war.  Douglas  declared  himself  hostile  to 
such  uniformity,  saying  that  it  was  neither  "de 
sirable  nor  possible."  Lincoln  would  have  com 
pulsory  uniformity;  Douglas  would  not  have  uni 
formity  at  all.  "Uniformity,"  he  said,  "in  local 
and  domestic  affairs  would  be  destructive  of  State 
rights,  of  State  sovereignty,  of  personal  liberty  and 
personal  freedom."  Douglas  defended  the  Dred 
Scott  decision  from  Lincoln's  criticism  on  two 
grounds:  First,  it  was  the  law  of  the  land  declared 
by  the  highest  tribunal  in  the  country,  and  one 
from  which  there  could  be  no  appeal  to  a  "town- 
meeting";  and  second,  it  was  right,  since  the  negro 
was  not  and  could  not  be  a  citizen,  as  "this  govern 
ment  of  ours  is  founded  on  the  white  basis."  The 
negro,  it  was  insisted,  "should  have  all  the  rights, 
privileges  and  immunities  which  he  is  capable  of 
exercising  consistent  with  the  safety  of  society." 
But  it  was  for  each  State  to  decide  what  those  rights 


304  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

should  be.  Yet  if  it  denied  him  all  the  rights  of  a 
human  being — such  must  be  the  logic — the  general 
government  could  not  object.  No  State,  apparently, 
could  clothe  him  with  the  right  of  citizenship.  So 
the  debate  opened — thus  far  at  long  range.  Lincoln 
replied  the  next  night  in  the  same  place.  He  very 
truthfully  said  that  in  the  speech  criticized  by  Doug 
las  he  did  not  say  that  he  "favored"  making  the 
Union  all  free — or  all  slave — but  had  only  made  a 
prediction  that  things  could  not  continue  as  they 
were — a  prediction  that  has  certainly  been  fulfilled. 
"I  only  said,"  he  declared,  "what  I  expected  would 
take  place."  Douglas's  labored  essay  in  defense 
of  variety,  which  he  assumed  was  attacked  by  Lin 
coln,  certainly  seems  rather  far-fetched  to-day. 
At  any  rate  we  all  believe  now  that  there  should 
be  uniformity  in  connection  with  freedom.  Speak 
ing  of  Douglas's  white-man  theory,  Lincoln  fell 
back  on  the  Declaration  of  Independence.  "Those 
arguments,"  Lincoln  said,  and  his  words  have  a 
strange  timeliness  to-day,  as  prophetic  words  are 
likely  always  to  have  an  application  far  wider  than 
intended,  "those  arguments  that  are  made,  that 
the  inferior  race  are  to  be  treated  with  as  much 
allowance  as  they  are  capable  of  enjoying;  that 
as  much  is  to  be  done  for  them  as  their  condition 
will  allow — what  are  these  arguments?  They  are 
the  arguments  that  kings  have  made  for  enslaving 
the  people  in  all  ages  of  the  world.  You  will  find 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    305 

that  all  the  arguments  in  favor  of  kingcraft  were 
of  this  class;  they  always  bestrode  the  necks  of 
the  people — not  because  they  wanted  to  do  it,  but 
because  the  people  were  better  off  for  being  ridden. 
That  is  their  argument,  and  this  argument  of  the 
judge  is  the  same  old  serpent  that  says:  'You 
work  and  I  eat,  you  toil  and  I  will  enjoy  the 
fruits  of  it/  '  So  the  debate  ran  along.  Douglas 
spoke  at  Bloomington,  Springfield,  and  other  places, 
always  to  large  crowds,  and  amid  great  enthusiasm. 
On  July  24  he  returned  to  Chicago,  where  he  re 
ceived  a  letter  from  Mr.  Lincoln  suggesting  that  it 
would  be  better  if  they  discussed  the  issues  from 
the  same  platform.  The  challenge  was  accepted, 
and  it  was  arranged  for  them  to  appear,  beginning 
August  21,  at  Ottawa,  Freeport,  Jonesboro,  Charles 
ton,  Galesburg,  Quincy,  and  Alton,  the  debate  to 
end  at  the  latter  town  October  15.  This  great  dis 
cussion  soon  drew  to  itself  the  attention  of  the  whole 
nation.  We  can  hardly  even  imagine  what  interest 
it  roused  and  what  excitement  it  stirred  in  Illinois. 
Vast  throngs  assembled  to  hear  the  two  men, 
both  of  whom  were  masters  of  the  art  of  debate. 
The  struggle  was  of  national  importance,  and  was 
so  recognized.  Douglas,  of  course,  was  well  known, 
and  Lincoln  hardly  known  at  all  outside  of  Illinois; 
the  assumption  was  that  the  senator  would  have 
an  easy  victory.  But  he  himself  was  not  so  sure — 
certainly  he  did  not  underestimate  Lincoln.  "I 


306  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

shall,"  he  said,  "have  my  hands  full.  He  is  the 
strong  man  of  his  party — full  of  wit,  facts,  dates — 
and  the  best  stump  speaker,  with  his  droll  ways 
and  dry  jokes,  in  the  West.  He  is  as  honest  as  he 
is  shrewd;  and  if  I  beat  him,  my  victory  will  be 
hardly  won."  TheJre  was  much  questioning  of  each 
candidate  by  the  other  for  the  purpose  of  entrapping 
him  into  admissions.  It  should  be  remembered 
that  this  great  tournament  was  not  altogether  a 
discussion  of  principles,  having  solely  for  its  pur 
pose  the  establishment  of  the  truth.  Party  interests 
and  personal  ambitions  were  involved,  and  very 
directly.  Both  Douglas  and  Lincoln  were  after 
votes,  both  wished  to  be  senator,  and  both  earnestly 
desired  a  party  victory.  In  a  very  real  sense  the 
greatest  issue  of  all,  the  one  that  underlay  all  others, 
was  whether  the  government  was  to  be  controlled 
by  the  Republican  or  the  Democratic  party.  On 
the  answer  to  that  question  every  one  could  even 
then  see  that  a  great  deal  depended.  Naturally 
therefore  there  was  some  shrinking  on  both  sides, 
some  unwillingness  to  push  the  argument  to  its 
logical  extreme.  \Lincoln  made  it  perfectly  clear 
that  he  thought  slavery  wrong,  while  Douglas  clung 
to  his  old  attitude  of  indifference  to  the  moral 
aspect  of  the  case — did  not  "care  whether  slavery 
was  voted  up  or  down."  His  great  interest  was  in 
seeing  that  the  people  should  have  the  right  to 
adopt  either  slavery  or  freedom  as  they  saw  fit. 


x 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    307 

He  would  have  them  free  to  hold  slaves.  On  the 
moral  issue  the  verdict  must  be  awarded  to  Lin 
coln,  "j 

It  is  a  mistake,  however,  to  think  of  this  debate 
as  wholly  a  contest  over  principles,  for  it  was  also 
a  battle  of  wits.  Nor  is  it  quite  true  to  say,  as  many 
do,  that  Lincoln  had  the  easier  task,  since  he  was 
championing  the  right  cause.  For  he  had  to  present 
that  cause  so  as  to  win  the  support  of  men  who  by 
no  means  thought  alike — abolitionists,  moderate 
Republicans,  Americans,  and  old-line  Whigs.  He 
felt  it  to  be  necessary — as  indeed  it  was — to  re 
pudiate  any  suggestion  that  he  himself  was  an  aboli 
tionist.  Lincoln  had  not  even  been  a  Free-Soiler, 
but  a  follower  of  Henry  Clay.  He  was  not  such  a 
Republican  as  Seward.  The  more  radical  Repub 
licans,  especially  of  the  East,  were  for  a  time  op 
posed  to  him,  and  others  were  lukewarm.  The  ut 
most  pains  was  taken  to  make  it  clear  that  he  did 
not  favor  social  equality.  There  was  even  danger 
of  offending  the  Democrats,  since  there  was  reason 
to  believe — or  at  least  to  hope — that  many  of  them 
would  vote  for  Lincoln.  Douglas,  on  the  other  hand, 
very  naturally  feared  opposition  in  his  own  party, 
and  he  was  greatly  weakened  by  the  antagonism 
of  the  national  administration.  He,  too,  reached 
for  votes  on  the  other  side  of  the  party  line.  There 
was  a  strong  feeling  in  his  favor  among  the  Repub 
licans,  though  this  was  most  marked  in  the  East. 


308  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

The  chance  of  winning  Republican  votes  was  too 
good  to  be  thrown  away.  But  no  one  could  suspect 
Douglas  of  favoring  social  equality  as  between  the 
whites  and  blacks,  of  opposition  to  the  Supreme 
Court,  or  of  abolitionism.  Perhaps,  on  the  whole, 
it  was  an  even  thing.  There  was  not  a  thing  said 
or  a  question  asked  that  was  not  designed  to  em 
barrass  and  weaken  the  adversary.  One  answer 
to  Douglas's  criticism  of  Lincoln's  "House-divided- 
against-itself  speech"  is  so  admirable,  and  shows 
such  a  knowledge  of  political  philosophy,  that  it  is 
worth  setting  out  in  full:  "The  great  variety  of 
the  local  institutions  in  the  States  springing  from 
differences  in  the  soil,  differences  in  the  face  of  the 
country  and  in  the  climate,  are  bonds  of  union. 
They  do  not  make  'a  house  divided  against  itself/ 
but  they  make  a  house  united.  If  they  produce 
in  one  section  of  the  country  what  is  called  for  by 
the  wants  of  another  section,  and  if  this  other  sec 
tion  can  supply  the  wants  of  the  first,  they  are  not 
matters  of  discord,  but  bonds  of  union — true  bonds 
of  union.  But  can  this  question  of  slavery  be  con 
sidered  as  among  these  varieties  in  the  institutions 
of  the  country?  I  leave  it  to  you  to  say  whether, 
in  the  history  of  our  government,  this  institution 
of  slavery  has  not  always  failed  to  be  a  bond  of  union, 
but  an  apple  of  discord,  and  an  element  of  division 
in  the  house  ?  "  Such,  of  course,  was  the  fact.  These 
words  were  used  in  the  first  debate,  the  one  at  Ot- 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    309 

tawa.  On  that  occasion  Douglas  asked  a  series  of 
searching  questions  based  on  resolutions  supposed 
to  have  been  adopted  by  a  Republican  convention 
at  Springfield  in  1854,  but  which  proved  to  be  a 
forgery.  Lincoln,  however,  answered  the  questions 
in  his  next  speech  at  Freeport,  with  clearness  and 
explicitness — and  adroitness.  He  said  that  he  was 
not  in  favor  of  the  repeal  of  the  fugitive-slave  law, 
though  he  thought  it  should  be  amended;  that 
though  Congress  had  the  power  to  abolish  slavery 
in  the  District  of  Columbia,  it  should  do  this  only 
gradually,  in  a  way  satisfactory  to  a  majority  of 
the  voters  of  the  district,  and  with  compensation 
to  the  owners  of  slaves;  that  he  was  not  opposed 
to  the  honest  acquisition  of  slave  territory;  and 
that  Congress  ought  to  prohibit  slavery  in  the  Terri 
tories.  In  his  answer  to  the  fifth  question,  whether 
he  would  oppose  the  admission  of  a  new  State  with 
whatever  Constitution  the  people  chose  to  adopt 
he  skirted  Douglas's  popular  sovereignty  rather 
closely:  "In  regard  to  the  other  question,  of  whether 
I  am  pledged  to  the  admission  of  any  more  slave 
States  into  the  Union,  I  state  to  you  very  frankly 
that  I  would  be  exceedingly  sorry  ever  to  be  put 
in  a  position  of  having  to  pass  upon  that  question. 
I  should  be  exceedingly  glad  to  know  that  there 
would  never  be  another  slave  State  admitted  into 
the  Union;  but  I  must  add  that  if  slavery  shall 
be  kept  out  of  the  Territories  during  the  territorial 


310  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

existence  of  any  one  given  territory,  and  then  the 
people  shall,  having  a  fair  chance  and  a  clear  field, 
when  they  come  to  adopt  the  Constitution,  do  such 
an  extraordinary  thing  as  to  adopt  a  slave  Con 
stitution,  uninfluenced  by  the  actual  presence  of 
the  institution  among  them,  I  see  no  alternative, 
if  we  own  the  country,  but  to  admit  them  into  the 
Union."  President  Buchanan  had  held  that  though 
slavery  existed  in  Kansas  the  people  could,  after 
the  State  had  been  admitted,  abolish  it  by  con 
stitutional  enactment.  While  Mr.  Lincoln  argued — 
and  we  can  imagine  that  he  made  the  concession 
with  the  greatest  reluctance — fthat  though  Con 
gress  might,  and  ought  to  exclude  slavery  from  the 
Territories,  those  Territories  would  have  to  be  ad 
mitted  by  Congress  as  States  even  with  slave  con 
stitutions.  In  other  words,  they  had  a  right  to 
order  their  local  institutions  and  affairs  as  they 
pleased — which  is  not  far  removed  from  the  Doug 
las  doctrine.  At  Freeport  Lincoln  was  the  ques 
tioner,  having  first  answered  the  Douglas  interroga 
tories.  Only  one  of  the  questions  is  of  importance, 
since  the  answer  to  it  brought  out  the  statement 
of  a  theory  to  which  Douglas  clung  throughout  the 
debate,  and  which  indeed  he  had  advanced  in  his 
speech  in  the  Senate  in  which  he  attempted  to  recon 
cile  the  Dred  Scott  decision  with  the  doctrine  of 
popular  sovereignty.  Lincoln  asked  whether  the 
people  of  a  Territory  can,  "  in  any  lawful  way,  against 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    311 

the  wishes  of  any  citizen  of  the  United  States,  ex 
clude  slavery  from  its  limits  prior  to  the  formation 
of  a  State  Constitution."  If  Douglas  said  no,  there 
would  be  an  end  of  popular  sovereignty;  if  he  said 
yes,  he  would  offend  the  slavery  leaders,  who  held 
that  the  people  could  do  no  such  thing.  Here  is 
Douglas's  answer:  "I  answer  emphatically,  as  Mr. 
Lincoln  has  heard  me  answer  a  hundred  times  from 
every  stump  in  Illinois,  t'hat  in  my  opinion  the  people 
of  a  Territory  can,  by  lawful  means,  exclude  slavery 
from  their  limits  prior  to  the  formation  of  a  State 
Constitution.  ...  It  matters  not  what  way  the 
Supreme  Court  may  hereafter  decide  as  to  the  ab 
stract  question  whether  slavery  may  or  may  not 
go  into  a  Territory  under  the  Constitution,  the  people 
have  the  lawful  means  to  introduce  it  or  exclude 
it  as  they  please,  for  the  reason  that  slavery  cannot 
exist  a  day  or  an  hour  anywhere  unless  it  is  supported 
by  local  police  regulations.  Those  police  regulations 
can  only  be  established  by  the  local  legislature; 
and  if  the  people  are  opposed  to  slavery,  they  will 
elect  representatives  to  that  body  who  will  by  un 
friendly  legislation  effectually  prevent  the  intro 
duction  of  it  into  their  midst.  If,  on  the  con 
trary,  they  are  for  it,  their  legislation  will  favor 
its  extension.  Hence,  no  matter  what  the  de 
cision  of  the  Supreme  Court  may  be  on  that  ab 
stract  question,  still  the  right  of  the  people  to 
make  a  slave  territory  or  a  free  territory  is  perfect 


312  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

and  complete  under  the  Nebraska  bill.  I  hope  Mr. 
Lincoln  regards  my  answer  satisfactory  on  that 
point."  It  was  not  satisfactory  to  Lincoln,  nor 
will  it  be  to  any  fair-minded  man.  This  theory  of 
the  power  of  a  local  legislature  to  nullify  and  over 
ride  a  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  was  one  of 
those  afterthoughts  for  which  Douglas  was  famous, 
brought  forward  to  save  his  doctrine  of  popular 
sovereignty  against  the  consequences  of  the  Dred 
Scott  decision.  At  Jonesboro,  on  September  15, 
Lincoln  said:  "The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States  has  decided  that  any  congressional  prohibi 
tion  of  slavery  in  the  Territories  is  unconstitutional; 
that  they  have  reached  this  proposition  as  a  con 
clusion  from  their  former  proposition  that  the  Con 
stitution  of  the  United  States  expressly  recognizes 
property  in  slaves,  and  from  that  other  constitutional 
provision  that  no  person  shall  be  deprived  of  property 
without  due  process  of  law.  Hence  they  reach  the 
conclusion  that  as  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  expressly  recognizes  property  in  slaves,  and 
prohibits  any  person  from  being  deprived  of  property 
without  due  process  of  law,  to  pass  an  act  of  Con 
gress  by  which  a  man  who  owned  a  slave  on  one  side 
of  a  line  would  be  deprived  of  him  on  the  other  side, 
is  depriving  him  of  that  property  without  due  process 
of  law.  That  I  understand  to  be  the  decision  of  the 
Supreme  Court.  I  understand  also  that  Judge 
Douglas  adheres  most  firmly  to  that  decision;  and 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    313 

the  difficulty  is,  how  is  it  possible  to  exclude  slavery 
from  the  territory  unless  in  violation  of  that  de 
cision."  The  question  manifestly  was  not  in  any 
sense  "abstract";  it  was  a  question  of  property 
and  property  rights.  Lincoln  further  showed  that 
Douglas  had  said  in  the  Senate  only  two  years  before 
that  "whether  the  people  should  exclude  slavery 
prior  to  the  formation  of  a  Constitution  or  not  was 
a  question  for  the  Supreme  Court."  "I  maintain," 
said  Lincoln,  "that  when  he  says,  after  the  Supreme 
Court  have  decided  the  question,  that  the  people 
may  yet  exclude  slavery  by  any  means  whatever, 
he  does  virtually  say  that  it  is  not  a  question  for 
the  Supreme  Court.  He  shifts  his  ground.  I  ap 
peal  to  you  whether  he  did  not  say  it  was  a  question 
for  the  Supreme  Court?  Has  not  the  Supreme 
Court  decided  the  question?  When  he  now  says 
the  people  may  exclude  slavery,  does  he  not  make  it 
a  question  for  the  people?  Does  he  not  virtually 
shift  his  ground  and  say  that  it  is  not  a  question 
for  the  court,  but  for  the  people?  This  is  a  very 
simple  proposition — a  very  plain  and  naked  one. 
It  seems  to  me  that  there  is  no  difficulty  in  deciding 
it.  In  a  variety  of  ways  he  said  that  it  was  a  ques 
tion  for  the  Supreme  Court.  He  did  not  stop  then 
to  tell  us  that  whatever  the  Supreme  Court  decides, 
the  people  can  by  withholding  the  necessary  'police 
regulations '  keep  slavery  out.  He  did  not  make  any 
such  answer.  I  submit  to  you  now  whether  the 


314  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

new  state  of  the  case  has  not  induced  the  judge 
to  sheer  away  from  his  original  ground?  Would 
not  this  be  the  impression  of  every  fair-minded 
man?"  The  logic  seems  remorseless.  Lincoln 
further  showed  that  slavery  could  exist,  and  had 
existed  under  police  regulations  of  an  unfriendly 
character.  Dred  Scott  himself  had  been  held  as  a 
slave  in  Minnesota.  He  finally  argued  that  every 
man  elected  to  a  legislature  was  sworn  to  uphold 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  which  had 
been  held  to  uphold  slavery,  and  also  that  Con 
gress  is  bound  to  give  legislative  support  to  any 
right  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution.  Douglas, 
however,  adhered  to  his  theory,  and  in  his  reply 
said  that  "you  cannot  maintain  slavery  a  day  in 
a  territory  where  there  is  an  unwilling  people  and 
unfriendly  legislation,"  and  that  "if  the  people  are 
opposed  to  it  our  right  is  a  barren,  worthless,  useless 
right;  and  if  they  are  for  it,  they  will  support  and 
encourage  it."  Douglas  strove  hard  to  prove  that 
Lincoln  was  an  abolitionist,  and  denounced  his  party 
as  "the  Black  Republican  party."  Each  man  was 
greatly  concerned  to  prove  that  the  other  had  been 
inconsistent,  and  that  each  was  bound  by  platforms 
of  the  past  by  which  he  was  not  now  willing  to  stand. 
Both  pressed  these  points  with  the  utmost  vigor. 

It  is  surprising  that  so  little  was  made  of  the  Le- 
compton  issue.  Douglas  had  little  to  say  of  it,  and 
Lincoln  did  not  press  it,  though  he  might  have  made 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    315 

much  of  the  schism  between  the  senator  and  the  na 
tional  administration.  Douglas,  of  course,  was  not 
interested  in  the  matter,  since  it  was  his  policy  to 
maintain,  as  far  as  he  could,  party  unity.  Though 
Lincoln  did  not  make  as  much  of  the  question  as 
he  might,  he  did  not  neglect  it.  Probably  he  thought 
that  the  Lecompton,  or  administration,  Democrats 
could  safely  be  left  to  take  care  of  Douglas,  as  far 
as  this  issue  was  concerned.  As  for  Douglas,  he 
held  that  there  was  nothing  on  which  the  Repub 
licans  could  agree  except  the  anti-Lecompton  policy, 
and  as  that  was  settled  and  at  an  end  the  situation 
reverted  to  its  former  status.  Besides,  there  was 
no  issue  between  Douglas  and  Lincoln  on  the  Le 
compton  question.  A  word  should  be  said,  however, 
in  regard  to  the  Freeport  speech  in  which  Douglas 
had  advanced  his  theory  that,  despite  the  decision 
of  the  Supreme  Court,  the  people  of  a  State  could 
exclude  slavery  through  unfriendly  police  regula 
tions.  The  Republicans  charged  that  this  was 
treason  to  Democratic  doctrine,  and  the  slavery 
leaders  made  the  same  claim.  The  doctrine,  as 
has  been  shown,  was  not  new,  nor  was  it  the  special 
property  of  Douglas.  But  the  charge  had  much 
weight,  and  Douglas  felt  it  necessary  later  to  de 
fend  himself  against  it,  by  showing  that  he  had 
made  the  statement  many  times,  and  also  that 
Southern  men,  including  James  L.  Orr,  of  South 
Carolina,  had,  in  1856,  held  and  expressed  precisely 


316  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

the  same  opinion.  Such  was  the  "Freeport  treason/' 
together  with  the  defense  of  Douglas.  But  the 
cry  of  treason  did  not  die  out;  it  was,  as  Sheahan 
says,  "continued  from  mouth  to  mouth,  until,  some 
time  in  the  dog-days  of  1859,  it  was  heard  for  the 
last  time  in  very  feeble  echoes,  somewhere  in  the 
remote  neighborhood  of  Grass  Valley,  California." 
The  matter  is  not  one  of  much  importance,  since 
Douglas  was  already  out  of  favor  in  the  South,  and 
was  viewed  every  day  with  more  and  more  distrust. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  his  doctrine  of  the  impossibility 
of  extending  slavery  to  States  that  did  not  want 
it  was  entirely  out  of  harmony  with  the  Southern 
view  of  the  Dred  Scott  decision.  And  that  was 
all  that  Lincoln  cared  to  show.  His  shrewdly 
framed  question,  therefore,  accomplished  its  purpose. 
The  opposition  to  him  in  his  own  party  became 
increasingly  active.  The  "Freeport  treason"  was 
doing  its  work.  The  President's  organ  at  Washing 
ton  denounced  him  as  a  renegade  whom  no  loyal 
Democrat  should  support.  John  Slidell  of  Louisiana 
was  actively  at  work  against  him.  The  Danites, 
as  the  Buchanan  Democrats  were  called,  were  very 
busy.  Vice-President  Breckenridge  refused  to  speak 
in  his  behalf,  though  he  ventured  to  say  that  he 
would  prefer  Douglas  to  Lincoln.  At  Galesburg 
Douglas  dwelt  on  the  sectionalism  of  the  Repub 
lican  party,  and  on  what  he  held  to  be  the  conflict 
between  the  statements  of  Lincoln,  delivered  in 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    317 

different  parts  of  the  State,  in  regard  to  negro 
equality.  Lincoln  sums  up  this  Galesburg  debate 
in  his  answer  to  Douglas:  "A  very  large  portion 
of  the  speech  which  Judge  Douglas  has  addressed 
to  you  has  previously  been  delivered  and  put  in 
print.  I  do  not  mean  that  for  a  hit  upon  the  judge 
at  all.  If  I  had  not  been  interrupted,  I  was  going 
to  say  that  such  an  answer  as  I  am  able  to  make 
to  a  very  large  portion  of  it  had  already  been  more 
than  once  made  and  published."  Douglas  held 
that  negroes  did  not  come  within  the  provisions  of 
the  Declaration  of  Independence,  while  Lincoln 
argued  that  even  if  they  were  not  citizens  they  were 
entitled  to  the  rights  enumerated  therein.  There 
is,  however,  one  thing  in  Douglas's  reply  that  is 
somewhat  interesting.  He  had  said  that  he  did 
"not  care  whether  slavery  was  voted  up  or  down/' 
and  Lincoln  had  declared  that  he  himself  did  care; 
that  only  to  a  man  who  believed  that  there  was  no 
moral  quality  involved  could  the  position  of  Doug 
las  be  logical.  In  this  Galesburg  speech  the  senator 
seems  to  have  been  somewhat  nettled  by  the  use 
that  Lincoln  had  made  of  his  remark,  for  he  said: 
"I  hold,  and  the  party  with  which  I  am  identified 
hold,  that  the  people  of  each  State,  old  and  new, 
have  the  right  to  decide  the  slavery  question  for 
themselves;  and  when  I  used  the  remark  that  I 
did  not  care  whether  slavery  was  voted  up  or  down, 
I  used  it  in  the  connection  that  I  was  for  allowing 


318  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Kansas  to  do  just  as  she  pleased  on  the  slavery  ques 
tion.  I  said  that  I  did  not  care  whether  they  voted 
slavery  up  or  down,  because  they  had  the  right  to 
do  as  they  pleased  on  the  question,  and  therefore 
my  action  would  not  be  controlled  by  such  con 
sideration."  The  explanation  is  a  true  one,  and 
yet  it  may  be  taken  as  indicating  in  this  connection 
that  Douglas  was  growing  somewhat  sensitive  on 
the  subject  of  slavery.  But  he  did  not  go  further, 
and  say  that  though  he  did  not  care — in  the  sense 
of  the  words  given  above — whether  slavery  was 
voted  up  or  down,  he  would  personally  rejoice  if 
the  people  of  a  State,  having  a  free  choice,  should 
prohibit  slavery.  In  the  debate  which  took  place 
at  Quincy,  Lincoln  pressed  the  moral  phase  of  the 
subject.  Judge  Douglas,  he  said,  "has  the  high 
distinction,  so  far  as  I  know,  of  never  having  said 
slavery  is  either  right  or  wrong.  Almost  every 
body  else  says  one  or  the  other,  but  the  judge  never 
does.  ...  If  you  will  examine  the  arguments  that 
are  made  on  it,  you  will  find  that  every  one  care 
fully  excludes  the  idea  that  there  is  anything  wrong 
in  it.  ...  So  I  say  again  that  in  regard  to  the 
arguments  that  are  made,  when  Judge  Douglas 
says  he  'don't  care  whether  slavery  is  voted  up  or 
voted  down/  whether  he  means  that  as  an  individual 
expression  of  sentiment,  or  only  as  a  sort  of  state 
ment  of  his  views  on  national  policy,  it  is  alike  true 
to  say  that  he  can  thus  argue  logically  if  he  don't 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    319 

see  anything  wrong  in  it;  but  he  cannot  say  so  log 
ically  if  he  admits  that  slavery  is  wrong.  He  can 
not  say  that  he  would  as  soon  see  a  wrong  voted 
up  as  voted  down.  .  .  .  When  he  says  that  slave 
property  and  horse  and  hog  property  are  alike  to 
be  allowed  to  go  into  the  Territories,  upon  the  prin 
ciples  of  equality,  he  is  reasoning  truly,  if  there  is 
no  difference  between  them  as  property;  but  if 
the  one  is  property  held  rightfully,  and  the  other 
is  wrong,  then  there  is  no  equality  between  the  right 
and  the  wrong;  so  that,  turn  it  in  any  way  you 
can,  in  all  the  arguments  sustaining  the  Democratic 
policy,  and  in  that  policy  itself,  there  is  a  careful, 
studied  exclusion  of  the  idea  that  there  is  anything 
wrong  in  slavery.  Let  us  understand  this.  I  am 
not,  just  here,  trying  to  prove  that  we  are  right, 
and  they  are  wrong.  I  have  been  stating  where 
we  and  they  stand,  and  trying  to  show  what  is  the 
real  difference  between  us;  and  I  now  say  that 
whenever  we  can  get  the  question  distinctly  stated, 
can  get  all  these  men  who  believe  that  slavery  is 
in  some  of  these  respects  wrong,  to  stand  and  act 
with  us  in  treating  it  as  a  wrong — then,  and  not 
till  then,  I  think  we  will  in  some  way  come  to  an 
end  of  this  slavery  agitation."  In  his  reply  Douglas 
merely  said  that  the  reason  he  refused  to  discuss 
the  right  or  wrong  of  slavery  was  that  "under  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States,  each  State  of 
the  Union  has  a  right  to  do  as  it  pleases  on  the  sub- 


320  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

ject  of  slavery."  "I  do  not/7  he  said,  "choose  to 
occupy  the  time  allotted  to  me  in  discussing  a  ques 
tion  that  we  have  no  right  to  act  upon."  In  this 
same  speech  Douglas  gave  Lincoln  another  point. 
After  refusing  to  say  whether  he  thought  slavery 
right  or  wrong,  Douglas  said:  "Let  each  State  stand 
firmly  by  that  great  constitutional  right,  let  each 
State  mind  its  own  business  and  let  its  neighbors 
alone,  and  there  will  be  no  trouble  on  this  question. 
If  we  will  stand  by  that  principle,  then  Mr.  Lin 
coln  will  find  that  this  republic  can  exist  forever, 
divided  into  free  and  slave  States,  as  our  fathers 
made  it  and  the  people  of  each  State  have  decided." 
In  his  rejoinder  Lincoln  said:  "I  wish  to  return  to 
Judge  Douglas  my  profound  thanks  for  his  public 
annunciation  here  to-day,  to  be  put  on  record,  that 
his  system  of  policy  in  regard  to  the  institution  of 
slavery  contemplates  that  it  shall  last  forever.  We 
are  getting  a  little  nearer  the  true  issue  of  this  con 
troversy,  and  I  am  profoundly  grateful  for  this  one 
sentence.  Judge  Douglas  asks  you,  'Why  cannot 
the  institution  of  slavery,  or  rather  why  cannot  the 
nation,  part  slave  and  part  free,  continue  as  our 
fathers  made  it,  forever/  '  To  such  a  conclusion 
had  Douglas  been  driven,  and  thus  was  Lincoln 
justified  in  making  in  June,  against  the  advice  of 
his  friends,  the  declaration  that  "a  house  divided 
against  itself  cannot  stand."  Lincoln,  as  the  de 
bate  drew  to  a  close  rose  steadily  toward  the  moral 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    321 

issue,  while  Douglas  continued  on  the  plane  of  strict 
legalism — which  was  not  always  legalism,  even. 
In  the  last  debate,  that  at  Alton  on  October  15, 
Douglas  discussed  his  quarrel  with  the  administra 
tion,  and  justified  his  attitude  and  course.  "Most 
of  the  men,"  he  said,  "who  denounced  my  course 
on  the  Lecompton  question  objected  to  it,  not  be 
cause  I  was  not  right,  but  because  they  thought  it 
expedient  at  that  time,  for  the  sake  of  keeping  the 
party  together,  to  do  wrong.  I  never  knew  the 
Democratic  party  to  violate  any  one  of  its  prin 
ciples,  out  of  policy  or  expediency,  that  it  did  not 
pay  the  debt  with  sorrow.  There  is  no  safety  or 
success  for  our  party  unless  we  always  do  right, 
and  trust  the  consequences  to  God  and  the  people. 
I  chose  not  to  depart  from  principle  for  expediency 
on  the  Lecompton  question,  and  I  never  intend 
to  do  it  on  that  or  any  other  question.  .  .  .  You 
saw  the  whole  power  and  patronage  of  the  federal 
government  wielded  in  Indiana,  Ohio,  and  Pennsyl 
vania  to  re-elect  anti-Lecompton  men  to  Congress 
who  voted  against  Lecompton,  then  voted  for  the 
English  bill,  and  then  denounced  the  English  bill, 
and  pledged  themselves  to  their  people  to  disregard 
it.  My  sin  consists  in  not  having  given  a  pledge, 
and  then  in  not  having  afterward  forfeited  it.  For 
that  reason,  in  this  State,  every  postmaster,  every 
route  agent,  every  collector  of  the  ports,  and  every 
federal  office-holder  forfeits  his  head  the  moment 


322  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

he  expresses  a  preference  for  the  Democratic  candi 
dates  against  Lincoln  and  his  abolition  associates. 
A  Democratic  administration  which  we  helped  to 
bring  into  power  deems  it  consistent  with  its  fidelity 
to  principle  and  its  regard  to  duty  to  wield  its  power 
in  this  State  in  behalf  of  the  Republican  abolition 
candidates  in  every  county  and  every  congressional 
district  against  the  Democratic  party.  All  I  have 
to  say  in  reference  to  the  matter  is  that  if  that  ad 
ministration  has  not  regard  enough  for  principle,  if 
they  are  not  sufficiently  attached  to  the  creed  of 
the  Democratic  party,  to  bury  forever  their  personal 
hostilities  in  order  to  succeed  in  carrying  out  our 
glorious  principles,  I  have.  I  have  no  personal  dif 
ficulty  with  Mr.  Buchanan  or  his  cabinet.  He  chose 
to  make  certain  recommendations  to  Congress,  as 
he  had  a  right  to  do,  on  the  Lecompton  question. 
I  could  not  vote  in  favor  of  them.  I  had  as  much 
right  to  judge  for  myself  how  I  should  vote  as  he 
had  how  he  should  recommend.  He  undertook  to 
say  to  me,  'If  you  do  not  vote  as  I  tell  you,  I  will 
take  off  the  heads  of  your  friends/  I  replied  to 
him,  'You  did  not  elect  me.  I  represent  Illinois, 
and  I  am  accountable  to  Illinois,  as  my  constituency, 
and  to  God;  but  not  to  the  President  or  to  any 
other  power  on  earth/  '  Lincoln  got  closer  and 
closer  to  the  real  issue,  and  gathered  courage  as  he 
proceeded.  The  real  issue,  and  the  whole  debate, 
is  thus  summed  up  by  him:  "You  may  turn  over 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    323 

everything  in  the  Democratic  policy  from  beginning 
to  end,  whether  in  the  shape  it  takes  on  the  statute 
book,  in  the  shape  it  takes  in  the  Dred  Scott  de 
cision,  in  the  shape  it  takes  in  conversation,  or  the 
shape  it  takes  in  short  maxim-like  arguments — it 
everywhere  carefully  excludes  the  idea  that  there  is 
anything  wrong  in  it.  That  is  the  real  issue. 
That  is  the  issue  that  will  continue  in  this  country 
when  these  poor  tongues  of  Judge  Douglas  and 
myself  shall  be  silent.  It  is  the  eternal  struggle 
between  these  two  principles — right  and  wrong- 
throughout  the  world.  They  are  the  two  principles 
that  have  stood  face  to  face  from  the  beginning 
of  time,  and  will  ever  continue  to  struggle."  This 
line  of  argument  Douglas  was  wholly  powerless  to 
meet.  It  represents  Lincoln  at  his  best.  The 
reply  of  Douglas,  with  which  the  debate  closed, 
was  in  the  old  vein. 

Before  leaving  this  subject  something  more  should 
be  said  of  the  effect  of  the  debate  on  Douglas's  fu 
ture.  All  of  Lincoln's  biographers  make  much,  and 
rightly,  of  the  question  as  to  whether  the  people  of 
a  Territory  could  in  any  lawful  way,  against  the  wish 
of  any  citizen,  exclude  slavery  from  the  Territory 
prior  to  the  formation  of  a  Constitution.  The 
dilemma  is  obvious,  as  has  been  pointed  out.  We 
have  seen  how  Douglas  answered  the  question.  He 
said  that  they  could  exclude  it  by  refusing  to  legis 
late  in  its  behalf.  A  negative  answer  would  have 


324  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

antagonized  the  people  of  Illinois,  and  an  affirmative 
answer  would  have  angered  the  South,  which  looked 
on  the  Dred  Scott  decision  as  making  the  nation 
wholly  slave.  In  "Lincoln  the  Lawyer,"  by  Fred 
erick  Trevor  Hill,  is  this:  "The  Republican  poli 
ticians  of  Illinois  were  not  so  astute  as  Douglas;  still 
they  foresaw  that  he  would  give  a  plausible  answer 
to  the  question  which  would  satisfy  the  local  voters, 
and  they  begged  Lincoln  to  withdraw  the  inquiry. 
But  the  far-sighted  lawyer  who  framed  it  was  deaf 
to  their  entreaties.  'Then  you  will  never  be  sena 
tor  V  was  the  angry  warning  of  one  of  his  advisers. 
'If  Douglas  answers/  responded  Lincoln  calmly, 
'he  will  never  be  President.'  The  fatal  question 
was  therefore  left  as  Lincoln  had  phrased  it,  and 
at  the  first  opportunity  Douglas  answered  by  stat 
ing  that  the  Territories  were  still  free  agents.  .  .  . 
As  soon  as  he  had  uttered  it,  Douglas  must  have 
seen  that  his  answer  involved  a  gross  blunder  in 
law.  .  .  .  But,  illogical  as  it  was,  this  fallacy  caught 
the  popular  fancy,  and  Douglas,  seeing  that  it  satis 
fied  his  constituents,  held  to  it  and  was  elected  to 
the  Senate.  Nevertheless,  as  Lincoln  anticipated, 
his  blunder  in  law  cost  him  the  presidency,  and 
not  long  afterward  Judah  P.  Benjamin,  one  of  the 
most  ardent  and  able  representatives  of  the  South, 
arraigned  him  as  a  renegade  and  traitor.  'We  ac 
cuse  him  for  this/  he  thundered,  'that  having  bar 
gained  with  us  upon  a  point  upon  which  we  were 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    325 

at  issue,  it  should  be  considered  a  judicial  point; 
that  he  would  abide  the  decision,  and  consider  it 
a  doctrine  of  the  party;  that  having  said  that  to 
us  here  in  the  Senate,  he  went  home,  and,  under 
the  stress  of  a  local  election,  his  knees  gave  way; 
his  whole  person  trembled.  His  adversary  stood 
upon  principle  and  was  beaten;  and  lo!  he  is  the 
candidate  of  a  mighty  party  for  the  presidency  of 
the  United  States.  The  senator  from  Illinois  fal 
tered.  He  got  the  prize  for  which  he  faltered;  but 
the  grand  prize  of  his  ambition  to-day  slips  from 
his  grasp  because  of  his  faltering  in  his  former  con 
test,  and  his  success  in  the  canvass  for  the  Senate, 
purchased  for  an  ignoble  price,  has  cost  him  the 
loss  of  the  presidency  of  the  United  States ! '  Thus 
two  years  after  Lincoln's  question  was  put  and  an 
swered  Douglas  was  repudiated  by  his  Southern 
friends,  the  Democratic  party  was  split,  three  candi 
dates  instead  of  one  were  nominated  against  the 
Republicans,  and  the  lawyer  whose  skill  had  pre 
cipitated  this  result  was  triumphantly  elected  at 
the  polls."  The  result  was  as  Lincoln  predicted. 
The  Republicans  carried  the  State — as  Douglas 
had  in  his  anti-Lecompton  speech  in  the  Senate 
predicted  they  would  do,  the  Lincoln  legislators 
receiving  a  popular  majority  of  16,000,  their  vote 
being  190,000  as  against  174,000  for  the  avowed 
Douglas  candidates.  The  majority  for  the  Re 
publican  candidate  for  Secretary  of  State  was  3,821. 


326  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

But  Douglas  had  the  advantage  of  12  hold-over 
Democratic  senators,  and  the  apportionment,  hav 
ing  been  made  before  the  large  increase  of  popula 
tion  in  the  Northern  part  of  the  State,  was  also 
in  his  favor.  When  the  legislature  met  in  January, 
54  votes  were  cast  for  Douglas  and  46  for  Lincoln. 
The  elections  generally  were  a  rebuke  to  the  ad 
ministration — as  was  of  course  the  victory  of  Doug 
las.  The  Republicans  carried  Pennsylvania,  the 
President's  own  State,  though  there  the  new  tariff 
and  the  financial  panic  had  their  effect.  New  York, 
Ohio,  and  Illinois  were  all  carried  by  the  Republicans, 
as  Douglas  had  predicted.  In  Indiana  the  head  of 
the  Democratic  ticket  was  elected  by  a  plurality 
of  only  2,851 ;  but  the  legislature  was  composed  of 
75  Republicans,  68  Democrats  and  7  anti-Lecomp- 
ton  men.  The  Republican  representation  in  the 
federal  Senate  rose  from  20  to  25,  and  that  of  the 
Democrats  from  38  to  39,  there  having  been  an 
increase  of  two  in  the  membership  of  the  body.  In 
the  new  House  of  Representatives  there  were  113 
Republicans  as  against  92  in  the  old;  and  93  ad 
ministration  and  8  anti-Lecompton  Democrats, 
whereas  in  the  old  House  there  had  been  116  ad 
ministration  and  11  anti-Lecompton  Democrats. 
The  defeat  was  not  serious  in  itself,  but  it  assuredly 
was  significant.  The  split  between  the  adminis 
tration  and  Douglas — the  recognized  leader  of  the 
Northern  Democrats — was  obvious.  As  to  the 
debate,  it  served  to  make  the  breach  wider,  brought 


THE  LINCOLN-DOUGLAS  DEBATE    327 

Lincoln  to  the  front  as  a  national  character — though 
this  was  not  at  once  realized — and  brought  the  whole 
question  of  slavery  before  the  country  in  such  a 
way  as  to  make  it  clear  to  most  thoughtful  men 
that  there  could  be  no  peace,  safety,  or  union  until 
it  was  disposed  of.  It  was  becoming  clearer  and 
clearer  that  "a  house  divided  against  itself  can  not 
stand/ '  and  that  the  nation  must  at  some  time  be 
come  all  slave  or  all  free.  Douglas  was  for  a  time 
the  hero  of  the  struggle.  The  honors  were  thought 
to  be  with  him,  partly  because  he  won  the  immediate 
prize,  and  partly  because  of  the  assumption  before 
the  debate  began  that  he  was  Lincoln's  master. 
Even  those  who  regretted  the  defeat  of  Lincoln 
took  comfort  in  the  thought  that  Douglas  would 
be  very  useful  as  an  instrument  for  the  destruction 
of  the  Democratic  party — as  proved  to  be  the  case. 
The  Republicans  were  very  glad  to  see  President 
Buchanan  rebuked  in  Illinois.  Douglas's  triumph 
was  personal.  His  rival  was  content.  He  said  of 
the  debate:  "It  gave  me  a  hearing  on  the  great 
and  durable  question  of  the  age  which  I  could  have 
had  in  no  other  way;  and  though  I  now  sink  out 
of  view  and  shall  be  forgotten,  I  believe  I  have  made 
some  marks  which  will  tell  for  the  cause  of  civil 
liberty  long  after  I  am  gone."  He  apparently  had 
no  thought  of  the  presidency,  though  the  idea  was 
in  the  minds  of  his  Illinois  friends.  But  the  men  of 
the  day  rated  Douglas  far  above  Lincoln. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
THE  GATHERING  STORM 

IN  the  closing  days  of  the  campaign  Mr.  Sew- 
ard  delivered  at  Rochester,  N.  Y.,  his  famous 
"irrepressible  conflict"  speech.  In  it  he  but  re 
stated  the  principle  enunciated  by  Mr.  Lincoln 
in  his  "House-divided-against-itself"  speech.  But 
what  Seward  said  carried  much  further,  since 
he  was  a  great  national  figure,  and  also  because 
he  spoke  with  an  eloquence  and  passion  not  shown 
by  Lincoln.  He  indicted  the  Democratic  party  as 
local  and  sectional,  deriving  its  power  wholly  from 
the  slave  States.  As  for  the  slavery  struggle,  he 
said  that  "it  is  an  irrepressible  conflict  between 
opposing  and  enduring  forces,  and  it  means  that 
the  United  States  must  and  will,  sooner  or  later, 
become  entirely  a  slaveholding  nation  or  entirely 
a  free-labor  nation."  Thus  the  two  men  who  were 
destined  less  than  two  years  later  to  contest  for 
the  Republican  nomination  for  the  presidency  stood 
on  the  same  platform.  Yet,  though  everything 
pointed  to  the  necessity  for  a  decision  of  the  issue, 
one  way  or  the  other,  there  were  many,  even  in 
the  Republican  party,  who  thought  that  the  solu 
tion  was  to  be  found  in  Douglas's  popular  sover- 


THE  GATHERING  STORM  329 

eignty,  and  there  were  not  a  few  who  favored 
nominating  Douglas  himself  as  the  Republican 
candidate  for  the  presidency.  Several  of  the  East 
ern  papers  thought  that  Seward's  speech  was  un 
wise.  With  Kansas  free,  and  with  no  other  disputes 
impending,  the  agitation  gradually  diminished,  and 
for  a  time  it  was  thought  that  the  election  of  1860 
might  be  fought  on  other  issues.  The  Southern 
men  were  not  so  shortsighted,  nor  were  they  at  any 
special  pains  to  conceal  their  views.  Shortly  after 
the  election  Douglas  made  a  tour  through  the  South. 
Though  his  object  was  recuperation,  he  could  not 
keep  clear  of  politics.  In  the  speeches  that  he  made 
he  clung  firmly  to  his  doctrine.  His  reception  was 
hardly  more  than  polite.  The  Southern  leaders 
and  people  could  not  be  made  to  believe  that  the 
local  authorities  might  exclude  slavery  from  terri 
tory  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  had  said  it  had 
a  right  to  exist.  It  was  with  slavery,  as  it  had  been 
for  several  years,  a  question  of  extending  or  dying. 
With  Seward  and  Lincoln  talking  of  an  "irrepres 
sible  conflict,"  and  Jefferson  Davis  saying  that 
"the  abolitionists  have  at  length  forced  upon  us 
a  knowledge  of  our  true  position,  and  compelled 
us  into  union,  a  union,  not  for  aggression,  but  for 
defense/'  there  was  not  much  reason  to  hope  longer 
for  a  peaceful  settlement.  Davis,  it  should  be  re 
membered,  regarded  most  Republicans,  and  Seward, 
Lincoln  and  Chase  in  particular,  as  abolitionists. 


330  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

After  a  brief  stay  in  Cuba — the  question  of  annex 
ing  the  island  was  to  come  before  Congress — Doug 
las  returned  to  this  country.  His  reception  in  New 
York  and  all  the  Eastern  cities  that  he  visited  was 
friendly  and  enthusiastic.  But  when  he  got  to 
Washington  he  found  that  he  had  been  deposed 
from  the  chairmanship  of  the  committee  on  Terri 
tories,  a  position  that  he  had  held  ever  since  he  en 
tered  the  Senate.  The  war  on  him  had  begun.  Just 
as  popular  sovereignty  seemed  to  be  so  firmly  estab 
lished,  it  became  necessary  to  deal  with  a  very  trouble 
some  situation  in  Utah  where  "  Governor  Young, "  to 
quote  from  the  President's  message,  "issued  his  proc 
lamation,  in  the  style  of  an  independent  sovereign,  an 
nouncing  his  purpose  to  resist  by  force  of  arms  the  en 
try  of  the  United  States  troops  into  our  own  territory 
of  Utah."  With  this  interesting  problem  we  have 
nothing  to  do,  except  as  it  is  related  to  Douglas. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  the  Cuban  question,  which 
the  President  discussed  at  considerable  length. 
There  were  the  usual  grievances,  some  of  which, 
Mr.  Buchanan  said,  were  enough  to  justify  war. 
There  was  hardly  a  Central  American  country, 
including  Mexico,  from  which,  according  to  the 
President,  we  had  not  suffered  wrongs.  The  mes 
sage  was  favorable  to  the  purchase  of  Cuba,  and 
to  the  establishment  of  a  protectorate  over  the 
Northern  States  of  Mexico.  All  this  territory  was, 
it  need  hardly  be  said,  looked  on  with  greedy  eyes  by 


THE  GATHERING  STORM  331 

the  slave-power.  In  1854,  our  ambassadors  to  France, 
GreatBritain  and  Spain— Mason, Buchanan  and  Soule 
— had  met  at  Ostend,  at  the  suggestion  of  President 
Pierce,  and  issued  the  famous  Ostend  Manifesto, 
which  was  simply  a  declaration  in  favor  of  stealing 
Cuba  if  Spain  refused  to  sell  it.  Now  the  question 
was  up  again.  Slidell  introduced  a  bill  appropriat 
ing  $30,000,000  as  an  advance  payment  to  be  made 
immediately  on  the  signature  of  a  treaty  with  Spain. 
It  was  charged  that  this  money  was  a  bribe  to  be 
used  in  corrupting  the  Spanish  officials — which  is 
quite  likely.  The  Southern  leaders  responded 
promptly  and  enthusiastically  to  the  President's 
recommendation,  though  they  must  have  been 
somewhat  puzzled  —  and  grieved  —  by  Mr.  Bu 
chanan's  statement  that  by  acquiring  Cuba  we 
should  be  better  able  to  suppress  the  slave-trade, 
as  that  island  was  "the  only  spot  in  the  civilized 
world  where  the  African  slave-trade  is  tolerated." 
However,  the  main  thing  was  to  "get"  Cuba. 
Before  the  introduction  of  this  Cuba-purchase  bill, 
Jefferson  Davis  had  presented  a  resolution  making 
it  the  duty  of  the  President  to  take  possession  of 
the  island  and  hold  it  till  certain  claims  were  paid, 
and  certain  unsettled  causes  of  complaint  against 
Spain  were  adjusted  by  her.  Douglas  supported 
the  bill.  As  he  had  long  favored  the  acquisition  of 
Cuba,  it  is  hardly  fair  to  say  that  he  was  prompted 
by  a  desire  to  conciliate  the  South  and  the  slavery 


332  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

interest,  though  that  was  charged  against  him.  His 
views  on  the  question  were  well  known,  and  had 
often  been  proclaimed.  However,  he  must  have 
seen  that  in  1859  Cuba  was  chiefly  desired  as  slave 
territory,  and  because  it  would  compensate  some 
what  for  the  loss  of  Kansas.  The  bill  failed,  as  did 
a  bill  granting  homesteads  to  actual  settlers,  the 
former  in  the  interest  of  slavery  and  the  latter  in 
the  interest  of  freedom.  During  the  course  of  an 
angry  debate,  in  which  the  two  bills  were  in  collision, 
Wade  of  Ohio  said,  in  answer  to  Toombs,  that  the 
question  was  "  Shall  we  give  niggers  to  the  niggerless 
or  land  to  the  landless?"  Addressing  the  South 
erners  directly,  he  said:  "When  you  come  to  nig 
gers  for  the  niggerless,  all  other  questions  sink 
into  perfect  insignificance."  Whatever  may  have 
been  Douglas's  motive  in  supporting  the  Cuba  bill, 
he  did  not  shrink  when  he  was  attacked  by  Brown 
and  Davis  of  Mississippi.  Brown  wanted  to  know 
whether  there  was  such  a  thing  as  the  right  of  pro 
tection  to  slave  property  in  the  Territories,  and  he 
repudiated  the  doctrine  of  squatter  sovereignty. 
Douglas  promptly  replied  that  there  was  none  as 
against  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  as  their  own 
lawmaking  power.  "I  know,"  he  said,  "that  some 
gentlemen  do  not  like  the  doctrine  of  non-inter 
vention  as  well  as  they  once  did.  It  is  now  becom 
ing  fashionable  to  talk  sneeringly  of  'your  doctrine 
of  non-intervention/  Sir,  that  doctrine  has  been 


THE  GATHERING  STORM  333 

fundamental  in  the  Democratic  creed  for  years." 
To  repudiate  it,  he  said,  was  to  repudiate  Democ 
racy.  "I  tell  you,  gentlemen  of  the  South,  in  all 
candor,"  he  continued,  "I  do  not  believe  a  Demo 
cratic  candidate  can  ever  carry  one  Democratic 
State  in  the  North  on  the  platform  that  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  federal  government  to  force  the  people 
of  a  territory  to  have  slavery  when  they  do  not 
want  it." 

Jefferson  Davis  followed  with  what  was  a  virtual 
declaration  of  war  on  Douglas.  "I  have  heard," 
he  said,  "many  a  siren's  song  on  this  doctrine  of 
non-intervention,  a  thing  shadowy,  fleeting,  chang 
ing  its  color  as  often  as  the  chameleon."  "I  trust," 
he  went  on,  "it  will  be  remembered  that  a  few  of 
us,  at  least,  have  stood  by  the  old  landmarks  of 
those  who  framed  the  Constitution  and  gave  us 
our  liberty;  that  we  claim  nothing  more  now  from 
the  government  than  the  men  who  formed  it  were 
willing  to  concede.  When  this  shall  become  an 
unpopular  doctrine,  when  men  are  to  lose  the  great 
States  of  the  North  by  announcing  it,  I  wish  it  to 
be  understood  that  my  vote  can  be  got  for  no  candi 
date  who  will  not  be  so  defeated."  What  Davis 
and  the  others  wanted  was  protection  for  slave 
property  wherever  carried.  It  was  no  longer  a  ques 
tion  of  not  interfering  with  slavery  in  the  States, 
or  of  the  denial  to  Congress  of  the  power  to  exclude 
it  from  the  Territories,  but  of  permitting  its  ex- 


334  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

tension  through  a  guaranteed  federal  protection. 
Douglas's  view  was  that  of  the  North — and  also 
that  of  the  men  of  the  South,  even  the  slavery  men, 
of  a  generation  before — while  the  Davis  view  was 
that  of  the  South,  and  was  solidly  supported  by 
the  South.  There  never  was  from  this  time  on  any 
chance  of  bridging  the  gap  between  the  Northern 
and  Southern  wing  of  the  Democratic  party.  In 
deed,  Douglas  showed  no  disposition  to  compromise 
— on  the  contrary  he  seemed  to  take  special  delight 
in  challenging  the  Southern  faction.  The  issue 
was  made  even  sharper  by  the  declaration  of  a  prom 
inent  editor  to  the  effect  that  there  was  a  large  party 
in  the  South  in  favor  of  a  limited  revival  of  the  slave- 
trade  as  indispensable  to  the  prosperity  of  that  sec 
tion.  "No  cause,"  said  this  man,  "has  ever  grown 
with  greater  rapidity  than  has  that  of  the  advocates 
of  the  slave-trade."  Later  a  Southern  convention 
meeting  at  Vicksburg  resolved  that  "all  laws,  State 
and  federal,  prohibiting  the  African  slave-trade, 
ought  to  be  repealed."  Indeed  this  trade  was  re 
vived  "in  a  limited  way."  The  crews  of  two  vessels 
engaged  in  this  traffic  were  indicted,  but  federal 
juries  refused  to  convict,  one  indeed  returning  a 
verdict  of  not  guilty.  There  was  no  sentiment  in 
favor  of  enforcing  the  law.  Douglas  is  reported  to 
have  said  in  a  private  conversation  that  fifteen  thou 
sand  negroes  had  been  imported  into  the  country 
within  the  last  year,  and  that  he  himself  had  seen 


THE  GATHERING  STORM  335 

"three  hundred  of  those  recently  imported  miserable 
beings  in  a  slave  pen  at  Vicksburg,  Miss.,  and  also 
large  numbers  at  Memphis,  Tenn."  Here  was  an 
other  issue  that  the  Illinois  senator  had  to  face, 
and  he  met  it  bravely.  In  a  letter  written  in  August, 
1859,  to  Colonel  John  L.  Peyton  of  Virginia,  he  said: 
"A  compromise  was  effected  and  incorporated  into 
the  Constitution  by  which  it  was  understood  that 
the  African  slave-trade  might  continue  a  legitimate 
commerce  in  those  States  whose  laws  sanctioned 
it  until  the  year  1808,  from  and  after  which  time 
Congress  might  and  would  prohibit  it  forever, 
throughout  the  dominion  and  limits  of  the  United 
States,  and  pass  all  laws  which  might  become  neces 
sary  to  make  such  prohibition  effectual.  The  har 
mony  of  the  convention  was  restored,  and  the  Union 
saved  by  this  compromise,  without  which  the  Con 
stitution  could  never  have  been  made.  I  stand 
firmly  by  this  compromise  and  by  all  the  other  com 
promises  of  the  Constitution,  and  shall  use  my  best 
efforts  to  carry  each  and  all  of  them  into  faithful 
execution,  in  the  sense  and  with  the  understanding 
in  which  they  were  originally  adopted.  In  accor 
dance  with  this  compromise,  I  am  irreconcilably 
opposed  to  the  revival  of  the  African  slave-trade, 
in  any  form  and  under  any  circumstances."  He 
was  even  more  positive  in  a  letter  to  J.  B.  Dorr, 
of  Iowa,  in  response  to  an  inquiry  as  to  whether  his 
name  would  be  presented  to  the  Charleston  con- 


336  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

vention  as  a  candidate  for  the  presidency.  After 
setting  out  what  seemed  to  be  the  true  Democratic 
doctrines,  he  said  that  if  the  convention  approved 
them  his  friends  would  be  at  liberty  to  present  his 
name.  Then  he  went  on:  "If,  on  the  contrary,  it 
shall  become  the  policy  of  the  Democratic  party — 
which  I  cannot  anticipate — to  repudiate  these, 
their  time-honored  principles,  on  which  we  have 
achieved  so  many  patriotic  triumphs,  and  if,  in 
lieu  of  them,  the  convention  shall  interpolate  into 
the  creed  of  the  party  such  new  issues  as  the  revival 
of  the  African  slave-trade,  or  a  congressional  slave 
code  for  the  Territories,  or  the  doctrine  that  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  either  establishes 
or  prohibits  slavery  in  the  Territories,  beyond  the 
power  of  the  people  legally  to  control  it  as  other 
property,  it  is  due  to  candor  to  say  that,  in  such 
an  event,  I  could  not  accept  the  nomination  if  ten 
dered  to  me."  This  letter  created  a  most  favorable 
impression  throughout  the  North,  but  it  served 
still  further  to  alienate  the  South.  For  the  purpose 
of  further  commending  non-intervention  to  the 
North  Douglas  contributed  a  long  discussion  of  it 
to  Harper's  Magazine  of  September,  1859.  There 
was  nothing  new  in  it.  But  the  interested  reader 
will  find  in  it  a  clear,  painstaking,  and  moderate 
statement  of  Douglas's  views.  The  article  was 
really  an  argument  against  the  Southern  theory, 
and  the  author  pointed  out  that  if  that  theory 


THE  GATHERING  STORM  337 

should  prevail  there  would  indeed  be  an  "irrepres 
sible  conflict/7  and  a  "house  divided  against  it 
self."  The  article  produced  a  great  sensation,  and 
called  forth  a  reply  from  Attorney-General  Black. 
A  war  of  pamphlets  followed  that  accomplished 
little  except  to  add  bitterness  to  the  controversy. 
After  reading  this  discussion,  in  which  the  best 
possible  case  was  made  for  the  Douglas  doctrine, 
Lincoln  said:  "Douglas's  popular  sovereignty,  as 
a  matter  of  principle,  simply  is:  'If  one  man  would 
enslave  another,  neither  that  other  nor  any  third 
man  has  a  right  to  object.7' 

Many  times  Douglas  was  compelled  to  make  his 
position  clear — perhaps  it  would  be  fairer  to  say 
that  he  willingly  did  so.  In  the  course  of  his 
debate  in  February  with  Davis  he  was  asked 
whether  he  had  not  favored  and  advised  federal 
intervention  in  Utah,  and  whether  that  was  not  in 
violation  of  popular  sovereignty.  He  was  able  to 
refer  to  a  speech  delivered  almost  two  years  before 
in  which  he  had  differentiated — or  attempted  to 
do  so — between  the  case  of  Kansas  and  that  of 
Utah.  Briefly  his  theory  was  that  in  dealing  with 
Utah,  we  had  to  do  with  what  was  virtually  a 
foreign  power,  since  most  of  its  people  were  aliens, 
bound  by  oath  to  support  the  government  of 
Brigham  Young  as  against  the  United  States,  and 
in  revolt  against  the  government  of  the  nation.  So 
he  would  repeal  the  organic  act  creating  it  a  Tern- 


338  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

tory.  But  he  admitted  that  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
act  might  also  be  repealed,  though  that  was  based 
on  an  agreement  that  the  question  as  to  the  constitu 
tionality  of  property  in  slaves  should  be  referred  to 
the  Supreme  Court.  As  to  Utah  he  said  that  if  evi 
dence  "shall  establish  the  facts  which  are  believed  to 
exist  it  will  become  the  duty  of  Congress  to  apply  the 
knife  and  cut  out  this  loathsome,  disgusting  ulcer." 
If  the  people  had  all  been  citizens,  living  under  a 
constitution  of  their  own  framing,  and  loyal  to  the 
United  States,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  we  could  have 
intervened  against  polygamy  without  denying  to 
the  people  the  right  to  order  their  domestic  affairs 
as  they  pleased — which  was  the  essence  of  popular 
sovereignty.  Douglas  had  reached  the  point  where 
he  was  unwilling  to  force  slavery  on  the  Terri 
tories,  or  to  allow  it  to  recruit  itself  by  a  revival  of 
the  slave-trade.  As  far  as  he  was  concerned,  there 
were  to  be  no  "niggers  for  the  niggerless"  brought 
from  overseas.  The  October  elections  of  1859 
were  generally  favorable  to  the  Republicans.  Be 
fore  the  November  elections,  namely  on  October 
17,  came  John  Brown's  raid  which  resulted  in 
the  capture  of  the  United  States  arsenal  at  Har 
pers  Ferry.  Here  was  more  trouble  for  the  poli 
ticians.  The  Republicans  were  quick  to  disclaim 
all  responsibility  for  it,  or  any  part  in  it.  The 
Democrats,  on  the  other  hand,  saw  in  it  nothing 
but  "Black  Republicanism."  The  story  need  not 


THE  GATHERING  STORM  339 

be  told  here.  Brown  was  captured  and  executed. 
The  best  statement  of  the  case  is  that  of  Francis 
Lieber :  "  Brown  died  like  a  man,  and  Virginia  fretted 
like  an  old  woman.  The  deed  was  irrational,  but 
it  will  be  historical.  Virginia  has  come  out  of  it 
damaged,  I  think.  She  has  forced  upon  mankind 
the  idea  that  slavery  must  be,  in  her  own  opinion, 
but  a  rickety  thing."  The  main  concern  of  men 
active  in  public  affairs  was  as  to  the  effect  of  the 
raid  on  the  elections.  The  Republicans  feared  that 
the  Democrats  would  make  capital  out  of  it,  as 
they  certainly  tried  to  do.  However,  the  Repub 
licans  made  large  gains.  In  New  York  they  elected 
most  of  their  State  ticket.  New  England  was  solidly 
Republican.  The  Republicans  carried  Ohio,  Penn 
sylvania,  and  Iowa.  The  Democrats  lost  even 
Maryland  to  the  "Opposition,"  as  they  did  New 
Jersey.  Indeed,  there  was  an  opposition  in  several 
Southern  States  strong  enough  to  defeat  the  Demo 
crats.  Minnesota  and  Wisconsin  returned  Republi 
can  pluralities,  while  the  Democrats  were  successful 
in  Nebraska,  Oregon,  and  California.  When  Con 
gress  met,  December  5,  1859,  John  Brown  had  been 
dead  three  days,  having  been  hanged  for  treason  on 
December  2.  The  North  was  greatly  stirred  by 
the  affair,  which  probably  had  as  much  to  do  as 
"Uncle  Tom's  Cabin"  with  rousing  the  fighting 
spirit — if  not  a  good  deal  more.  Helper's  book, 
The  Impending  Crisis,  and  especially  its  indorse- 


340  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

ment  by  leading  Republicans,  served  still  further  to 
inflame  public  sentiment.  The  comment  of  the 
President,  in  his  message,  was  as  follows:  "I  shall 
not  refer  in  detail  to  the  recent  sad  and  bloody 
occurrences  at  Harpers  Ferry.  Still  it  is  proper 
to  observe  that  these  events,  however  bad  and 
cruel  in  themselves,  derive  their  chief  importance 
from  the  apprehension  that  they  are  but  symp 
toms  of  an  incurable  disease  in  the  public  mind, 
which  may  break  out  in  still  more  dangerous  out 
rages  and  terminate  at  last  in  an  open  war  by  the 
North  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  South."  It  is  in 
this  message,  by  the  way,  that  the  familiar  words 
"old  public  functionary"  occur.  But  if  the  "dis 
ease"  were  indeed,  as  the  President  said,  "incur 
able"  one  cannot  readily  understand  how  he 
expected,  as  he  said  he  did,  the  agitation  to  cease. 
During  this  session  of  Congress,  Douglas  was 
beset  by  enemies  from  every  side.  It  was  to  the 
Southern  senators,  however,  that  he  devoted  most 
of  his  attention.  The  doctrine  of  his  Freeport  speech 
was  under  constant  attack.  Practically  the  only 
question  discussed  was  slavery.  The  situation  was 
grave,  and  more  threatening  in  the  country  as  a 
whole  than  in  Congress.  Perhaps  both  sides  had 
begun  to  realize  that  the  nation  was  indeed  facing 
an  "irrepressible  conflict."  Douglas  spoke  many 
times  in  the  Senate.  In  response  to  the  taunts  of 
the  Southern  senators  he  said:  "I  am  not  seeking 


THE  GATHERING  STORM  341 

a  nomination.  I  am  willing  to  take  one  provided  I 
can  assume  it  on  principles  that  I  believe  to  be 
sound;  but  in  the  event  of  your  making  a  platform 
that  I  could  not  conscientiously  execute  in  good 
faith  if  I  were  elected,  I  will  not  stand  upon  it  and 
be  a  candidate.  ...  I  have  no  grievances,  but  I 
have  no  concessions.  I  have  no  abandonment  of 
position  or  principles;  no  recantation  to  make  to 
any  body  of  men  on  earth."  Davis  spoke  in  his 
usual  arrogant  style  in  support  of  resolutions  offered 
by  him  demanding  federal  protection  for  slave  prop 
erty  in  the  Territories.  The  time  had  gone  by 
for  conciliation.  Yet  another  attempt  was  made, 
this  time  by  Abraham  Lincoln  in  his  great  Cooper 
Union  speech  on  February  27,  1860.  That  served 
to  bring  Lincoln  before  the  country  even  more 
than  had  his  debate  with  Douglas.  The  speech 
was  a  vindication  of  the  Republican  position, 
and  also  a  plea  for  harmony  and  good-will.  It 
has  been  said  that  Douglas  waged  war  on  both 
factions.  As  there  were  no  concessions  to  the 
Southern  leaders,  there  were  none  to  the  Repub 
licans.  On  January  16  he  introduced  a  resolution 
instructing  the  judiciary  committee  to  report  a 
bill  "for  the  protection  of  each  State  and  Territory 
of  the  Union  against  invasion  by  the  authorities 
or  inhabitants  of  any  other  State  or  Territory;  and 
for  the  suppression  and  punishment  of  conspiracies 
or  combinations  in  any  State  or  Territory  with  in- 


342  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

tent  to  invade,  assail,  or  molest  the  government, 
inhabitants,  property  or  institutions  of  any  State 
or  Territory  of  the  Union."  Of  course,  this  reso 
lution  was  prompted  by  the  John  Brown  raid.  A 
week  later  Douglas  spoke  at  length  in  its  behalf. 
The  governor  of  Virginia  had  in  the  preceding  Oc 
tober  asked  for  federal  troops  to  protect  the  State 
against  conspiracies  that  had,  as  he  said,  been  formed 
in  other  States  to  rescue  John  Brown.  "I  am  at 
a  loss,"  replied  the  President,  "to  discover  any  pro 
vision  of  the  Constitution  or  laws  of  the  United 
States  which  would  authorize  me  to  Hake  steps' 
for  this  purpose."  So  Douglas  proposed  legislation 
to  remedy  the  defect. 

That  there  should  be  such  power  in  the  federal 
government  is  of  course  clear,  and  on  this  point 
Douglas  argued  with  great  force,  winning  the  ap 
proval  of  such  Republicans  as  Senator  Fessenden, 
who  said:  "I  stated,  and  I  believe  it  was  all  I  said 
on  that  matter,  that  I  was  disposed  to  agree  with 
the  senator  in  his  views  as  to  the  question  of  power; 
and  that,  with  my  views,  I  should  go  very  far — far 
enough  to  accomplish  the  purpose — to  prevent  the 
forming  of  conspiracies  in  one  State  to  attack  an 
other."  Douglas,  however,  had  broadened  his  de 
mand  so  as  to  include  the  prevention  of  conspiracies 
to  "run  off"  slaves,  thus  bringing  up  the  question  of 
the  fugitive-slave  law.  He  charged  that  the  Brown 
raid  was  the  direct  result  of  Republican  teaching, 


THE  GATHERING  STORM  343 

a  charge  that  was  resented  by  the  Republican  sena 
tors.  There  was  a  glimmer  of  irritation  in  Doug 
las's  reply  to  Fessenden's  reference  to  the  declara 
tion  of  the  Illinois  senator  that  he  did  not  care 
whether  the  people  "voted  slavery  up  or  down"; 
perhaps  the  moral  phase  of  the  question  was  be 
ginning  to  dawn  on  him.  Yet  he  refused  to  go  be 
yond  his  old  position  of  indifference.  He  said:  "I 
say  this:  if  the  people  of  Kansas  want  a  slave  State, 
it  is  their  business  and  not  mine;  if  they  want  a  free 
State,  they  have  a  right  to  have  it;  and  hence  I  do 
not  care,  so  far  as  regards  my  action,  whether  they 
make  it  a  free  State  or  not;  it  is  none  of  my  busi 
ness.  But  the  senator  says  he  does  care,  he  has  a 
preference  between  freedom  and  slavery.  How  long 
would  this  preference  last  if  he  was  a  sugar-planter 
in  Louisiana,  residing  on  his  estate,  instead  of  living 
in  Maine  ?  Sir,  I  hold  the  doctrine  that  a  wise  states 
man  will  adapt  his  laws  to  the  wants,  conditions  and 
interests  of  the  people  to  be  governed  by  them. 
Slavery  may  be  very  essential  in  one  climate  and 
totally  useless  in  another.  If  I  were  a  citizen  of 
Louisiana  I  would  vote  for  retaining  and  maintain 
ing  slavery,  because  I  believe  the  good  of  the  people 
would  require  it.  As  a  citizen  of  Illinois  I  am  ut 
terly  opposed  to  it,  because  our  interests  would 
not  be  promoted  by  it.  ...  I  have  said  and  repeat 
that  this  question  of  slavery  is  one  of  climate,  of 
political  economy,  of  self-interest,  not  a  question 


344  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

of  legislation.  Wherever  the  climate,  the  soil,  the 
health  of  the  country  are  such  that  it  cannot  be 
cultivated  by  white  labor,  you  will  have  African 
labor,  and  compulsory  labor  at  that.  Wherever 
white  labor  can  be  employed  cheapest  and  most 
profitably,  there  African  labor  will  retire  and  white 
labor  will  take  its  place.  .  .  .  But  the  senator  thinks 
it  a  great  crime  for  me  to  say  that  I  do  not  care 
whether  they  have  it  or  not.  I  care  just  this  far:  I 
want  every  people  to  have  that  kind  of  government, 
that  system  of  laws,  that  class  of  institutions  which 
will  best  promote  then*  welfare,  and  I  want  them 
to  decide  for  themselves;  and  so  that  they  decide  it 
to  suit  themselves,  I  am  satisfied,  without  stopping 
to  inquire  or  caring  which  way  they  decide  it.  That 
is  what  I  meant  by  that  declaration,  and  I  am  ready 
to  stand  by  it."  By  this  time  the  country  had  swung 
past  this  principle.  Lincoln  had  showed  that  it 
could  mean  only  that  for  all  practical  purposes  the 
right  was  what  the  people  had  established.  If  the 
people  of  Kansas  had  adopted  polygamy  Douglas 
would  have  been  bound  by  his  principle  to  let  them 
have  their  way.  The  speech  is  important  now  only 
as  showing  that  on  the  very  eve  of  the  national  con 
ventions  the  Illinois  senator  was  still  unwilling  to 
pass  judgment  on  slavery.  It  was  still  a  mere  matter 
of  " political  economy."  Looking  back  on  those 
times  one  cannot  but  marvel  that  Douglas  was  able 
to  maintain  his  absolute  neutrality  so  long. 


CHAPTER  XV 
DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT 

CHARLESTON  had  four  years  before  been  selected 
as  the  place  for  the  meeting  of  the  Democratic  con 
vention.  It  assembled  on  Monday,  April  23.  The 
preliminary  skirmishes  revealed  that  there  were 
differences  that  were  almost  certain  to  prove  irrec 
oncilable.  Douglas  had  a  practically  solid  backing 
|  from  the  West  and  Northwest.  On  January  4  the 
State  Convention  of  Illinois  had  met,  elected  dele 
gates  to  the  Charleston  convention,  instructed  them 
for  Douglas,  and  adopted  his  slavery  programme. 
Later  Ohio,  Indiana,  Wisconsin,  Iowa,  Minnesota, 
and  Michigan  fell  into  line.  In  other  States  in  which 
prevailed  the  custom  of  choosing  delegates  by  dis 
tricts,  similar  resolutions,  and  instructions  for  Doug 
las,  were  adopted.  The  struggle  was  plainly  between 
the  South  and  the  Northwest.  New  York,  Pennsyl 
vania,  New  Jersey,  and  even  Tennessee,  proclaimed 
the  Douglas  doctrine,  though  they  did  not  instruct. 
When  the  delegates  met  they  soon  learned  that,  as 
far  as  the  platform  was  concerned,  the  choice  was 
between  Douglas's  non-intervention  policy  and  Jef 
ferson  Davis's  resolutions  that  had  been  offered  in 
the  Senate  calling  for  protection  for  slavery  in  the 

345 


346  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Territories  against  unfriendly  local  legislation. 
There  was  a  feeling  —  soon  dispelled  —  that  the 
Northern  Democrats  would  again  yield,  as  they 
had  so  often  yielded  in  the  past.  But  the  North 
west  was  a  new,  and  most  determined,  factor.  It 
was  devoted  to  Douglas,  and  with  good  reason. 
Moreover,  the  Northern  men  knew  that  it  would 
be  impossible  to  carry  a  single  Northern  State  on 
the  Davis  platform.  As  the  Southern  leaders  had 
made  up  their  mind  to  break  up  the  Union  if  they 
could  not  have  their  way,  there  was  no  reason  to 
look  for  any  concessions  from  them. 

What  made  the  situation  worse  was  the  bitter 
feeling  of  the  South  against  Douglas  personally. 
The  leaders  from  that  section  demanded  not  only 
a  platform  that  would  express  their  views,  but  one 
on  which  Douglas  could  not  possibly  stand.  A  year 
before  Douglas  had  in  the  Senate  warned  Davis 
and  the  others  that  no  "Democratic  candidate  can 
ever  carry  any  one  Democratic  State  of  the  North 
on  the  platform  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  federal  gov 
ernment  to  force  the  people  of  a  Territory  to  have 
slavery  when  they  do  not  want  it."  "When  this/' 
replied  Davis,  "shall  become  an  unpopular  doc 
trine,  when  men  are  to  lose  great  States  of  the  North 
by  announcing  it,  I  wish  to  be  understood  that  my 
vote  can  be  got  for  no  candidate  who  will  not  be 
so  defeated."  Popular  sovereignty  was  as  hateful 

men  of  this  class  as  "Black  Republicanism"  it- 


DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT  347 

self,  and  Douglas  was  as  much  disliked  as  Seward. 
With  the  help  of  Oregon  and  California  the  South 
controlled  the  committee  on  resolutions,  though  it 
did  not  control  the  convention.  Having  seventeen 
States  out  of  thirty-three,  the  South  elected  the 
chairman,  Caleb  Gushing  of  Massachusetts.  After 
deliberating  for  five  days  the  resolutions  committee 
reported  two  platforms,  that  of  the  majority  being 
practically  a  reaffirmation  of  the  Davis  resolutions, 
which  were  themselves  nothing  more  than  a  reaf- 
j  firmation  of  the  old  Calhoun  doctrine  of  the  na 
tionalization  of  slavery.  The  minority  report — that 
made  by  the  Douglas  members — was  simply  an  in 
dorsement  of  the  Cincinnati  platform  of  four  years 
before.  After  another  attempt  at  reconciliation,  the 
convention  by  a  vote  of  165  to  138  adopted  the 
Douglas  platform.  Only  twelve  Southern  delegates 
voted  for  it,  and  only  thirty  Northern  delegates 
against  it.  In  the  discussion  of  the  platform,  Yancey 
of  Mississippi  at  last  stated  with  frankness  the 
Southern  view.  Addressing  the  Northern,  or  Doug 
las,  delegates,  he  said:  "You  acknowledged  that 
slavery  did  not  exist  by  the  law  of  nature  or  by  the 
law  of  God — that  it  existed  only  by  State  law;  that 
it  was  wrong,  but  that  you  were  not  to  blame.  That 
was  your  position,  and  it  was  wrong.  If  you  had 
taken  the  position  directly  that  slavery  was  right 
and  therefore  ought  to  be  you  would  have  triumphed, 
and  antislavery  would  now  have  been  dead  in  your 


348  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

midst.  But  you  have  gone  down  before  the  enemy 
so  that  they  have  put  their  foot  upon  your  neck; 
you  will  go  lower  and  lower  still,  unless  you  change 
front  and  change  your  tactics.  When  I  was  a  school 
boy  in  the  Northern  States  abolitionists  were  pelted 
with  rotten  eggs.  But  now  this  band  of  abolitionists 
has  spread  and  grown  into  three  bands — the  Black 
Republican,  the  Free-Soilers,  and  squatter-sover 
eignty  men — all  representing  the  common  sentiment 
that  slavery  is  wrong.  I  say  it  in  no  disrespect,  but 
it  is  a  logical  argument  that  your  admission  that 
slavery  is  wrong  has  been  the  cause  of  all  this  dis 
cord."  Having  all  his  life  refused  to  say  that  slavery 
was  wrong,  Douglas  and  his  friends  were  now  asked 
to  say  that  it  was  right,  and  that  it  existed  "by  the 
law  of  nature  or  the  law  of  God."  And  they  re 
fused.  "Gentlemen  of  the  South,"  said  Pugh,  of 
Ohio,  "you  mistake  us — you  mistake  us;  we  will 
never  do  it."  On  the  adoption  of  the  Douglas  plat 
form  the  Alabama  delegation  withdrew  from  the 
convention.  It  was  announced  that  Mississippi, 
Louisiana,  South  Carolina,  Florida,  Texas,  and 
Arkansas  would  also  secede.  After  taking  57  bal 
lots,  on  the  last  of  which  Douglas  received  145  y* 
votes — 202  being  necessary  to  a  choice — the  con 
vention  on  May  3  adjourned  to  meet  again  in 
Baltimore  on  June  18.  The  seceders,  after  adopt 
ing  a  platform,  adjourned  to  meet  in  Richmond  on 
June  11.  They  met,  and  again  adjourned  to  re- 


DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT  349 

assemble  in  Baltimore  the  same  day  as  the  regular 
convention,  June  18.  In  the  interval  the  Senate 
•  jwas  busy  with  the  slavery  question.  It  adopted 
the  Davis  resolutions — which  were  the  platform  of 
the  slavery  convention — by  a  decided  majority,  both 
Northern  and  Southern  Democrats  voting  for  them, 
ywith  the  exception  of  Pugh,  of  Ohio,  and  Douglas, 
who  was  not  present.  The  discussion  in  the  Senate, 
in  which  Douglas  and  Davis  were  the  leaders,  was 
marked  by  great  bitterness.  There  was  no  yield 
ing  on  the  part  of  the  Illinois  senator.  He  charged 
his  opponents,  Yancey  in  particular,  with  a  purpose 
to  break  up  the  Union,  and  said  that  such  would 
be  the  inevitable  effect  of  their  doctrines.  Davis 
was  more  arrogant  and  offensive  than  usual,  de 
scending  to  personalities,  as  when  he  referred  to 
Douglas's  "swelling  manner"  and  "egregious  van 
ity."  While  this  futile  debate  was  going  on  the 
Republicans  were  engaged  in  the  business  of  nominat 
ing  Abraham  Lincoln  for  the  presidency.  Hamlin 
of  Maine  was  nominated  for  the  vice-presidency. 
The  platform  was  shrewdly  drawn.  It  declared 
for  the  Union  and  State  rights;  denounced  the  John 
Brown  raid  as  "among  the  gravest  of  crimes";  con 
demned  the  administration,  and  especially  its  forc 
ing  a  Constitution  on  Kansas;  denied  that  the 
Constitution  carried  slavery  into  the  Territories,  or 
that  Congress  could  give  it  legal  existence  there; 
condemned  popular  sovereignty;  and  of  course  de- 


350  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

clared  strongly  against  the  revival  of  the  slave- 
trade.  It  was,  in  short,  a  moderate,  or  Lincoln,  plat 
form. 

When  the  two  Democratic  conventions  met,  the 
delegates  realized  that  there  was  imperative  need 
for  unity  in  order  to  avoid  the  election  of  a  "Black 
Republican."  Some  of  the  seceders  were  willing 
to  return,  the  anti-Douglas  men  favoring  their  ad 
mission,  arid  indeed  claiming  that  they  could  not 
be  excluded.  This  was  opposed  by  the  majority 
of  the  convention.  Contesting  Douglas  delegations 
appeared  from  Alabama  and  Louisiana,  and  were 
admitted.  This  action  started  a  new  secession, 
Virginia,  and  most  of  the  delegates  from  Ten 
nessee,  Kentucky,  Maryland,  and  North  Carolina 
retiring.  Douglas,  realizing  that  the  fight  was 
specially  directed  against  him,  twice  offered  to  with 
draw  his  name,  provided  his  platform  stood,  and 
a  "non-intervention,  Union-loving  man"  be  nomi 
nated.  The  men  to  whom  these  communications 
were  sent,  rightly  judging  that  Douglas  and  the 
platform  were  inseparable,  suppressed  them.  Caleb 
Gushing,  the  chairman,  having  gone  over  to  the 
seceders,  was  succeeded  by  David  Tod  of  Ohio. 
On  the  second  ballot,  which  was  taken  June  23, 
Douglas  received  all  the  votes  cast  except  thirteen, 
and  was  declared  the  nominee  of  the  party.  Senator 
Fitzpatrick  of  Alabama  was  nominated  for  vice- 
president.  When  he  later  declined,  the  national 


DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT  351 

committee  substituted  Herschel  V.  Johnson  of 
Georgia.  The  seceders  nominated  John  C.  Brecken- 
ridge  for  president,  and  Joseph  Lane  of  Oregon  for 
vice-president.  The  old  Whigs  and  Americans  had, 
on  May  9,  met  at  Baltimore  and  nominated  John 
Bell  of  Tennessee  for  president,  and  Edward  Everett 
of  Massachusetts  for  vice-president.  If  the  Re 
publican  party  was,  as  had  been  charged,  sectional, 
there  were  now  two  Democratic  parties,  each  of 
which  was  sectional.  The  line  that  was  later  to 
divide  the  Union,  until  it  was  washed  out  in  blood, 
now  divided  the  Democratic  party.  It  was  the 
first  victim  of  the  secession  and  disunion  spirit. 
In  the  campaign  that  followed  Douglas  was  easily 
the  leading  figure.  He  was  the  first  candidate— 
unless  we  except  General  Scott — to  make  a  speak 
ing  tour.  He  spoke  in  every  section  of  the  country. 
Almost  from  the  outset  of  the  campaign  Lincoln's 
election  seemed  to  be  assured.  In  September  Doug 
las  said  that  Lincoln  would  be  elected.  The  chief 
argument  against  the  Republicans,  and  it  had  weight, 
was  that  if  their  candidate  were  chosen  secession 
would  follow.  But  men  had  made  up  their  minds 
that  the  time  had  come  to  settle  the  issue.  There 
had  been  threats  of  secession  before,  and  the  more 
optimistic  refused  to  be  terrified.  Probably  most 
Northerners  were  sceptical.  So  though  some  were 
influenced  by  the  argument,  it  was,  on  the  whole, 
not  convincing.  For  a  time  Douglas  was  hopeful, 


352  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

apparently  honestly  so.  Soon,  however,  it  developed 
that  he  was  losing  votes  to  Lincoln — and  in  some 
cases  to  Bell — in  the  North,  and  to  Breckenridge  in 
the  South.  There  were  attempts  at  fusion,  some 
of  them  successful,  as  far  as  local  candidates  were 
concerned,  though  they  were  opposed  by  Douglas. 
He  continued  his  campaign,  and  with  increasing 
vigor,  long  after  he  was  practically  certain  that  he 
would  be  beaten.  His  purpose  undoubtedly  was 
to  prepare  the  people,  particularly  those  of  the  South, 
for  the  election  of  Lincoln,  and  to  prevent  secession. 
When  it  was  suggested  that  he,  and  the  other  Demo 
cratic  candidates  withdraw,  in  order  that  another 
might  be  nominated  who  would  unite  the  party, 
he  said  that  he  was  "in  the  hands  of  his  friends," 
but  declared  that  the  plan  was  not  practical,  as 
the  result  would  be  to  throw  his  support  in  the  North 
to  Mr.  Lincoln.  Wherever  he  spoke  he  drew  large 
and  enthusiastic  crowds.  At  Norfolk,  Va.,  on  Au 
gust  25,  he  was  asked  whether  the  election  of  Lin 
coln  would  justify  the  South  in  seceding  from  the 
Union.  "To  this,"  said  Douglas,  "I  emphatically 
answer  no.  The  election  of  a  man  to  the  presidency 
by  the  American  people  in  conformity  with  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States  would  not  justify 
any  attempt  at  dissolving  this  glorious  confederacy." 
When  asked  whether  he  would  advise  resistance  to 
secession,  he  answered,  in  the  spirit  of  Andrew  Jack 
son:  "I  answer  emphatically  that  it  is  the  duty  of 


DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT  353 

the  President  of  the  United  States  and  of  all  others 
in  authority  under  him,  to  enforce  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  passed  by  Congress  and  as  the  courts 
expound  them;  and  I,  as  in  duty  bound  by  my  oath 
of  fidelity  to  the  Constitution,  would  do  all  in  my 
power  to  aid  the  government  of  the  United  States 
in  maintaining  the  supremacy  of  the  laws  against 
all  resistance  to  them,  come  from  whatever  quarter 
it  might.  .  .  .  The  mere  inauguration  of  a  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States,  whose  political  opinions 
were,  in  my  judgment,  hostile  to  the  Constitution 
and  safety  of  the  Union,  without  an  overt  act  on 
his  part,  without  striking  a  blow  at  our  institutions 
or  our  rights,  is  not  such  a  grievance  as  would  justify 
revolution  or  secession."  In  North  Carolina  he 
talked  in  the  same  strain,  saying  that  he  "would 
hang  every  man  higher  than  Haman  who  would 
attempt  to  resist  by  force  the  execution  of  any  pro 
vision  of  the  Constitution  which  our  fathers  made 
and  bequeathed  to  us."  He  then  journeyed  to 
the  Northwest,  and  every  day  he  made  it  clearer 
that  he  was  animated,  not  by  personal  ambition, 
•but  by  deep  love  for  the  Union.  Better  than  any 
other  man  except  those  who  were  plotting  its 
overthrow  he  realized  the  danger.  "It  is  not," 
he  said,  "personal  ambition  that  has  induced  me 
Ho  take  the  stump  this  year.  I  say  to  you  who 
know  me  that  the  presidency  has  no  charms  for 
me.  I  do  not  believe  that  it  is  my  interest  as  an 


354  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

ambitious  man  to  be  President  this  year  if  I  could. 
But  I  do  love  this  Union.  There  is  no  sacrifice  on 
earth  that  I  would  not  make  to  preserve  it."  Hear 
ing  that  the  October  States,  Pennsylvania  and  In 
diana,  had  been  carried  by  the  Republicans,  he  said : 
"Mr.  Lincoln  is  elected  President.  We  must  try 
to  save  the  Union.  I  will  go  South."  And  go  South 
he  did.  He  faced  threats  of  personal  violence,  al 
ways  speaking  for  the  Union  and  against  secession. 
He  was  denounced  as  "a  regular  old  John  Adams 
federalist  and  consolidationist."  His  friends,  among 
them  Senator  Clingman,  warned  him  of  his  danger. 
But  he  kept  on  in  spite  of  everything.  At  Balti 
more  he  anticipated — and  denounced — the  Con 
federate  doctrine,  later  formulated,  and  no  doubt 
still  held  by  some  men:  "States  that  secede  cannot 
screen  themselves  under  the  pretense  that  resis 
tance  to  their  acts  'would  be  making  war  upon  sover 
eign  States.'  Sovereign  States  cannot  commit  trea 
son.  In  my  opinion  there  is  a  mature  plan  through 
the  Southern  States  to  break  up  the  Union.  I  be 
lieve  the  election  of  a  Black  Republican  is  to  be  the 
signal  for  that  attempt,  and  that  the  leaders  of  the 
scheme  desire  the  election  of  Lincoln  so  as  to  have 
an  excuse  for  disunion."  The  results  in  Maine  and 
Vermont,  and  in  the  October  States  foreshadowed 
the  election  of  Lincoln.  Douglas  was  in  the  South 
when  the  news  of  the  Republican  victory  reached 
them.  He  continued  his  speech-making,  his  pur- 


DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT  355 

pose  now  being  to  urge  the  people  to  accept  the 
verdict.  This  was  the  message  he  delivered  at  Vicks- 
burg.  In  the  same  strain  he  wrote  to  the  business 
men  of  New  Orleans.  Lincoln  received  180  electoral 
votes,  Douglas  12,  Breckenridge  72,  and  Bell  39. 
Douglas  carried  but  one  State — Missouri — and  in 
addition  got  3  votes  from  New  Jersey.  Lincoln 
carried  every  free  State  but  New  Jersey,  from  which 
he  got  4  votes.  The  popular  vote  was  Lincoln 
1,857,610;  Douglas  1,291,574;  Breckenridge  850,- 
082;  Bell  646,124.  The  combined  Democratic  vote 
exceeded  that  cast  for  Lincoln  by  930,170.  In  the 
slave  States  Breckenridge  lacked  135,057  of  a  ma 
jority.  Even  in  the  Gulf  States,  where  there  was  a 
poll  of  330,000,  Breckenridge's  majority  was  a  bare 
14,000.  Douglas  and  Bell,  both  of  whom  were  for  the 
Union,  polled  690,000  votes  between  them  as  against 
561,000  for  Breckenridge.  Even  in  the  South,  there 
fore,  the  Union  sentiment  was  triumphant.  The 
immediate  problem  confronting  the  country,  and 
the  President-elect,  was  one  of  preventing  secession, 
and  of  holding  together  all  who  were  opposed  to  it, 
or  might  be  influenced  to  oppose  it.  Mr.  Lincoln 
was  altogether  conciliatory.  In  a  speech  at  a  meet 
ing  held  at  Galena  November  20,  to  celebrate  the 
Republican  victory,  he  said:  "In  all  our  rejoicings 
let  us  neither  express  nor  cherish  any  hard  feelings 
toward  any  citizen  who  by  his  vote  has  differed 
with  us.  Let  us  at  all  times  remember  that  all  Amer- 


356  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

ican  citizens  are  brothers  of  a  common  country,  and 
should  dwell  together  in  the  bonds  of  fraternal  feel 
ing."  But,  though  he  showed  an  entire  reasonable 
ness  of  spirit,  and  made  many  concessions,  it  be 
came  evident  that  he  was  of  the  opinion  that  there 
could  be  no  compromise  on  the  slavery  question. 
But  what  he  proposed  to  exclude  from  compromise 
was,  not  slavery,  but  "the  extension  of  slavery." 
This  he  made  clear  in  a  letter  to  Alexander  H. 
Stephens,  written  December  22,  1860.  By  this  time 
South  Carolina  had  seceded,  and  that  action,  taken 
on  December  20,  raised  an  issue  more  important  than 
any  question  in  regard  to  slavery — the  question, 
namely,  whether  there  really  was  such  a  thing  as 
the  government  of  the  United  States.  This  is  made 
clear  in  a  letter  written  by  Lincoln  to  J.  T.  Hale, 
of  Springfield,  111.,  January  11,  1861:  "We  have 
just  carried  an  election  on  principles  fairly  stated 
to  the  people.  Now  we  are  told  in  advance  the 
government  shall  be  broken  up  unless  we  surrender 
to  those  we  have  beaten,  before  we  take  the  offices. 
In  this  they  are  either  attempting  to  play  upon  us 
or  they  are  in  dead  earnest.  Either  way,  if  we  sur 
render,  it  is  the  end  of  us  and  of  the  government." 
It  is  important  that  the  attitude  of  Mr.  Lincoln 
be  kept  in  mind  in  connection  with  the  attitude  of 
Douglas  toward  him  and  his  policies,  and  toward 
the  question  of  preserving  the  Union.  Mr.  Lincoln 
merely  at  that  time  denied  the  right  of  States  to 


DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT  357 

secede  because  a  national  election  had  gone  against 
them. 

But  Mr.  Lincoln  was  wrong  in  saying  that  "Doug 
las  is  sure  to  be  again  trying  to  bring  in  his  '  popular 
sovereignty/  '  On  the  contrary,  he  very  promptly 
threw  it  overboard.  From  the  day  of  Lincoln's 
election  to  that  of  Douglas's  death  a  few  months 
later,  the  two  men  worked  together,  in  mutual  con 
fidence,  for  the  preservation  of  the  Union.  No  man 
ever  needed  the  support  of  the  men  who  had  voted 
against  him  more  than  did  the  first  Republican 
President.  This  support  was  loyally  and  ungrudg 
ingly  given  by  Douglas  and  his  followers.  Douglas, 
it  was  true,  had  much  wrong  to  undo,  for  he  had 
said  much  to  strengthen  the  Southern  people  in 
the  belief  that  the  election  of  a  Republican  would 
involve  an  attack  on  slavery  in  the  States  in  which 
it  existed.  He  had  said  in  January,  1860,  that  the 
John  Brown  raid  was  the  direct  result  of  Repub 
lican  teaching.  But  when  the  Union  was  in  danger 
he  rallied  to  the  support  of  the  administration  in 
the  constitutional  government.  When  Congress 
met  in  December,  1860,  South  Carolina  was  con 
sidering  in  convention  the  question  of  secession,  and 
trying  to  define  its  relations  "with  the  Northern 
States  and  the  government  of  the  United  States." 
And  on  December  20,  the  State  passed  an  ordinance 
of  secession,  though  the  South  was  still  in  control 
of  the  executive  department  of  the  government  and 


358  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

of  the  army  and  navy,  and  had  a  majority  in  the 
Senate.  There  were  still,  strange  as  it  now  seems, 
hopes  of  compromise.  Seward,  now  as  always  in 
curably  optimistic,  viewed  the  situation  with  much 
equanimity.  Douglas,  however,  was  not  deceived, 
but  even  he  clung  to  the  last  to  the  hope  of  saving 
the  Union  by  compromise.  In  his  message  Presi 
dent  Buchanan  said  that  "the  election  of  any  one 
of  our  fellow-citizens  to  the  office  of  President  does 
not  of  itself  afford  just  cause  for  dissolving  the 
Union,"  and  that  "in  order  to  justify  secession  as 
a  constitutional  remedy,  it  must  be  on  the  principle 
that  the  federal  government  is  a  mere  voluntary 
association  of  States,  to  be  dissolved  by  any  one 
of  the  contracting  parties."  "If  this  be  so,"  he  con 
tinued,  "the  confederacy  is  a  rope  of  sand,  to  be 
penetrated  and  dissolved  by  the  first  adverse  wave 
of  public  opinion."  The  federal  government  was, 
he  said,  "a  great  and  powerful  government,  in 
vested  with  all  the  attributes  of  sovereignty  over 
the  special  subjects  to  which  its  authority  ex 
tends.  Its  framers  never  intended  to  implant  in 
its  bosom  the  seeds  of  its  own  destruction,  nor  were 
they  at  its  creation  guilty  of  the  absurdity  of  pro 
viding  for  its  own  dissolution."  But  this  "great 
and  powerful  government"  was  not  great  and  power 
ful  enough  to  prevent  its  own  destruction — such 
was  the  argument  of  the  President.  He  found  au 
thority  for  enforcing  the  laws  and  protecting  federal 


DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT  359 

property,  but  none  for  "coercing"  a  State.  There 
were  many  men  in  the  North,  and  some  newspapers, 
that  preached  the  same  doctrine.  The  question 
was  new,  and  presented  in  startling  form,  and  it  is 
not  surprising  that  there  should  have  been  doubt 
and  hesitation.  One  Northern  paper  declared  that 
a  Union  held  together  by  force  was  neither  pos 
sible  nor  desirable.  Greeley  of  the  Tribune  held 
that  the  right  of  revolution,  which  the  President, 
and  indeed  every  one  else  admitted,  was  identical 
with  the  right  to  secede,  and  the  Tribune  declared 
that  "whenever  a  considerable  section  of  our  Union 
shall  deliberately  resolve  to  go  out  of  it  we  shall 
resist  all  coercive  measures  to  keep  it  in."  Yet  if 
there  is  a  right  to  start  a  revolution,  there  must 
be  a  right  to  suppress  it.  Such  language  as  this 
confirmed  the  South  in  its  conviction  that  peaceful 
secession  was  possible. 

In  the  light  of  Northern  sentiment,  there  seemed 
a  fair  chance  for  compromise,  and  to  this  work  Doug 
las  devoted  himself.  "Mr.  Lincoln,"  he  said,  "hav 
ing  been  elected,  must  be  inaugurated  in  obedience 
to  the  Constitution."  He  pleaded  for  a  laying  aside 
of  prejudice  and  bitterness,  and  asked  all  to  unite 
with  him  "in  a  common  effort  to  save  the  country 
from  the  disasters  which  threaten  it."  But  the 
Republicans  were  not  favorably  disposed  to  further 
compromises,  or  attempt  at  them,  while  Southern 
senators  boldly  proclaimed  the  purpose  of  their 


360  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

States  to  secede.  Douglas,  as  has  been  said,  did 
not  stand  on  his  doctrine  of  popular  sovereignty. 
On  the  contrary,  he  agreed  to  a  restoration  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise,  which  he  had  often  denounced 
as  unconstitutional,  and  which  the  Supreme  Court 
had  overthrown.  This  was  proposed  by  Senator 
Crittenden  of  Kentucky  in  a  series  of  resolutions 
which  were  referred  to  a  special  committee  of  thir 
teen.  Douglas  was  a  member  of  the  committee, 
and  voted  for  all  the  resolutions.  They  were  de 
feated  by  Republican  votes,  and  the  committee  was 
forced  to  admit  the  impossibility  of  its  agreeing. 
"No  adjustment,"  said  Douglas,  "will  restore  and 
preserve  the  peace  which  does  not  banish  the  slavery 
question  from  Congress  forever  and  place  it  beyond 
the  reach  of  federal  legislation.  Mr.  Crittenden's 
proposition  to  extend  the  Missouri  Compromise  line 
accomplishes  this  object,  and  hence  I  can  accept  it 
now  for  the  same  reasons  that  I  proposed  it  in  1848. 
I  prefer  our  own  plan  of  non-intervention  and  pop 
ular  sovereignty,  however."  Douglas  supported  the 
plan  to  submit  the  Crittenden  resolutions  to  a 
popular  referendum.  But  nothing  came  of  this 
proposition.  '  The  situation  in  no  way  resembled 
that  of  1850.  Douglas  was  no  longer  bound  even 
by  pride  of  opinion.  "I  have  no  hesitation  in 
saying,"  he  declared,  "to  senators  on  all  sides  of 
this  chamber,  that  I  am  prepared  to  act  on  this 
question  with  reference  to  the  present  exigencies 


DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT  361 

of  the  case,  as  if  I  had  never  given  a  vote,  or  uttered 
a  word,  or  had  an  opinion  upon  the  subject." 

Early  in  January  a  steamer  carrying  arms,  am 
munition  and  men  to  reinforce  the  garrison  at  Fort 
Sumter,  was  fired  on.  The  secession  of  Missis 
sippi  was  announced  on  the  same  day — January  9. 
Florida,  Georgia,  Alabama,  and  Texas  followed. 
Before  this,  Floyd,  Secretary  of  War;  Thompson, 
Secretary  of  the  Interior;  and  Cobb,  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  had  seceded  from  the  President's 
cabinet.  Cass  resigned  as  Secretary  of  State,  dis 
approving  of  the  administration's  policy  of  inaction. 
Attorney-General  Black  was  appointed  in  his  place, 
Edwin  M.  Stanton  becoming  attorney-general. 
Joseph  Holt  was  appointed  Secretary  of  War,  and 
John  A.  Dix,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury — all  Union 
men.  There  was  thus  a  total  change  in  the  atmos 
phere  of  the  White  House,  though  there  was  little 
change  in  the  policy.  January  21  the  senators  from 
the  seceding  States  withdrew  from  the  Senate.  But 
still  attempts  at  compromise  continued.  Shortly 
afterward  Kansas  was  admitted  as  a  free  State. 
A  peace  Congress  was  held,  attended  by  delegates 
from  fourteen  free  and  seven  slave  States.  It 
adopted  an  article  of  amendment  to  the  Constitu 
tion  embracing  seven  propositions,  very  similar 
to  those  contained  in  the  Crittenden  resolutions. 
When  this  article  was  presented  to  congress  it  was 
found  that  it  would  not  be  acceptable  to  the  dis- 


362  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

unionists.  Finally  Douglas  called  on  the  President 
elect  and  asked  him  in  his  inaugural  to  recommend 
the  calling  of  a  convention  to  amend  the  Constitu 
tion;  in  this  he  was  supported  by  Seward.  Lincoln 
asked  for  time  to  consider  the  suggestion.  A  few 
days  later  in  his  inaugural  address  he  said:  "I  can 
not  be  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  many  worthy  and 
patriotic  citizens  are  desirous  of  having  the  national 
Constitution  amended.  While  I  make  no  recom 
mendation  of  amendments,  I  fully  recognize  the 
rightful  authority  of  the  people  over  the  whole  sub 
ject,  to  be  exercised  in  either  of  the  modes  prescribed 
in  the  instrument  itself;  and  I  should,  under  exist 
ing  circumstances,  favor  rather  than  oppose  a  fair 
opportunity  being  afforded  the  people  to  act  upon 
it.  I  understand  a  proposed  amendment  to  the  Con 
stitution — which  amendment,  however,  I  have  not 
seen — has  passed  Congress,  to  the  effect  that  the 
federal  government  shall  never  interfere  with  the 
domestic  institutions  of  the  States,  including  that 
of  persons  held  to  service.  To  avoid  misconstruc 
tion  of  what  I  have  said,  I  depart  from  my  purpose 
not  to  speak  of  particular  amendments  so  far  as  to 
say  that,  holding  such  a  provision  to  now  be  implied 
constitutional  law,  I  have  no  objection  to  its  being 
made  express  and  irrevocable."  Such  an  amend 
ment  had  been  indeed  passed  by  Congress,  only 
such  men  as  Sumner  and  Wade  voting  against  it. 
It  is  known  that  Lincoln  changed  his  original  policy, 


DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT  363 

which  was  hostile  to  a  constitutional  amendment. 
Douglas  warmly  praised  the  inaugural,  saying  that 
it  was  "an  emanation  from  the  brain  and  heart  of 
a  patriot."  Mr.  Lincoln,  he  said,  has  "sunk  the 
partisan  in  the  patriot."  All  the  way,  clear  through 
to  the  fateful  hour — and  after  it  had  struck — the 
Illinois  senator  stood  by  the  Illinois  President.  He 
took  great  pains  to  show  his  friendship  in  every 
possible  way.  Two  days  after  the  inauguration 
President  Lincoln  sent  for  him  and  praised  the  speech 
delivered  by  him  on  March  6,  saying  that  he  was 
in  entire  agreement  with  it.  Douglas  and  his  family 
were  on  the  most  friendly  social  terms  with  the 
White  House  family,  and  he  occupied  a  front  seat 
at  the  inauguration  ceremonies.  Lincoln  seems 
to  have  trusted  him  and  relied  on  him  in  the  great 
crisis.  In  his  effort  to  get  an  interpretation  of  the 
President's  inaugural  address  by  Republican  sena 
tors,  the  Illinois  senator,  toward  the  close  of  the 
session,  made  a  speech  that  had  a  strong  partisan 
ring,  suggesting  as  it  does  that  his  purpose  was  to 
make  trouble  between  the  President  and  his  party. 
But  it  is  to  be  remembered  in  his  favor  that  he  was 
as  opposed  as  he  ever  had  been  to  those  whom  he 
called  the  "irreconcilables,"  and  that  he  might 
legitimately  wish  to  know  whether  they  would  sup 
port  a  President  of  their  own  party  who  had  just 
delivered  what  Douglas  spoke  of  as  "a  peace-offer 
ing  rather  than  a  war  message."  Finally  the  Presi- 


364  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

dent  decided  to  send  supplies  to  the  Fort  Sumter 
garrison,  and  on  April  12  the  fort  was  fired  on.  The 
days  of  compromise  were  over.  The  South  had 
chosen  war,  and  war  it  was  to  be.  There  is  little 
more  to  be  told.  The  need  for  the  support  of  Doug 
las  and  his  followers  was  greater  than  ever.  This 
was  realized  by  the  administration.  There  was  no 
assurance  at  the  outset  that  the  North  would  be 
united  in  support  of  war,  whatever  it  might  think 
about  slavery.  Not  long  before  prominent  Re 
publicans  had  favored  the  policy  of  allowing  the 
seceding  States  to  depart  in  peace.  No  one  could 
tell  what  had  been  the  effect  of  their  speaking 
and  writing  on  the  people.  That  its  effect  in  the 
South  had  been  deplorable  all  agree.  Indeed  the 
South  had  been  taught  for  years  to  believe  that 
whatever  it  demanded  it  would  receive,  and  that 
there  were  no  limits  to  the  concessions  of  the  North. 
On  the  other  hand,  Northerners  had  been  trained 
in  the  school  of  compromise.  The  old  Whig  spirit 
was  by  no  means  dead.  Douglas,  therefore,  was  a 
great  asset.  Though  the  firing  on  Sumter  had  very 
largely  united  the  North,  as  events  made  clear, 
Mr.  Lincoln  could  not  be  sure  how  the  people  would 
receive  his  call  for  volunteers,  which  of  course  would 
mean  war.  On  the  evening  of  the  day  that  the  news 
of  the  firing  on  Sumter  reached  Washington,  George 
Ashmun  of  Massachusetts  arranged  for  an  inter 
view  between  the  President  and  Douglas.  The 


DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT  365 

story  is  well  told  by  Samuel  Bowles  in  an  obituary 
notice  of  Ashmun  printed  in  Bowles's  paper  on  the 
death  of  Ashmun  in  1870:  "By  being  master  of 
himself  and  superior  to  the  reasons  which  influenced 
his  own  mind,  it  was  that  he  became  capable  of 
giving  the  reasons  which  should  influence  the  minds 
of  others.  His  career  in  public  life  is  full  of  strik 
ing  illustrations  of  this  great  power  of  his.  Probably 
the  most  notable  was  the  result  of  his  interview  with 
Stephen  A.  Douglas;  directly  after  the  rebels  fired 
on  Fort  Sumter,  and  the  rebellion  was  fully  launched 
upon  the  land.  Such  were  his  appeals,  such  the 
force  of  the  arguments  he  addressed  to  Douglas, 
that  the  great  Illinoisian  rose  up  superior  to  par 
tisanship,  and  took  his  stand  with  his  country. 
'Now/  said  Mr.  Ashmun,  although  it  was  very 
late  in  the  night,  'let  us  go  up  to  the  White  House 
and  talk  with  Mr.  Lincoln.  I  want  you  to  say  to 
him  what  you  have  said  to  me,  and  then  I  want 
the  result  of  this  night's  deliberations  to  be  tele 
graphed  to  the  country.'  That  interview  at  the 
White  House  between  these  three  men — Lincoln, 
Douglas,  and  Ashmun — should  be  historical.  Then 
and  there  Mr.  Douglas  took  down  the  map  and 
planned  the  campaign.  Then  and  there  he  gave 
in,  most  eloquently  and  vehemently,  his  adhesion 
to  the  administration  and  the  country.  Mr.  Ash 
mun  himself  briefly  epitomized  the  story,  and  it 
went  by  telegraph  that  night  all  over  the  country, 


366  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

to  electrify  and  encourage  every  patriot  on  the  mor 
row."  The  President  submitted  his  call  for  volun 
teers,  and  Douglas  said  that  he  concurred  in  every 
word,  though  he  would  make  the  call  for  two  hun 
dred  thousand  rather  than  seventy-five  thousand 
men.  "You  do  not  know,"  he  added,  "the  dis 
honest  purposes  of  those  men  as  well  as  I  do."  The 
epitome  of  the  interview,  penned  by  Douglas,  fol 
lows:  "Senator  Douglas  called  upon  the  President, 
and  had  an  interesting  conversation  on  the  present 
condition  of  the  country.  The  substance  of  it  was, 
on  the  part  of  Mr.  Douglas,  that  while  he  was  un 
alterably  opposed  to  the  administration  in  all  polit 
ical  issues,  he  was  prepared  to  fully  sustain  the  Presi 
dent  in  the  exercise  of  all  his  constitutional  functions, 
to  preserve  the  Union,  maintain  the  government, 
and  defend  the  federal  capital.  A  firm  policy  and 
prompt  action  was  necessary.  The  capital  was  in 
danger,  and  must  be  defended  at  all  hazards,  and 
at  any  expense  of  men  and  money.  He  spoke  of 
the  present  and  future  without  any  reference  to 
the  past."  Speech  after  speech  he  made  in  support 
of  the  government — and  the  administration.  Men 
in  those  days  were  not  so  careful  to  discriminate 
between  the  two.  Douglas  knew  what  terrible  bur 
dens  the  President  was  carrying,  and  he  conceived 
it  to  be  his  duty  to  do  everything  he  could  to  lighten 
them.  "We  must  fight  for  our  country,"  he  said, 
"and  forget  all  differences.  There  can  be  but  two 


DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT  367 

parties — the  party  of  patriots  and  the  party  of  trait 
ors.  We  belong  to  the  first."  Wherever  he  went 
he  delivered  the  same  message.  Speaking  to  the 
people  of  West  Virginia — still  a  part  of  old  Virginia 
— he  showed  the  folly  and  madness  of  secession. 
In  his  own  State,  and  especially  in  that  part  of  it 
most  likely  to  be  tainted  with  disunion  sentiment, 
he  presented  the  issue  squarely,  and  with  the  greatest 
eloquence.  At  Springfield,  the  home  of  Lincoln, 
and  once  his  home,  he  said:  "When  hostile  armies 
are  marching  under  new  and  odious  banners  against 
the  government  of  our  country,  the  shortest  way 
to  peace  is  the  most  stupendous  and  unanimous 
preparation  for  war.  ...  If  a  war  does  come,  it  is 
a  war  of  self-defense  on  our  part.  It  is  a  war  in 
defense  of  the  government  which  we  have  inherited 
as  a  priceless  legacy  from  our  patriotic  fathers,  in 
defense  of  those  great  rights  of  freedom  of  trade, 
commerce,  transit  and  intercourse  from  the  centre 
to  the  circumference  of  our  great  continent.  .  .  . 
I  believe  in  my  conscience  that  it  is  a  duty  we  owe 
to  ourselves  and  to  our  children,  and  to  our  God, 
to  protect  this  government  and  that  flag  from  every 
assailant,  be  he  who  he  may."  He  appealed  for 
an  impartial  verdict,  and  said  that  if  he  had  in  the 
past  leaned  too  far  to  the  South  as  against  the  North, 
he  had  at  least  "never  pandered  to  the  prejudice 
and  passion  of  my  section  against  the  minority  sec 
tion  of  the  Union."  Rather  he  had  braved  the 


368  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

fiercest  opposition  and  the  most  savage  denuncia 
tion  because  of  the  tenderness  he  was  supposed  to 
have  shown  to  the  South  in  his  Kansas-Nebraska 
legislation.  His  whole  record  served  to  reinforce 
powerfully  every  plea  he  made  for  the  Union  and 
for  resistance  to  rebellion.  In  a  sense  he  was  speak 
ing  against  what  many  people  believed  had  been 
his  own  side,  and  that  gave  his  words  added  weight. 
His  manifest  sincerity,  deep  feeling,  and  tremendous 
earnestness  carried  conviction  to  all  his  hearers. 
He  rendered  a  great  service,  as  did  the  hosts  of 
Douglas  Democrats  who  stood  by  the  Union,  and 
thronged  into  the  Union's  armies. 

Douglas's  campaign  closed  at  Chicago  with  a 
great  meeting  attended  by  men  of  all  parties.  When 
he  had  returned  to  his  home  city  after  the  passage 
of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  act  he  was  met  by  an  in 
furiated  people,  and  was  not  allowed  to  speak.  After 
his  break  with  the  administration  over  the  Lecomp- 
ton  question  he  was  received  there  with  the  greatest 
enthusiasm.  Now  he  was  to  have  his  last  triumph. 
The  scene  was  the  Wigwam,  in  which  Lincoln  had 
been  nominated  a  year  before.  Facing  an  audience 
bound  together  by  the  felt  tie  of  a  common  citizen 
ship,  every  member  of  which  he  must  have  known 
to  be  his  friend,  Douglas  could  not  but  have  been 
conscious  of  an  inspiration  such  as  he  had  never 
known  before.  He  stood  before  the  throng,  not  as 
a  partisan  or  a  party  leader,  not  as  the  champion 


DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT  369 

of  any  political  policy,  but  as  a  citizen  and  patriot. 
"The  present  secession  movement,"  he  said,  "is 
the  result  of  an  enormous  conspiracy  formed  more 
than  a  year  since.  .  .  .  The  conspiracy  is  now 
known.  Armies  have  been  raised,  war  is  levied 
to  accomplish  it.  There  are  only  two  sides  to  the 
question.  Every  man  must  be  for  the  United  States 
or  against  it.  There  can  be  no  neutrals  in  this  war; 
only  patriots — or  trait ors."  His  work  was  done, 
and  the  end  crowned  it.  On  June  3  he  died,  literally 
worn  out.  Almost  his  last  words  were  words  of 
encouragement  to  the  President. 

Of  the  private  life  of  a  man  who  was  so  entirely 
absorbed  in  public  affairs  there  is  little  to  be  said. 
Mr.  Douglas  was  twice  married.  His  first  wife,  Miss 
Martha  Denny  Martin,  died  in  1853,  leaving  two 
sons  and  a  daughter,  the  latter  dying  in  infancy. 
She  is  said  to  have  been  endowed  with  beauty,  in 
telligence,  and  charm  of  manner.  In  November, 
1856,  Mr.  Douglas  married  Miss  Adele  Cutts,  the 
daughter  of  an  old  Maryland  house,  and  a  great 
niece  of  Dolly  Madison.  That  she  was  a  woman  of 
rare  beauty  and  culture  all  agree.  In  both  marriages 
Douglas  found  happiness  in  full  measure.  There  were 
two  daughters  by  the  second  marriage.  Outside  of 
his  home  Douglas  had  little  interest  in  anything 
but  politics.  As  has  been  shown,  he  knew  little 
of  any  history  except  that  of  his  own  country.  If 


370  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

he  had  any  fondness  for  literature,  or  taste  for  it, 
his  speeches  do  not  show  it.  They  are  free,  not  only 
of  quotations,  but  of  literary  allusiveness.  ft  is 
indeed  said  that  he  read  hardly  anything  but  law 
and  politics.  And  politics,  not  law,  was  his  mis 
tress.  Douglas  is  said  never  to  have  quoted  a  line 
of  poetry.  There  is  in  his  speeches  slight  evidence — 
which  is  so  strong  in  the  speeches  of  Lincoln — of  any 
great  familiarity  even  with  the  Bible.  He  belonged 
to  no  church,  though  he  had  many  of  the  virtues 
which  are  regarded  as  the  fruit  of  religion — kind 
ness,  charity,  honesty,  and  love  of  his  fellowman. 
In  him  religious  intolerance  always  met  a  deter 
mined  foe.  As  hi$  life  was  public,  so  it  was  mostly 
on  the  outside.  He  had  little  tiftie,  in  the  midst 
of  his  stormy  career  which  closed  in  his  forty-ninth 
year,  for  meditation,  and  probably  no  predisposi 
tion  that  way.  There  was  no  trace  of  mysticism 
in  his  character.  But  he  was  a  brave  and  true  man, 
devoted  to  his  friends,  faithful  to  his  duty  as  he 
saw  it,  generous  far  beyond  his  means,  and  endowed 
with  a  remarkable  capacity  to  inspire  affection  in 
his  friends  and  followers. 

Was  he  a  statesman?  The  question  is  important, 
since  it  is  as  a  public  man  that  he  must  be  judged. 
Yet  there  are  few  questions  that  are  more  difficult 
to  answer,  so  thin,  often,  is  the  line  that  divides 
the  politician  from  the  statesman.  Douglas  was 
certainly  a  great  political  leader— one  of  the  greatest 


-DOUGLAS  THE  PATRIOT  371 

ibhat  the  country  has  known.  He  was  almost  unin 
terruptedly  successful,  and  the  winner  of  several 
battles  that  seemed  hopelessly  lost  when  he  entered 
them.  He  wielded  great  influence  in  Congress,  even 
in  a  Congress  that  numbered  on  its  rolls  such  men 
as*  Webster,  Clay,  and  Calhoun.  Almost  from  the 
beginning  of  his  Washington  career  he  played  a 
leading  part.  In  debate  few  men  of  his  time  ex 
celled  him.  His  mind  was  powerful,  and  his  will 
imperious.  Perhaps  it  may  be  said  fairly  that  he 
had  many  of  the  elements  of  greatness,  without 
being  a  great  man.  He  was  limited  by  his  inability 
to  view  politics  from  the  moral  angle.  His  personal 
integrity  no  one  ever  questioned.  His  political 
morality  was  up  to  the  level  of  the  time — and  often 
higher.  But  his  weakness  seems  to  have  been  in 
regarding  politics  as  a  game,  rather  than  a  conflict 
of  ideas.  It  has  been  said  that  a  statesman  some 
times  thinks  of  the  next  generation,  while  a  politician 
always  thinks  of  the  next  election.  Douglas  was 
always  much  concerned  over  the  next  election.  But 
nevertheless  he  rendered  important  service  to  the 
republic.  Up  to  1854,  his  attitude  on  the  slavery 
question  was  that  of  Clay  and  Webster — that  is, 
it  was  the  same  as  to  the  remedy  to  be  applied. 
From  1858,  after  his  break  with  President  Buchanan, 
he  gradually  rose  to  the  Lincoln  platform,  and  fin 
ished  as  a  warm  supporter  of  the  Republican  presi 
dent.  He  failed  in  the  Kansas-Nebraska  crisis. 


372  STEPHEN  A.  DOUGLAS 

Even  his  action  here  has  been  explained  by  Lamon, 
Lincoln's  friend  and  biographer,  as  designed  to  aid 
the  Republicans  in  destroying  the  Democratic  party. 
But  this  does  not  help  matters  much.  The  Lincoln- 
Douglas  debate  was  not  a  mere  sham  battle.  Doug 
las  was  a  lover  of  the  Union,  and  a  patriot.  Though 
he  made  mistakes  they  are  forgiven  because  he 
"  loved  much." 


INDEX 


Adams,  Charles  Francis,  166 
Adams,  John  Quincy,  33,  36,  49  /., 

246 

Antislavery  Convention,  70 
Ashmun,  George,  364 
Atchison,  Senator,  139,  198  /. 

Banks,  Nathaniel  P.,  234 

Bates,  Edward,  6 

Battle  of  Buena  Vista,  54 

Bell,  John,  66,  106,  140,  297,  351  /. 

Benjamin,  Judah  P.,  269,  324  /. 

Benton,  Senator,  34,  38,  44  /.,  48, 

51,  55,  60,  74,  113,  149,  208,  211 
Birney,  James  G.,  41 
Black,  Jeremiah  P.,  264,  337,  361 
Bowles,  Samuel,  98,  365 
Breckinridge,   John   C.,   253,   316, 

351 /. 

Breese,  Sidney,  25,  28 
Bright,  Senator,  62,  139 
Brooks,  Preston,  244  /. 
Brown,  John,  246 /.,  338 /.,  342,  349, 

357 

Brown,  Senator,  195,  332 
Browning,  Orville  H.,  29 
Bryant,  William  Cullen,  256 
Buchanan,    John,    159,    178,    187, 

252  /.,  261  /.,  273  /.,  276,  279  /., 

286,   288  /.,  310,  322,  331,  340, 

342,  358 

Bulwer,  Sir  Henry  Lytton,  139 
Burke,  Edmund,  99 
Burlingame,  Anson,  245 
Burns  Case,  221  /. 
Butler,  Senator,  62,  244 

Calhoun,  John,  265,  279 

Calhoun,  John  C.,  38,  41,  46,  52,  66, 
69,  73  /.,  81,  92,  95,  98,  101,  186 

California,  56;  conquest  of,  62; 
question  of  slavery  in,  86  /. ;  con 
stitution  of,  87;  slavery  prohib 
ited  in,  89  /.,  110 

Cass,  Lewis,  66,  69  /.,  72,  106,  154, 
156 /.,  253,  264,  361 

Chase,  Salmon  P.,  98, 100,  149, 166, 
168,  196,  250,  329 

Choate,  Rufus,  254,  257 


Clay,  Henry,  32  /.,  37,  41,  60,  61, 
65/.,  68/.,  81,  88,  90 /.,  93,  96/.. 
100 /.,  103 /.,  108 /.,  119 /.,  122 /., 
123,  131,  140,  142,  145  /.,  157, 
162,  167,  307 
Clayton-Bui wer  Treaty,  138  /.,  172 

/.,  181 
Clayton,  Secretary  of  State,  139  /., 

140,  173,  177 
Clingman,  Senator,  354 
Cobb,  Howell,  88,  265,  361 
Collamer,  Senator,  85,  242,  244 
Committee  on  Compromise,  106 
Committee  on  Territories,  62/.,  191 
Compromise   of   1850,    90,    104  /., 
119  /.,  123  /.,  131  /.,  141,  145  /., 
150  /.,  161,  163,  168,  186,  192  /. 
Crittenden,  Senator,  66,  297  /.,  360 
Cuba,  172,  330  /. 
Curtis,  George  William,  256 
Curtis,  Justice,  268  /. 
Cushing,  Caleb,  184,  347,  350 
Cutts,  Adele,  369  f 

Davis,  Jefferson,  66,  76,  96,  102, 
107,  114 /.,  117 /.,  120,  131,  149, 
154,  184  /.,  194,  237,  329,  331  /., 
337  /.,  346,  349 

Dayton,  William  L.,  250 

Democratic  Review,  157 

Dix,  J.  A.,  361 

Dixon,  192  /.,  208 

Douglas,  Dr.  Stephen  A.,  3 

Douglas,  Stephen  A.,  birth,  2;  child 
hood,  3;  education,  4/.;  migration 
to  Illinois,  6;  schoolteacher,  9; 
success  as  debater,  10  /. ;  admitted 
to  bar,  10;  state  attorney,  12; 
elected  to  legislature,  15  /.;  and 
panic  of  1837,  19  /.;  candidate  for 
House  of  Representatives,  22;  as 
counsel  in  McClernand  Case,  23; 
and  campaign  of  1840, 25 ;  Lincoln- 
Walker-Douglas  debate,  25;  as 
judge,  27  /. ;  elected  to  House  of 
Representatives,  29 /.;  first  speech 
ia  Congress,  35  /.;  and  internal 
improvements,  40;  re-elected,  41; 
and  annexation  of  Texas,  45;  and 


373 


374 


INDEX 


Oregon  question,  48  /. ;  and  Mex 
ican  War,  48  /.;  re-elected,  58; 
Chairman  of  Committee  on  Ter 
ritories,  60;  marriage,  63;  pro 
moted  to  Senate,  66;  and  "squat 
ter  sovereignty,"  80/.;  and  "Om 
nibus  BUI,"  111;  and  Compro 
mise  of  1850,  115  /.;  and  fugitive- 
slave  law,  125  /.;  and  Illinois  Cen 
tral  Railroad,  132;  as  a  Presiden 
tial  possibility,  147 /. ;  and  election 
of  1852,  166  /.;  and  Kansas-Ne 
braska  bill,  167/. ;  re-elected  to  Sen 
ate,  171;  in  Europe,  177  /.;  and 
"  Popular  Sovereignty,"  191/. ;  and 
repeal  of  Missouri  Compromise, 
198  /.;  -Lincoln  debates,  215  /.; 
and  Know-Nothing  Party,  224; 
and  war  in  Kansas,  226  /.;  and 
Dred  Scott  Decision,  266;  deser 
tion  of  Buchanan,  281  /.;  -Lin 
coln  debates,  301/. ;  and  "  Doctrine 
of  Non-Intervention,"  332 /.;  and 
Democratic  Convention  of  1860, 
352  /.;  against  secession,  359  /.; 
reconciliation  with  Lincoln,  363  /. ; 
campaign  in  support  of  Lincoln, 
367  /.;  triumph  in  Chicago,  368; 
death,  369;  family  life,  369;  as 
politician  and  statesman,  371  /. 
Dred  Scott  Decision,  266  /.;  271, 
273,  276,  303,  310  /.,  316,  323  /. 

English,  William  H.,  297 
Emerson,  Ralph  Waldo,  55  /.,  255 
Election,  of  1840,  41 ;  of  1844,  69/.; 

of  1852,  156  /.;  of  1856,  249  /.;  of 

1860,  349  /. 
Everett,  Edward,  177,  201,  351 

Fessenden,  Senator,  342  /. 
Fillmore,  MUlard,  83,  87,  109,  140, 

162  /.,  254 
Fisk,  Sarah,  3 
Fitzpatrick,  Senator,  350 
Floyd,  John  B.,  265,  361 
Foote,  Senator,  106,  140,  149  /. 
Fort  Sumter,  361,  364 
Free-Soil  Party,  78/.,  81,  100, 165 /. 
Fremont,  John  C.,  88,  250,  254  /. 
Fugitive  Slave  Law,  90, 97, 101,  111, 

118,  120  /.,  124  /.,  129  /.,  141  /.. 

147  /.,  152,  231,  309 

Garrison,  William  Lloyd,  76  /.,  100, 

143 /. 

Geary,  J-  W.,  261  /.,  265,  273 
Giddings,  Joshua,  88,  142,  166,  168 


Great  Britain;  and  Oregon  Case, 
46  /.,  52;  and  emancipation  of 
slaves,  94;  138;  and  Nicaragua 
affair,  173  /. 

Greeley,  Horace,  166,  359 

Gwin,  William,  88 

Hale,   John  P.,  41,  70,   140,   149, 

165  /.,  168 

Hardin,  John  J.,  12  /.,  17 
Harrison,  William  Henry,  17,  26,  31 
Higginson,     Thomas     Wentworth, 

144,  222 

Hill,  Frederick  Trevor,  324 
Holt,  J.,  361 

Illinois  State  Bank  Case,  19 
Irving,  Washington,  256 

Jackson,  Andrew,  5,  9,  36/.,  65,  221 
Johnson,  Prof.  Allen,  36,  62 
Johnson,  Herschel,  351 
Jones,  John,  31 

Kansas-Nebraska  Bill,  105,  167, 
190,  194  /.,  200,  203,  207,  211  /., 
216  /.,  221,  223,  225  /.,  235  /., 
244,  252,  254,  280  /.,  289,  292, 
312,  338 

King,  Rufus,  246 

King,  William  K.,  159,  173 

Know-Nothing  Party,  214, 220, 224, 
234,  253 

Lecompton  Constitution,  274  /., 
277  /.,  281,  284  /.,  287  /.,  290  /., 
293  /.,  297  /.,  314  /.,  321  /. 

Liberty  Party,  41,  70,  79 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  1,  5,  20,  25,  52/., 
60  /.,  94  /.,  207,  215  /.,  250,  268, 
271  /.,  301  /.,  329,  337,  341,  344, 
349  /.,  354  /.,  362  /. 

Longfellow,  Henry  W.,  255 

Lothrop,  Thornton  Kirkland,  102 

Lowell,  James  K.,  43 

McClernand  Case,  23 

Mangum,  W.  P.,  31,  106,  140 

Mann,  Horace,  89 

Marcy,  William  L.,  159,  184 

Martin,  Col.,  64 

Martin,  Martha,  63 

Mason,  Senator,  106,  331 

Merriam,  George  S.,  98 

Mexico,  war  with,  35,  42, 44/.,  55/., 

62;  peace  with,  71;  73 
Missouri    Compromise,    32  /.,    45, 

71  /.,   79,  80,  92,  96,   114,   124, 


INDEX 


375 


189  /..  192  /.,  196  /.,  211,  215,  223, 
234,  238,  252.  283  /.,  360 

New  England  Emigrant  Aid  Com 
pany,  226,  228,  232,  241  /.,  244, 
246 

New  Mexico,  56,  71;  conquest  of, 
86  /.;  question  of  slavery  in,  86, 
90  /.,  93,  97;  110 

New  York  Times,  214 

New  York  Tribune,  359 

Omnibus  Bill,  107,  111/.,  118 /. 
Oregon,   admission   to   Union,   38; 

boundary    question,    47    /.,    58; 

question  of  slavery  in,  71  /. 
Ostend  Manifesto,  331 

Parker,  Theodore,  1,  76,  144,  222 
Phelps,  Senator,  106 
Phillips,  Wendell,  76,  144,  222 
Pierce,  Franklin,  159  /.,  163,  166, 

170,   179,   181  /.,  205,  228,  230, 

234  /.,  252  /.,  262 
Polk,  James  K.,  41,  45/.,  52,  55,  58, 

65,  75,  185,  266 
Pugh,  Senator,  297  /.,  348  /. 

Reeder,  Andrew  H.,  228 /.,  247,  261, 

273 
Rhodes,  James  Ford,  55  /.,  73,  99, 

133,  183,  204,  220,  229 
Richardson,  233,  257 
Richmond  Enquirer,  222 
Richmond  Whig,  211 
Robinson,  Charles,  231 
Roosevelt,  Theodore,  76 

Schurz,  Carl,  32,  58,  104 

Scott,  Winfleld,  60,  62,  162 /.,  165 /. 

Seward,  William,  76,  87,  98,  100  /., 
112,  125,  140,  149,  164  /.,  177, 
187,  198,  200,  246,  250,  286  /., 
307,  328  /.,  347,  358,  362 

Shadrach  Case,  142 /.,  145 

Shawnee  Mission,  230 /. 

Shields,  Senator  James,  23,  140, 
215 /. 

Sheahan,  James  W.,  4,  177 

Sims  Case,  144 

Slave  Trade,  in  District  of  Colum 
bia,  118;  334 /. 

Slidell,  John,  252,  316,  331 

Smith,  Gerrit,  148 

Smith,  William  Henry,  185  /.,  188, 


Southern  Rights  Association,  148 
Spain,  35,  48,  172,  330 /. 
Springfield  Republican,  97  /.,  211 
"Squatter  Sovereignty,"  72 /.,  80 /. 
Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  361 
Stanton,  Frederick  P.,  273,  277,  287 
Stephens,  Alexander,  89,  107,  165, 

356 

Stowe,  Harriet  Beecher,  243 
Sumner,  Charles,  149,  168  /.,  201, 

218,  242,  244  /.,  362 

Taney,  Chief  Justice,  266,  270  /. 
Taylor,  Zachary,  47,  60,  67  /.,  75, 

83/.,  106 /.,  112,  139 
Texas,  ceded  to  Spain,  35;  question 

of  annexation  of,  38,  41  /.,  44  /., 

67 

Thayer,  Eli,  227 
Thompson,  Jacob,  265,  361 
Tod,  David,  350 
Toombs,  Robert,  89,  107,  165,  254, 

332 

Topeka  Constitution,  231  /. 
Toucey,  Isaac,  264  /. 
Trumbull,  Lyman,  215 /.,  219 /. 
Tyler,  John,  26,  31,  45  /.,  52 

Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,  339 

Van  Buren,  John,  205 
Van  Buren,  Martin,  17,  19  f.,  26, 
38,  41,  65,  69/.,  78 

Wade,    Benjamin,    149,    166,    168, 

187,  332,  362 
Walker,  Cyrus,  25 
Walker,  Robert  J.,  266,  273  /.,  281, 

287 

Washington,  George,  83 
Webster,  Daniel,  1,  33,  52,  60,  66, 

69,  74  /.,  81,  91  /.,  97  /.,  103  /., 

106,   109,    122  /.,  131,   140,   157. 

162  /.,  167  /. 

Whitman,  Walt,  8  /.,  258,  293 
Wilmot  Proviso,  61  /.,  70  /.,  74  /., 

79,  88,  97,  107,  112/.,  122,  134 /. 
Wilson,  Henry,  144,  166 
Wilson,  Woodrow,  250 
Winthrop,  Robert  C.,  88 
Wise,  Governor,  290 
Wyatt,  John,  12  /. 

Yancey,  W.  L.,  347  /. 
Young,  Brigham,  337 


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